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Abstract 
 
A recent development in the field of microfinance has been the promotion of a specific model 
of savings groups intended to create a basic and sustainable system of financial intermediation 
by training members to operate using a lockable box, passbooks and rules regarding their 
operations.  The model seeks institutional change through the implementation of this set of 
rules and procedures to achieve transparent and accountable operations.  However, 
institutional change is not a straightforward process and how effective institutional change 
occurs has also become an increasing concern of the development literature.   
This thesis therefore examines how effective and sustainable the institutionalisation of these 
rules in Savings Groups has been in Kenya, using recent theories for analysing institutional 
change.  The focus is on understanding and explaining the variation in how the 
institutionalisation of new rules in such groups actually takes place.  The evidence reveals a high 
degree of variation in how the rules were practiced, in the sustainability of the groups and the 
institutionalisation of the rules.  The analysis examines the role of social relations and political 
power among group members and between groups and trainers in the outcomes produced.  
The theories employed all identified important but different dimensions of the institutional 
change process, in particular the necessity of having certain types of rules (Ostrom, 1990); the 
role of those with political veto power (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010); and the importance of 
culture and its relationship to external intervention (Boettke et al. 2008). The thesis argues that 
the insights of these theories need to be more systematically brought together by paying 
greater attention to the role of social and power relations, social norms and culture as well as 
how external intervention influences dynamics of institutionalisation.  It concludes that savings 
group interventions which offer a “cookie cutter” approach to institutionalising rules are 
unlikely to produce sustainable results across a range of socio-cultural and political contexts.   
   11 
 
 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The promotion of savings groups (SGs) is a recent development in the field of microfinance.  
This has arisen, especially in Africa, because the success of microfinance organisations (MFOs) in 
providing services has on the whole been rather limited. In this context, the take-up of MFO 
services is by just a few percent of the population and the challenges of reaching remoter rural 
areas and poorer clients remains significant (Beck et al. 2011). These challenges have generated 
new interest to find models of financial service delivery that can offer basic services at lower 
cost for both providers and users than the MFO model. One of these models is the savings 
group approach.  Savings groups are user-owned because members provide the capital for the 
group through their own savings and they are also managed by the members. User ownership 
and user management makes running savings groups cheaper for both the interveners and for 
the groups themselves. The methodology suggests that the providers bear only the cost of an 
initial training phase and supervision for a period of one year.   The costs for the members are 
also much lower than for microfinance groups since the group leaders usually volunteer their 
time.  
The purpose of the savings group methodology is to provide a basic savings and loan service by 
creating a simple and transparent approach to operating a group fund which can be sustained 
over the long term.  It is essentially an accumulating savings and credit association - an ASCA – 
which has a set of rules that are seen as simple to follow and which regularly terminates, that is, 
there is a clear point at which all the funds of the group are divided out.  This termination point 
not only gives members access to a lump-sum of their savings but in particular aids 
transparency and accountability by providing a point at which all the funds have to be 
accounted for.   This contrasts, for example, with savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and 
ASCAs that do not terminate.  In these cases there is greater scope for misappropriation and 
poor repayment to persist over time leading to poor financial performance and the potential 
loss of savings though the risks of poor governance and exploitation by unscrupulous 
leaders  (Balkenhol 1999).  Underpinning the SG rationale, therefore, is a perspective that 
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accountability and transparency will lead to the formation of more robust groups that have a 
longer lifespan with improved security for poor peoples’ savings.  
However, the NGOs promoting this savings group methodology usually operate in areas where 
informal financial groups such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or 
accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs) already exist.  Hence, from an institutional 
perspective the attempt to increase the transparency and accountability through the 
introduction of SGs can be seen as being driven by the intent to change the existing rules and 
institutionalise new ones.  This process of introducing a new methodology in the form of a set of 
rules that is expected to be sustained over the long term is however not straightforward.  
Indeed, Dore notes in relation to his study of co-operatives in the 1970s that institutionalising 
new rules is essentially about  “institutionalising suspicion” and is not easy  (Dore 1988, 58; here 
Johnson and Sharma 2007).  He argues that for it to happen successfully there needs to be a 
balance between the mutual trust that enables such groups to come together in ‘traditional’ 
societies and the mutual suspicion which the rules seek to develop through their application of 
“rational accounting methods”, but this “trick is an immensely difficult one” (Dore 1988, 58).   
The focus of this research is therefore to examine how the savings group (SG) methodology is 
working in practice.  In particular to examine how SGs are being adopted and used and to 
investigate the process of institutional change that they are seeking to bring about.  The 
research does this by employing recent approaches to the analysis of institutional change.  A 
phase of development of rational choice institutionalist theory such as that of North (1990; 
North 2005) has been criticised but also further developed.  Recently historical institutionalist 
analysis has undergone new development such as through an attempt to understand the 
dynamics of more gradual institutional change by Mahoney and Thelen (2010); while Boettke, 
Coyne and Leeson (2008) have also made a contribution.  I will draw on these to investigate the 
degree to which each can explain the adoption and use of SGs from an institutional perspective 
also deploying the more specific analysis of collective action arenas presented by 
Ostrom  (Ostrom 1990, 2005). 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  In section 2, the context of financial sector development 
policy, the informal financial sector, the SG intervention and a brief overview of the literature 
on ROSCAs and ASCAs is presented in order to give the background to the research question.  In 
section 3, developments in institutional theory as the theoretical context of the research are 
laid out.  Section 4 then outlines the objectives of the study, and section 5 provides an outline of 
the study. 
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1.2. Policy context  
1.2.1. Financial sector development and the informal sector 
 
There is a broad consensus that the robustness of the financial sector is one of the leading 
contributors to economic growth  (Levine 2005). It promotes economic growth through 
mobilising and pooling resources and then allocating them based on risk and return assessment 
and enabling higher risk to be taken but also higher return investments to be made.  The 
financial sector further provides risk-reduction and risk-pooling products  (Honohan 2007).  
Over the past decade at least, discussions have focused on the relationship between financial 
sector development and poverty reduction  (Beck et al. 2007; Lawrence 2006; Green et al. 
2006). Even though there is currently rather little evidence that this sector can have a direct 
impact on poverty reduction, Demirguc-Kunt et al.  demonstrates with empirical evidence that 
“improved access to finance is not only pro-growth but also pro-poor, reducing income 
inequality and poverty” (World Bank 2008, 17). 
Even though there is a broad agreement on the importance of the financial sector for economic 
growth and development, access to financial services is still limited in Africa.  In Kenya, only 
29.2% of the population have savings accounts in banks and building societies and only 3.6% 
have a loan from a bank  (FinAccess 2013). For a long time microfinance was regarded as a 
solution to the problem of access especially for poorer people. However, microfinance NGOs 
and banks have in most of the countries in Africa not provided financial services for more than a 
small part of the population.  Hence, major donors in the field shifted policy to “Access for  
All” (Helms 2006; World Bank 2008), where the approach is to support not only microfinance 
NGOs and microfinance banks, but also, a broad range of financial organisations in order to 
stimulate pro-poor provision  (Helms 2006; World Bank 2008).   Moreover, the early focus on 
credit has given way to controversy over its impact  (e.g.Bateman and Chang 2009), and 
evidence from randomised control trials has also been demonstrating that credit alone has little 
impact on poverty. Drawing from six randomised evaluations of microcredit in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Mongolia and Marocco, Banerjee et. al.  (2015) conclude 
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that when analysed jointly the six studies did not reveal strong evidence that poverty of the 
participating households had reduced or incomes had increased.1 
Additionally, evidence from Collins  et. al  (2009) in Portfolios of the Poor shows that poor and 
ultra-poor households, actively save and manage money. Indeed, saving and borrowing often 
are interlinked; people use their savings for major investments as well as borrowing funds.   For 
example in Bangladesh on average of 10 different financial instruments were used by an 
individual, several of which were savings instruments.  In South Africa the poor and ultra-poor 
used on average 17 different financial instruments, four savings, two insurance and 11 credit 
instruments.  When income flows are not only low but more importantly irregular, clients 
valued places where they could save money safely.   
As a result of this increased interest in inclusion and the recognition that credit alone is not the 
solution to poverty, there is a growing body of literature highlighting the importance of savings 
for the poor.  Armendariz and Morduch (2010) note that even the term microcredit has been 
replaced in much of the literature with microfinance indicating that poor households may also 
benefit from other financial services besides credit.  In particular this has led to a number of 
experimental studies examining the effect of making savings accounts available.  
Dupas and Robinson’s  (2013a) study from Western Kenya highlight the importance of savings 
accounts for market vendors. The research team randomly selected a sample of women and 
men.  All the women were market vendors and all the men were bicycle taxi operators (boda 
boda operators).  Roughly half of the sample was then again randomly selected and the 
research team asked the selected men and women whether they wanted to have a non-interest 
bearing account opened in the bank.   The research team paid all the costs related to account 
opening for the respondents that were interested in opening an account.   Of the sample 13% 
were not interested in opening an account, 42% allowed an account to be opened but never 
used it.  However, a substantial share of the remaining 45% used their account actively.  The 
results indicate that after four months of opening the account female members of the 
treatment group that had access to an account increased their average productive investments 
with 40%.  Likewise, women’s daily food expenditure increased on average between 13 and 
28%.  However, opening accounts for men did not have an impact on their investment behavior. 
These findings illustrate the potential impact, especially in the case of women, but caution 
needs to be exercised when drawing conclusions since both the sample and timeframe were 
                                                          
1
 However, there were indications that the businesses expanded and profits increased.  However the 
evidence why this is not reducing poverty or increasing the incomes of the participating households was 
mixed. 
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short and the results quite strongly skewed with the benefits arising for less than half of the 
users.  
In order to understand why poor households have challenges in saving even though the findings 
indicate that they have small amounts that they could save, Dupas and Robinson in a further 
experimental study (2013b) tested the effect of different commitment devices on savings.  The 
experiment was set-up as a randomized control trial in Western Kenya consisting of 113 existing 
ROSCAs.  The ROSCAs were divided into five different groups, four treatment groups and one 
control group.  All the groups, including the control group, were encouraged to save for health 
related investments, but in addition to encouragement, the treatment groups used different 
types of commitment devices, for example a lockable safe box.  Their findings indicate that all 
the different devices that encouraged saving were very effective.  Between 66 and 97% of the 
members used them and on average the health savings in the four treatment groups were 66% 
higher than in the control groups.  These two studies by Dupas and Robinson seem to indicate 
that there are welfare improvements as a result of savings services, even though it was only 
women in the first study and mainly women in the second study, since the majority of ROSCA 
members were women.   While commenting Dupas and Robinson (2013a and 2013b) and other 
studies on savings, Karlan et. al (2014) note that even though these studies show promising 
results in terms of up-take of savings and increased savings levels, these studies fall short of 
measuring clients and households overall financial wealth and overall welfare.  Karlan et al.  
(2014) also wonder whether the substantial increases in savings, investment and consumption 
would hold, if all whole population in a certain area would have access to the same financial 
services that the experiments of Dupas and Robinson and others provide.  Nevertheless, Karlan 
et al. (2014) note that the poor can save and actually do save, but that both the informal and 
formal savings products used are often high risk, costly and not necessarily appropriate for the 
poor concluding that the quality of both informal and formal savings products needs to be 
improved.Informal user-owned organisations, such as Rotating Credit and Savings Associations 
(ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs)2 have been found to exist 
across the world   (Ardener 1995; Wilson et al. 2010). However, while these informal financial 
groups were one of the major inspirations for the development of group-based microfinance 
models, with expectations of high repayment, microfinance models evolved to have much 
                                                          
2
 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs) facilitate saving and lending within groups. In a ROSCA group meeting savings are collected, the 
whole pot is then immediately given to one member through either a ballot or order of rotation.   In the 
case of ASCAs, funds are lent to willing borrowers who repay them with interest.  The interest paid on the 
loans then accumulates in the group fund and may be paid out as a dividend to the members. 
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greater management and control by MFOs themselves  (Jain 1996). The question of how to 
work with informal groups has received diminishing attention, but with the new, more 
pluralistic donor policies of the past decade, there has been renewed interest to this sector.3  
One reason why financial inclusion via the informal sector has not been considered important in 
the past is that it was assumed that this sector would decline once people had access to formal 
financial services.  However, findings from the last Kenyan FinAccess survey (FinAccess, 2013) 
indicate that despite the fact that formal financial participation is increasing, participation in 
informal groups is still very significant.  For example in Kenya, they still serve some 27.7% of the 
population (FinAccess 2013).  This may be because they provide forms of financial 
intermediation that are complementary to formal service use.  Nevertheless, experience with 
informal user-owned groups in the past has also demonstrated many challenges in their 
operation. For example, the FinAccess data reveals that 20% of the approximately 8% of the 
population who are ASCA users,  have lost funds in their groups  (Malkamaki 2011). 
Findings further indicate that microfinance organisations and microfinance banks largely fail to 
provide basic financial services to poorer people and those living in remoter rural 
areas  (Johnson et al. 2006).  The cost of reaching clients is higher in rural areas because of 
longer distances that field officers need to travel to service the groups and roads are also often 
in poor condition or do not exist. Moreover, microfinance organisations (MFOs) have to cover 
their operating costs from the interest income that they receive from the loans that group 
members take.  However, the debt capacity of the poor clients living in remote rural areas is 
limited.  Further, the clients may need credit only during certain times during the year, which 
leads to small and seasonally fluctuating loan portfolios that are often not enough to cover the 
operating costs of the MFOs  (Allen and Panetta 2010). These challenges for MFOs have 
generated new interest to find models of financial service delivery that can offer basic services 
for poorer clients and remoter areas at lower cost for both providers and clients than the MFO 
model. 
1.2.2 Promoted savings groups 
 
One of these models is the savings group approach that is now promoted by a number of NGOs. 
Setting up and running SGs is cheaper for both the interveners and for the groups themselves, 
                                                          
3
 For example in Kenya DFID, World Bank, Swedish SIDA, Gates and Rockefeller Foundations support the 
work of Financial Sector Deepening Trust on informal inclusion.   
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for, in particular, unlike an MFO, the intervening agency does not provide loan capital for the 
groups. The promoted SG model as it is now being widely used was first developed by CARE in 
Niger.  Currently a number of international NGOs such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 
Oxfam, Plan, PACT and the Aga Khan Foundation train groups using this model in numerous 
African countries, with several local NGOs having also adopted it or variants of it.4  Trained 
groups currently serve around 14.5 million members.5  This figure does not include groups 
trained by the increasingly large number of small southern NGOs. 
As discussed in the introduction, the aim of the savings group methodology is to reach remoter 
areas and poorer people than microfinance organisations have been able to reach.  In order to 
do this, the costs for the interveners have to be lower.  As aforementioned, setting up and 
running SGs is cheaper for both the interveners and for the groups due to the fact that the 
members themselves both provide the capital and manage the group operations.  The costs that 
the interveners bear are group training and supervision for a period of one year.    
SG methodologies come in many different varieties but share many core principles.  For 
instance, all SGs are essentially time-bound accumulating savings and credit associations 
(ASCAs). Members save together, borrow small loans from their savings, distribute their savings 
and income at the end of the year, as well as usually give access to emergency insurance from 
the group’s social fund.  Usually one group has between 15 and 30 members. This study will 
investigate one particular model promoted by CARE and which is termed the Group Savings and 
Loans (GSL) model.6  From now on I will refer to the GSL methodology using the more generic 
name savings groups (SGs) and I now outline its approach. 
During the preparation phase, CARE introduces the SG concept to the community through the 
trainers, who ask the members to identify other community members with whom they want to 
form a group. After the group has self-selected its members, it then calls the trainer and asks to 
be trained.   During an intensive three-month training phase, a trainer visits the groups every 
week and trains them on group methodology, rules, incentives and sanctions. During the initial 
training, SG members receive orientation training on the process of saving and taking loans as 
well as instruction in group management.  After being trained on the roles and responsibilities 
of group leaders and members, members select their own leaders: a chair, secretary, treasurer 
                                                          
4
 The Self-Help Group (SHG) model that has been promoted in India by NGOs with extensive Government 
support, has many similar features and now reaches some 50 million clients. Much emphasis is being put 
on linking them up to the banking system – which has not been a key feature of the current SG model in 
Africa. 
5
 E-mail correspondence 1.9.2015 with Hugh Allen.   
6
 Also known as VSLA (Village Savings and Loan Associations). 
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(box-keeper) and money-counters. The groups are also instructed in recordkeeping.   After the 
group has been trained, a development phase starts where the trainer visits the groups every 
two weeks or once a month as it becomes more independent. After three months, the trainer is 
supposed to came only once a month and after 12 months s/he ceases to visit the group and it 
is expected to continue autonomously  (Grant and Allen 2002). 
A key feature of the methodology is the use of a metal cashbox with three locks.  Its purpose is 
to ensure that transactions only take place during the group meetings when all the members 
are present and it is formally opened. After the meeting the remaining cash as well as the ledger 
and/or passbooks are supposed to be locked in the box.  Three members of the group (who are 
not officeholders) are supposed to keep the keys and the box is next opened during the 
following meeting when all the members are again present.  Savings collection and issuing of 
loans are supposed to take place only during the group meetings. The aim of the cashbox and 
transacting only during the group meetings is to increase transparency and trust  (Grant and 
Allen 2002; Singer 2008; Otieno 2009; Allen and Panetta 2010; Allen and Staehle 2006). At the 
beginning of this particular project, CARE used a centralised ledger where all the members’ 
savings and loans were recorded.  Later, this approach was changed and groups were instructed 
on how to use passbooks as the only record keeping system necessary.  Those groups that had 
been initially trained on ledger use were also introduced to the passbooks. 
In general, during the initial training, groups are supposed to develop their own rules by 
answering a set of questions that the implementing organization provides.  There are some 
rules in the methodology that the implementing organisation insists the groups follow, in 
particular, it requires every group member to save at every meeting and usually, that the loan 
terms have to be set.  It generally also insists that groups hold elections for group leaders once a 
year.  Then there are other areas where the groups can formulate the rules.  For instance, they 
are encouraged to decide upon a number of fines that they should levy on those not following 
the group rules. In order to facilitate and speed-up the savings and loan process the SG 
methodology suggests that group members always sit in the same place in a circle in order of 
their group membership numbers  (Allen and Staehle 2006).  However, CARE dropped this part 
of the methodology, since very few groups actually followed the rule (CARE project director, 
Own observation). 
In answering questions intended to help form the constitution, the groups are also expected to 
define how often and when it will meet as well as what the value of one share is.  At each 
meeting each member has to save at least the value of one share and at most five. According to 
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the methodology, the value of one share should be so low that even the poorest member is able 
to save it, whilst it should be sufficiently high that the value of five shares would make it 
attractive for wealthier members to save. The groups are also trained on the repayment of 
loans, with the methodology suggesting that members could keep loans between one and three 
months. In addition, they are asked to set the monthly interest rate, with nearly all of them 
charging 10% per month.  As part of the constitution making process, groups are asked to 
discuss what penalties are to be enforced if members do not repay loans on time  (Allen and 
Staehle 2006).  
On a date chosen by the members, usually after about a year and called a cycle, all the financial 
assets are divided among the members in proportion to each one’s savings.   This pay-out is 
called “share-out” and, at the end of the first cycle, the trainer is supposed to train the leaders 
on how to perform it.  According to the methodology employed, if a member has not repaid her 
loan at the time of share-out, the value of her shares equalling her loan is supposed to be 
cancelled from the records.  This is a penalty for not clearing the loan and means that group 
profits are  to be allocated only to those shares that remain, or in other words only for those 
members who have repaid their loans.    After the share-out which effectively liquidates all the 
groups assets, groups normally re-form immediately (that is, in the same meeting) and start a 
new cycle of savings and lending.  The groups rely solely on their own savings and have no 
access to external funds either from banks, NGOs or other groups.  As aforementioned, after the 
initial training and supervision period of 12 months the trainer is expected to stop visiting the 
group, which is then supposed to continue operating on its own.  If groups want to, they are 
also able to contribute to a social fund to cover emergencies or costs of burials of group 
members or their relatives  (Allen and Panetta 2010; Grant and Allen 2002; Singer 2008).  
In addition to these general characteristics this particular CARE project, named COSALO that 
was studied in this research was also testing out different ways of delivering the training and 
supervision. The Financial Sector Deepening Trust (Kenya), who funded the COSALO project, 
suggested that besides direct delivery through its own staff, CARE should also test alternative 
channels for delivering training.  This was to examine whether the training could be delivered at 
lower cost and also the potential for scale by involving different types of organisations in the 
delivery, since a major scale-up of the intervention across the country was not thought to be 
viable financially or organisationally using a direct NGO delivery approach.  So, for COSALO, 
CARE used three delivery channels: 
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1. Direct delivery channel: implementation using community based trainers (CBTs) 
managed by CARE. As in CARE’s earlier projects, COSALO hired community members 
with mobilisation skills and paid them a monthly salary as well as supervising them. 
2. Faith based organisation (FBO) channel:  CARE signed agreements with several local 
churches that had a wide following in the area, and trained them to train the groups.  
3. Franchisee channel: local businesses who would train groups as part of their business 
were identified.  They were expected to be well established and know the area well.  
CARE called this a franchisee model.   Towards the end of the project CARE viewed the 
franchisee channel as being its most effective delivery channel because it had been 
highly successful in mobilising groups compared to the other channels and hence with a 
lower cost per trained member.  
The FBO and franchisee delivery channels operated on the basis of a performance incentive 
payment system for undertaking the training.  They received Kshs 130 (approx. US$2 at that 
time) for each group member who received training.  The trainers themselves working for the 
church and the franchisee owner received Kshs 130 for each trained member.   The payment for 
the churches, franchisees and trainers was made in two instalments, 67% immediately after the 
group had been trained and started operating, and the remaining 33% was paid after one year,  
after the first ”share-out”, where the group divided its savings and profit among the group 
members before starting a new cycle.7 
The SG approach therefore sought, first of all, to develop these groups in order to enable access 
to people who did not have access to financial services.  Moreover, it was anticipated that after 
supporting groups for one year they would have adopted the methodology and could be left on 
their own  to continue sustainably delivering the financial services  (see e.g. Anyango et al. 
2007).  That is, the model was expected to improve the outreach of the informal financial 
sector, thereby assisting financial inclusion and ensuring the sustainability of groups in the long 
run in delivering a basic financial service.  
In summary, the  promoters see the methodology as fostering transparency and accountability 
and with an expected long term survival rate of 90 percent, through training that addresses the 
following (Allen and Panetta 2010): 
                                                          
7
  The main manual that was used by CARE when training the trainers and implementing the program was  
Hugh Allen and Mark Staehle (2006)  Village Savings and Loan Associations.  Programme Guide Field 
Operations Manual. 
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• groups develop rules for themselves on the roles and responsibilities of leaders and 
members  
• groups elect leaders every year 
• groups are trained in simple bookkeeping  
• financial transactions are only carried out during the group meetings when everyone is 
present 
• groups use a locked box where the cash and records are kept between meetings. 
 
To date there have been a number of studies of SGs examining outreach, impact and 
sustainability although few of these have been published in the academic literature.  A review of 
results is  provided by an edited volume by Nelson  (2012) drawing together a range of grey 
literature and experience from across the sector. In particular, Johnson and Storchi  (2012) 
review the record on outreach and conclude that SGs are more accommodating for poor people 
than most other financial services.  However, most of the SG programmes did not target the 
poor, but rather the members self-select themselves.  In these cases, like for example in a SG 
programme in Uganda, SG members were less poor than the overall population.  On the other 
hand in Kenya 64% of the SG members were below the poverty line, when only 38% of the 
national population were below the poverty line.  The high poverty rate among members was 
explained by the programme targeting some of the poorest areas of Kenya  (Johnson and 
Storchi 2012). Since that book was published, similarly, Lønborg and Rasmussen (2014) found in 
Malawi that the SG members were less poor than the overall population in the area.   
The most thorough and extensive study of a programme has been a three year randomized 
control trial in Mali that also had an extensive and separate qualitative component.  Women 
who participated in the SG program were, on average somewhat wealthier than non-members.  
However, 82% of the population in the villages lived below the poverty line, thus indicating that 
the programme was indeed working with very poor clients.   (Bureau of Applied Research in 
Anthropology and Action 2013). The random control trial (RCT) findings show that in treatment 
villages there was an increase in savings (31%) and on loans (12%) as well as an increase in food 
security and an increase in livestock investment when compared to the control villages.  
However, the researchers did not find any significant effect of the programme on health, 
education or income.   
As aforementioned, SG methodologies operate in areas where indigenous forms of ROSCAs and 
ASCAs have long operated.  These have been the subject of anthropological and economic 
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studies for some time and can give a perspective on the potential opportunities and challenges 
that promotion of the SG methodology is likely to face in practice.  Consequently, the next 
section gives a brief overview of the literature and how it has treated their successes and 
failures.   
1.2.3 Indigenous ROSCA and ASCA: successes and failures
8
 
 
The fascination with ROSCAs and ASCAs in the literature arose from a growing appreciation of 
their flexibility, multi-purpose and multi-dimensional role in both economic and social life.  
From an economic perspective, Besley et al. (1993) were keen to understand why people co-
operated to save in such a way rather than simply to save alone.  They demonstrated that 
ROSCAs are an efficient mechanism for saving to buy a consumer durable good since each 
individual (except the last) will be able to buy the good earlier than she would if saving alone.  
More recently, economic research has analysed the commitment aspects of ROSCAs, for which 
two specific explanations have been put forward: household conflict and self-commitment.  
According to the first explanation there are conflicts within households and ROSCAs are a device 
through which women can commit the household to saving more than the husband would 
like  (Anderson and Baland 2002).  However, Aliber  (2001) and Gugerty  (2007) claim that the 
main reason people join ROSCAs is self-control problems, for without a ROSCA or an ASCA all 
the potential small savings would be used in household needs. The underpinning rationale is 
that peer group pressure and encouragement will bind the members into committing 
themselves to saving, in the absence of which they would find much harder to be able to save. 
While economists have sought to examine the rationality behind their financial mechanisms, 
anthropologists have been fascinated with ROSCAs as a “cultural invention”  (Velez-Ibanez 
1983) and Shirley Ardener  (1964) and Clifford Geertz  (1962) were the anthropologists who 
brought their study to the fore  in the 1960s.  Ardener documented their diversity in a range of 
contexts and has argued that the social and economic functions of ROSCAs are 
inseparable  (Ardener 1995). 
Indeed, with respect to this study Geertz’s contribution is of particular interest.  Geertz’s classic 
article argues that they represent “intermediate” forms of institution between a traditional and 
                                                          
8
 This section draws from a literature review that was previously published in Johnson, S., Malkamäki, M. 
& Niño-Zarzúa, M., 2012. El papel de los grupos informales en los mercados financieros: evidencias de 
Kenia. In: M. Villarreal & L. Angulo, eds. Las Microfinanzas en los Intersticios del Desarrollo: Cálculos, 
Normatividades y Malabarismos. Guadalahara, Mexico. 
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more modern or developed societal context in which their “functional significance is primarily to 
facilitate social and cultural change” (Geertz 1962, 262).  Even if peasants continue to work as 
peasants, Geertz claimed that they still needed the mind-set of traders. Through ROSCAs, 
peasants   
“learn to be traders, not merely in the narrow occupational sense but in the 
broad cultural sense; an institution which acts to change their whole value 
framework from one emphasizing particularistic, diffuse, affective and ascriptive 
ties between individuals to one emphasizing—within economic contexts—
universalistic, affectively neutral and achieved ties between them… The 
theoretical as well as the practical interest of the association lies in its ability to 
organize traditional relationships in such a way that they are slowly but steadily 
transformed into non-traditional ones” (Geertz 1962, 260-1).   
He argues that the ROSCA therefore represents two contrary forces:  
“one which reflects the increased segregation of economic from non-economic 
activities and a freeing from traditional constraints; while at the same time have 
a directly contradictory attempt to maintain the dominance of the traditional 
values”  (Geertz 1962, 261). 
 Geertz sees them as a phenomenon of social transformation suggesting that they will be “self-
liquidating being ultimately replaced by banks, cooperatives and other economically more 
rational types of credit institution” (Geertz 1962, 263).  Hence, in contrast to Dore’s concern 
about the difficulties of “institutionalising suspicion” in co-operative societies as indicated in the 
introduction above, Geertz is rather more positive about the way in which ROSCAs might in fact 
facilitate this shift.  
Indeed, while the fascination in both the economic and anthropological literature has on the 
whole been to celebrate their benefits, there is literature that does also reveal their limitations. 
As Bouman (1995) points out, a  
“low rate of default is assumed to be self-evident because of peer 
pressure…denials of misconduct ….are accepted by researchers at face value. 
Proper investigation is almost impossible without access to books and records.  
Outsiders, that is non-members or former members may tell a different 
story” (Bouman 1995).  
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 Research on ROSCAs in Benin found that 26% of members had experienced problems in their 
groups, with 25% not concluding a full cycle.  For about 40% of these respondents, the reason 
was financial irregularities, such as irregular payments to the pot, members leaving the group 
early and not being willing to continue paying or the groups organiser (president) leaving with 
the money  (Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher 2008).  They also discovered that ROSCAs that were 
organised and managed by one person performed much worse those that had a committee 
managing affairs, for they tended to have written rules and elected leaders.  Handa and 
Kirton  (1999) found that 10% of their Jamaican sample experienced problems in their ROSCA 
groups and these were mainly the late payment (50%) or delinquency (25%).  Anderson et 
al.  (2004) also discuss the problems of contributions faced in ROSCAS in the Kibera slum in 
Kenya, finding in particular that those who were lower ranked in the order of pay out or who 
had already received their share of the pot often failed to pay.  
A further reason why the literature tends to view default as minimal in these systems is that 
anthropologists tend to regard the fact that funds are repaid in some form at a later date as 
repayment.  Hence, for example, Nelson writes that the Kiambu group was very successful and 
reports 23 cases of what she calls “negotiated temporary default”, whereby members paid at a 
later date  (Nelson 1995, 62).  Additionally, Alila et al. conclude that default is minimal in these 
informal systems and report that gifts were used in some cases to make up the default  (Alila 
1992).   Indeed, the underlying issue here is that debt is a social relation and in many African 
systems regarded as open ended (Zegers 1989). Drawing on Berry  (1993), Johnson uses the 
term “negotiability” to refer to the flexibility of these systems in this respect.  She argues that it 
is the fact that the underlying social relationships allow for renegotiation of debts is a key 
reason for the popularity of these mechanisms in Central Kenya in the late 1990s (Johnson 
2004b).  This negotiability means that the risk of entering debt relations through these systems 
is reduced compared to borrowing from the formal sector and hence, in the context of 
uncertain livelihoods is more compatible.  However, it is this element of negotiability and its 
intrinsic flexibility that contain both the greatest strength of these systems and their greatest 
weakness since it also enables powerful individuals to manipulate them to their own 
advantage  (Johnson et al. 2002a). Hence, the power dynamics of the social relations in which 
these systems are embedded are also a key source of their failure.   
To conclude, the literature on the ubiquity of ROSCAs and apparent success must be balanced 
with acknowledgment of their failures and the potential pathologies that underlie them. For a 
number of reasons these failures might have been less evident to researchers – not least 
because failed ROSCAs are hard to study as they no longer exist.  Moreover, the embeddedness 
   25 
 
of their economic functions within wider social relations is both a reason for their success and 
failure.  The dynamics of the power relations that such embeddedness involves can inevitably 
result in default and fraud. It is perhaps not surprising then, that external intervention which 
has been premised on their apparent success has met with widespread failure and has led 
Bouman to conclude, somewhat pessimistically, that “we must finally accept that indigenous 
self-help societies have their own ways of helping themselves and their own views of what 
Utopia looks like and at what tempo to get there (Bouman 1995).   
 
1.2.4. Conclusion  
 
This section has shown how the promotion of SGs is seen by policy makers as a means to 
increase financial inclusion through the spread of an approach that can provide a basic financial 
service.  It is intended to reach poorer people and more remote areas than microfinance 
institutions have been able to through being savings led and through the search for low cost 
models of promotion. It is also intended to provide more transparent, accountable and safer 
services than the indigenous ROSCA or ASCA groups.   However, in promoting this approach to 
financial inclusion, interveners are not working from a clean slate.  In many, if not most 
developing, country contexts - as has been indicated above – there is a range of existing 
informal sector forms of financial arrangement.  Invariably, therefore, this methodology is being 
implemented within the context of indigenous group-based financial institutional arrangements.  
Also, the underlying social relations will have an impact on how the methodologies perform.  
This means that the attempt to proliferate and “improve” on existing arrangements in terms of 
the transparency and accountability regarding how they work involves assumptions about how 
the adoption of such technologies takes place.  Essentially, the SG methodology represents an 
attempt to change the rules and norms within which people operate such transactions and 
hence, can be seen to be aimed at delivering institutional change.  It is within the theoretical 
frameworks for analysing institutional change that I therefore want to consider how the SG 
methodology is being adopted and used.    
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1.3. Theoretical context 
1.3.1. New Institutional Economics  
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) operating within rational choice institutionalism undertakes 
two levels of analysis – both at the micro level of analysing information and transactions costs 
associated with particular market operations, and at a broader level pertaining to how changing 
transactions costs are related to economic development. In the area of financial sector 
development NIE has been applied quite extensively to understand financial transactions 
through analysis of the transactions and information costs involved in lending.  In this review I 
will be looking at how NIE has addressed institutional change and how historical institutionalist 
perspectives go beyond it in providing explanations for institutional change.   
Within NIE the theoretical work for analysing financial markets lies mainly in transaction costs 
economics as well as in the imperfect information approach  (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005).  Imperfect information approach has been a primary analytical approach for 
explaining the success of microfinance groups.  For proponents of NIE, institutions exist in order 
to reduce transactions costs  (North 1990) and one way of doing so, is to mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  The key contribution of the imperfect information perspective that 
has formalised adverse selection and moral hazard is that it was able to explain how joint 
liability9 could, in theory, solve imperfect information problems and lower transactions costs for 
lending through microfinance groups  (Ghatak 2000; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005; 
Conning 1999; Chowdury 2005). The transactions costs approach sees institutions as the means 
through which these costs are reduced in order for economic development to take place.  
Hence, this approach analyses the situation not only from lenders perspective, but rather, 
whether institutions will reduce the overall transactions costs of the contract.  For example 
Llanto and Chua  (1996), Karduck and Seibel  (2004) and Shankar  (2007) have compared  the 
transaction costs of different financial institutions as well as savings and credit groups. 
However, this approach has been criticised for being non-dynamic.  That is, it is a useful tool for 
comparing the transaction costs of different systems, but it does not provide tools for 
understanding how institutions change  (Granovetter 1985). 
                                                          
9
 Joint liability is a contract between a financial organisation and a savings and credit group where the 
financial organisation promises to provide to each group member with loans as long as the group 
members are willing to guarantee to repay other group members’ loans if the other members do not 
repay the loans to the organisation. 
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However, another strand within NIE, as represented by North, is dynamic and focused on 
economic development.  For North, the most important reasons for institutional change are 
changes in relative prices which is a dynamic process and this highlights the fact that he is trying 
to build NIE within the neoclassical framework.   Relative prices are important because they 
change the incentives of individuals, specifically referring to changes in the ratio of land to 
labour, changes in cost of information and/or changes in technology.  For him, it is maximizing 
entrepreneurs (in the field of economy or politics) who make innovations that change relative 
prices (North 1990 and 2005).  
North  (2005) argues that the key driver of institutional change is the interaction between 
institutions and organisations.  For him, institutions’ formal and informal rules determine the 
types of opportunities that exist in an economy and what types of organisations can be formed.  
In a competitive market place the leaders of organisations see new opportunities and they push 
for institutional changes (changes in the rules) in order to stay competitive.  Nevertheless, at the 
same time the existing institutions constrain change and organisations that have been formed 
to support current ones, in turn, defend the existing development path.   
Since the key reason for institutional change within NIE is market competition, changes in 
institutions are supposed to lead to more efficient outcomes and reductions in transactions 
costs  (Argandona 2004). According to North, one of the key reasons why inefficient institutions 
or institutions that do not enhance the welfare of the society continue to exist is “path 
dependency”.  This refers to the phenomenon that if one alternative has been chosen in the 
past, the likelihood that the same one will be chosen again is greater.  North claims that it is 
easy to understand that actors in different geographical areas have had different challenges 
which they have tried to solve in different ways and the initial institutional choices different 
societies have results different paths of institutional development.   
When evaluating the significance of NIE, Toye  (1995) acknowledges that it has brought 
institutions into economics in a way that has enabled economists to start discussing them. 
However, he claims that as a macro level theory that is trying to explain the development 
process, it has not brought anything new that other disciplines have not been able to explain. 
Similarly Harriss  (2008) claims that NIE is not in a position to explain historical change. Toye 
criticises what he calls the “functionalist” view of the institutions where their role of institutions 
is seen as finding solution to specific problems (Toye 1995).  That is, according to the 
functionalist view, institutions are there to solve economic problems and reduce transactions 
costs.  However, this view does not take into account the norms that are also part of institutions 
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and that cannot be changed consciously.  Harriss (2008), Toye (1995) and Bates  (1995) conclude 
that since the study of politics, history, sociology and anthropology have not been successfully 
integrated into NIE and because of methodological challenges it is probably not possible to do 
so, but rather, should be embedded in the study of the aforementioned fields of academia. 
Despite some NIE authors having used the transaction costs approach to empirically study 
financial institutions, especially microfinance groups, Casson et al.(2010) conclude that  much of 
the discussion on institutions is on a macro-level and highly abstract.  Also, much of the 
empirical institutional analysis has been of cross country studies and Casson et al. claim that 
these are  
”plagued by the endogeneity of institutions to growth. We therefore need on the 
one hand to provide precise descriptions of the mechanisms through which 
institutions play a role in determining development outcomes, and on the other 
hand to move beyond cross-country studies to explore the heterogeneity of 
institutions in different countries, which is best achieved through studies based 
on micro-data”  (Casson et al. 2010, 137).  
Further, institutional analysis has largely concentrated on formal institutions. According to 
Jütting  (2003), most of the studies do not distinguish clearly between these  (formal rules) and 
informal institutions (informal norms), nor do they pay enough attention to the role of informal 
norms, which need to be taken into account. Moreover, very few authors discuss social 
institutions, such as ethnicity, caste or religion. Owing to the above oversights, NIE has been 
criticised for having an incomplete understanding of institutional change.   
 
1.3.2. Historical institutionalist approaches to institutional change   
 
Historical institutionalism has a long theoretical tradition of its own in political studies, and 
according to Hall and Taylor grew as a response to group theories of politics and structural 
functionalism in the 1960s  (Hall and Taylor 1996). It accepted but sought to go beyond the idea 
that conflict between groups for scarce resources lay at the heart of politics wanting to 
understand the specificities of the settlements that characterised different contexts.  In 
particular they identified the political economy features of a situation as critical, rather than the 
social, psychological or cultural traits  (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
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Hall and Taylor suggest that historical institutionalism has four features. First, they see the 
relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in broad terms.  This contrasts a 
more ‘”cultural” with a “calculus” approach, seeing individuals as affected by a worldview in 
which their actions are affected by routines, symbols and so on,  such that institutions affect 
their identities, self-images and preferences   This does not render individuals irrational but 
shows how such routines and preferences are taken for granted and since they are collective 
constructions, “institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very 
choices about reform that the individual is likely to make” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 940).   
Second, they are particularly concerned with power asymmetries, recognising that individuals 
and organisations have differential access to decision making power and that this will lead to 
some as winners and others as losers.  Third they are concerned with path dependence and 
unintended consequences.  This perspective emphasises the way in which change forces will not 
have the same results everywhere but rather they will be specific in time and place due to the 
context which is strongly derived from the past.  Indeed, the key inherited feature is institutions 
and hence tend to lead development along a particular set of paths.  Finally, they are interested 
in how other factors such as socioeconomic development and ideas and beliefs affect 
outcomes, not anticipating that institutions will be the sole cause of change.   
Mahoney and Thelen  (2010), coming from the  historical-institutionalist school, agree with 
Harris that NIE does not have a comprehensive theory of how institutions change.10  Indeed, the 
reasons for change within NIE are often an exogenous shock that forces the institution to 
change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).  Their recent contribution has attempted to develop a 
more comprehensive theory of institutional change that also considers the endogenous gradual 
evolution of institutions.  They do this by defining institutions as “distributional instruments 
laden with power implications” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8).  
In addition to this balance-of-power approach, Mahoney and Thelen introduce another concept 
they call compliance. Regarding which, they claim that compliance within NIE is usually part of 
the definition of an institution.  However, these authors argue that, if institutions are not 
assumed to be self-reinforcing and also that distributional issues are indeed central, then 
compliance is not automatic and becomes a variable that has an impact on whether institutions 
                                                          
10
 Mahoney and Thelen also claim that the two other institutionalisms namely Historical institutionalism 
and Sociological institutionalism do not have a convincing theory of change of institutions, but since this 
piece of research mostly deals with NIE,  however, I will not discuss the critique of Historical and 
Sociological institutionalisms here. 
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remain stable or whether they change.  Through the concept of compliance they have also 
allowed for the introduction of the dynamics of power and politics into the analysis.   
However, Mahoney and Thelen’s analysis is solely endogenous and hence does not cover 
external intervention. As a consequence, I turn to Boettke et al. (2008) in order to address this 
oversight.  While Boettke’s work fits with the Austrian school which is in many ways rationalist 
in its approach, his approach is to propose a theorem that contains both endogenous and 
exogenous rules as well as indigenous and ”foreign” introduction of then.  Specifically, their 
theorem is able to accommodate both exogenous rules  introduced by outsiders, whilst at the 
same time also taking into account the endogenous elements, which according to the authors 
are close to local culture and the closer the institution is to this culture or metis, the more likely 
it is to stick.  On the other hand, foreign introduced exogenous rules are least likely to stick, 
since they are furthest away from local culture.   As discussed in subsequent chapters, since the 
SGs have elements of both endogenous and exogenous rules, with indigenous and foreign 
introduction, the theorem thus brings up the matter of the balance between the different 
elements.  
However, Boettke et al. do not address the concept of culture in any greater detail, they do not 
discuss the role of norms or how the formal institutions are embedded in social relations.  As 
has been suggested above, these have the potential to pattern the outcomes of the kinds of 
informal groups that this study seeks to address in significant ways.  Indeed, according to 
Granovetter, the economy is always embedded in social relations and he seeks to understand 
how these structure economic actions.  For him, “[h]ow behaviour  and institutions are affected 
by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory”  (Granovetter 1992, 53).  A 
rational choice new institutional economist would claim that the influence of social relations is 
minimal on the choices of individuals, because they are primarily motivated by self-interest.   
However, Granovetter contends that economic actions cannot be simply derived from the 
principle of profit maximization.  For, social relations also influence economic outcomes and 
heavily constrain the individual actions  (Granovetter 1992).  Within this tradition, Pujo  (1996), 
Harriss-White  (2005) and Johnson  (2003)  have tried to identify the key social institutions 
influencing the way markets operate. The findings indicate that  economic institutions are 
embedded in social institutions like gender, kin, ethnicity, class and age and that these 
”regulate” the former type of institution  (Harriss-White 2005). Through the concept of ”social 
regulation” Harriss-White wants to emphasize how social institutions influence the way the 
economic institutions are functioning and that the former confer power on some people to be 
exerted over others  (Johnson 2006; Harriss-White 2005).  The work of Geertz (1962), Ardener 
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1995), Bouman (1995) and Hospes (1996) that has already been reviewed in sections 1.3 and 1.4 
of this chapter also belong to this tradition and has specifically sought to analyse informal 
savings and credit groups in terms of how they are embedded in the culture and different social 
institutions.  All of these perspectives on institutions will be expanded upon in the literature 
that follows in Chapter Two. 
However, before bringing together the policy context and this brief theoretical survey to 
develop the research questions which this study seeks to address,  I first want to introduce 
Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) framework for analysing collective active institutions.  As indicated in the 
discussion of institutional change above, this is frequently discussed at a highly abstract level.  
For the purposes of this study it was necessary to find a means to focus on what rules might be 
important and how they might be developed.  Ostrom’s institutional framework derives from 
her study of collective action institutions involved in common property resource management 
and since SGs are also a collective action institution her framework offers a basis for analysing 
rules and design principles for successful collective action institutions. Ostrom classifies the 
different rules into: position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information and payoff.  According 
to her, all institutions need rules in all these categories.   Ostrom  (2005) has also identified 
design principles for robust collective action institutions, which indicate the need for 
participation, monitoring, sanctions, enforcement  and conflict resolution.  While her 
framework operates within a more rational institutionalist approach in which actors seek to 
optimise their outcomes, and also says little about how change occurs, it does offer a means to 
more specifically investigate an institutional arena in practice and so has been adopted as a core 
framework for conducting this study.  With this foundation it is then possible to consider 
Mahoney and Thelen’s approach to compliance and Boettke et al’s considerations of culture 
and external intervention in the process of change.   
 
1.4. Research questions 
 
This study considers SG methodologies as an example of interventions that seek to create 
institutional change at the micro level. Therefore, the aim is to investigate and hence, explain 
how savings-group approaches are being adopted and used, by employing institutional analysis 
as a theoretical framework.   
The main research question guiding the investigation is: 
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• To what extent can the adoption and use of savings group rules be explained 
by theories of institutional change? 
Two supplementary questions are: 
• What determines the differential success of SG groups in adopting new rules 
and norms and sustaining their operations in the longer term? 
• How do different underlying social institutions and cultural, economic and 
political contexts affect the ways in which savings-group methodologies are 
adopted and used? 
 
As indicated above, to date, there are few academically published studies of SG experience.  In 
the practical analysis of SG success, much discussion has centred on what the core SG principles 
need to be for group operations to be successful.  For example, interveners have focussed on 
the use of the locked box or been concerned with how non-literate people can best record 
transactions or indeed, whether it is possible for groups to function without a record keeping 
system at all. Moreover, the quality of training has also been a key focus of discussion 
(Malkamaki 2011).   As Wilson et al note t 
“these [externally introduced SG] methods are usually better than those of 
customary systems. Steel boxes with triple lock, formal procedures, simple 
recording systems that illiterate people can use, total transparency – all these 
features save time and help to reduce loss and theft”  (Wilson et al. 2010, 54)  
However, in addition to the ‘technical’ issues related to the SG model, there are other issues 
that potentially impact on group dynamics and performance that also need to be understood. 
Many of the problems that different types of groups face are related to the operation of power 
and socio-cultural norms within their local environment.  In such circumstances, training 
members on their responsibilities and rights does not necessarily produce the anticipated 
results.  For example, the age of groups, power dynamics within them, socio-economic issues 
like education levels or wealth of the households, the nature of the local economy or socio-
cultural norms within the local environment might all impact on the adaptation of new rules 
within the SG groups. Alternatively, the differences in the rule adaptation might better be 
explained by differences in incentives between groups. Also, the existence of indigenous savings 
and credit groups within the area could result in the new SG rules being adapted so as to be 
compatible with those already existing. 
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The novelty of this study is that it goes beyond the relatively short time scales of many of the 
practical studies, and uses micro-level empirical data to examine the issues raised above.  
Specifically, the aim is not only to present the rules in operation, but also, to understand their 
interaction with norms and social relations present in the local context. Lastly, until now much 
of the work on savings and credit groups within institutionalism has been static; comparing 
different groups at a certain point of time. To address this, the aim of this study is to examine 
change in institutions, thus making the study dynamic.  
 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis  
 
The study proceeds as follows.  Chapter Two reviews in more depth the literature on New 
Institutional Economics and rational choice institutionalism that deals with how institutions 
change and then draws on recent historical institutionalist analysis to examine how to go 
beyond it in discussing institutional change. Chapter Three explains and justifies the 
methodology and framework for the study as well as describing how the empirical study was 
carried out and providing reflections on what happened in practice.  Chapter Four provides an 
overview of financial sector development in Kenya including the informal financial sector and 
microfinance.  It also reviews the social, economic and political structure that forms the context 
in which SG groups operate.  
The following three chapters present and analyse the findings of the empirical field work.   
Chapter Five presents the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample as well as assessing the 
extent to which the SG rules were adopted in practice.  Then, the performance of the groups is 
reported. To establish which socio-economic characteristics affect rule adoption and the degree 
to which the latter affects financial performance, indices of rule following and financial 
performance are developed and correlations between a range of variables are estimated and 
statistically tested.   Chapter Six then turns to an in depth examination of how the trainers 
implemented the SG methodology and its rules, with a particular focus on their role in 
institutionalising rules on loan repayment.  It also explores the unexpected role that trainers 
themselves played in misappropriation and fraud.    Chapter Seven investigates how the internal 
dynamics of groups affected the ways rules were institutionalised, expecting that understanding 
these dynamics could offer insight into the process.   Regarding the rules of interest, in this 
chapter the focus is again on loan repayment as well as default and misappropriation cases for 
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which group leaders were also found to be responsible.  Chapter Eight presents a synthesis of 
the findings from the three previous chapters drawing on the literature presented throughout 
the thesis in order to address the main research question and the two supplementary ones.  
Namely, to what extent and how the adoptions and use of SG methodologies can be explained 
in terms of theories of institutional change. Chapter Nine concludes by examining the 
implications of the findings for the analysis of institutional change.  
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CHAPTER 2.  THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
 
2.1. Introduction    
Evans  (2007) suggests that there has been an ”institutional turn” in development economics. 
Hoff and Stiglitz  (2001) summarize this turn by stating that ”Development is no longer seen 
primarily as a process of capital accumulation, but rather as a process of organisational 
change” (Hoff and Stiglitz 2001, 389).  Acemoglu et al. (2004) claim that ”differences in 
economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development”. 
Similarly, after comparing the level of impact of institutions with geography and trade, Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi conclude that ”the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ everything 
else”  (Acemoglu et al. 2004; Rodrik et al. 2004; here Evans 2007, 35).  Hall and Taylor (1996) 
identify three main schools within institutional theory, historical institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism.   Within this categorization new 
institutional economics (NIE) is part of rational choice institutionalism.   
This chapter reviews the literature on new institutional economics (NIE) as it has been applied 
and then draws on historical institutionalism and on theories of embeddedness to examine how 
to go beyond it when discussing institutional change.   New institutional economic analysis has 
been a primary analytical lens for examining the success of microfinance groups and to an 
extent, informal financial arrangements, such as ROSCAs and ASCAs.  Since the analytical 
concepts of this approach, moral hazard, adverse selection and transaction costs analysis were 
briefly discussed in the first chapter, I will not discuss them again here.  Further, this involves 
static analysis at the micro level and does not demonstrate how change takes 
place.  Consequently, the wider NIE analysis of change and development which has instead been 
more focused at the macro level is discussed.  The work of North (1990) and Grief (2006) is 
presented and then critiqued for its narrow view on institutional change that does not consider 
politics, power or social relations. 
 Next, I introduce Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) framework for analysing collective action 
situations.   Like North and Grief, her work can also be seen to be located within rational choice 
institutionalism.  However, the analysis of rules that she has developed in her work on collective 
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action institutions for managing natural resources offers a more focussed approach to such 
analysis than these authors. 
More recently, the work of Mahoney and Thelen has endeavoured to incorporate part of this 
critique - explaining change by viewing institutions as distributional instruments and recognising 
the importance of compliance, thereby bringing in the dynamics of power and politics.  This and 
their characterisation of modes of change is useful since it offers a more specific focus for 
analysing how institutions might change through ”displacement”, ”layering”, ”drift” or 
”conversion”. However, this approach neglects informal norms and the way formal rules are 
embedded in social institutions. To address this, the theorem of Boettke et al. is presented, who 
emphasize that new institutions need to have a link with local culture and norms.   Then, the 
concept and discussions around embeddedness within economic sociology are reviewed. The 
central contribution of economic sociology and anthropology is the realisation that economic 
institutions are always embedded in social and cultural institutions.  Unlike NIE which only deals 
with the functions of institutions by trying to make them more effective through lowering 
transactions costs, the embeddedness approach allows for the institutions themselves to be 
analysed.  Further, within this tradition Harriss-White’s (2005) claim that social institutions 
”regulate” economic institutions and economic development emphasises the power dimensions 
of the social and cultural institutions. Since Ostrom does not deal explicitly with how change 
occurs, it is necessary to include Mahoney and Thelen’s concept of compliance and power 
relations as well as Boettke et al.’s theorem, which incorporates external intervention and lastly, 
the dimension of embeddedness of norms and social relations needs to be taken into  account.  
 
2.2. Rational choice institutionalism 
2.2.1  New institutional economics and institutional change 
 
Within new institutional economics, North (1990) has developed a dynamic analysis of 
institutional change, for according to him, neo-classical economic theory cannot explain the 
dynamic of change.  Nevertheless, neo-classical economics still provides the central building 
blocks for the author. This is because institutional economics, like the neo-classical approach 
”begins with the scarcity hence competition postulate; it views economics as a theory of choice 
subject to constraints; it employs price theory as an essential part of the analysis of institutions; 
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and it sees changes in relative prices as a major force inducing change in institutions”  (North 
1995). However, in order to explain change North (1991) adds institutions as a critical element 
to the theory, defining them as follows:   
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction.  They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights.)  Throughout history, institutions have been 
devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.  
Together with the standard constraints of economics they define the choice set 
and therefore determine transaction and production costs and hence the 
profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity.  They evolve 
incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future… Institutions 
provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it 
shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or 
decline” (North 1991, 97). 
North (1990) also describes institutions as “rules of the game”, such that whenever humans do 
something together, there is always a structure, i.e. ”rules of the game”, that guides them.  This 
structure, according to North (2005) consists of institutions – formal rules, informal norms and 
mechanisms that enforce these rules and norms.  
However, North (1990) also draws attention to the need to differentiate institutions from 
organizations. Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are the team of players 
that play the game according to these rules.  Rules have been created so that the players would 
know how to play the game, with aim being to win the game. Developing strategies on how to 
improve the chances of a team winning the game within the commonly agreed rules 
(organization) and developing ideas how to change as well as further modify the rules of the 
game (institution) are two separate processes. Organizations are dependent on institutions in 
the sense that they come into existence because of inbuilt incentives in the former.  
Organizations will reflect the opportunities provided by the institutions and the way they evolve 
is dependent on the latter.  Organizations such as firms, government and NGOs operate to 
reproduce institutions that favour their survival.  This is done within organizations by creating 
knowledge and innovations that strengthen the organizations and institutions (North 1990). 
One central concept also for North in the theory of institutions is that of transaction costs.  
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“The incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process 
information determines the costs of transacting which underlies the formation of 
institutions…  The costs of transacting arise because information is costly and 
asymmetrically held by the parties of exchange…and when it is costly to transact, 
institutions matter” (North 1995, 18). 
“NIE modifies the ‘rationality postulate’ of neo-classical economics which maintains that values 
are given and constant and that individual economic agents select the most efficient means of 
maximising rationally chosen ends” (Harriss et al. 1995, 3). North claims that individuals choose 
between different alternatives based on mental models. These are  
”mental constructs individuals form to explain and interpret the world around 
them and are partly a result of their cultural heritage, partly a result of the ‘local’ 
everyday problems they confront and must solve, and partly a result of non-local 
learning” (North 2005, 61).  
The concept of mental models is potentially important partly because it assists in explaining why 
rational individuals make irrational decisions.  It also sheds light on why individuals within the 
same context make different choices and why nations move in different directions.  
Whereas North (2005) discusses institutions mostly at the macro level, Greif (2006) is trying to 
establish micro-foundations for the study of institutions. The framework that he develops 
“studies institutions on the level of the interacting individuals” (Grief 2006, 13).  Further, his 
analysis is trying to combine old and new institutionalism, economic sociology and evolutionary 
institutionalism. Instead, of abstract econometric analyses he advocates context specific 
studies. For him, “an institution is a system of social factors (rules, beliefs, norms, and 
organizations) that together generate a regularity of (social) behaviour” (Grief 2006, 30). By 
regularity of behaviour, Grief refers to the reality that (most) individuals that have a ”social 
position” in a social situation are anticipated to behave in a certain way (Grief 2006, 32).   The 
perspective of social position emphasises the social role in a particular situation rather than the 
individual’s personal characteristics and can be, e.g. a buyer, seller, lender, borrower, 
man/woman etc.  Rules, norms, beliefs and organisations are all social, thus implying that all 
these institutions have been created by humans. Despite institutions being made by humans, at 
the same time they are exogenous to the individual.  They have to be exogenous, because of 
their role to  ”enable, guide and motivate behaviour” and can only perform this function when 
an individual’s relative influence is low (Grief 2006, 34). However, this does not mean that no 
one can change institutions. For a dictator, laws are not exogenous, since he can decide 
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whether to obey them or not as he has all the power.  By contrast, a prime minister is in strong 
position to change formal rules, laws, but after these have been approved they are exogenous 
and he has to obey them.   In these examples, the formal rules and laws are not institutions for 
the dictator or for the prime minister since they can ”initiate” change.  However, even a dictator 
cannot change the beliefs or norms. When discussing how to ensure that rules are followed, 
instead of talking of enforcement, Grief (2006) uses the term motivation, which is because 
individuals can follow rules either because there is a threat of punishment or there is an 
incentive or reward. And motivation covers both alternatives.  
Many institutional economists, including North (2005), have focused enforcement because they 
usually assume there is an external force, a third-party enforcer that ensures that rules are 
followed.  However, there are many situations where the third-party enforcer is weak (e.g. weak 
states) or does not exist at all.  Even in these situations rules are often enforced.   In order to 
understand how these self-enforcing or self-motivating institutions function, the motivation as 
well as the beliefs and norms behind it have to be better understood.11 According to Grief 
(2006), a major methodological division within the students of institutions is between the 
agency and structuralist perspectives.  The majority of economists use the former, which 
assumes that individuals are the agents of their lives, whereas many sociologists employ the 
latter, which emphasises the structures and institutions that constrain the choices that 
individuals have.  Grief’s (2006) view is close to Giddens’ (1984) ”structuration” approach, which 
takes the view that there is dynamic interplay between structure and agency, thus claiming that 
both perspectives are needed.  He is trying to bridge this divide with his definition, whereby 
institutions are considered as being made by humans (agency perspective,) but institutions are 
exogenous to individuals (structural perspective).   
How institutions change: path dependence and mental models 
 
Even though different authors have defined institutions in a slightly different ways, almost all 
the definitions emphasise their permanence and thus, before analysing how institutions change, 
it is useful to understand why they often are persistent.  When explaining the rise of different 
types of institutions, North (2005) uses the term path dependency, referring to the situation 
that if one alternative has been chosen in the past, the likelihood that the same alternative will 
                                                          
11
 In the case of most of the user owned savings and credit groups the third-party enforcement is at best 
weak or does not exist.  Thus, studying motivation, beliefs and norms makes sense.   
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be chosen again is greater than a change being made.12  According to this author, one of the key 
reasons why inefficient institutions or those that do not enhance the welfare of the society 
continue to exist is path dependency.  The origins of path dependency date back to the actor’s 
different decisions and actions in different geographical areas. These early choices have lead 
different societies to different paths.  However, if the actors want to maximize their welfare, 
why do inefficient institutions exist?  According to North (1990), this is because markets are 
imperfect and information feedback not satisfactory.  This leads to mental models with 
imperfect information and ideologies that support the existing institutions instead of what could 
be more efficient ones (North 1990).  
Path dependency is strengthened further because organisations are formed to defend existing 
institutions and hence, are pro the existing development path.  These organisations and their 
leaders often have a vested interest that certain institutions are not changed. A further reason 
why change of institutions is difficult is that the informal norms cannot be consciously changed.  
Moreover, institutions are dependent on each other meaning change in one does not take 
place, if others do not change.  Lastly, formal rules can sometimes be changed relatively quickly, 
but norms have to catch up with rule changes  (North 2005).  Path dependency also means that 
change of institutions is usually incremental, because many existing organisations will oppose 
radical change that goes against the interests of the organisations and the institutions that they 
are reproducing.  
For North (1990, 2005), the most important reasons for institutional change are changes in 
relative prices, which highlights the fact that he is trying to build NIE within the neoclassical 
framework.   Relative prices are important because they change the incentives of individuals.   
By changes in relative prices, North (1990, 2005) is referring to, e.g. changes in the ratio of land 
to labour, in the cost of information or changes in technology.  For him, it is maximizing 
entrepreneurs (in the field of economy or politics), who make innovations that change relative 
prices (North 1990 and 2005). 
How then have societies arrived at different types of formal and informal rules that guide their 
operations and enforce these rules?  According to North (2005), rules and norms are being 
created on the basis of the beliefs that humans have. Where do people then get their beliefs?  
They are created through learning.  In his latest book, North  (2005) discusses in detail the 
different theories of learning and concludes that humans learn through pattern recognition.  
                                                          
12
 For a famous example see Paul David’s article “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”.1985 American 
Economic Review, 75:332-37.  
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What this means in practice is that humans will find it easier to adopt new rules or norms, if the 
new ones are fairly similar to the existing ones. This explains, at least partly, why norms change 
very slowly. If mental models of actors are better understood, it is easier to understand how 
actors choose between different actions and what types of institutional choices are 
made  (Schlueter 2009). 
2.2.2. Challenges in using NIE for analysing change  
 
The role of NIE is to understand the evolution of institutions as these “are the source of political 
and economic change and since formal institutions are the only instrument we possess to alter 
the way in which economies perform” (North 2001, 491).13 However, according to North, a 
theory of polity needs to be integrated into the theory of change, because it is through political 
processes that rules are made and enforced.  Further, the study of norms has to be integrated 
into the theory of change.  Hence, knowledge from sociology and anthropology should to be 
integrated with NIE  (North 2001).  According to Williamson, very few economists have so far 
dealt with the social embeddedness level even though North  (2005) and Grief  (2006) claim that 
it is important for understanding institutions.  Williamson  (2000) divides the institutional 
analysis into four levels.  Level 1 deals with informal norms and beliefs, which he calls 
”embeddedness”. Level 2 is about formal rules and laws, whilst level 3 covers contracts and 
transactions costs and level 4 includes prices and incentives alignments.  His categorisation of 
institutions is important, because it highlights the levels of institutional analysis where less work 
has been done and is in line with North’s (2005) view that political science, sociology and 
anthropology needs to be integrated into NIE. 
In his earlier writings, North states that  NIE  “builds on, modifies and extends neo-classical 
theory”  (North 1992, 3). However, Harriss claims that NIE is not in a position to explain big 
historical changes.  He uses as an example the agrarian change in India, showing that 
institutional analysis can explain how inefficient agrarian institutions contributed for decades to 
low productivity.  However, institutional analysis cannot explain why this productivity increased 
suddenly in the early 1990s.  Harriss claims that in order to understand relations between social 
classes and the relative power structure between them, they need to be understood historically 
(Harriss 2008, 312-3). Similarly, Bardhan (2001) claims that the evolution of institutions and the 
way property rights are organised reveal the relative strength of different social groups. Further, 
                                                          
13
 With this North implies that norms cannot be created. 
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even though North states that ”a dynamic model of economic change entails as an integral part 
of that model analysis of the polity” (North 1995, 22), Harriss suggests that the analysis of 
politics is not part of NIE.   He notes that it does not provide an explanation why the same 
institutions in different locations produce different outcomes.  He refers to Bates’ (1995) study 
on coffee marketing boards in Kenya and Tanzania, where identical institutions produced very 
different outcomes.  Bates (1995) concludes that in order to explain the different outcomes 
there is ”the necessity of embedding the new institutionalism within the study of 
politics”   (Bates 1995, 42; here Harriss 2008). Another reason why Harriss (2008) thinks that it is 
difficult to integrate politics into NIE is the key assumptions involved, namely, scarcity and the 
utility maximization of the individual, which are the same as in neo-classical theory: all agents 
are assumed to be equal. Regarding North’s intention to integrate norms (culture and beliefs) 
into NIE, Harriss again claims that this could be problematic because a basic assumption 
underlying NIE is that economic models are universal (Harriss 2008, 316).  
However, in his later works North (2001, 2005) seems to at least partly agree with his critics 
when he concludes that neo-classical theory was never developed to theorise about economic 
change, stating that ”neo-classical economic theory provides an understanding of the operation 
of markets in developed economies but was never intended to explain how markets and overall 
economies evolved” (North 2005, 65).  According to him, the key weaknesses of neo-classical 
theory are that it assumes frictionless functioning of the economy, it is static, and does not 
incorporate the human intentionality.  To understand intentionality comprehension of how 
people make choices is needed. However, the mental models on which people make choices 
and act are exogenous for neo-classical theory (North 2005, 65). Hence, he concludes that in 
order to develop a theory of change, “we have to evolve a new body of theory or at least to 
modify existing theory to integrate it with those parts of neoclassical theory that are of value 
(North 2001, 491).       
When evaluating the significance of NIE, Toye  (1995) acknowledges that it has brought 
institutions into economics in a way that enables economists to start discussing them.  
However, he claims that as a macro-level theory that is trying to explain the development 
process, it has not brought anything new that other disciplines have not been able to explain.  It 
does not offer at the macro-level any hypotheses to be tested, or any clear policy guidelines.  
Similarly, Harriss concludes that NIE at its core does not have a theory of historical change and 
agrees with Toye who claims that “the main weakness of NIE as a grand theory of socio-
economic development  is that it is empty”  (Toye 1995,64; here Harriss 2008). This author 
criticises what he calls the “functionalist” view of the institutions, whereby their role is to solve 
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specific problems (Toye 1995).  Specifically, according to the functionalist view, institutions are 
there to solve economic problems and reduce transactions costs.  However, this perspective 
does not take into account the norms that are also part of institutions and these cannot be 
changed consciously.  The view that Mahoney and Thelen (2010) among others present is that 
institutions can also be distributional instruments, thus implying that power can be used and 
conflicts may arise in the process of distributing resources and hence, provides an alternative 
hypothesis to that of the NIE. 
Further, Harriss, Toye and Bates conclude that since the study of politics, history, sociology and 
anthropology have not been successfully integrated into NIE and because of methodological 
challenges it is probably not possible to do so (Toye 1995, Bates 1995, Harriss 2008).  However, 
before turning to historical institutionalist theories of institutional change that more 
systematically seek to incorporate these dynamics, I first introduce Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) 
framework for analysis of collective action institutions.  This is because, first, her work operates 
within a rational choice institutionalist framework, rather than an historical institutionalist one 
and, second because - as implied by the criticisms above - North’s (1990, 2005) approach 
operates at a high level of abstraction, while Ostrom’s offers a more detailed approach to 
analysing the rules operating in specific action arenas, which is necessary for undertaking an 
analysis of savings groups.  
2.2.3. Ostrom’s framework for analysing collective action situations  
 
Ostrom provides a framework through which to investigate specific collective action 
institutions. Her major contribution has been on studying collective institutions that work 
around for natural resource management, especially regarding how local communities in 
different parts of the world have managed common poor resources.  Since savings groups are 
also collective action institutions, I examine this framework as it has the potential to offer a 
much more specific focus to the analysis of these groups.  According to Ostrom (2005), the 
researcher has first to choose the action arena that is relevant for the analysis.  In figure 2.1, the 
action arena consists of the actors (participants) and action situation, with exogenous variables 
also affecting this situation.  Ostrom contends that the key exogenous variables are biophysical 
and material conditions as well as the attributes of culture and rules. The two foremost are 
important for Ostrom because, as explained, she deals mostly with common property resources 
like land and water.   Evaluative criteria are being used to assess the performance of the system 
by examining interactions and outcomes. There is a feed-back loop from outcomes to 
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participants and action situations such that the outcomes over time can change both of these 
factors.  Further, the outcomes can also change the exogenous variables.  Nevertheless, when 
action situations are analysed, the framework treats exogenous variables as fixed.  Ostrom 
claims that if the actors perceive that the outcomes arising from interactions are positive, they 
are more committed to sustain the structure of the action arena.  Whilst if they are not content 
with the outcomes, they might want to change the structure of the situation or to leave the 
action arena. 
Figure 2.1. A framework for institutional analysis 
 
Source: Ostrom 2005, 15. 
In order to better understand the action arena, an institutional analyst needs also to the 
exogenous variables.  Ostrom (2005) claims that the key issues influencing the action arena are 
(1) “the rules that are used by the participants to order their relationships, (2)  the 
biophysical/material conditions that the action arenas deal with and (3) the structure of the 
more general community within which any particular arena is placed” (Ostrom 2005, 15).   
Rules: These and institutions are in Ostrom’s terminology very close to each other, regarding 
which she states that 
 “Institutions can be defined as the sets of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are 
allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures 
must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what 
payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions…  All rules 
contain prescriptions that forbid, permit or require some action or outcome.  
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Working rules are those actually used, monitored and enforced when individual 
make choices about the actions they will take” (Ostrom 1990, 51). 
 She proposes that (working) rules are known to everybody in the groups or at least the majority 
and that they are, at least to some extent, monitored and enforced.  If only a minority of group 
members is aware of a ”rule”,  or certain ”rules” are not monitored or enforced, according to 
her definition then it is not a rule.  She also emphasises the fact that rules do not have to be 
written or come from formal legal procedures.  In reality, institutional rules are often created by 
individuals who want to get improved outcomes from the action situations that they are in, i.e. 
people who are trying to solve their problems and to achieve this create rules  (Ostrom 2005). 
Norms are not mentioned in Ostrom’s (2005) framework, which might be because she usually 
tries to formalise the collective action situations and this is difficult to do with norms.   
Elsewhere, Ostrom (2007) has defined the norms and rules in the following way: “Norms 
represent preferences related to prescriptions about actions or outcomes that are not focused 
primarily on short term materials payoff to self.”  Rules are fairly close to norms, but “carry an 
additional assigned sanction if forbidden actions are taken and observed by a monitor.  For rules 
to  exist, a particular situation must be linked to a rule-making situation and some kind of 
monitoring and sanctioning must exist”  (Ostrom 2007, 12-13). Probably, social norms fit better 
under the values of the community in Ostrom’s framework. 
Values of community:    Key attributes of the community that affect in important ways the 
action arena are the generally accepted values of the community, its equality or inequality and 
its size.  According to Ostrom, the term culture is often used to describe the values of a 
community and cultures in turn have an impact on the mental models of the participants. 
Ostrom claims that if all participants in a common pool-resource situation come from the same 
community, sharing some key values and following them, it is much easier for them to agree on 
certain key rules.  However, if they come from different communities, speak different languages 
and do not share all the key values, agreeing on key rules for using common-pool resources is 
much more challenging  (Ostrom 2005). Despite Ostrom (2005) stating that in some action 
situations participants may start from highly unequal positions and the more powerful might 
receive additional net benefits through their position, social institutions (e.g. class, gender) are 
not explicit in her framework nor does she discuss the power dimensions of social institutions. 
Biophysical and material conditions: This is the third external element that according to Ostrom 
substantially affects the action situation, which is understandable since, as aforementioned, she 
deals mostly with common property resources.  The relevance of material conditions is in some 
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action situations more important than in others. For example, in a chess game the rules define 
almost every aspect of the game and the material attributes of the game are fairly insignificant 
(Ostrom 2005). Ostrom (2005) claims that the structure of most of action situations can be 
explained and explored by using the variables presented in figure 2.2: (1) participants filling (2) 
positions, (e.g. chairperson of a group, secretary, member of the group etc.) (3) actions that 
participants in  positions can take, (4) potential outcomes, (5) information that is available to 
the participants about the actions and outcomes, (6) the control that participants have over the 
actions and outcomes and (7) costs and benefits – incentives and sanctions that are assigned to 
the actions and outcomes  (Ostrom 2005). 
 
Figure 2.2. The internal structure of an action situation 
 
Source: Ostrom 2005, 33. 
Ostrom claims that if we need to compare different action situations and possibly improve the 
outcome of them, a coherent framework is required so as to be able to begin to think about the 
different types of rules in terms of whether and how they impact on or change the action 
situation.  In figure 2.3,  the different types of rules that affect the action situation in groups are 
presented.  
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Figure 2.3. Different rules affecting the elements of an action situation (Ostrom 2005) 
 
Source: Ostrom 2005, 189. 
• Position rules define what positions groups have (e.g. chair, secretary, treasurer, 
members) 
• Boundary rules or exit and entry rules define who is eligible to enter a position, through 
what process potential participants enter and how an individual may leave a position  
• Choice rules specify what a group member in a particular position must, must not or 
may do. 
• Aggregation rules determine whether single participants can make the decision or 
whether several or all are needed to support the decision. 
• Information rules determine how information should flow between participants, what 
information should be communicated to members and what should not be shared with 
non-members as well as in in what form the information should be communicated  
• Payoff rules determine the rewards (incentives) and sanctions to specific actions that 
have happened. 
• Scope rules are outcome targets that regulators set for the collective action situation  
Even though Ostrom considers the classification of rules important, she points out that it is not 
only the rules that impact on the different components of the action situation, but also the 
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attributes of the community. Ostrom (1990) also defines three different categories of rules: 
operational, collective-choice and constitutional rules.  Operational rules are nested in collective 
choice rules which are in turn nested in constitutional rules. 
1. Operational rules deal with day-to-day operations of the groups, e.g. who gets 
resources (in savings groups e.g. who gets loans), who monitors others, what 
information should be shared with other group members and what are sanctions if 
someone does not follow the rules. 
2. Constitutional-choice rules determine who is allowed to participate in the group and 
how operational rules are changed.   
3. Constitutional-level rules determine how the lower level rules can be change. For 
example the rules that determine how the group’s constitution can be changed are 
rules at the constitutional level. 
This categorisation has a lot of similarities to Williamson’s analysis of levels of rules, but lacks his 
embeddedness level.   This demonstrates the observation made earlier that Ostrom’s 
framework does not deal with social institutions and norms. 
Ostrom (2005) has also sought to identify design principles for robust collective action 
institutions.  She suggests that the common features of successful group- based institutional 
arrangements required are:  
1. Clearly defined boundaries.  The boundaries of the resource systems as well as the 
individuals or households that are allowed to use the resource 
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and cost.  The benefits for each resources 
users need to be in relation to the costs for resource users. 
 
3. Collective choice arrangements which allow those affected by operational rules to 
participate in crafting and  modifying them.  “ These rules take time and effort to 
develop, try out, modify and then experiment again.  Users who have been engaged in 
this process for some time understand the rules that they have crafted, agree why they 
are using one rather than another and tend to follow their own rules to a greater extent 
than those that are imposed on them “ (Ostrom 2005, 263-264).   
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4. Monitoring arrangements: Who is monitoring that the group rules are followed and do 
they face appropriate incentives given the challenge of monitoring? 
5. Sanctions and enforcement: What are the sanctions that the group is authorizing and 
can they be adjusted so that someone who makes an error that is a small rule infraction 
is sufficiently warned so as to ensure longer-term compliance without trying to impose 
unrealistic sanctions? Moreover, are sanctions graduated in the sense that the more 
serious the offence against the group, the more serious the sanction?  In groups that 
apply graduated sanctions enforced by local monitors, the first sanction is not 
significant, since the main purpose is to notify both the rule breaker as well as all the 
other members that rules matter and that the leaders are aware that some members 
are not following them.   
6. Conflict resolution: What local mechanisms exist to resolve conflicts arising over the use 
of this resource?  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rule-making rights of community 
members should respected by outside authorities.  
In the case where resources are part of a larger systems a design principle of nested 
enterprises is needed 
8. Nested enterprises: “Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises”(Ostrom 1990, 90). 
Initially Ostrom (1990) developed these design principles for common property natural resource 
institutions.  However, later Ostrom (2005) broadened the institutional analysis to include all 
kinds of institutions including private associations.  
These design principles suggest how better outcomes in terms robust collective action 
institutions can be achieved.  Hence, while Ostrom does not propose how processes of long 
term institutional change do in fact take place, she does suggest under what conditions they 
might be effective.  
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Ostrom  (2000) claims that rules developed within the group can operate as well as those 
externally provided on the condition that the above eight features are taken into account.  She 
further claims that if external rules are imposed on the group, it does not develop internal rules 
and is not willing to enforce those from the outside. This might be one of the reasons why joint 
liability does not operate as well as has been suggested by some of the theoretical models. 
However, Ostrom does contends that if external rules are not imposed on the group, they are 
able to develop their own that they themselves will be willing to enforce  (Ostrom 2000).  
To conclude on Ostrom, the fact that in her framework for institutional analysis (figure 2.1) 
there is a feedback loop from outcomes to action situation and to exogenous variables implies 
that it is dynamic and can be used for analysing change within institutions, although this does 
not operate for the rather longer term timescales of North’s approach. Further, the internal 
structure of an action situation (figure 2.2) and the different rules affecting it (figure 2.3) enable 
institutions (rules) to be analysed as distributional instruments in relation to power in action 
situations. However, because Ostrom does not deal with how change occurs, nor concentrate 
on politics and power or compliance, it is necessary to incorporate  Mahoney and Thelen’s 
concepts into the analysis.  The next section begins to address this by drawing on the work of 
Mahoney and Thelen.  
 
2.3. Historical institutionalism:  Mahoney and Thelen’s gradual evolution  
 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), coming from the historical-institutionalist school, claim that NIE 
does not have a comprehensive theory of how institutions change and that it does not focus 
appropriately on issues related to the power of different actors.14  According to these authors, 
the reason for change within NIE is almost always an exogenous shock or sudden happening 
that forces the institution to change. Consequently, Mahoney and Thelen  (2010) have 
attempted to develop a more comprehensive theory of institutional change that considers not 
only exogenous shocks, but also the endogenous gradual evolution of institutions, through 
viewing institutions as distributional instruments and recognizing that the compliance with rules 
is not necessarily complete. They argue that in order to develop a broader theory of change 
                                                          
14
 Mahoney and Thelen also claim that the two other institutionalisms namely Historical institutionalism 
and Sociological institutionalism don’t have a convincing theory of change of institutions, but since this 
piece of research mostly deals with NIE, I will not discuss the critique of Historical and Sociological 
institutionalisms here. 
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some elements within institutions need to be dynamic so that this can also happen from within, 
i.e. endogenously.  Mahoney and Thelen do this by defining institutions as ”distributional 
instruments laden with power implications” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8). According to them, 
the purpose of formal institutions is to distribute resources, more for some, less for others and 
if an individual or a group has a lot of power, it can largely define the key rules of the 
institutions. However, much more commonly the institutions reflect the compromises of 
different, often conflicting, interests.  When institutions are defined as compromises between 
different groups, it is understandable that endogenous change within them is possible.   This 
view can explain both the stability and change within institutions.  Specifically, the individuals or 
groups who benefit from the existing institutional set-up will try to support stability and gather 
political resources to defend it, whereas those who benefit less are interested in changing the 
institution.  If the subordinate individuals or groups succeed in changing the institutions, it can 
be interpreted that the balance of power has shifted (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). It is 
important to note that when discussing institutions, Mahoney and Thelen seem to be talking 
about formal ones.  However, gender norms, for example, are informal institutions but are also 
distributional instruments. 
This definition of institutions as distributional instruments is common among historical-
institutionalists. Moreover, Mahoney and Thelen acknowledge that some authors with an NIE 
perspective, for example,  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) and North (2005) in his 
more recent work, also see institutions as distributional instruments (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010).  Also, within the NIE framework anthropologists Ensminger and Knight   (1997) tested the 
bargaining approach, subsequently presenting three different theories on how norms change: 
co-ordination of focal points, competitive selection among contracts and bargaining. They 
tested the theories with empirical material gathered from the Orma community in Kenya 
covering the following issues: common property rights (land), bridge wealth and clan exogamy, 
concluding that a bargaining approach has the best explanatory power on how new norms are 
generated, especially in situations where their benefits can be distributed unevenly among the 
actors.   
In addition to the balance-of-power approach, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) introduce another 
concept they call compliance.   While New Institutional Economics discusses this phenomenon 
in the sense that the purpose of monitoring and enforcement is to reduce free riding, they claim 
that compliance is usually part of the definition of an institution. Regarding which, they refer to 
North  (1990; 1993) who defines institutions as self-reinforcing, whereby   
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“What institutions do is stabilize expectations (among other ways, by providing 
information about the probable behaviour of others) and thus enforcement is 
endogenous in the sense that the expected costs and extent of noncompliance 
are factored into the strategic behaviour of the actors in a particular institutional 
equilibrium” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 10).  
However, they argue that, if institutions are not assumed to be self-reinforcing and that 
distributional issues are indeed central, then compliance is not automatic and becomes a 
variable that has an impact on whether institutions remain stable or whether they change 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 10). 
Mahoney and Thelen indicate that the following are the consequences if compliance is a 
variable:  
1. There will be struggles over the ”meaning, application and enforcement” relating to 
resource allocation (Mahoney Thelen 2010, 11).   
2. Referring to Durkheim’s notion of the ”non-contractual basis of contracts” Mahoney 
and Thelen claim that ”institutions are always embedded in assumptions that are often 
implicit” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 13).  Shared understanding may exist in a certain 
group or in particular locations but not in other groups or other locations.   
3. It is not enough to design rules, for they also need to be implemented, monitored and 
enforced.  If the rules have been designed by someone who is not in charge of 
implementation, monitoring or enforcement, some of them might not be implemented 
or enforced (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).  
Through suggesting that institutions should be viewed as distributional instruments and that 
compliance should not be assumed but rather, analysed as a variable, Mahoney and Thelen  
have created a framework for analysing institutions as a dynamic concept and in doing this have 
focused on the role of power and the politics involved.  This is because institutional change is 
seen as an outcome of how power dynamics affect how compliance takes place.    
Taking this further, they offer a characterisation of modes of institutional change that arises as a 
result of these dynamics,  by addressing two questions: 
1. ”Does the political context afford defenders of the status quo strong or weak veto 
possibilities? 
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2. Does the targeted institution afford actors opportunities for exercising discretion in 
interpretation or enforcement?” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 18). 
Table 2.1. Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of institutional change 
 Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
Low level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
High level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
Characteristics of 
the Political Context 
Strong veto 
possibilities 
Introduction of new rules on 
the top of old ones 
Layering  
Neglect of existing/old rules 
 
Drift 
Weak veto 
possibilities 
Removal of old rules and 
introduction of new ones 
Displacement 
Active change in functions of 
existing rules 
Conversion 
Source: Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p.19 
The first question concerns the veto characteristics.  There are strong veto possibilities in 
situations where there are actors that are able to ensure that institutional change does not take 
place.  These actors might have veto powers on whether rules are changed or how they are 
interpreted in practice.  When change agents want to introduce new rules and face strong veto 
agents, displacement,  i.e. replacing old rules with new ones, is not likely to happen nor is 
conversion probable, since these people can also influence how rules are implemented in 
practice.  Mahoney and Thelen suggest that layering and drift are the most common strategies 
when introducing institutional change in situations where there are strong actors with veto 
powers to oppose it.  Under these circumstances, no rules of the old institution are changed or 
they are neglected (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 19-20).  The second question relates to the 
extent to which ”institutions are open to contending interpretations and variations in their 
enforcement” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 20).  The degree of variation in rule enforcement can 
at least partly explain how institutional change takes place.  If change agents confront an 
institution where there is not much space for discretion in enforcement, then conversion and 
drift as change strategies are less probable.  ”Conversion normally occurs when rules are 
ambiguous enough to permit different (often starkly contrasting) interpretations... Drift can 
occur when a gap opens up between rules and enforcement (in this case, often a gap due to 
neglect)” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 21). 
As a result of recognising these dimensions of how the rules may change, Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) also offer a characterisation of how the modes of institutional change take place: 
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1. Displacement is where the old rules are replaced with new and different  ones;  
2. Layering is where new rules are established next to the existing ones.  Layering does 
not replace the existing rules, but rather, adds new rules to them, which leads to 
their reinterpretation;  
3. Drift takes place when the rules remain formally the same, but are increasingly 
neglected;   
4. Conversion is when the rules are not formally changed but they are interpreted 
differently.  This can be because actors make use of the vagueness of some rules or 
the gaps between them and enactment by trying to change the interpretation of 
the existing rules.   
According to these authors, incremental change is more likely to happen in the ”gaps” or ”soft-
spots” where there are differences regarding how institutions are interpreted or where there 
are differences between the institutions and enforcement of that institution (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, 14).  
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also discuss the agents behind the institutional change by 
classifying them as either attempting to preserve the pre-existing institution or not and whether 
the actor attempts to follow the existing rules or not, identifying four types of change agents:  
insurrectionaries, symbionts, subversives and opportunists. Insurrectionaries actively attempt to 
displace the existing institution and might be able to introduce new rules and institutions 
quickly.  Mahoney and Thelen link “insurretionary innovators” with displacement, because low 
discretion matches well with the aim of replacing an existing institution and a weak veto 
indicates that there is not a strong opposition to the changes   (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 24).  
Parasitic symbionts are actors that use the institution to benefit privately, but like all parasites 
they need the institution to be in existence in order to be able to benefit from it.  They are 
linked with drift, because they need a high discretion environment to change the meaning of 
rules when they feel that it is necessary, for which they have a strong veto power.   The aim of 
the subsersives is to displace the institution but using their veto covertly so that others do not 
understand their true aim and they are associated with layering. Lastly, opportunists do not 
actively try to displace or preserve the existing institution, but rather, use the opportunities that 
come up to benefit themselves. 
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Table 2.2. Contextual and institutional sources of change agents  
 Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
Low level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
High level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
Characteristics of 
the Political Context 
Strong veto 
possibilities 
Subversives  
Layering  
Parasitic Symbionts 
Drift 
Weak Veto 
possibilities 
Insurrectionaries 
Displacement 
Opportunists 
Conversion 
Adapted from Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 28 
The characterisation of modes of change is useful since it offers a more specific focus for 
analysing how institutions can change through rules being modified, displaced, layered or 
converted. However, Mahoney and Thelen’s analysis covers mostly formal rules and  does not 
focus on the embeddedness, a level that Williamson (2000) introduced above.  I therefore next 
turn to Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008) who introduce culture into institutional theories  and 
also external intervention.      
2.4. Culture and external agents: Boettke et al.’s theorem 
 
Boettke et al. divide institutions into foreign or indigenously introduced and further into  
endogenous and exogenous. For them, foreign introduced means that these institutions are 
brought in by “outsiders”, whereas indigenously introduced are introduced  by 
“insiders” (Boettke et al. 2008, 335).   Exogenous institutions are “constructed and imposed 
from above” (Boettke 2008, 335), and are created by national government or by “foreign” 
entities , whilst endogenous ones are not constructed by any outside formal entity, such as the 
government,  but rather, ”have their roots in the behaviour of individual agents pursuing their 
own ends”  (Boettke et al. 2008, 337). Further, endogenous institutions are ”firmly grounded in 
the practices, customs and values and beliefs of indigenous people”  (Boettke et al. 2008, 338). 
They acknowledge that these types of definitions simplify reality as in all endogenous 
institutions there can be exogenous elements and vice versa. Based on these definitions Boettke 
et al. conclude that institutions belong to one of the following three categories:  
1.  indigenously introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions; 
2. foreign-introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions;  
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3. indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions.  
 
1. Indigenously introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions 
Endogenous institutions are by their nature indigenously introduced.   IEN institutions are 
closest to metis i.e. culture or local norms, since they “evolve informally over time in specific 
places” (Boettke et al. 2008, 335) and “emerge entirely spontaneously” (Boettke et al. 2008, 
333). Hence institutions that belong to this category are most likely to stick (Boettke et al. 
2008). 
2. Foreign-introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions  
If an institution is exogenous and foreign introduced, for Boettke et al., this implies that it was 
constructed (mostly) by outsiders and  imposed from above.  Hence, such institutions are far 
away from metis, being not likely to “stick” in the new context. An example of FEX institution is 
a development community programme that introduces law reform in a particular country.  Even 
though the indigenous government would have approved the programme, the content is is 
mainly produced by the outsiders (Boettke et al. 2008, 335). 
3. Indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions  
In between IEN and FEX institutions, Boettke et al. place indigenously introduced exogenous 
institutions that are associated with policies created by national governments.   IEX is 
exogenous in the sense that it is constructed largely by outsiders to the local community.  
However, this exogenous construct is introduced by a national or a local  player.   Since IEX is 
introduced by national/local players, the institution might, according to Boettke et al.,  have 
more appeal than an exogenous institution introduced by outsiders.  In terms of stickiness an 
IEX is more likely to do so than an FEX and less likely than an IEN.  
Interventions by the development community, like the IMF or World Bank, are, according to 
Boettke et al., in most cases FEX institutions.  This means that even if the development 
community has correctly identified what types of institution are needed, it is still very unlikely 
that these will ”stick”.  However, the authors refer to West Germany after the Second World 
War, where the development interventions ”stuck”.  However, the authors site more examples, 
such as the similar intervention in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the FEX 
institutions did not ”stick”. They recognize that even if  
   57 
 
“exogenous force is  needed to jolt agents out of suboptimal institutional 
arrangements, such force has low voltage precisely because it is exogenous.  In 
other words, despite the fact that exogenously introduced change provides a 
conceptual way out of locked-in, inferior institutional arrangements, realistically, 
its power to alter institutional paths is severely limited” (Boettke et. al 2008, 
353). 
 If an FEX institution sticks, this means that it can be traced back to an IEX institution and hence, 
also indirectly to IEN one, which is “rooted in metis”( (Boettke et al. 2008, 345).  This means that 
for institutional change processes to be successful they should be traceable to an indigenously 
introduced endogenous institution (IEN).   Moreover, if the institutional change process 
considered is of the IEX type (indigenously introduced exogenous institution), it should also be 
traceable to an IEN one (Boettke et al. 2008, 354).   
To conclude on Boettke et al., they have introduced the potential to predict the 
institutionalisation of the rules by assessing whether they ”stick”.  Further, their theorem holds 
that an outside agent can be very unlikely to introduce new institutions that also stick.   They 
note that the new institutions need to be connected to metis or culture, thus emphasizing the 
importance of local norms. Local agents who have a good understanding of local norms are 
needed.   However, their theorem  does not really break culture into smaller parts so as to be 
able to understand how the local actors can bridge the gap between exogenous and 
endogenous elements of the institutions so that they stick.  I therefore turn to discussion on 
how the economic institutions are embedded in social and cultural institutions and the ways 
these influence how economic institutions develop.  
 
2.5. Embeddedness and social relations  
 
In the field of natural resource management there is a wide literature that has engaged critically 
with institutionalist “common property” or “collective action” literature.  Hall, Cleaver et 
al  (2014) call this approach critical institutionalism and make a distinction between this and  
mainstream institutionalism.  Mainstream institutionalism refers to common property and 
collective action analysis that they link to  the New Institutionalist Economics of North (1990) 
and Ostrom (1990), which I have also referred to here as rational choice institutionalism. 
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Hall, Cleaver et al (2014) identify three key themes that they say leaves mainstream 
institutionalism lacking: First, the assumption that communities are homogenous; second,  
avoidance of power and politics and third, inadequate analysis of social phenomena.   They 
claim that the collective action tradition is based on the assumption of homogenous 
community, since heterogeneity would constrain the crafting of rules because the different 
agents within the community would have different interests.  This in turn has meant that 
proponents of community based institutions have not adequately analysed the politics and 
power relations in these institutions.  This has often meant that “big men” like local chiefs, 
politicians or entrepreneurs have gained more power because they are not only the leaders, 
they also represent the community.  They also argue that a lack of analysis of power relations 
has also meant that marginal groups within communities have not been identified or they have 
not been allowed to participate in the decision making.  Moreover, they argue that social 
analysis has been inadequate in the sense that norms, values and symbolic meaning of 
resources has been lacking.  Since the “rules .. are ‘fuzzy’; people’s complex social identities and 
unequal power relationships shape resource management arrangements and 
outcomes”  (Cleaver 2012, 9; here Hall et al. 2014, 73), critical institutionalism sees a need for 
political and  social analysis as well as analysis of norms  (Hall et al. 2014).  
The theoretical work for analysing the way social institutions contribute to the rules and social 
structures comes mainly from economic anthropology and economic sociology starting with the 
substantivist tradition within anthropology that was closely linked to Polanyi  (1957).  He 
suggested that whereas in ”primitive” areas the economy was embedded in the non-economic 
institutions, in the industrialised West it had become dis-embedded from the social base/social 
institutions and should be re-embedded. Granovetter  (1985) claims that in line with Polanyi the 
majority of social scientists think that the economy in pre-modern or tribal societies is 
profoundly embedded in social relations, but in modern market societies this is far less the 
case.15  However, according to him neo-classical economists and formalist anthropologists16 
think differently.  For them, the level of embeddedness of the economy in social relations is 
more or less at the same level in different societies.  Consequently, neo-classical economic 
proponents believe their theory can applied to ”tribal” societies effectively  (Granovetter 1985). 
Granovetter disagrees with both of these views, for according to him the economy is less 
                                                          
15
 Polanyi (1957) actually claimed that the economic sphere becomes disembedded from society in 
modern market economies. 
16
 In the debate between formalists and substantivists the formalists claimed that all societies including 
the ’primitive’ and tribal societies the economic behaviour can be analysed assuming the same ‘rational’ 
behaviour as in Western societies. 
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embedded in tribal societies than what the substantivist anthropologist17 and many 
development theorists have claimed  (Granovetter 1985). On the other hand, he thinks that the 
economy is more strongly embedded in market societies than neo-classical economists think. 
With the concept of embeddedness Granovetter is trying to locate a middle ground between 
the ”over-social” view of social action, where the community’s rules and norms largely guide 
what the individuals do, and the ”under-social” view where the atomized individual makes 
rational choices without the constraints of the community or the norms. According to 
Granovetter, the economy is always embedded in social relations and seeks understand how 
these structure economic actions.  For Granovetter, ”[h]ow behaviour and institutions are 
affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory” (Granovetter 1992, 
53).  Rational choice NIE would claim that the importance of social relations is minimal 
regarding the choices of an individual, because individuals are primarily motivated by self-
interest.   However, Granovetter notes that economic actions cannot be simply derived from the 
principle of profit maximization as social relations also influence the economic outcomes and 
heavily constrain individual action.  (Granovetter 1992).  
Several authors within this tradition have tried to identify the key social institutions influencing 
the way markets operate.   Pujo (1996) shows how the social institution of gender influences 
the rice market in Eastern Guinea. Specifically, activities that require technology, e.g. husking or 
transport are controlled by men, because they have the funds to purchase technology and also 
because tasks where it is used are considered men’ jobs even by women  (Pujo 1996).  Hence, 
she argues that the rice market is embedded in other social institutions.  She concludes that 
“[rice] markets … are partially determined, regulated and perpetuated by a wide set of social 
institutions” Pujo 1996, 132, here Johnson 2003).  Likewise, Harriss-White  (1998) argues that in 
West-Africa the social relations of gender enable women to be active only in certain markets, 
e.g. selling perishable vegetables and fruits, which do not bring much in income.  Regarding the 
social institution of religion, Harriss-White reports from India that  
“religious affiliation can govern the creation and protection of rent, the 
acquisition of skills and contacts, the rationing of finance, the establishment and 
defence of  collective reputation, the circulation of information, the norms that 
regulate the inheritance and management of property and those that prescribe 
the subordination of women”  (Harriss-White 2005, 7).  
                                                          
17
 Substantivists that opposed the views of formalists claimed that in primitive cultures assuming Western 
rational behaviour did not provide deep and meaningful analysis.  
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 Harriss-White’s study of the Indian labour force shows that it is not just regulated by the state 
and the market, but that it is also ”socially regulated” by class, gender, and caste in addition to 
religion. Regarding the concept of ”social regulation”, Harriss-White wants to emphasize how 
social institutions influence the way the economic ones are functioning and that social 
institutions confer power on some people over others  (Johnson 2004a; Harriss-White 2005). 
2.5.1. Social relations and savings group performance  
 
Within substantivist and economic sociology tradition there are several authors who have 
sought to analyse informal savings and credit groups in terms of how they are embedded in 
culture and in different social institutions (Geertz 1962, Ardener 1995, Bouman 1995, Hospes 
1996).  Geertz  (1962) provides an interesting description in the 1950’s from Indonesia on a 
ROSCA in the process of transforming itself into an economic institution, whilst being embedded 
in social and cultural institutions. However, neither Geertz nor Ardener  (1995) tried to analyse 
how social institutions influence the rules, norms and operations of the groups, what power 
dimensions the social institutions have and which specific ones influence groups. There are only 
a few studies that have sought to understand more specifically which institutions have an 
impact on group performance and how they do so. Hospes’  (1996) research on financial 
markets in Ambon, Indonesia is one of them, viewing financial systems as ”social systems 
sustained by actors who are not only participants of these systems but also of other social 
systems, such as ethnic community, an extension program, an office, a neighbourhood, a 
religious society, a group of entrepreneurs, that affect or somehow  embed financial systems” 
(Hospes 1996, 13).  Hospes thinks the different forms of ROSCAs need to be studied and related 
to the differences in ”local economic, social and political developments, since the economic, 
social and political conditions affect the way informal groups operate”  (Hospes 1996).  Another 
author that has sought to understand which specific social institutions influence the rules and 
performance of savings groups is Johnson (2003).  She explains the popularity of mutuals 
(SACCOs and also informal groups like ROSCA and ASCAs) in Central Kenya as a result of the 
social relations and cultural norms that people have in relation to land, in particular of meaning 
related to ancestors and social importance of inheritance.  According to Johnson, mutuals are 
therefore popular because people are not willing to mortgage land to get a loan from the bank.   
To conclude on embeddedness, the central contribution of economic sociology and 
anthropology is the realisation that economic institutions are always embedded in social and 
cultural institutions.  Unlike NIE that only deals with the functions of institutions and is trying to 
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make them more effective through lowering transactions costs, the embeddedness approach 
allows for the institutions themselves to be analysed.  Further, Harriss-White’s claim that social 
institutions ”regulate” economic ones and economic development  emphasises the power 
dimensions of the social and cultural institutions  (Harriss-White 2005; here Johnson 2006).  
Regarding institutional change in relation to embeddedness, Williamson suggests that at the 
embeddedness level change takes place very slowly meaning that trying to change rules that are 
strongly embedded in social norms might be a very slow process and hence, it is important to 
understand which social norms enable or prevent the change of particular rules.   
 
2.6 Institutional change theories and the study of Savings Groups 
 
As noted in chapter one, Ostrom’s framework offers a detailed set of rules for analysis to give a 
basis for the enquiry,  albeit that her approach is based within a more rational choice 
institutionalist perspective.  Her design principles are also open to enquiry regarding the means 
by which rules are created, monitored and enforced in the operationalization of SGs.  However, 
Ostrom does not specify how change might actually occur, i.e. what are the processes through 
which the change takes place. The theories of Mahoney and Thelen, Boettke et al. and the 
embeddedness approach have introduced important themes that explain how institutional 
change takes place.  These themes are first, power and politics; second, external intervention 
and the balance between external intervention and indigenously introducing endogenous rules; 
and third, under the theme embeddedness the importance of social relations and norms in how 
dynamics work out in practice. These themes are incorporated into the analysis.  This section 
briefly discusses how  power,  the embeddedness approach and Boettke et al’s external 
intervention and the balance between what he calls ”foreign”, or external, and indigenous rules 
is related to the other  theories discussed. 
First, it is useful to include the variable of power and politics as well as the concept of 
compliance from Mahoney and Thelen’s theory so that this aspect of Ostrom’s  design principles 
can be analysed. This therefore involves identifying who the different interest groups with a 
political veto to changing the rules are and how they act to resist changes in the rules or steer 
them towards their preferred outcomes. 
Of the different theories, Boettke et al.’s is the most explicit that emphasizes the importance of 
social embeddedness with its emphasis on metis (culture), even though as noted it is not able to 
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explain how the local actors can bridge the gap between exogenous and endogenous elements. 
Ostrom’s framework deals less with the embeddedness level and does not (at least explicitly) 
include norms and social relations as well as the power dynamics related to these.  In order to 
understand how social relations influence the formal rules, norms and social relations, then 
these would need to be explicitly integrated into Ostrom’s framework under the ”attributes of 
the community”.  However, even though embeddedness is less central in Ostrom’s framework, 
it could be interpreted that this is essentially achieved through an in depth participation in 
crafting and modifying the group rules.   
With respect to the relationship between institutional change and embeddedness, the latter 
suggests a high degree of path dependence such that where the implementation of rules is 
strongly affected by norms then they may be slow to change. So part of the issue is 
understanding how embeddedness in particular social relations might facilitate or prevent 
institutional change. The implication is that some social relations and the norms that they 
involve can promote the adoption of new rules while others may not.  For example, 
Johnson  (2004a) showed that the norm that women manage small amounts of money on a 
regular basis as a result of the gender division of labour means that they might more easily be 
able to engage in savings groups than men. Linking embeddedness and Mahoney and Thelen’s 
characterisation of how modes of institutional change takes place (displacement, layering, drift 
and conversion), the issue is whether the modes can be applied not just to formal rules as these 
authors do, but also to social norms.  
With respect to external intervention, it is only Boettke et al that deal with this explicitly.  Both 
Ostrom and Mahoney and Thelen only deal with institutions that are effectively understood to 
be indigenous or local and operating within their own socio-cultural context. The Common 
Property Institutions that Ostrom has studied are member-owned organizations where the rules 
are generated without external intervention and, similarly, Mahoney and Thelen discuss gradual 
institutional change without an external intervention.  
However, regarding how to find the balance between exogenous intervention and indigenously 
introduced endogenous rules Boettke et al.  note that an ”outside” intervention has its own 
cultural boundaries because the outsider most  likely tries to impose his own views. It can be 
interpreted that in Ostrom’s framework, it is genuine participation that is able to bridge the gap 
between Boettke et al.’s endogenous and exogenous elements of the institution so as to ensure 
that the institution is close enough to theses scholars’ metis to stick.  Ostrom’s design principles 
are interesting in this regard, because she analyses Common Property Resource institutions 
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which are indigenously introduced and evolve endogenously (IEN).  She argues for the design 
principle of participation and this can be seen as seeking to ensure that rules do indeed stick.  
This in turn, suggests that it might be possible to bridge the gap between exogenously devised 
rules and endogenous ones better through a sufficiently in depth and extensive process of 
participatory training and development of the model, both among trainers and then between 
trainers and members, such that this gap in understanding can be addressed and its dynamics 
understood. In an analysis of the introduction of new rules into the microfinance sectors in 
Bosnia and Uganda, Goodwin Groen (2012) shows how an extensive phase of discussion 
between local practitioners and foreign experts was crucial to ensuring that proposals for 
regulations and guidelines were well understood by local players even though they involved 
advice from external experts and as a result they did indeed “stick”.    Obviously, such a process 
has to be adequately two-way and one in which local actors can negotiate changes in the rules 
that will support their own objectives, whose importance they can understand.  Hence, such a 
process requires not a nominal form of participation, but rather, needs to have the potential to 
be transformational (see White 1996) .  That is, it must be sufficiently engaging, that the 
purposes are indeed understood.   
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
The review started by considering the wider NIE framework, as represented by North and Grief, 
that has attempted to understand how institutions change. NIE has brought institutions into the 
analysis of economic development and has provided conceptual tools for analysis, such as the 
transaction costs approach. Then Ostrom’s intermediate framework for studying collective 
action institutions at the micro level was presented and analysed, where it emerged that she 
provides a framework for analysing rules in such institutions.  She also suggests design 
principles on how better outcomes in terms of collective action can be achieved, but she does 
not analyse how change occurs. However, as the discussion has indicated both the NIE view of 
North and Ostrom’s perspective on how institutions change is limited. In particular, neither 
have they been able to theorize how politics and social relations might be integrated into the 
NIE or rational choice institutionalism.  The limitations of the latter in terms of its ability to 
analyse change led to reviewing the theory of Mahoney and Thelen, who emphasize that 
institutions are, at least partly, distributional instruments and they assume that compliance is 
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not necessarily complete.  Institutional change is then understood as an outcome of the 
compliance variable and hence its dynamics are related to changing power dynamics.  
The limitation of the analysis by Mahoney and Thelen is that they only deal with formal rules, 
failing to cover the importance of norms and the social institutions (the embeddedness level in 
Williamson’s categorization). Boettke et al.’s theorem was introduced, because it brings in 
external intervention as well as culture.  Even though their concept of culture (metis) is rather 
limited, it provides an opportunity to expand on the phenomenon. Within economic sociology, 
Granovetter emphasises that all economic institutions are in turn embedded in social 
institutions. Whilst Harriss-White and Johnson’s contribution has been to highlight that 
economic institutions are not just embedded in social and cultural ones but also that these two 
types institutions ”regulate” the foremost, which thus emphasizes their power dimensions. It 
was concluded that Ostrom’s framework will be used as a basic framework to study SGs.  
However, power, politics and the concept of compliance drawn from Mahoney and Thelen need 
also to be analysed integrated in order to examine how change occurs.  In addition, it was 
concluded that the dynamics of external intervention as considered by Boettke et al. need also 
to be taken into account.   
The findings from the literature review indicate that social relations are under-theorized in the 
works of Ostrom, Mahoney and Thelen as well as that of Boettke et al.  It is important that 
institutional theory is extended so as to take into consideration the drivers for embeddedness, 
for, as Williamson points out, the existing institutional theories have not dealt with this 
challenge.  Hence, it was concluded that social norms and social relations need also to be 
studied since they are not part of Ostrom’s framework.  Linking embeddedness to her 
framework implies that when rules are strongly nested in social norms, they will change slowly.  
So, part of the issue is to understand how embeddedness in particular social relations might 
facilitate or prevent institutional change.  Mahoney and Thelen point out that politics and 
power impact on how a veto is exercised, and the review of social embeddedness suggests that 
it is likely that the social relations of gender, kin and so on will also influence this. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 established the conceptual and theoretical basis of this study.  It discussed the way in 
which rational choice institutionalism has brought institutions into the analysis of economic 
development but has been criticised as having a narrow focus on incentives and prices.  
Ostrom’s (1990 and 2005) framework for analysing collective action institutions related to the 
management of common property resources was introduced as located within rational choice 
institutionalism but providing a much more operationally focused approach to this analysis.  The 
limitations of NIE in terms of its ability to analyse change led to a turn to historical 
institutionalist frameworks and in particular to the insights of Mahoney and Thelen who see 
institutions as distributional instruments which allow for change through the power of 
stakeholders and the degree of compliance.  However, the limitation with the analysis of 
Mahoney and Thelen is that they only deal with formal rules and do not discuss the importance 
of norms or underlying social institutions.  Hence, Boettke et al.’s theorem, which incorporates 
a dimension of culture as well as external intervention was introduced.  However Boettke deals 
with the culture in a similar way to the way Williamson refers to underlying social norms which 
led us to consider the way social embeddedness has been discussed in economic sociology and 
economic anthropology.    
The overall objective of this study – as stated in Chapter 1 – is to examine the extent to which 
the adoption and use of savings group rules can be explained by theories of institutional change, 
with subsidiary questions related to, first, their sustainability over time and, second, to the 
influence of the social, cultural, economic and political context.  
This chapter therefore turns to a discussion of how this study proceeds.  Ostrom’s framework 
for analysing collective action situations was introduced in the last chapter as an approach 
which offers some detailed tools for operationalising the study of SGs, although her 
conceptualisation is largely within a rational choice view.    Therefore, I first present a discussion 
of how it will be used in this study.   Second, I discuss the research design in terms of 
methodology, methods and sample selection, before turning to a discussion of reflexivity, 
reliability, validity and ethics.   
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3.2.  Analysing SGs using Ostrom’s framework 
 
Since the theoretical discussion of institutions and institutional change in the NIE, historical 
institutionalism and new economic sociology are very broad, it was necessary to look for an 
intermediate framework through which to investigate rules and norms and how they are 
operating at the group level.  As outlined in the previous chapter, Ostrom’s (1990; 2005) 
framework for analysing collective action institutions offers a useful tool because, savings 
groups are indeed a form of collective action and the focus of SG interventions is on enabling 
these to operate more effectively.  Ostrom’s action arena consists of the actors (participants) 
and an action situation.  In this study the action situations are the saving group meetings and 
other interactions that the SG group members have because of the SG activities or 
responsibilities.  Actors are the group members.  However, as noted earlier, Ostrom’s 
framework for analysing action situations does not include an external intervener.  In the case 
of savings groups the external intervention is undertaken by the implementer (CARE) and the 
trainers it introduces to train the groups, even though it can be argued in line with Boettke et al. 
that whereas the some of the rules were “exogenous”, perhaps the trainers the “indigenous” 
introducers.   
Ostrom’s approach offers two dimensions for analysis.  First it offers a specific categorization of 
the types of rules that a collective action situation must have in order to operate effectively.  
These were listed in their general form in the previous chapter, and can be more specifically 
applied to the case of SGs in order that the study can proceed to identify the rules of the action 
situation, as follows: 
 
• Position rules define what positions groups have which in savings groups are the 
positions for example of the chairperson, secretary, treasurer, members etc. 
• Boundary rules or exit and entry rules define who is eligible to enter a position for 
example to become a member or become a chair. Boundary rules also determine 
through what process potential participants enters and how the individual may leave a 
position e.g. some groups have a limitation how long the same leader can remain in the 
position. 
• Choice rules specify what a group member in a particular position, e.g. chairperson, 
secretary, or member must, must not or may do. 
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• Aggregation rules determine whether single participants can make the decision or 
whether several and all participants are needed to support the decision. 
• Information rules determine how information should flow  between participant, what 
information should be communicated to members and what information should not be 
shared with non-members and in what form should the information be communicated, 
for example,  in financial records, minutes or just verbal communication.  
• Payoff rules determine the rewards (incentives) and sanctions to specific actions that 
have happened, in SGs this includes the way loans are allocated and the share out is 
made.  
• Scope rules are outcome targets that regulators would set for the collective action 
situation.  In savings groups scope rules might be (financial) performance targets that 
the trainer or the group itself has given to the group. 
 
The second dimension Ostrom  (2005) offers is the design principles for robust collective action 
institutions. However, four of the eight design principles are not so central to the analysis of SGs 
and the groups could not be clearly differentiated based on these four design principles.  The 
first design principles, clearly defined boundaries are self-evident in the case of SGs in the sense 
that it is the members that save and borrow that are within the boundaries and the non-
members are outside of the boundaries.  Although occasionally groups do lend to non-
members, this is as non-members so there is no difficulty in identifying this boundary.  
Regarding the second design principle, the proportional equivalence between benefits and 
costs, this is also rather clear: members invest time in attending meetings, invest their funds in 
the group and can borrow a multiple of their savings so that again the relationship between 
their costs and benefits is fairly straightforward and does not bear similar levels of uncertainty 
to that involved in managing and maintaining common property resources.  Regarding the 
seventh design principle, the minimum right to organise, this is certainly the case and in fact SGs 
were encouraged and are able to register with the government’s Ministry of Culture and Social 
Services which gives groups certificates of registration. The last design principle did not apply to 
SGs since they were not designed to be or in fact directly nested into a larger system. 
 
Hence, the analysis will proceed by focussing on Ostrom’s  third, fourth, fifth and sixth design 
principles. 
The following adapts the four principles to the specific case of savings groups:   
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• Participation: Whether the savings-group methodology has enhanced the 
participation of those involved in making key decisions in the group? 
• Monitoring: Who is monitoring that the group rules are followed and do they face 
appropriate incentives given the challenge of monitoring? 
• Sanctions and enforcement: What are the sanctions that the group is authorizing and 
can they be adjusted so that someone who makes an error in a small rule infraction is 
sufficiently warned so as to ensure longer-term compliance without our trying to 
impose unrealistic sanctions? And are sanctions graduated in the sense the more 
serious the offence against the group, the more serious is also the sanction? For 
example if the loan is late by a week, is the member warned but if the loan is late by 
three months, are her assets confiscated?  
• Conflict resolution: What local mechanisms exist to resolve conflicts arising over the 
use of savings group resources?  
 
The categorization of rules and the design principles capture her analysis of what is needed for 
collective action institutions to operate effectively and so offer a first basis for the analysis.  It 
allows the analysis to explore, first, what rules are in existence and, second, what the dynamics 
around their introduction and operation are.  Through this the dynamics of participation, 
monitoring, enforcement and conflict resolution can be determined.   
 
There is a wide literature that examines participation in development practice pointing out the 
problems and pitfalls.  As  White  (1996) has noted this can result in very different outcomes 
ranging from it being purely of a nominal form to genuinely transforming  that when carried out 
in an unsatisfactory way, participation or lack of it can reinforce exit.  Indeed, Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) claim that the advocates of participation do not deal properly with the issue of 
power and unequal power relations are highly problematic for participation,  but Ostrom does 
not problematize her design principle.   .  While participatory interventions are supposed to be 
bottom-up and empower the poor, Cooke and Kothari argue claim that participatory 
interventions often tend to be top-down and reproduce “dominant power structures” (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001, 171)  In some case local communities “ask for what they think they will get” in 
others “development partners are able to project their own various institutional needs onto “ 
recipient communities (Cooke and Kothari 2001, 24).  
However, there are other authors that claim that participation is not necessary “tyrannical” and 
can be empowering.   The collection edited by Hickey and Mohan  (2004) is a response to Cooke 
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and Kothari’s work and claims that participatory approaches can also be transformative.  The 
starting point for Hickey and Mohan is that politics matter.  They claim that “understanding the 
ways in which participation relates to existing power structures and political system provides 
the basis for moving towards a more transformatory approach to development; one which is 
rooted in the exercise of a broadly defined citizenship” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 5). The way 
Ostrom describes the process of participation indicates that she expects participation to be 
transforming because in her models participation  has the ability to achieve effective 
organisational structures.  However, Ostrom does not share Cooke and Kothari’s starting point 
that politics matter, and does not explicitly deal with how power structures underpin and 
influence the quality of participation.  
 
 
Ostrom pays particular attention to the biophysical and material conditions in which the 
collective action arena is operating as these are clearly central to the natural resource common 
property situations with which her analysis was primarily concerned.  In the context of financial 
arrangements to provide social insurance, Platteau  (1997) argues that the nature of these 
arrangements is affected by the interaction they experience as a result of their livelihood 
activities.  For example, that in agrarian societies there is more likely to be balanced reciprocity 
than conditional reciprocity (i.e. social insurance) when these interactions are less frequent.    
Hence biophysical and material conditions might also impact the operations of the groups and 
their rules and norms in rural areas that are frequently affected by drought.   However, since 
the inquiry will be undertaken in areas which are not hugely bio-physically diverse, that is, the 
agricultural activities are somewhat but not hugely different, this may not be a strong feature of 
this study.  
 
Moreover, the aim of this analysis is not just to understand whether the design principles work 
or not, but through the analysis of social relations and social embeddedness to understand what 
the influence of these is on how the design principles work.   As pointed out in the last chapter, 
these aspects are subsumed into her category entitled “attributes of community” but are 
attributes to which this analysis will play much closer attention.  As has been shown in the 
discussion of informal financial groups in Chapter 1 and the discussion of social embeddedness 
in Chapter 2, there are a range of social relations that might affect the way the institution is 
operating.  For example:  
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• What role do the social and cultural practices of different ethnic groups play in 
explaining differential group performance  - for example, do different ethnic groups 
have social or cultural practices which support the implementation of some rules more 
than others?  
• What is the impact of gender  relations on rule implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement?  This includes not only how gender differences affect the ways in which 
rules are implemented, monitored or enforced but whether the mix of men and 
women in groups affects how this occurs. 
• What is the effect of kin relationships on the performance of groups? For example how 
are rules enforced between members when their relatives are also in the groups?  
• What is the role of differences in wealth among group members on its performance 
 
Ostrom’s framework therefore offers a starting point for a focussed and in-depth analysis of the 
SGs with a focus on the rules in use, the extent to which the design principles are in operation, 
but one which will be enhanced by a much stronger on the “attributes of community” in terms 
of the social relations and power dimensions at work in their operation. 
 
3.3. Research methodology and methods 
 
Institutional analysis has primarily operated with an objectivist ontological orientation in both 
its rational choice and historical forms.  As indicated above, those critical of mainstream 
institutionalist analysis, such as Hall, Cleaver et al (2014) point out that the analysis of the social 
and the ways in which meanings and values and their symbolic dimensions are inscribed into 
their operation has been lacking.   Given the importance of social norms, social relations and 
culture for this research it is therefore important to move beyond an objectivist ontology and 
positivist epistemology to the analysis of institutions to an approach that can incorporate an 
interpretive epistemology.   
Critical realism offers such an opportunity and there has been some consideration of its use 
with respect to institutional economics  (Wilson 2005).  Ontologically it takes as its starting point 
the view that ”the social world is reproduced and transformed in daily life” (Bhaskar, 1989:4, 
here Bryman, 2004: 440) and hence is neither entirely objectivist nor constructionist ontology.   
It takes the view that social phenomena are real but that it is their effects rather than the 
phenomena themselves that are observable.  This position allows that knowledge of the world 
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can produce alternative valid accounts rather than be certain  (Maxwell 2012).  At the same 
time it accepts that understanding of the world is necessarily therefore relativist and 
constructed.  This position therefore also accommodates an interpretive epistemology.  
Interpretivist epistemology “requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of 
social action” (Bryman 2004, 13) which enables a more inductive analysis of social relations and 
social norms and values to be undertaken.   
The research has employed mixed methods which is also consistent with this more open 
ontological and epistemological stance, since critical realism treats both individual’s situations 
as well as their perspectives as real phenomena which interact  (Maxwell and Mittapalli 2010).  
In particular it was adopted because it was perceived that quantitative data would facilitate 
some testing of the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and group 
performance and that the detailed examination of performance would provide triangulation for 
the qualitative research findings.    
Quantitative methods were necessary to investigate the financial performance of groups since,  
as has been pointed out above, anthropologists have frequently taken claims about the 
performance of informal groups at face value without examining in detail the actual processes 
and patterns of payment involved.  In the field of SGs, quantitatively based claims about 
financial performance are strong and it is therefore important to assess these.  Second, detailed 
analysis of financial performance data would also enable an assessment of the relationship 
between financial performance and socio-economic dimensions of group membership as a 
means of approaching the assessment of the role of social dimensions such as gender, wealth 
and education.  Moreover a detailed understanding of the financial performance of groups was 
expected to enable a deeper understanding and interpretation of the experience of group 
members which was to be investigated through qualitative interviews. The time consuming and 
intensive collection of financial data also enabled us to uncover several of the default and 
misappropriation cases that did not come out in the qualitative interviews. Never the less, a 
significant part of the data was collected with qualitative methods. 
The qualitative data component more obviously allows investigation of the ”facts” of actual 
financial transactions in terms of members’ own experience of participation in the groups.  
Hence the analysis of qualitative data is largely interpretative because it gives consideration to 
the meaning that actors give to their actions  (see Bryman 2004).  Underlying social institutions 
and structures can also then be investigated to act as a frame for actor’s interpretations.  This 
has been done through quantitative and qualitative data, as well as observation of the way 
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groups operate and has allowed allow me to explore the interactions of members to reveal the 
social relations and power dimensions of their interaction. 
3.3.1. Longitudinal research design 
 
Studying institutional change as it happens necessitates research over many years using a 
longitudinal approach.  Longitudinal research involves studying a phenomena over a period of 
time which usually implies that data will be collected at least twice. Further, the cases that are 
studied during the first and subsequent periods have to be the same or at least similar.  
Retrospective studies analysing the past through e.g. life histories can also be considered as 
longitudinal  (Thiétart and Wauchope 2001).  Historical institutionalist studies are usually 
undertaken over decades and often therefore use secondary historical documents and records 
as their evidence base.    
In the case of studying institutional change in SGs, the timeframe is in part provided by the 
expectations of change by the intervention itself.  The SG model proposes that groups will be 
trained and supervised over a period of one year, after which they will be left to carry on with 
the methodology on their own.  This therefore anticipates a rather rapid change in the way 
business is done in these groups - breaking away from indigenous ASCA and ROSCA practices to 
adopt the rules of this new model.  A research design with a longitudinal component was 
deemed possible within the timeframe of this doctoral enquiry in part because I was 
undertaking the research part-time and this therefore offered the prospect of undertaking four 
visits over a period of two years.  
Data for the study was collected both as it happens as well as retrospectively.  Observation of 
the groups was undertaken where possible.  Qualitative interviews were both current and 
retrospective in their orientation – enquiring into the formation of the groups up to four years 
ago as well as the more recent experience of their operation.  Two biases may have 
nevertheless had an impact on the collection of these recall data. The first is whether the 
interviewee was able to remember correctly, or to remember the phenomena at all.  The 
second bias is that the interviewee might have in the light of his/her present understanding 
rationalised what had happened, for example interpreting an incident in a more positive light 
afterwards.  Several methods have been suggested to reduce the biases because of recall and 
rationalization  (Thiétart and Wauchope 2001).  First is that information collected from different 
interviews can be weighed against each other; second, information given by the same 
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interviewee in subsequent  interviews can be compared;  third, that if the interviewees cannot 
easily remember, they should not be probed to answer; finally, that questions should not be 
asked about the very distant past.   All of these approaches have been used in analysing the 
qualitative data collected here.  
Another challenge when collecting data from the same agents several times is that the 
information could be interpreted differently at different times, especially if different people 
collect the data.  Thus it is important that the same researcher or research assistant collects the 
information.  This was possible during the second and subsequent visits but, due to logistical 
reasons, the research assistants involved in the first cycle of field research were not available for 
the subsequent ones.   
 
3.3.2. Sample selection  
 
This study examines institutional change in savings groups that were formed and trained by 
CARE’s COSALO project in Nyanza province in Western Kenya between January 2009 and July 
2011. The COSALO project operated in three districts: Vihiga, Rachuonyo and Nyamira.   Two of 
the locations were selected for the study, namely Rachuonyo and Nyamira.   These two districts 
neighbour each other and are home to different ethnic groups: Rachuonyo is in the Luo-
speaking part of Nyanza, while Nyamira is from the Kisii-speaking part.  So by selecting them this 
made it possible to study groups operating in different socio-cultural contexts and offering 
scope for their comparative analysis while keeping the logistics of the study feasible.  .   
Initially, the aim was also to study groups that were formed at different times and in different 
ways.  First were ‘old’ groups who had been trained at the beginning of the project and hence 
were at least a year old at the beginning of this study so that by April 2011 they were supposed 
to be operating autonomously.  Second, the idea was to observe the training of some ‘new‘ 
groups and to follow them through in order to be able to observe whether and how the 
adoption of the rules drifted over time in comparison to the older groups.  However in practice 
we were not actually able to observe the training process for logistical reasons so had to use 
qualitative interviews with these new groups to understand what had happened in a similar way 
as the older groups.  Moreover, since the analysis revealed little difference in performance 
between these categories, it does not actually differentiate them in practice.   
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A third category of groups was also anticipated.  The project anticipated that groups would 
spontaneously replicate themselves using the new approach and there was some evidence from 
a previous study that this was happening.18  In terms of research, the idea was that if 
spontaneously replicated groups were found in the study areas, they would have been studied 
as a means of examining how groups explain rules to each other. If the replicated groups were 
found to follow similar rules as the groups that were trained by ‘professional’ trainers during 
the project, and if it is possible to find out how the ‘indigenous’ trainers argue for rule/norm 
changes, then this research project would have been in a position to assess more deeply how 
the local institutions (rules and norms) had in fact changed.  However, despite the apparent 
evidence of their existence we were not in fact able to identify these groups in the field.      
In order to select groups for the study, CARE was asked to draw up a list of what it thought were 
its best trainers. It may appear odd to ask for the trainers they thought were the best.  
However, this was to seek to ensure that the groups had the best opportunity to understand 
and implement the new rules, rather than to find that the rules had not been implemented 
because the training had not been done well.  By selecting the trainers that the implementer 
itself thought were most successful,   the aim was to mitigate this problem of variability in 
training quality.   The idea was then to randomly select from the shortlisted ‘best’ trainers, a 
few whose groups could be studied.   
As discussed in chapter 1, in terms of training in COSALO project CARE used three different 
approaches to organising the training, what it calls delivery channels: first, trainers who were 
directly employed and managed by CARE; second, trainers managed by faith-based 
organisations, i.e. churches or FBOs; third, it wanted to test out a private sector approach in 
which trainers were managed by private businesses (franchisees).  In total CARE had trained 50 
trainers across these three delivery channels 
However, instead of shortlisting the ‘best’ trainers as we requested, CARE had asked its 
different regional offices to provide not a selection of good trainers but the ‘best’ trainer under 
FBO and franchisee category in each region. Also the trainers selected by CARE regional offices 
had already been informed that they had been selected for the study and a time arranged when 
the research team would meet the four best trainers, two from each area.  CARE had selected 
these trainers as their best based on its understanding of their groups overall performance in 
rule following and the financial performance (judged on return on savings) these trainers 
produced.  I decided to proceed with their suggestions anticipating that there was still likely to 
                                                          
18
 Results of a study of post-project replication of group in COSALO. FSD Updates No 7 March 2012. 
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be adequate variation in their results to be of interest, and as the subsequent chapters will 
show, there was indeed more than sufficient variation among the performance of these groups 
to form the basis of the research. 
Initially the intention was also to select only trainers from the FBO and franchisee delivery 
channels in order to have comparison, and to exclude those directly implemented by CARE.  This 
was because the intervention was also seeking to lower the cost of delivery by implementing 
through these channels as CARE’s own costs tended to be higher.  The project sponsor, FSD 
Kenya was therefore concerned to find ways to scale up the intervention by lowering training 
costs.  However, having selected two districts, in the first field visit it was found that there were 
no franchisee trainers in Rachuonyo District, only FBO trainers and those directly managed by 
CARE.  Hence from Rachuonyo CARE had selected two trainers that were under the local church 
(FBO).  Since we also found that these FBO trainers were still visiting some of the groups after 
they had  - in theory – finished the training, we then decided to drop one of these and 
substitute groups that had been trained directly by CARE as in this case the trainer (regarded as 
a good one) was no longer present and this therefore offered some comparison which matched 
the original intention of the methodology.  
Each trainer was then asked to list all the groups that they had trained and that had completed 
at least one share-out and rank them into good, medium and poorly performing groups.  Then 
one group from each category was randomly selected.  CARE officials in Rachuonyo assisted in 
ranking the groups of the trainer that had left.  This ranking was based on the Return on Savings 
at the time of share-out. 
As table 3.1 indicates, the total sample consisted of 24 groups: half of the groups, 12 groups, 
were from Nyamira, six groups that had been in existence for at least one year and another six 
that were formed in April 2011 when the research project started.19  Likewise, there were 12 
                                                          
19
 The complexity of new group formation processes was interestingly revealed more fully during our last 
visit.  We then found out that only the FBO channel in Rachuonyo had actually recruited three entirely 
new groups.  The franchisee in Nyamira used existing groups and in two cases asked members from 
existing groups to form a new group and in the third case presented an existing group as a new group.  
The FBO channel in Nyamira had recruited two new groups, but the third one was an existing group that 
had been formed in February 2011. According to CARE rules trainers were not supposed to form groups 
with members that were already in other Savings Groups – so this was in itself a breach of the rules but 
goes to demonstrate how incentives affect the way rules are actually implemented.  Within the 
Franchisee channel all the members of two new groups were already in other CARE groups.  However, 
while filling the CARE application form for the new groups, the trainer noted that no one belonged to 
other COSALO groups.  The benefit of presenting an already existing group as new group enabled the 
delivery channel and the trainer to receive the payment for forming a group twice.    The fact that several 
of the ‘new’ groups were actually ‘old’ groups was another reason why the old and new groups were in 
the end analysed as one category. 
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groups from Rachuonyo, nine groups that were at least one year old in April 2011 (and more 
than two years old in May 2012) and three ‘new’, that were formed in April 2011. 
The sample consisted of 24 groups but the exact total number of group members varied over 
the period of research.  At any one time there were around 690-695 members in the groups.  
However, since members left groups and new members joined, the research collected financial 
data about 1025 individuals who had been group members in these 24 groups over a period 
from April 2011 until May 2012. This in itself suggests a high level of turnover of membership.  
Socio-economic data was collected from 630 individuals that were members of the groups in 
April 2011 and that attended the group meeting in April 2011.  During April 2012 socio-
economic data was collected from two groups from which data had not been collected in 2011.   
 
Table 3.1. Overview of final sample   
 
Nyamira Rachuonyo Total 
Number of groups 12 12 24 
Number of trainers 2 2 4 
Groups by delivery channels 
       1. CARE direct  0 6 6 
    2. Faith Based Organisation 6 6 12 
   3.  Franchisee  6 0 6 
Groups > 2 years old 6 9 15 
Groups  1 year old* 6 3 9 
Financial data on group members (from records) 507 518 1025 
Socio-economic data on group members(respondents) 370 260 630 
*In April-May 2012 
 
3.3.3.   Quantitative and qualitative data collection  
 
As indicated above, this was a mixed methods study with quantitative and qualitative data being 
used to assess different aspects of the groups and their operations and to complement each 
other.  
First, quantitative data was necessary to understand the financial performance of groups and 
member’s socio-economic characteristics.  A panel survey of member and group level financial 
performance was collected from group records over multiple rounds of data collection.  The 
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instrument collected data on member’s savings and loans at the individual level and also 
collected the performance data of the group as a whole (e.g. Return on Savings). This data 
collection was in fact highly complicated and time consuming as data records were rarely 
complete or well kept.  Nevertheless, persistence with this paid off because it did much to 
reveal the reality of how money was actually being managed as will become evident below.    
Second, a questionnaire survey was administered to all group members on socio-demographic 
and livelihoods data.  In particular, the survey used some similar questions as are contained in 
the national FinAccess surveys in order to provide data that could be compared with those 
datasets. 
The financial data and socio-economic data on group members were analysed in two main ways 
using the SPSS statistical package for the recording and data analysis.  First, the socio-economic 
data was used to produce descriptive statistics of the profile of members to compare the 
sample with available national level data so that the sample can be put into a wider context.  
Second, the financial performance data have been used alongside scores regarding rule 
following (see below) to construct a number of measures of financial and rule following 
performance.  These have then been used to statistically test the correlation of these with 
socio-economic variables of gender, poverty, wealth differentials and education in order to 
assess whether these appear to be influencing performance in any systematic way.  
For the in-depth analysis of rules and norms and the influence of social relations on these, four 
approaches to qualitative data collection were used.  First, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with group members.  We endeavoured to interview the two or three main leaders 
of the group  - chairman, secretary and treasurer; and three members who were randomly 
selected.  The data were collected both by directly discussing the issues or rules and norms with 
them but also indirectly by collecting accounts of what had happened in the groups and the 
nature and extent of rule following that could be understood from these.  For example, if we 
knew there were delays, default or fraud in the groups, we asked what the group had done in 
order to recover the funds.  We also used critical empirical incidents in the group history as a 
focus of such discussions with group members and leaders to examine whether and how the 
rules were actually practiced.   
Second, key informant interviews were carried out with trainers themselves and other key 
informants such as project managers, local chiefs and so on, on a range of issues, including the 
training procedures, critical empirical incidents in particular groups, and issues around rule 
following and enforcement that arose as the research proceeded.  
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Third, during the third round of visits the groups were observed actually undertaking their group 
meetings in order to directly assess how the rules that the groups had agreed to follow were 
implemented. This was done by myself and two research assistants using a checklist, taking 
notes and triangulating our findings afterwards.  These results were also turned into 
quantitative scores of rule following and used in the quantitative analysis.  Qualitatively, the 
analysis also then uses these observations with the training methodology, and trainers and 
member’s accounts of the training.   
Finally, in order to understand the composition of groups in terms of relatedness of members to 
each other, relationship maps were drawn in the smaller  sample of eight  groups.  After a group 
meeting all the group members were invited to assist in the process of drawing the map on a 
flipchart that everybody was able to see.  First the names of the leaders were written in the 
middle and group members names were then added one by one and all the members were 
encouraged to contribute how the members were related to leaders.  Different colours were 
used to mark the following relationships between the leaders and members: from the same 
nuclear family, aunts, uncles,  cousins, grandparents, in-laws and neighbours or friends. If some 
of the members were not related to any of the leaders, we inquired whether they were related 
to other members. Also, if they were not related to anybody, they were asked who had brought 
them to the group.   
In practice, four visits were made over a period of just over two years: the first field visit took 
place in April-May 2011, the second in October-November 2011, the third in April-May 2012 
and the fourth in May-June 2013.  All of the qualitative data was stored in Nvivo and analysed 
with it.   
During the first field visit two research assistants with Masters degrees from the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Nairobi assisted in the collection of the quantitative 
data.  Since they were not available during the second and subsequent field visits, another 
female research assistant assisted in the collection of the qualitative data.  She had been 
working for several years in a project that had done research on SGs and other similar groups 
and hence had a good understanding of the issues.  She undertook interviews in Swahili, rather 
than the local languages. Whenever the respondents were not fluent in Swahili, I interviewed 
them with the assistance of local translators, one from Nyamira who was a native Kisii speaker 
and another from Rachuonyo who was a native Luo speaker.  The local translators also 
organised field visits and interviews with the group members.  The translator from Nyamira was 
a university graduate who had previously worked for a large donor funded health project in 
   79 
 
Kisii,  and the translator from Rachuonyo was a young trained English teacher who had not yet 
obtained a permanent teaching position. 
Regarding the analysis and the coding of the material, I had some prior aspects I was interested 
in on the basis of the literature; for example gender relations, age and other forms of power 
dynamics around institutionalisation of rules.    Further, the literature had also indicated that 
groups fail so I was particularly attentive to the reasons why they fail.  The main reasons for 
group failures, default and fraud, came out over time as I observed delays and other 
problems.    My research was oriented towards understanding that these dynamics were likely 
to have problems.  These themes proved to be important features of how the systems were 
working that I needed to examine and pay attention to as the COSALO programme seemed to 
suggest that increased transparency and accountability of the SG methodology will avoid these.   
I therefore analysed material and undertook coding around these themes  across all the 204  
interviews, of which 171 were SG participant, 12 trainer and 21 key informant interviews. 
However, not all the material in all the interviews was coded but that that related to above 
mentioned themes. In coding  I further concentrated on the eight groups on which I had more in 
depth material  and presented them as case studies in chapter 7.  
However, I did not just encode data based on my understanding from the literature.   These 
themes also partly emerged from observation.  I did analysis between the different stages of 
fieldwork and this analysis then informed my next round of fieldwork.  For example after 
collecting financial data during the first and second field trips the substantial challenges with 
repayment, quality of recordkeeping and misappropriation of funds became clearer and led me 
asking more questions on these themes during the consequent field visits and hence deepening 
the focus of the analysis on these areas.   
 
3.4. Reflexivity and positionality  
 
My access to the organisation was facilitated by the fact that I had worked with both CARE and 
its funder FSD Kenya previously.  The project funder, had funded another project on the 
development of SGs that I managed.  As part of that I had also been involved in an evaluation of 
the previous SG project that CARE had implemented (COSAMO).  Further, since FSD was 
interested in funding a more  in-depth research on the CARE SG project, they were willing to 
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fund the field work for this doctoral research project. Therefore, since both organisations knew 
me,  I had a relatively easy entry into the field.  Both organisations were used to research being 
undertaken on their projects and neither sought to directly influence the questions asked.  As 
pointed out above, CARE were indeed keen to ensure that its best trainers were the subject of 
the research, but in this case this was convergent with the intention of the research to examine 
how well rules had been institutionalised among those groups who were expected to have 
received the highest quality of training. Nevertheless, in some aspects of the work I still had to 
negotiate my access with the delivery channels.  As will be seen later, one of the delivery 
channels was not happy when we visited ‘their’ groups without them being present.   Moreover,  
the results of this research were somewhat challenging and there was a strong reaction to the 
findings from CARE.  Given my close relationship with FSD, it is unsurprising that CARE was 
sensitive to these findings as this could negatively influence FSD’s future funding decisions.  In 
these circumstances I approached the presentation of the findings in as balanced a way as was 
possible.   
The research involved myself as a European male researcher interviewing individuals and 
groups which contained mostly Kenyan women. It has been reported elsewhere   (McKeganey 
and Bloor 1991; here Silverman 2006) that male fieldworkers in certain situations do not have 
access or were not provided similar information than female fieldworkers.  Similarly, male 
respondents might not be as willing to reveal information to female fieldworkers.  In order to 
mitigate these effects, a female research assistant  interviewed many of the  female 
respondents.  McKeganey and Bloor also claim that  besides race and gender also age and social 
class of the fieldworker might influence to what extent the respondents are willing to reveal 
information. I was conscious of these dynamics and the involvement of a local assistant who 
also worked as a translator helped facilitate the interaction.  Under these circumstances such 
assistants are vital to the interaction.  By discussing the intentions of the research with them, 
they were able to find ways to explain the objectives and questions to respondents in ways that 
put them at greater ease.  
 
3.5. Reliability and validity in qualitative research 
 
According to Kirk and Miller “reliability  usually refers to the degree to which the finding of a 
study are independent of accidental circumstances of their production” (Kirk and Miller 1986; 
   81 
 
Silverman 2006, 282).  To increase the reliability of qualitative research  Moisander and 
Valtonen suggest two broad criteria, first,  to describe the data collection and data analysis in 
detail and second to ensure that the theoretical framework  on which the analysis is based is 
clearly laid out  (Moisander and Valtonen 2006; here Silverman 2006).   Both of these 
approaches have been used in this study.  Data collection and analysis were described in this 
chapter in section 3.3.  The theoretical frameworks on which the analysis is based were 
discussed in the literature review and in this chapter in section 3.2. They will also be discussed 
in chapter eight. 
Further, Seale  (1999) argues that reliability is associated with ”low-inference descriptors”.  
According to him this means 
“recording observations in terms that are as concrete as possible, including 
verbatim accounts of what people say, for example, rather than researchers’ 
reconstructions of the general sense of what a person said, which would allow 
researchers’ personal perspectives to influence the reporting” (Seale 1999, 148) 
To collect low-inference descriptors, Kirk and Miller (1986) suggest that the observer keeps 
different types of notes.  First, short notes are jotted  while observing, second, more detailed 
notes are made soon after the observation session and third a field journal is kept on ideas and 
challenges that arise during the observation sessions (Kirk and Miller 1986; here Silverman 
2006).  These different types of notes were kept.  But in addition the majority of interviews 
were also recorded and later transcribed by myself.  In order to enable increase systematic note 
taking in the case of observing the operations of groups at their group meetings,  a checklist was 
developed  In this case three people took notes: myself, the research assistant and the local 
assistant-cum-translator and we discussed our notes immediately after the meeting to arrive at 
as full an understanding of what had happened as possible. 
To achieve reliability in carrying out the interviews, great care was exercised that respondents 
understood the questions and that all the respondents understood the questions in the similar 
way.  In order to ensure this, the interview instruments were pre-tested in the field and unclear 
questions clarified.  Further the interviewers were trained on the instrument and in asking 
questions in appropriate ways.  The interview instruments were devised in English, the research 
assistants undertook mock interviews of each other translating the questions into local 
languages who then answered the question first in the local language and then translated the 
question that she had heard back into English.  In this way the research team were able to 
assess what aspects of the questions were unclear and revise how they were asking them.    
   82 
 
 
Several methods have been suggested to assess whether findings are valid or 
trustworthy  (Creswell 2003).    First is triangulation; second, is to take the draft report back to 
the respondent and  validate it through the feedback; third is to use “thick description” that 
provides the reader with detailed and convincing evidence; fourth is to increase validity by 
spending  long periods in the field; and finally, the validity can be increased through “peer 
debriefing”  with people that understand the issues but are not part of the research (Creswell 
2003 , 196). 
The first method, triangulation of data refers to using multiple methods. In this research for 
example both observation and interviews were used to assess whether the rules in groups had 
changed. When similar findings were obtained with both of these methods, this increases the 
validity of findings.  However Denzin and Lincoln note that in many instances using multiple 
methods does not lead to similar findings.  Hence, rather than defining triangulation as a 
method to increase validity, Denzin and Lincoln write that triangulation “is best understood as a 
strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry” (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000, 5).  When studying financial performance or whether members were late in their 
repayment, the records often provided a very different picture than what members had initially 
revealed in the interviews  However, when respondents realised that the research team had 
also studied the group records, their responses often became more consistent with the picture 
that the records provided.  However, as noted earlier, triangulation between the records and 
interviews in several groups was problematic because the records were of poor quality.  The 
second approach to improving validity of  taking the research findings back to the respondents 
was not directly used in this research, although our repeated interactions with respondents did 
mean that we were continually revisiting the earlier information collected and fitting it together 
with the latest developments.  The third and fourth approaches of thick description method and 
prolonged field time were related in this research.  By repeatedly visiting over a period of two 
years, the circumstances and dynamics of the groups to some extent unfolded.  This fitted well 
with the fact that I was working part time and repeated visits are often meaningful to 
respondents.  The passage of time can build trust, in particular when they become confident 
that there are no untoward consequences of being interviewed.     “Thick description” is in part 
achieved in this study by providing significant extracts from the interviews in the empirical 
chapters that follow as well as in depth descriptions of the dynamics of some of the groups.    
Regarding the last approach to enhancing validity of “peer debriefing”,  after the field work I 
delivered a draft report of my field findings back to the funder, Financial Sector Deepening Trust 
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(FSD Kenya).  FSD had not been directly involved in the research and several useful comments 
were received. However the implementer, CARE was also present and, as indicated above,  they 
were rather critical and questioned the validity of my findings by claiming that I had not 
properly understood the methodology, which was not in fact the case.  This incident is discussed 
further in chapter eight.     
The longitudinal research design also played an important role in increasing the reliability and 
validity of the data collection and findings.  In the periods between field visits I was able to 
process and analyse the data which allowed me  go back to the field with new question and 
probe issues further, hence increasing robustness.  In particular, it was this approach that 
enable the extremely important dynamics of numerous default and misappropriation cases to 
become more  apparent during the third and final field visits.     
 
3.6. Ethical issues 
 
All of our respondents were adults and verbal consent was sought  to interview them and use 
the information provided for the purposes of this doctoral research project. A written note on 
the project was prepared and given to the respondents who wanted to have more information 
on the project.  When asking for consent, respondents were informed that their identity and 
location would not be revealed and the names of the groups and the names of the respondents 
have been anonymized.  One ethical issue that arose was whether respondents should be 
compensated for their time.  Since this was longitudinal research, the selected respondents 
were to be interviewed up to three or four times.  Since this involved some hours of their time, 
we discussed within the research team whether they should be compensated.  However, in 
some ways it was the longitudinal nature of the research that made this more difficult as it 
risked turning our interviews into transactional encounters that would be regarded as meriting 
payment.  It therefore also risked that people who were not interviewed might in fact become 
dissatisfied with our presence.  We therefore decided not to directly compensate people for 
talking to us but did invite some of the interviewees with whom we spent more time to take a 
soda or lunch with us  (see Ryen 2004).  
In the course of the research some respondents appealed to me to be a link between them and 
the implementer (CARE) in order to circumvent the delivery channel with which they had been 
dealing since they were unhappy with the behaviour of one of the intermediaries.  The case is 
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discussed in detail in Chapter six. I did this  and sought to do it in a way that would not implicate 
the people who had raised the issue.  While CARE had already closed the project and hence the 
intermediary could not formally be removed, in practice it did not distance itself from the 
intermediary either as this delivery channel was regarded as one of its most successful.  As 
discussed further below, this was indicative of an important set of dynamics around that 
delivery channel. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
The methodology chapter started by presenting the nature of intervention through which 
institutional change in SGs will be analysed.  Then under research methodology Ostrom’s 
framework for analysing collective action situations was operationalized for the study. It was 
noted that since Ostrom’s framework does not deal with how change takes place, on external 
intervention, social norms and social relations, these will be dealt by using concepts from other 
theories.  
The analysis used her categorisation of rules and her design principles as a focus for the analysis 
to explore what rules were in existence and what the dynamics around their operation were.  
Through this the dynamics of participation, monitoring, enforcement and conflict resolution can 
be investigated.  But the aim of this analysis is not just to understand whether her design 
principles work or not, but through the analysis of social relations try to understand what are 
the underlying reasons why.   
The study used a methodology that is inductive in that it seeks to build up the themes of the 
research from the data before comparing and contrasting these findings to the broader 
theoretical frameworks discussed above.  It was also interpretive in that it investigated how 
members reported and explained their own experience of these groups.  Importantly it was 
longitudinal in following groups adopting new rules over the period of two year to understand 
the dynamics of this adoption.  It used a mixture of methods including a questionnaire survey, 
analysis of group records, in-depth interviews and observation.   Different ways to increase 
reliability and validity were discussed before concluding by ethical issues.  
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CHAPTER 4. SAVINGS GROUPS IN CONTEXT  
  
4.1. Introduction 
 
As explained in the introductory chapter, this chapter contains contextual information regarding 
Kenya so as to situate the empirical study that investigates the effectiveness of savings groups 
as set out in the following three chapters. This contextual information involves reviewing the 
literature and evidence in four areas. First, a profile of informal financial groups in Kenya from 
national surveys is provided.  As was briefly discussed in the literature review, there are several 
kinds of informal financial groups operating in Kenya.  This section examines the scale and 
characteristics of informal groups currently operating, focusing on ROSCAs and ASCAs.   The 
purpose is to provide a background on the scale, of their use, the socioeconomic characteristics 
of their users and to give an overview of the motives for using them as well as the problems 
users encounter.  This analysis is based on data from national financial access surveys.  
 
Second, the literature relating to the dynamics of groups, focusing especially on their social 
relations, in both Kenya and the wider African context is reviewed.  The literature review in 
Chapter 2 highlighted the influence of social relations of class, wealth, gender, ethnicity, kinship 
and friendship on the performance of financial groups, since the extent to which rules are 
followed is embedded in these power relations.  Based on the Kenyan and wider African 
literature, there is discussion of how power and social relations impact on group performance 
and patterns of rule following.   
 
Third, the specific background of the study location in Nyanza, the people’s livelihoods and the 
origins of financial groups in that area are covered. More specifically, this first section provides a 
geographical and livelihood overview pertaining to Nyamira and Rachuonyo in Southern Nyanza 
where the study was conducted.  Anthropological literature gives some explanation regarding 
the origins and history of groups in these areas in the context of livelihoods. This evidence 
demonstrates that informal groups have provided financial and other services for many years 
prior to the recent phase of promotion by external agencies and hence, that these interventions 
are operating in the context of pre-existing social norms, patterns of social relations and 
institutional dynamics. Fourth, a brief outline of the macro-level of political economy of Kenya 
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since the colonial period is presented concentrating on patronage and politics.  This sheds some 
light on the social and power relations that have emerged at the local level, in particular, in 
relation to the concepts of negotiability and rule following discussed in detail in a later section. 
This section highlights how some of the key themes of power and social relations at the wider 
political economy level can shed light on the micro level of social relations of groups discussed 
in the previous section.  
 
4.2. A profile of informal financial groups in Kenya 
 
This section first presents an overview of the use of groups as a financial service relative to 
other financial services. This followed by a profile of who uses these groups and third, there is 
discussion on the motivations for joining them as well as the problems members face.   
4.2.1 Overview of the use of financial groups  
 
This subsection first provides an overview of financial service use in Kenya.  Three national 
surveys, in 2006, 2009 and 2013 collected data about financial access including information on 
informal financial groups. Table 4.1. presents an overview of the financial service use in the 
country.     
Table 4.1. Financial service use (% of adult population) 
Financial service FinAccess 2006 FinAccess 2009 FinAccess 2013 
 (n=4,418) (n=6,343) (n=5,849) 
Banks 17.8 21.5 29.2 
SACCO 13.1 9.0 11.0 
MFO* 1.7 3.4 3.5 
MMT registered** - 27.9 61.6 
Government 1.1 0.3 1.0 
ROSCA 29.3 31.7 21.4 
ASCA 5.7 8.0 5.8 
Local shop 22.8 24.3 5.6 
Informal moneylender 0.7 0.4 0.4 
Employer loan 0.9 0.5 0.0 
Buyer loan 0.9 1.2 1.1 
Family or friend (saving or loan) 17.5 17.5 11.0 
*Microfinance organisations 
**Mobile Money Transfer registered users 
Source: FinAccess surveys 2006, 2009 and 2013  (FinAccess 2009, 2013).  
   87 
 
 
The table shows that whilst the use of banks increased substantially from 17.5% to 29.2% 
between 2006 and  2013, there are big regional differences.  As figure 4. 1 shows, in the Nairobi 
region in 2013 52.4% of the adult population had a bank account, whereas in Nyanza this was 
the case for only 19.2%.   The use of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) was notably 
reduced  between 2006 and 2009, but has since increased to 11% in 2013.  In recent years, 
SACCO reform has resulted in their services looking more like those of banks and at the same 
time the latter have started to compete for SACCO customers. Microfinance organisation (MFO) 
usage doubled between 2006 and 2009 from 1.7% to 3.4%, but this figure hardly changed up to 
2013.  The most significant change that has taken place across the three time points is in the use 
of mobile financial services (e.g. M-PESA), which did not exist in 2006, but by 2013 61.6% of the 
adult population was using them.  These are essentially money transfer services and cannot 
really be compared to banks, SACCOs, MFOs or informal groups, because they do not provide 
savings services or loans (Johnson and Arnold 2012)  
 
The use of informal groups, namely, ROSCAs and ASCAs, increased between 2006 and 2009 
despite the growth in other financial services, but then fell in 2013 to 21.4% and 5.8%,  
respectively.   However, Johnson (personal communication) argues that the reduction of 
informal groups might in reality be smaller than what the numbers indicate, because the data 
were collected towards the end of 2012, which is a time of the year when many ROSCAs have 
finished operating only starting again in the following February. Whatever the case, the figures 
suggest that informal groups remain very popular. It could be assumed that the growing rate of 
bank use is undermining the use of these groups, but according to the latest statistics there 
currently still as many people using them as there are with bank accounts.  Borrowing from local 
shops dramatically declined from 24.3% in 2009 to 5.6% in 2013, which could reflect the 
increased use of mobile money and increased access to formal banking services.  In addition, 
borrowing from family and friends fell from 17.5% to 11.0% between 2009 and 2013, which can 
be  also be attributed to increased use of mobile money transfer services, for this means there 
is less reliance for  direct support from kith and kin.  That is, people are still borrowing from 
family and friends but now partly through mobile services.  Other financial services like loans 
from employers, the government (if the person is employed by the government) or from 
informal moneylenders were rarely resorted to during the focal time period (FinAccess 2013). 
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Figure 4.1. Use of banks by region 
  
 
Source: FinAccess 2013. 
 
4.2.2 Socioeconomic characteristics of informal group users  
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the data I conducted out an analytical study of the 
FinAccess 2009 dataset on informal groups (Malkamäki 2011) and in this as well as in the two 
following subsection the findings are reported.20   For the analysis, cross-tabulations are to 
study the percentage of the population using a particular service.   Regression techniques were 
also used to identify which socioeconomic characteristics are most associated with access to 
services.21  Informal financial groups consist of ROSCAs, ASCAs and Welfare groups, but the 
discussion is focused on the two former types as they intermediate funds.  That is, because 
welfare groups do not do so and instead, provide financial support for group members and their 
next of kin in the case of illness, death and other emergencies, they are beyond the scope of the 
thesis.  
                                                          
20
 Similar analysis from the 2013 dataset is not yet available 
21
 Regressions in my paper were undertaken for the Johnson and Arnold (2012) paper by Arnold so there 
were two outputs from the same analysis.   
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As table 4.2 shows, 21.4 % of adult Kenyans were members of ROSCAs and 5.8% participated in 
ASCAs in 2013.  It is notable that the share of ROSCA users has been substantially reduced since 
2009, when 31.7% of the population used them.  Women have traditionally been the dominant 
users of informal groups and in 2006 36.0% were members of one or several ROSCAs, which 
dropped to around 28% in 2013. By contrast, only 14.8% of men belonged to these groups in 
2009, which remained approximately the same up until 2013. Historically, ROSCAs used to be a 
rural phenomenon, but nowadays they are popular both in rural and urban areas, thus 
indicating that they not only thrive on the intimacy of village identity but also the urban setting.    
Table 4.2.  Informal group and formal financial service use in Kenya 
Financial service 
% of adult pop (weighted) 
FinAccess 2006 
(n=4418) 
FinAccess 2009 
(n=6343) 
FinAccess 2013 
(n=5849) 
ROSCA 29.3 31.7 21.4 
                              Women 36.0 39.6 27.9 
                              Men  22.2 14.8 14.5 
                              Rural 30.4 31.4 21.0 
                              Urban 26.2 32.7 22.1 
ASCA 5.7 7.8 5.8 
                             Women 5.9 8.2 7.2 
                             Men  4.9 3.9 4.4 
                             Rural 6.1 8 5.5 
                             Urban 3.2 7.7 6.6 
Source: FinAccess surveys 2006, 2009 and 2013. 
 
Table 4.2 also reports that in 2006 ASCAs were twice as popular in rural areas than in urban 
areas, but over the years their usage in urban areas has increased and in fact, in 2013 they were 
somewhat more popular in urban areas.  Moreover, women also use ASCAs more frequently 
than men.  Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below  illustrate maps from a report that used 2009 data to 
produce a regional perspective on the density of ROSCA and ASCA usage, showing that high 
density areas are in Central , Eastern and Nyanza (Johnson and Fouillet 2011). 
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Figure 4.2 Estimated ROSCA use in 2009
 
Source: Johnson and Fouillet  (2011) 
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Figure 4.3. Estimated ASCA use in 2009 
 
Source: Johnson and Fouillet (2011) 
 
Table 4.3 reports the percentage in each sub-groups that are using ROSCA or ASCA service.  
Hence, instead of analysing what proportion of ROSCA users are female or male (e.g. 70% and 
30% respectively) the table looks at the proportion of women that are ROSCA users (39.6%) 
compared to men (14.8%). This approach enables us to see the overall access in relation to each 
sub-category. The table highlights  that the highest proportions of people using ROSCAs are in 
Eastern, Central , Nyanza, Nairobi and Western provinces, with roughly one third of the adult 
population in these five provinces being members.  The highest use of ASCAs  is in the  Western 
region, followed by Nyanza, Central and Nairobi.  In addition, Nyanza is one of the regions 
where both ROSCAs and ASCAs are popular and provide financial inclusion in place of the banks 
(Malkamäki 2011).  It is commonly assumed that because ROSCAs and ASCAs are informal 
services they are more likely to be used by less educated people, but the evidence suggests 
otherwise.  In table 4.3, the proportion of the population with no formal education using 
ROSCAs was 18.6% , whereas that which had completed either primary or secondary education 
was 34.9% and 32.4%, respectively.   
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Table 4.3. ROSCA and ASCA membership by socioeconomic characteristics 
2223
 
 ROSCA 09 
N = 6,343 
ASCA 09 
N = 6,343 
Overall 31.7 7.8 
Cluster type   
Rural 31.4 8.0 
Urban 32.7 7.2 
Gender *** *** 
Male 14.8 3.9 
Female 39.6 8.2 
Age *** *** 
18-24 21.0 2.6 
25-34 39.2 9.1 
35-44 41.2 12.3 
45-54 32.7 11.2 
55+ 25.7 7.3 
Education *** *** 
No formal education 18.6 3.9 
Primary 34.9 7.7 
Secondary+ 32.4 9.4 
Region *** *** 
Nairobi 31.7 8.1 
Central 34.6 11.7 
Coast 25.6 3.1 
Eastern 37.1 10.0 
Nyanza 37.0 9.1 
Rift Valley 28.1 3.9 
Western 34.6 13.1 
North Eastern 3.3 - 
Frequency without enough food to eat *** ** 
Often 22.9 7.1 
Sometimes 30.5 7.3 
Rarely 35.7 7.7 
Never 33.5 8.5 
*, ** and *** significance at the 0.05. 0.01 and 0.001 level, respectively. Chi-square was 
calculated on un-weighted data 
 
                                                          
22
 This table and the following table 4.4 are sourced from Malkamäki 2011.   
23
 Table reports proportion respondents within category 
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In order to understand the poverty status of respondents, a self-reported indicator, namely, 
food security, was used.  That is, they were asked how often they did not have enough food to 
eat.   In table 4.3 the proportion of people in ROSCAs who ”often” do not have enough food to 
eat is 22.9%.  The proportion of those who ”never”, ”rarely” or ”sometimes” do not have 
enough food to eat is 33.5%, 35.7%  and 30.5%, respectively, thus indicating  that the people 
who belong to a ROSCA are less likely to experience hunger.24  
                                                          
24
 Increase in the ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ categories for ASCAs might at least partly be related to the fact 
that several organisations are training ASCA groups in remote rural areas with Village Savings and Loan 
Association i.e. with SG methods.  
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Table 4.4. Regression analysis – ROSCA and ASCA 2009
25
 
Variable ROSCA ASCA 
Location   
Rural -0.006 0.010 
Urban  --- --- 
Gender   
Men --- --- 
Women 0.225 *** 0.042 *** 
Education   
No formal education --- --- 
Primary 0.106 *** 0.031 ** 
Secondary+ 0.081 *** 0.049 *** 
Expenditure 0.004*** 0.024*** 
Main source of income/money   
Sell produce from farm, livestock & fishing  --- --- 
Pension/transfer from family or friend -0.123 *** -0.031 *** 
Employed on people’s farm full time/seasonal  -0.084 *** 0.031 ** 
Employed on domestic chores -0.055 -0.012 
Government -0.068 * 0.004 
Private sector 0.003 0.015 
Running own business 0.066 *** 0.031 *** 
Sub-letting / earning from investment etc. -0.113 ** 0.007 
Dwelling general condition   
Permanent -0.101 *** 0.046 ** 
Semi-permanent -0.059 ** 0.035 * 
Temporary --- --- 
Traditional -0.077 ** -0.008 
Household assets   
Radio 0.036 ** 0.008 
Television 0.020 0.016 * 
Bicycle 0.063 *** 0.017 ** 
Car -0.118 *** -0.024 * 
Mobile phone usage   
Use own mobile phone 0.145 *** 0.078 *** 
Use somebody else’s mobile phone 0.083 *** 0.052 *** 
Do not use at all --- --- 
Number of obs. 6315 5984 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.079 
*** p< 0.01; ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.4 reports probit regression results.  Probit regressions were used to assess the 
association of socio-economic, demographic and geographic factors with the likelihood of being 
a member in ROSCA and/or  ASCA groups.  The regression results were converted into marginal 
effects, which show the probability of a person with a certain characteristic (e.g. female) being a 
                                                          
25
 Base categories for categorical variables to which the other categories are compared in table 4.4 are 
the following: Urban, Male, No education, Province – Nairobi, Income – sale of own produce from framing 
and fishing, Housing – temporary and Do not use mobile phone at all. 
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member in a group compared to the missing category (in this case male).  Hence, for example 
the marginal effect coefficient of 0.225 for the variable female in the ROSCA regression 
indicates that women are 22.5% more likely to be in ROSCAs than men.  
 
In line with table 4.3, also table 4.4.  shows that having completed either primary and secondary 
education significantly increases the probability that the person belongs to a ROSCA. Similarly, 
having had an education are significantly more likely to use ASCAs than those go without. 
 
Table 4.4. also shows that the expenditure of respondents was also significantly associated with 
increased probability of ASCA use (Malkamäki 2011). The evidence on food security (in table 
4.3.) and on expenditure demonstrates that most people participating in ROSCAs and ASCAs are 
not those whose sources of income are most uncertain and vulnerable.      
 
Another factor that is significantly associated with the use of ROSCA and ASCA services is users’ 
reported main source of income for most elements. Table 4.4 indicates how those depending on 
pensions and transfers, those employed on people’s farms full time or seasonally and those 
subletting land or rooms are significantly less likely (at the 1% level) to use ROSCAs than those 
whose main income was from farming.  On the other hand, those running their own businesses 
are significantly more likely to use this service than those who reported that their main income 
source was farming.   With respect to ASCAs, those depending on pensions and transfers are 
significantly less likely to participate, whilst those employed on people’s farms and those with 
their own businesses are significantly more likely to use them  (Malkamäki 2011). Thus, it 
transpires that particular income sources decrease or increase the likelihood of being in both 
ROSCAs and ASCAs:  being a pensioner or a recipient of transfers leads to lower engagement, 
whereas running your own business leads to higher participation.  However, interestingly, being 
employed on someone’s farm full time or seasonally decreases significantly the likelihood to be 
in a ROSCA, whereas it significantly increases that of being in an ASCA.   The findings on the 
main income sources seem to confirm that people whose sources of income are more insecure 
and vulnerable, such as those dependant on money transfers (pensioners, students and very 
poor people), are less likely to use these groups, whereas business people who need to manage 
their income are more likely to participate.  
   
Compared to the base case of temporary dwelling, living in a permanent, semi-permanent or 
traditional house is significantly associated with a reduced probability of ROSCA use.  On the 
other hand, living in a permanent or semi-permanent dwelling significantly increases the 
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probability of ASCA use (Malkamäki 2011). This higher probability in these types of dwellings  
again indicates that it is not the poorest that use ASCAs. The ownership of radios and bicycles is 
significantly associated with increased probability of ROSCA use, whereas having a car is 
significantly related to a reduced probability of ROSCA use.  The ownership of a car also slightly 
lessens the probability of ASCA use.  This again indicates that whilst the majority of  group users 
are not very poor, they do not come from the top of the distribution since they tend not to own 
a car.  The influence of mobile phone ownership or access to someone else’s is significantly 
associated with an increased probability of membership of  both types of groups.     Those who 
do not own a mobile phone and do not have access to one are significantly less likely to belong 
to either type of savings scheme.   
4.2.3 Joining groups:  motivations and problems  
 
When asked to respond to statements about their reasons for belonging to these groups, by far 
the highest proportion agreed with “they cannot save alone and that they get strength to save 
from sitting with others”.  The second most important reason was that “you can’t save at home 
because money gets used for other things”. These findings support Gugerty’s  (2007) from 
Western Kenya, who also elicited that the main reason why individuals join ROSCAs is for self-
control purposes in order to save. The third most important reason is to acquire certain items, 
which is more important for women.  This is in line with work by Besley, Coate, and 
Loury  (1993), who found that members join ROSCAs because they wish to buy an indivisible 
durable good.  According to this perspective, the advantage of saving together is that everybody 
except the last person will have received their lump sum quicker than if they were saving on 
their own (see chapter 2 for an explanation).     
 
Anderson and Baland (2002)  have put forward another reason why people, especially women, 
join groups, that of household conflict.  Specifically, based on data from Kibera in Nairobi, they 
show that men prefer immediate consumption to saving.  However, even if the husband prefers 
consumption, he will not force the wife to withdraw from a ROSCA, because they are both 
aware of the social sanctions that would ensue for the household if the wife withdraws.  When 
the wife has received her pot (the lump sum from the ROSCA) the husband is usually willing to 
allow her to purchase the goods towards which she has been saving, if she has enough 
bargaining power within the household.  However, the FinAccess 2009 data do not support the 
findings of Anderson and Baland.  That is, they show that only 1% of female ROSCA  members 
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and  2% of female ASCA  group members reported that they were in groups because they 
thought the husband would otherwise use the money.  Notably, in the case of ROSCAs, the 
share of men being worried that their wives would use the money if  not invested in the groups 
was higher than vice versa  (Malkamaki 2011).  
 
Those respondents who did not belong to any group were asked why this was the case. Figure 
4.4 shows that 24.1% reported they do not trust the groups and a further 6.8% responded that 
because other group members steal money they do not want to join.  However, the most 
important reason for not joining groups (42% of respondents) was that they do not have spare 
money.  For 15.7%, the reason for not joining a group was that they do not know about them 
and significantly more men than women reported this to be so.   14.3% claimed that they do not 
need the service.   11.6% said it took too much time and 4.2% of the respondents reported that 
they do not belong to groups because they have an account with a bank or another financial 
institution.   
 
Figure 4.4. Reasons for not belonging to any group  
 
Source: FinAccess 2009. 
 
As figure 4.4 indicates, many do not trust the groups and are afraid of losing their savings if they 
join.  The FinAccess (2009) survey also asked respondents whether they had lost savings in 
informal groups and if so, whether this was during the last 12 months.  Of the ROSCA members, 
12.7% reported this to be the case,  of whom 60% said this was during the last year. Of the ASCA 
members, 18.8% had lost savings with 62.8% reporting that this had happened during the last 
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year. This therefore suggests that savings in ASCAs are more vulnerable to loss than those in 
ROSCAs (Malkamaki 2011).  The higher likelihood of losing money in indigenous ASCAs might be 
attributed to the fact that these arrangements do not have a natural breaking point where all 
the funds are distributed to the members.   This section has so far reviewed the orientations of 
users towards ROSCAs and ASCAs; in the next subsection characteristics of groups will be 
discussed.   
 
4.2.4 Group characteristics 
 
Table 4.5 reports that ASCAs tend  to have more member than ROSCAs as both the mean and 
median figures for the former are higher. These statistics are preferred to the mean, because 
this is skewed by there being a small number of particularly large groups.  Disaggregating group 
size by gender shows that ASCAs to which women belong were somewhat larger than such 
groups where men were members.    This could suggest that women trust each other more and 
have better means than men to deal with possible problems, thus being able to accommodate 
more members. 
Table 4.5. Group size by gender (number of members in a group) 
 N=3509 All  Male  Female  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ROSCA 22 15 19 15 21 15 
ASCA 30 20 23 14 30 20 
 
In table 4.6, both mean and median figures for the longevity of ASCAs are somewhat higher 
than for ROSCAs.   Similarly, the respondents have been members slightly longer in the former 
as compared to the latter.  While the groups in Nyanza tend to follow the national average in 
terms of duration, those in Central and Eastern exist for somewhat longer  (Malkamäki 2011).  
As discussed above, one reason  why ASCAs have a longer life and members stay longer in them 
might be because they do not have the natural breaking point that ROSCAs do. That is, ROSCAs 
break up at the end of each cycle and if members are not happy with the performance it will not 
restart or might after some of the more problematic members have been left out. However, it 
could be the case that ASCA members would like to leave weakly performing groups, but have 
to stay because they have money in the group that they cannot get out.   
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Table 4.6.  Longevity of group and duration of membership 
 N=3,509 Longevity of group 
(years) 
Duration of membership 
(years) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
ROSCA 3.8 2 2.8 2 
ASCA 4.4 3 3.7 2 
 
Respondents were also asked about their contributions to the informal groups and table 4.7 
indicates that ROSCAs receive larger average contributions than ASCAs.    Considering that in 
2009 estimated household expenditure per adult equivalent per month was Kshs2,270 in rural 
areas  (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics  and Society for International Development 2013), as 
can be seen,  the average ROSCA and ASCA monthly savings were quite high, which emphasises 
the fact that these schemes were not only used by the poor but by all income groups including 
the wealthy.  Analysing the contributions by gender, the data show that women’s mean 
contributions to both ROSCAs and ASCAs are significantly higher than men’s.  This is 
counterintuitive especially in the case of ASCAs, because men, who are more likely to save in 
these as compared to ROSCAs save considerably less than woman even though they usually 
earn more.  It could be that women have better established groups and hence are willing to 
save more in them.  
Table 4.7.  Contributions to informal groups (mean and median) in Kshs per month  
 N=3,509 Mean Median Mean Male Mean Female T-test Male/Female 
ROSCA 758 400 748 777 *** 
ASCA 619 300 435 658 *** 
 
To conclude on the FinAccess survey findings, overall, the popularity of informal financial groups 
seems to be high, especially among women.  Both types of groups are more popular in Nyanza 
than the national average. Moreover, while historically their use originated in rural areas, these 
financial groups are now popular in urban areas as well. The data has also demonstrated that 
the groups are not used by the poorest, but rather, by the more educated and business people 
who need to manage their funds. The popularity of these groups is, however, paralleled by fairly 
high levels of risk.  Almost 20% of the ASCA users had lost funds in the groups and one quarter 
of non-members  said that they did not trust them.  The relatively high share of members who 
had lost money in the groups, lack of trust and wide variation in governance raises the question 
of what are the causal factors underlying these problems in groups?  This is addressed in the 
next section. 
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4.3. The impact of social relations on groups   
This section discusses social relations and their relationship to group performance.  In the 
literature review  in chapter Two it was concluded that any discussion on group dynamics and 
rule following  needs to recognise that rules and norms are embedded in the underpinning 
dimensions of social relations, such as class (wealth), gender, kinship and age and in power 
relations that are linked to these. Bouman (1995) reports on the dynamics of groups in Nigeria 
where ROSCAs failed because the power was concentrated in the hands of too few leaders, in 
particular old men, who misappropriated the funds.   In addition to power relations, Bouman 
also highlights that age can be another determining factor regarding how groups play out.  This 
author found that as long as old men were in power, the fraudulent practices continued, but 
these were reduced when young men were elected as office holders  (Bouman 1995). 
Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2008) found that in Benin one quarter of the ROSCA groups 
collapsed before the end of the cycle.  The main reasons for this were irregular as well as late 
contributions to the pot and that members who had received their lump sum left the group 
without contributing until the end.  The study also found out that if the power in the group was 
held by the chairperson alone, it was more likely to fail compared to groups where the power 
was more equally distributed between the office holders. 
 
Burman and Lambert (1995) discovered that men default more often in ROSCAs in South Africa 
due to the dynamics of gender relations.   That is, men are more likely to migrate and leave the 
debts unserviced than women.  Ardener (1995) lists several aspects that are particular to 
women’s participation in ROSCAs across several countries. First, they use the social sanction of 
shame to enforce repayment and hence, rules are more likely to be followed.   Second, women 
also value the network and mutual support that groups offer in addition the economic functions 
of ROSCAs.  Third, women prefer groups where there are only female members.  These social 
features also strengthen the groups, ensuring that performance is good and that rules are 
followed. 
 
Johnson’s (2004a) analysis of ROSCAs in Kenya found two reasons for their greater popularity 
among women.  First , the social sanction of shame to ensure repayment works better with 
women than with men.  Second, women have less money and save smaller amounts for less 
expensive household items or clothes, whereas men are responsible for bigger items like farm 
inputs that require larger funds.   Moreover, because every member contributes the same 
amount of money to ROSCAs they are of limited use for men. Also, farm inputs and school fees 
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that men are usually responsible are needed at a certain time of the year, but only a few 
members of the ROSCAs can get their lump sum as required.  Gender can also be a source of 
power in the groups  (Johnson 2004a).  In a study from Kenya, Johnson and Sharma  (2007) 
report on an in-depth follow-up of nine groups, finding seven cases of default, six of which 
involved men and only one a woman.  Over two thirds of the membership in these groups were 
women and hence, even though the sample was small, the findings indicate that men are more 
likely to be involved in default cases.   
 
Gender relations can often explain misappropriation cases and the same study by Johnson and 
Sharma also identified five cases where the group funds had been misappropriated.  In all these 
cases office holders were responsible for the misappropriation, with three being men and two 
women.  When these cases were discovered, the two women were asked to repay the money 
and were at the same time removed from office.  However, the groups dealt with the men 
differently. One man was allowed to stay on as a group leader, because the group wanted him 
to pay before they removed him.  The second was only accused of misappropriation after he 
had already left his position and in the third case new elections were first held for the office 
holders through which the third man was removed from the office.  As with the second case, it 
was only after he was no longer an officer that the misappropriation was raised with him.  These 
cases illustrate the importance of gender relations in the sense that men were able to use their 
higher social status to better evade the responsibility and punishments  (Johnson and Sharma 
2007).  
 
Kinship is another factor, whereby it can lead to people joining these groups in order to protect 
resources from other family members.   On the other hand, when people are in the groups with 
their kin this can cause problems.   Ambecy and Treich  (2004) show how wealthy members of 
the community handle the social pressures from kin and friends through groups. They 
demonstrate that in economies where there are strong norms to redistribute wealth, wealthy 
individuals use ROSCAs as a socially acceptable way for protecting their wealth.  Platteau (2000) 
has made the same argument, noting that “[ROSCAs] provide a socially accepted alibi to protect 
people’s saving against all sorts of social pressures”   (Platteau 2000, 231)  
 
Kinship ties and friendships can also impact on group performance, especially when default and 
misappropriation cases have to be dealt with, for often groups find it difficult to enforce 
sanctions against those close to them.   Bähre (2002) reports on groups in South Africa that do 
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not allow close kin in these groups, but in many cases this is not possible, because friends and 
relatives want to be included.   
 
In their study on Kenya, Johnson and Sharma (2007) revealed that members claimed that in 
default cases the group will visit the defaulter’s homestead and if the member is not willing to 
repay, assets will be taken.  However, the study could not identify any actual cases where the 
group took this action and instead, as long as the members with late loans expressed their 
willingness to pay they were given time to do so.  Similarly, Nelson (1995) reports from a group 
in Kiambu, Kenya where many members were late with their loans, but since they did not want 
to willingly default, they were given time and 23 group members “negotiated temporary 
default”, whereby they were allowed and expected to repay at a later date (Nelson 1995, 62).  
Johnson (2004b) uses the term “negotiability” when discussing this type of flexibility in informal 
groups.  She argues that social relations enable the renegotiation of the loans and that the 
ability to renegotiate the contract with the groups is one of the key reasons why people are 
more willing to join informal financial groups than other more formal financial institutions.  For, 
the possibility of negotiating makes it less risky to take a loan.  In Kenya, where the incomes for 
the poor are uncertain and fluctuating, the ability to negotiate the conditions of a loan is an 
additional benefit.  However, Johnson adds that even if “negotiability” makes these groups 
attractive, it also makes the groups vulnerable: the more powerful members of the groups can 
negotiate terms that only benefit them, but not the poorer and less influential  members of the 
group  (Johnson 2004b).  
 
This section has shown how the impact of the underpinning dimensions of social (class, gender, 
age and kinship) and power relations impact on the performance of groups as well as why 
negotiability is an important feature in these groups.  However, negotiability also often means 
that the more powerful members of the groups have more options for setting up deals that 
benefit them more than the poorer members. The importance of social relations and power is 
not important only at the micro-level:  the same dynamics influence the politics and economy at 
every level. Before considering how social and power relations at a wider political economy 
level impact on how the rules are followed in section 4.4, the livelihoods and history of groups 
in the focal areas are discussed.   
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4.4 Livelihoods and history of groups in Nyamira and Rachuonyo   
4.4.1 Livelihoods and poverty in Nyamira and Rachuonyo  
The sample of savings groups for this study was collected from the Nyamira and Rachuonyo 
districts that are both located in southern Nyanza.  The Nyamira district is mainly populated by 
the Kisii (also Gusii) ethnic group who speak the Kisii language., and Rachuonyo district is 
populated predominantly by the Luo ethnic group who speak Luo.26  The Kisiis live in the hilly 
and mountainous part of Southern Nyanza where the soils are mostly fertile and receive an 
ample reliable amount of rainfall, ranging between 1200mm and 2100mm annually.  This and 
moderate temperatures have enabled Nyamira to become an important grower of the following  
cash crops: tea, sugar cane, bananas, pineapples and pyrethrum as well as to a lesser extent 
coffee  (Nyamira County 2013).   Coffee used to be the most important cash crop in the district 
but currently the main one is tea. The population density in Nyamira is among the highest in the 
whole Kenya, which according to the Nyamira County website now stands at 665 persons per 
square kilometre (Nyamira County Government). The increasing population density has meant 
that the size of farms has been getting smaller. In 1956 the mean size of a farm was 2.8 hectares  
per homestead  (LeVine and LeVine 1966, 16) and by the late 1980s this had fallen to less than 
one hectare  (Raikes 1989).   Because farm sizes are small and declining, households receive 
their incomes from many sources.   Nevertheless, the Nyamira County Strategic Plan estimates 
that agriculture provides employment for 80% of the population.  (Nyamira County 2013) 
 
Population density in Rachuonyo is higher than in many of the other parts of Kenya, but lower 
than in the Nyamira.  The Homa-Bay County Strategic Plan (2013) estimates that the average 
population density per square kilometre in the county is around 300 persons, with the average 
farm size being between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares  (Climate  Adaptation to Climate Change and 
Insurance 2013). The annual rainfall in Rachuonyo is between 500mm and 1000mm, 
substantially lower than in Nyamira, which means that the cash crops cultivated in the latter 
district cannot be cultivated in the Rachuonyo. The most important food crops in this district  
are maize, sorghum, Irish and sweet potatoes, ground nuts  and legumes  (Homa-Bay County 
2013, own observation). 
 
                                                          
26
 Due to the devolution process Nyamira district was in 2013 transformed to Nyamira County.  
Rachuonyo district became part of Homa Bay County. 
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With the high population densities in the two focal districts, especially in Nyamira, women’s 
ability to produce food for the family became more difficult from the 1940s onwards.   Cash 
crop production (where the money was controlled by men) increased and there was less space 
for food production, which meant the women needed to established microenterprises in order 
to increase their incomes  (Raikes 1989; Silbersmith 2001). The figure 4.5. shows the poverty 
incidence, i.e. percentage of population falling below the poverty line for Nyanza province in 
1997, including the Nyamira and Rachuonyo districts.27  As table 4.8 shows,  regarding the two 
focal districts, in Nyamira it was 69% and in Rachuonyo 71% in 2003  (Central  Bureau of 
Statistics 2003). 
 
 
                                                          
27
 This poverty line was estimated at the cost of consuming 2,250 calories per adult equivalent per day as 
well as the  costs of non-food expenditure.  
   105 
 
Figure 4.5. Nyanza Province poverty incidence: percent population below the rural poverty 
line 
 
Source: The  Central  Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
 
Further, table 4.8 indicates that between 1997 and 2005/06 the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line in Kenya fell slightly from  52.9% to 49.1%.  In Nyanza, the reduction in 
poverty was more substantial:  from 63.1% to 47.2%.  Similarly, the percentage of those below 
poverty line in Nyamira and Rachuonyo had in 2005/06 been reduced to 47.2% and 40.4%, 
respectively. Hence, the estimated rural  poverty in Nyamira was very close to both Nyanza and 
the national mean.     
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Table 4.8. Rural poverty over time (%) 
 1997 2005/06 
National rural poverty  52.9% 49.1% 
Nyanza 63.1% 47.6% 
Nyamira 69% 47.2% 
Rachuonyo 71% 40.4% 
Source:  Central  Bureau of Statistics (2003); Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2007) 
 
4.4.2. History of groups in Nyanza 
The origins of Rotating and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs and ASCAs) 
lie in the operations of labour exchange groups with there being some evidence that the latter 
were developed through the experience of SACCOs (Malkamaki 2010).  In the colonial era and 
up to 1980s labour exchange in work groups was fairly common both among Kisiis and Luos.   
During their fieldwork in the mid-1950s LeVine and LeVine (1966) found such work groups in 
Kisii  for both women and men. 
 
“Women of neighbouring homesteads organize themselves into cooperative 
groups for the performance of routine agricultural activities. This type of group is 
called egesangio, which literally means “an equally shared thing” and a strict 
equality is its dominant theme.  In hoeing corn, for example, the group spends a 
morning in the field of each of its members and then begins the round again. 
Each woman in the group keeps strict account of the amount of time spent in the 
fields of others and is jealous of any inequalities. When the work group weeds 
eleusine (finger millet) the strip of field each woman is required to weed is 
measured with a rope, and arguments often develop over whether or not a 
woman has done her full share” (LeVines 1966, 15).  
 
While doing his fieldwork in the 1980s, Shipton (2007) also found labour exchange groups 
among the Luos , but he also elicited that the popularity of these work groups, called rika, had 
declined.  The researcher also found a ”modern” variety of rika, called shirika.   
 
“People who might once have organized weeding and other labour-intensive 
tasks on a kin basis have lately often turned to a church-members basis instead – 
especially women who after marriage usually live among their husbands’ natal 
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kin rather than their own. As the foreign (Swahili) term suggests, Luo consider the 
shirika a more recent and ‘modern’ kind of group, whatever its real age, probably 
older.  Single sexed or mixed, a shirika group  commonly meets once 
weekly”  (Shipton 2007, 109). 
 
Raikes found that  communal working-groups (ebiombe) in Kisii were the basis of the savings 
groups that he studied in the mid-1980s  (Raikes 1989), with the owner of the farm paying the 
group at the end of the work-party.   The author reports that some of the money was shared 
immediately, whereas part stayed in the fund and was invested in durable assets, such as a 
maize-mill or piece of land .  While the group waited for the fund to grow big enough to be able 
to buy whatever they had agreed upon, it loaned the money with interest to its members and 
also at a higher fee to non-members.  In other groups, employed women contributed to a fund 
who could then borrow from it to run their businesses  (Raikes 1989, 48). This means that in 
addition to being work groups, many of these were also ASCAs since they involved borrowing 
and repayment with interest.  
 
Raikes reports that the most common interest rate mentioned was 10% for a month’s loan and 
if members had it for longer more interest was not always charged (Raikes 1989, 49).  He adds 
that in some cases the interest was not charged, because the person was unable to pay.  Default 
cases were rare, because the people knew each other, being from the same location and hence, 
it was easy to pressurise defaulters.  Raikes did find cases of fraud, where leaders took group 
funds, were more common than cases of default. 
 
In an earlier study of groups in this area, I also found that several indigenous ASCA groups in 
Kisii had started with joint projects, cultivating each other’s farms, or investing jointly in  banana 
or sugarcane farming and after working together for a while they had added  financial functions 
to the group activities. Members of the Itongo group in Kisii said that they had started as a work 
group in 1976, where they assisted each other in cultivating and weeding each other’s farms.  At 
this time, each person earned Ksh 1 for working one day, but they were not paid this money 
directly and instead the money was lent to certain group members on an interest free basis as 
required.  They introduced a 1% interest per year in 1978 when members did not repay on time, 
which was increased to 5% in 1983 and then to 10% in 1993.  The members indicated that the 
idea to set-up an independent ASCA came from SACCOs that had been set-up in the region in 
the mid-1970s.  Another ASCA that was interviewed had also started as a work group in the 
1980s helping each other and instead of distributing the funds after each work-party (communal 
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working-group), they started lending the funds to the members that needed a loan  (Malkamaki 
2010).   
 
Hence, lending with interest in informal ASCAs was occurring amongst the Kisii people already in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  Shipton  (2007) claims that ASCAs existed amongst the Luos in the 1980s, 
but does not provide more detailed evidence During this research we also came across 
indigenous terminating ASCAs in Nyamira, but not in Rachuonyo.  In some of these, members 
saved monthly, but in others they just saved once at the beginning of the cycle. In some groups 
members paid “registration fees” of around Kshs 200 each cycle. As the subsequent chapters 
show, one of the SG delivery channels also introduced such “registration fees”  as a service 
charge.   Further,  in the indigenous ASCAs members were  able to stay with the loans for as 
many months as they wished,  as long as they paid the interest.   However, in contrast to the 
SGs the local ASCAs were less transparent than the SGs.  In some, the members did not meet as  
a group, but visited the leaders houses on a fixed time one by one in order to save, repay and 
request new loans.  This meant the members did not know who was saving and whether other 
members repaid.  Members also complained that the profit sharing was not done in transparent 
way, because only the leaders were present during the profit sharing (Indigenous ASCA 
interviews 1, 2 and 3).      
      
These examples demonstrate that informal groups have provided financial and other services 
for many years prior to the project that promoted savings groups in the area.  This evidence also 
implies the savings groups have been operating in the context of pre-existing social norms, 
patterns of social relations and institutional dynamics. In the following section, the bigger 
picture of the Kenyan political economy is presented for the reasons given in the brief 
introduction. 
 
4.5. Political economy and patronage 
 
This section discusses the wider political economy of Kenya in order to provide a broader 
context and perspective on the role of rules in the society, and how social and power relations 
as well as the patronage operate.   There exists a wide literature on patronage and clientelism in 
Africa.  Bayard (1993) describes African politics as  “the politics of the belly”, where the central 
driving force  of politics is to “eat”, i.e. to acquire material benefits through the powers that one 
has (Bayart 1993, xvii).  This means that “the struggle for power is chiefly a struggle for wealth” 
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(Bayart 1993, 89).  He argues that in order to hold political office which enables accumulating 
wealth requires among others building and cultivating patronage networks (Bayart 1993).  
 
Bayart (1993) claims that the Western dichotomy between the state and civil society i.e. 
between politics and economic activities is not helpful  to understand African political economy.  
Neither is the Weberian dichotomy between legal-rational vs. personalized politics helpful.  
Dominant actors in Africa are not either in the political or in the economic sphere, they 
according to Bayart are in both spheres.   In the political sphere they are promoting their 
economic interests and at the same time they economic activities and wealth to strengthen 
their political power.  Further, Bayart claims that the logic in the survival strategies of ordinary 
citizens is similar to those of the elite.  It is not only the elite, but also ordinary African that use 
patronage networks. 
 
However, the “politics of the belly” is not just about private wealth accumulation.   To be  an 
African “big man” and also a man of honor, the leaders need not only accumulate wealth, but 
must also redistribute it to their clients.  A leader that does not redistribute his wealth will lose 
his honor, followers and influence (Bayart 1993). 
 
In line with Bayart, Chabal and Daloz  (1999) note that  Western concepts are not of much help 
when trying to understand the political economy of Africa.  According to them the African state 
is not only weak but “an empty shell” (Chabal & Daloz 1999, 24) and that in order to understand 
African political economy “the myriad networks which link the various levels of power from top 
to bottom” need to be studied (Chabal & Daloz 1999, 2). 
 
Like Bayart and Chabal and Daloz, Olivier de Sardan  (2008) notes that the existence of 
patronage systems (and clientelist systems) in Africa is indisputable.  He suggests that “there 
exists a system for the management of public affairs, delivery of public services and interactions 
between government officials and citizens – in other words, a mode of governance – which takes 
place, as we all know, in the world of informal deals, enrichment, embezzlement, cronyism and 
network. (emphasis in original)” .” (Olivier de Sardan 2008, 6)However, he is of the view that 
often these terms “provide a means of saving effort on empirical analysis of the realities to 
which they refer.” (Olivier de Sardan 2008, 6 Researching the practical norms of real governance 
in Africa).   In the next section I focus on the work of Sarah Berry who has sought to explain the 
historical origins of these political economy dynamics in the legacies of colonialism specifically 
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relating the analysis to Kenya amongst other African cases, before then considering specific 
literature relating to patronage and politics in Kenya. 
 
 
4.5.1 The origins and dynamics of resource access and power 
 
Berry (1993), writing on agrarian change in Africa after drawing on studies relating to Ghana, 
Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya emphasises the importance of social relations and wealth rather 
than merely considering market relations in the context of gaining access to productive 
resources.  According to her, during the time before colonialism access to productive resources 
was through a “social unit”, such as an ethnic group, kinship or community.  However, access to 
the resources did not necessarily mean full control of them.  For example, the leaders of the 
community could reallocate land, heads of households had to work towards increasing their 
status through using their wealth in strategic ways.  As Berry (1989) notes: 
 
“Cattle, grain, gold or other commodities could be used to acquire control over 
wives, marriage wards, slaves or clients and their dependents. Succession to 
offices and titles was usually open to competition among a number of eligible 
individuals. Success in competing for office depended on the size and dedication 
of one's following, which could, in turn, be increased through strategic acts of 
generosity or patronage” (Berry 1989, 43). 
 
In other words, Berry argues that not only wives but also clients and supporters were bought 
during the pre-colonial times, for supporters and clients were needed to increase the status of 
the patron. 
 
Colonialism changed African societies in several ways and in particular, market relations became 
more important. However, Berry claims that the main channels for accessing resources 
remained the same, namely, social relations and accumulated wealth.  She also maintains that 
the same channels persisted during the period after independence.  Consequently, social units, 
ethnic groups as well as kinship and friendship ties had an impact on transforming the state into 
an entity that was primarily seen as a resource to be exploited by patrons and clients. Berry 
(1989) writes:         
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 “As Africans took control of their own national governments, the state passed 
into the hands of people who already belonged to local communities and descent 
groups and who had often received assistance from relatives and neighbours in 
rising to positions of wealth or public office. Accordingly, many ordinary citizens 
entertained high hopes of furthering their own access to the resources of the 
state through the gratitude and/or patronage of their successful proteges” (Berry 
1989, 44). 
 
Berry’s comment indicates that patron-client relationships were already in place before 
independence, but once the colonial powers had left the substantial state resources were now 
controlled by indigenous leaders who together with their clients had high hopes of benefitting 
from them.  According to Berry (1993), a central feature in gaining access to resources is 
“negotiability”, where: 
 
“negotiability is … a pervasive feature of social and economic processes which 
calls for reconceptualization …In rethinking African … change we need to begin 
with historical and anthropological literature which represents law as social 
process, transactions as subject to multiple meanings and exchange as open-
ended and multidimensional rather than single-stranded and definitive…….If 
rules, transactions and values are ambiguous and negotiable, then economic 
activity cannot necessarily be explained in terms of decisive choices or efforts to 
gain exclusive control over goods and resources.  If access to resources depends 
on one’s ability to negotiate, people may be more interested in keeping options 
open than cutting them off, and in strengthening their ability to participate in and 
influence negotiations rather than acquiring exclusive control over resources and 
severing connections which are not immediately profitable” (Berry 1993, 13-14). 
 
Further Berry claims that: 
 
“… A person’s status and influence depend directly on his or her ability to 
mobilise a following.  If access to resources depends on the influence one brings 
to bear in negotiations over property rights, production, or exchange, and 
influence is enhance by having followers, then it is not necessarily advantageous 
to exclude people from social networks”(Berry 1993, 15). 
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Negotiability refers to the fact that people (especially powerful people) can reinterpret the rules 
or make new ones and then mobilise their followers around their interpretation.  Hence, 
negotiability means that rules are not fixed, are open ended, can be contested and/or 
reinterpreted. 
 
To summarise, drawing from Kenya and the other cases the essence of Berry’s argument is 
therefore that the key means of gaining access to resources in Africa are not only from market 
relations, but also through social relations and power.  Within this framework Berry uses the 
term “negotiability” to explain how the rules are continually renegotiated or reinterpreted or 
new rules created and that the success in these negotiations depends on the number of the 
supporters.   The discussion in this subsection on origins and dynamics of resource access and 
power has concentrated on pre-colonial and colonial history.  The next section moves on to the 
post-independence to consider how the politics and patronage evolved after independence.  
4.5.2 Politics and patronage in the independence era 
In the late 1980s, Haugerud (1995) undertook a study combining several disciplines to 
investigate politics in Embu.  Specifically, the aim was to investigate farmers’ socio-political 
economy in the region so as to explain the processes engaged in in the wider context of Kenya.  
In line with Bayart (1993) the author discovered that  there is a “pyramid of patron-client 
relations” through which ordinary people are upwardly linked to assistant chiefs and chiefs, 
councillors, district officers, head-masters, members of parliament and finally to ministers as 
well as the president.  At each level the patron has different resources that they can distribute 
in order to gain (political) support from clients (Haugerud 1995, 146).  As Haugerud explains: 
 
“To keep his pyramid of followers intact, a patron distributes personal favors 
(assisting in obtaining employment, commercial loans, school admission, trader 
or import licenses, land, and so on).  In addition successful politicians must bring 
(or appear to bring) to their constituencies improvements such as roads, schools, 
health centres, and mains water”  (Haugerud 1995, 46). 
 
In Kenya, the personal favours have often been distributed through organising Harambee or 
self-help groups to which the local politician contributes funds during public Harambee 
celebrations (Haugerud 1995). Haugerud (1995) observes that rural people’s chances of 
prospering depend not only on hard work or economic and political strategizing, but also and to 
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a great extent, on the nature of their relationships with the patrons.  If the state lacks resources, 
then the patron also has fewer to distribute to the client.  All patrons also need to broker28 with  
those higher up in the pyramid as clients in order to ensure that they have enough resources to 
distribute (Haugerud 1995, 146). 
 
Next I am going to briefly discuss some features of political economy since independence as a 
general background and also because it shows how the country has been governed through 
patronage (rather than through a rules based system). This discussion also shows how difficult it 
has been institutionally to reform the rules of the game.  The aim of the new post-colonial 
leaders was to speed the development process as much as possible and to be able to control it.  
With the colonialists’ departure many jobs became available in the civil service and also, the 
white settlers vacated large tracts of land.  These changes meant that there were substantial 
amounts of land, labour and capital able to “manipulated” (Berry 1989, 44) through patronage 
by those with the political power. Poulton  (2014) argues that since independence this political 
power in Kenya has been gained through forming coalitions of ethnic groups. These have been 
maintained through patronage, whereby the leaders of an ethnic group have been allowed 
access to state resources through nominating one or some of the regional leaders as the 
minister or as the head of a parastatal entity.   Patrons who have access to resources will then 
reward their clients often in exchange for political support. 
 
As Barkan et al.  (2003 ) writing on Kenya have explained:    
 
The political process ... is one of perpetual coalition building—of the formation 
and reformation of coalitions of local organizations that have no common 
interests other than the control of the state and its resources.  Stated simply, the 
objective of politics is to control the state for the purpose of funnelling state 
resources back to one’s supporters and local communities. Politics is local and 
patronage is usually king”  (Barkan et al. 2003, 6; taken from Poulton 2014).  
 
The ways in which these processes have operated over the years since independence have been 
widely analysed in the literature.  In the immediate aftermath of independence, president 
Kenyatta used the resources of the state to reward his own ethnic group, the Kikuyu.  One of 
the major means through which he did this was the allocation of settler land to them through 
                                                          
28
 Haugerud uses the verb “to broker” which she has borrowed from Scott 1985.  
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the Million Acre Scheme   (Ogachi 1999; Branch and Cheeseman 2009). Similarly, in the post-
independence process of Africanising of the civil service, Kenyatta also provided many more key 
posts to his ethnic community than to anybody else.  According to Ogachi, for example, the 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) and the Kenya National Trading 
Corporation (KNTC) that provided credit to emerging entrepreneurs  were headed by Kikuyus 
and also provided the major part of the credit to Kikuyu entrepreneurs (Ogachi 1999). Also 
Kelsall (2012) found Kenya classical case of neo-patrimonial29 state under Kenyatta.  
   
When president Moi took over from Kenyatta, he did not have the same patronage resources 
available that the latter had had.  Kenyatta’s supporters had benefitted greatly through 
acquiring land or employment from the government after vacation by the settlers (Mueller 
2008), which was obviously not available for Moi to exploit.  
 
“Unlike Kenyatta, who could give without taking away, Moi had to take away 
before he could give. Hence, the means Moi used both to consolidate support 
and control those opposed to him were cruder and more repressive. This entailed 
‘destroy[ing] Kikuyu hegemony and dismantl[ing] the economic foundations of 
the Kenyatta state’ to ‘build Kalenjin privileges into the structure of the 
state’” (Mueller 2008, 188; the sentence in quotes in the middle of the quote 
from Barkan 1994). 
 
As can be seen, Moi’s approach was first to oust the Kikuyus from the key positions in the civil 
service and as parastatals, thus being able to replace them with loyal Kalenjins and other allies. 
The literature also demonstrates how he systematically taxed the Kikuyu agricultural association 
so as to weaken their economic base and at the same time used the state’s forestry resources 
for patronage purposes  (Mueller 2008). Part of Moi’s strategy was also to extend the patronage 
network to all districts and constituencies  (Branch 2012). Kanyinga provided evidence at the 
local level showing how Moi, through patronage, was trying to win votes and hence, stay in 
power (Kanyinga 1994). 
  
Increased political competition before the first multiparty election in 1992 and thereafter, 
increased the pressures for all parties to provide more tangible benefits to voters because the 
                                                          
29
  The term ‘neo-patrimonialism’ implies that  “African growth is constrained by a governance system in 
which national leaders or ‘big men’ secure their legitimacy by allocating lucrative but unproductive 
economic opportunities to their clients or cronies.” (Kelsall 2012, 677) 
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Kenyan electoral system, as can be seen above, was structured in a way that ensured that the  
”winner takes all” owing to the dictatorial powers of the president.   Consequently, candidates 
(patrons) have to provide something for the voter (clients). Regarding which, there is a poignant 
Swahili proverb  ”an empty hand is not licked”  (mkono mtupu haulambwi) (Haugerud 1995, 46), 
implying that voters expect ‘something’ and hence, that politicians with empty hands will lose.  
The fight for patronage resources has become much more salient during the multiparty era, 
because if the sitting president loses, he and his ethnic followers will also lose access to these 
resources. Moi started using the forests as patronage resource, both to settle his supporters on 
these lands and to allow illegal logging, the revenues from which were used to  reward political 
allies (Boone 2012).  One top-level Kenyan government official suggested that “if there were an 
election every year, there would be no forest left” (Klopp 2012, 355). 
 
In addition to using forests as a patronage resource, Moi initiated several  other schemes 
through which state resources were transferred to private hands.  As Branch and Cheeseman 
note:  
 
“…the corruption of the Moi regime impoverished the state, as millions of dollars 
were looted through the infamous Goldenberg scandal. However, an equally 
significant outcome was that institutions of oversight and accountability had to 
be weakened in order for the scams to remain undiscovered, or at least 
unreported. This meant that central budgeting measures from the Finance 
Ministry to the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) were undermined. .. Greater 
corruption, then, created additional reasons for the executive to encourage a 
process of state informalization that continues to constrain anti-corruption 
effort”  (Branch and Cheeseman 2009, 12).  
 
The patronage politics continued also during the third president, Mwai Kibaki’s, term during 
which there were several corruption scandals involving his ministers.   The popular metaphor “it 
is our turn to eat” was coined to  by ministers and other senior politicians under Kibaki, when 
justifying their requirement to have access to state resources that had previously been denied 
them  (Wrong 2009).  Eventually, this process of “eating” and corruption led to the post-election 
violence in early 2008, with core issue underlying this being the challenge to the centralised 
control of the state by the president.  For at least 10 years preceding this violence, the 
opposition had tried, unsuccessfully, through the constitution review process to reduce the 
powers of the president as well as to decentralise the powers of the central government to the 
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regions. Eventually, a new constitution was approved in 2010, which has reduced the powers of 
the president and has also devolved power to 47 new counties.  However, the numerous 
corruption cases reported both at the central and county level indicate that the “eating” will 
most likely continue and the negotiations around the rules too.  
 
In this section, the wider political economy in Kenya has been discussed, in particular, the role 
of patronage politics. The terms negotiability and patronage politics attributed to that notion 
refer to the situation that, in general, commonly agreed rules are not followed. Instead, the 
more powerful or the patrons  negotiate or manipulate to exert leadership through patronage.  
Nevertheless, the weaker are willing to take part in this system, because they hope to receive 
some small reward and/or the possibility of being able to renegotiate their contracts. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the context for analysis of promotion of savings groups by reviewing  
the literature and evidence in four areas.  First, an overview of informal groups based on 
national surveys was presented.  Even though the popularity of groups during recent years has 
somewhat reduced, they still remain popular: there are as many people in these groups as there 
are bank account holders.   Moreover, the findings have shown that these groups are 
particularly popular among women.   It has also been demonstrated that most of the users were 
not the least educated and poorest, but rather, people with more education as well as business 
people that needed to manage their funds.  Survey findings have indicated that group 
membership was a commitment device, whereby the respondents felt that they could not save 
independently, but got the strength to save from doing so with others. However, a quarter of 
the non-members did not want to join groups because they did not trust them and some had 
also lost funds through being members.  In addition, the findings suggest that there is a higher 
likelihood to lose money in ASCAs as compared to ROSCAs, which could be attributed to the fact 
that the latter have a natural breaking point.   This makes the ROSCA as an institution more 
transparent  and accountable than ASCAs, for with the latter  members might have to wait for 
years before they get their funds back.     
In the second section, it was contended that group dynamics and especially social and power 
relations are key in understanding group performance.  Power in the groups as well as the 
impact of the underlying factors regarding social relations (age, gender, wealth and kinship) on 
the performance of groups were reviewed.  Moreover, their popularity was explained through 
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the concept of “negotiability”, whereby in situations where income is uncertain and fluctuating, 
the ability to re-negotiate contracts is deemed important for members.    The third section 
provided a geographical and livelihood overview of Nyamira and Rachuonyo.  In this section, the 
history of informal groups in the area was also discussed and it was demonstrated how informal 
groups provided financial and other services for many years prior the COSALO project 
promoting savings groups.  This means that people were already familiar with some of the 
concepts of the SG methodology that the international NGO introduced to them.  This evidence 
also implies that  the focal savings groups have been operating under pre-existing social norms, 
patterns of social relations and institutional dynamics.  
The last section sought to identify the dynamics of social relations and political economy more 
broadly in order to contextualize the discussion of these dynamics in groups.  It demonstrated 
that patronage politics, rather than politics based on commonly agreed rules, has been central 
throughout the independence era.  It also showed that the central feature of patronage politics 
has been the ability to “negotiate” and “manipulate” rules.  
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CHAPTER 5. SAVINGS GROUP PERFORMANCE: A QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As stated in chapter One, one of the research questions that this study attempts to answer is to 
explain how differential success of groups in adopting new rules and norms and sustaining their 
operations in the longer term can be explained.   As explained in the methodology chapter, both 
quantitative and qualitative data are needed for this purpose.  This chapter presents 
quantitative data from the savings groups, whilst chapters six and seven will provide analysis of 
the qualitative data. The first section of this chapter describes the socioeconomic characteristics 
of the sample and the second assesses the extent to which the SG methodology has become 
institutionalised i.e. that the SG rules were in use.  Specifically, this section focuses on 
attendance levels, rules in the group meetings and the quality of record keeping.  The third 
section discusses the performance of the groups. To establish which socioeconomic 
characteristics affect rule adoption and  the degree to which the latter affects financial 
performance, correlations between a range of variables are estimated.  The possibility of a 
direct relationship between the identified socioeconomic indicators and financial performance 
was also tested. 
5.2. Socioeconomic characteristics of SG group members 
 
This section presents an overview of the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample.  Table 5.1 
shows  that 75.9% of the sample were women, which was in line with the overall share of 
women in all the groups that  CARE had  trained (77%) (CARE 2011).30  With regards to the mean 
age of the women and men as well as the mean household size the samples in two provinces 
were similar.  In the whole sample 79.8% were married.  In Rachuonyo 19.6% of the 
respondents were widows, whereas in Nyamira only 9.5% were so.  The greater proportion of 
widows in Rachuonyo helps to explain why a larger percentage of households were headed by 
women (33.3%) than in Nyamira (17.2%).  The educational attainment, especially the 
                                                          
30
 Information in this section is from CARE International in Kenya: Community Savings and Loan (COSALO) 
Project Final Report 2011. 
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completion of secondary education of the group members in Nyamira was three times higher 
than in Rachuonyo, being  19.7% and 6.5%, respectively.    
 
Table 5.1. Background characteristics of the SG respondents (percentages by category)   
N = 630 Nyamira Rachuonyo All groups 
Background    
Women 74.1 78.5 75.9 
Men 25.9 21.5 24.1 
Mean age of the respondents 42.0 42.0 42.0 
Mean age of the women 42.0 42.0 42.0 
Mean age of the men 44.0 45.0 44.5 
Mean household size 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Marital status    
Married/living with partner 80.8 78.5 79.8 
Separated 3.0 0.4 1.9 
Single 5.9 1.2 4.0 
Widowed 9.5 19.6 13.7 
No response 0.8 0.3 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Female headed households 17.2 33.3 24.1 
Formal education    
None 7.3 8.1 7.6 
Some primary 30.8 39.6 34.4 
Primary complete 20.5 30.4 24.6 
Some secondary 18.9 12.7 16.3 
Secondary complete 19.7 6.5 14.3 
Technical training 1.9 1.2 1.6 
University 0.3 1.2 0.6 
No response 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Data were also collected to assess the poverty levels of the sampled group members, which 
were measured using the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI). This is an objective client poverty 
assessment tool, which estimates the likelihood that a participant has an income below the 
national poverty line.  The PPI uses responses to 10 questions about family, housing, education 
and ownership of assets to obtain a score  ranging from 0 (most likely to be below the poverty 
line) to 100 (least likely to be below the poverty line).  This score is then used to measure the 
probability that the household has a per capita expenditure below a given poverty line as 
provided by the Kenyan Government. 31  
                                                          
31
  Scores were derived from Kenya's 2005/6 Integrated Household Budget Survey. 
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Table 5.2 presents a breakdown of the poverty likelihood for all groups in Nyamira and 
Rachuonyo as well as for the different delivery channels: FBOs, franchisees and direct training 
by CARE.  The results indicate that the likelihood of groups in Nyamira being poor was 
somewhat higher than in Rachuonyo.  Specifically, the FBO groups in Nyamira had the highest 
likelihood of this being the case (43.5%), whereas the franchisee groups had a 10 percentage 
points lower likelihood level (35.5%) and those trained directly by CARE were the least likely to 
be poor (32.8%). 
 
Table 5.2. Poverty likelihood in Nyamira and Rachuonyo by different delivery channels 
District and delivery channel 
Poverty 
likelihood  
Nyamira all groups (n= 370) 39.5% 
    Franchisee (n= 196) 35.5% 
    FBO (n= 174) 43.5% 
Rachuonyo all groups 
(n=260) 35.0% 
    CARE (n=124) 32.8% 
    FBO (n=136)  37.3% 
All groups (n =630) 37.3% 
 
 
To summarise, the background characteristics of the sample in terms of mean age and 
household size for  the two areas were largely similar.   The key difference in socioeconomic 
data was that a higher proportion of the Nyanza sample had completed secondary education.  
Moreover, the results indicate that the likelihood of a group being below the poverty line was 
somewhat higher in Nyamira (39.5%) than in Rachyounyo (35.0%), which is generally consistent 
with the district level poverty statistics as presented in the previous chapter showing the former 
as having a slightly greater level of poverty. The next section discusses the rule following in the 
SG groups. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 For details on how the score was constructed see http://progressoutofpoverty.org/kenya.   The scores of 
poverty likelihood are averaged across the group so as to obtain a single figure as proposed by the PPI 
methodology. 
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5.3. Rule following  
In order to assess whether the groups followed the SG methodology and the rules that they had 
agreed to follow, the following areas are analysed in this section:  meeting attendance, rule-
following during the meeting, the quality of record keeping, and share-out procedures. 
5.3.1. Attendance of group meetings 
 
Under the SG methodology, it was proposed that all group members should be present at every 
meeting and that all transactions should be undertaken only during them so as to ensure 
transparency.  CARE’s management information system reported that during the first cycle the 
attendance was very high in both the focal areas, being 96% and 87% respectively (CARE MIS for 
COSALO).  However, it transpired that there were much lower levels of attendance one year 
after CARE had left the area.  Regarding measuring attendance of group meetings the research 
team was only able to observe 19 group as four groups did not meet any more and 
unfortunately, one was meeting at the same time as another during the research window.     
 
Table 5.3. presents both the CARE MIS and observed attendance data, from which it is evident 
that less than half of the group members attended the group meetings from the beginning of 
the session (43%) and slightly over half were present by the end (57%), which was a similar 
finding in the two geographical areas covered.  It was expected that in the sample, for new 
groups the attendance would have been higher, because the trainers  were still visiting the 
group.    In fact, as can be seen,  only half of the members were present in the new groups in the 
beginning of the meeting(53%). 
 
 There were also substantial differences between the delivery channels.  That is, attendance 
levels were highest in the groups that had been trained by the FBOs (56%), which was followed 
by those that were trained directly by CARE (38%) and the lowest levels were in groups that had 
been trained by the franchisee (28%).   
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Table 5.3. Mean proportion of members attending group meetings by district and by channels 
 CARE MIS 2011 
Observation May 
2012: Beginning of 
meeting 
Observation May 
2012: End of the 
meeting 
Mean for all groups  43 % 57 % 
All groups in Nyamira 96 % 42 % 59 % 
All groups in Rachuonyo 87 % 44 % 54 % 
Old groups > 2 year  38 % 51 % 
New groups  (1 year old)    53 % 71 % 
FBO Channel 93 % 56 % 66 % 
CARE Direct (only old 
groups) 86 % 38 % 51 % 
Franchisee Channel 96 % 28 % 47 % 
N for CARE MIS = 2,500 groups; n for observed groups =21 groups   
 
The observed attendance levels would have naturally been even lower if non-operational 
groups had been included in the data and if a local person had observed the group meetings.  
Regarding the first point, two groups that had been trained by the franchisee and had ceased 
meeting, i.e. where the attendance was 0%, were not included in the calculations.    In relation 
to the second matter, it is likely that the presence of the research team had a strong influence 
in increasing the attendance levels between the beginning and the end of the meeting.  More 
specifically, in some groups the members knew in advance that the research team was going to 
attend the meeting,  which increased attendance because we were seen to be associated with 
CARE.   In the groups where members did not know in advance about the visit, when group 
members realised that the ”visitors” were going to attend, just before the start of the meeting 
they phoned other members, which thus increased the attendance numbers by the end in many 
cases.  It also became apparent in some groups that meetings would not have been even held, if 
the research team had not attempted to visit the group. 
 
Comparison between the 2011 attendance levels of the sampled groups taken during an earlier 
cycle with the those for the observed meetings would have been desirable, but unfortunately 
the data for the former were incomplete. Therefore, instead the average attendance levels of 
each channel in the CARE MIS were compared with the observed attendance levels of the 
sampled groups. Table 5.3 shows that there is a substantial difference between the CARE MIS 
attendance figures and the observed data.  That is, by the end of the group meetings the FBO 
channel attendance was 27 percentage points below that taken from the CARE MIS system, 
whilst this difference was 35 percentage points for the direct CARE channel and 49 percentage 
points for that of the franchisee.  What this demonstrates is that there was a significant decline 
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in the attendance levels to those that were recorded during the first year of operations.  This 
decline happened even when visitors were present and when many of the groups knew we 
were going to attend. There are several possible reasons why attendance levels were so  much 
lower. First, in groups where both wives and husbands were members, it could have been 
deemed sufficient for wives only to attend.  Second, attendance may have been low because 
there were some members who rather than attend (e.g. due to distance) still participated by 
delegating someone else to bring their savings to the group (FBO1-R,1).  Third, in three groups 
the attendance was low or even non-existent because they had stopped saving and could not 
share-out, because they were still waiting for some members to repay their loans. That is, the 
borrowers were avoiding attending as they could not pay and the other members saw no point 
in attending until it was time for the share-out which they were continually failing to do.  
Attendance was also often low in those groups where someone had appropriated group funds.32   
 
This section presented the observed attendance rates and compared them with the CARE MIS 
data. The findings have indicated that the observed attendance rates were substantially lower 
than the CARE MIS attendance levels one year earlier.  There were also substantial differences 
between the attendance levels according to the different delivery channels, with that of the 
FBO having the highest and the franchisee the lowest.  However, low attendance figures do not 
necessarily imply that members were not saving as instances were observed where people 
delegated others to do so, possibly due to the travel distance involved, illness or being 
otherwise engaged.      
5.3.2. Rule following in group meetings 
 
This subsection covers the different stages of a group meeting in terms of which SG rules were 
followed and which were not.    SG members received orientation training on savings, loans and 
group management from the CARE, from which they developed their own rules through 
answering a set of questions that CARE provided.  There were some rules in the methodology 
that CARE insisted the groups follow, such as every group member must save at every meeting, 
                                                          
32
 The rate of attendance had some relationship to the use of fines in that some groups that enforced 
meeting attendance with a fine for non-attendance had higher attendance. In the groups that did not levy 
a fine for non-attendance, there were many reasons given for not charging a fine, such as accepting 
members having other commitments and thus allowing them to send their savings through other group 
members with their apologies.  Some groups had a rule that if the group met weekly or fortnightly, 
members must attend at least one meeting in the month.     
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whilst on other matters they  were allowed to formulate their own rules.  For example, they 
were encouraged to decide which fines to implement and their amount. 
 
The degree of rule following was analysed by observing the aforementioned 19 group meetings 
and noted on an observation guide.  Specifically, for each group the observation guide was 
completed by three different observers and notes were compared immediately after the 
meeting.    The majority of the observed groups started their meeting punctually, for as table 
5.4. shows, 12  out of the 19 groups started theirs on time. The other seven groups started more 
than 30 minutes late and some meetings did not commence until one to two hours later than 
announced.  The SG methodology suggests that if members do not follow the SG rules they are 
supposed to pay a fine. All the groups in the sample had agreed that members absent without 
an apology would have to do so as well as any late comers.   However, only in eight groups did 
non-attending members pay fines and in ten groups members paid a fine if they arrived late.  
The observation exercise also revealed that for all but one of the meetings some members 
arrived late, with on average, nine persons per group doing so.  In ten groups the record-keeper 
registered attendance but in nine groups no attendance was taken. 
 
Part of the methodology that CARE introduced to the groups was a metal cashbox with three 
locks, which was only supposed to be opened during the meetings. After the meeting the 
remaining cash as well as the ledger and passbooks were to be locked in the box, as 
appropriate, which was only to be opened again when all group members were present at the 
next meeting.  Three members of the groups who were not the officeholders were to keep the 
keys.  The aim of having the cashbox and transacting only during the group meetings was to 
increase transparency and trust  (Grant and Allen 2002; Singer 2008; Otieno 2009; Allen and 
Staehle 2006). 
 
 However, even though the metal box was a key part of the methodology in the majority of 
groups it was not used as intended and surprisingly six did not even have one at the observed 
meeting.  Further, five out of the remaining 13 groups that had a box did not keep their ledger 
and/or passbooks in the box between the group meetings.  Lastly, in five groups the three keys 
were kept by one person, who in  most cases was one of the group leaders.   All these variations 
meant that only seven out of the 19 groups used the metal box as intended. 
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Table 5.4. Numbers and percentages groups following and not following the SG rules 
Rules Yes Yes % No No % N/A* % 
Meeting opening        
Meeting started on time 12 63 % 7 37 % 0 0 % 
Attendance register taken 10 48 % 9 52 % 0 0 % 
Members paid fine if did not attend meeting 8 42 % 11 58 % 0 0 % 
Members paid a fine for being late 10 53 % 9 47 % 0 0 % 
Metal box       
Group had a metal box 13 68 % 6 32 % 0 0 % 
Group kept the books in the box 9 47 % 5 26 % 5 26 % 
The box was locked with three locks 11 58 % 2 11 % 6 32 % 
Different members kept the keys to the box 9 47 % 3 16 % 7 37 % 
Savings        
Members to recall the balance of the loan fund from the previous meeting 0 0 % 19 100 % 0 0 % 
Record keeper asked members to recall the amount of money kept in the box before it was opened 1 5 % 3 16 % 15 79 % 
Members were asked to come in front of the group to save 16 84 % 1 5 % 2 11 % 
Every group member saved 1 5 % 17 90 % 1 5 % 
Members bought more than 10 shares 3 16 % 14 74 % 2 11 % 
Money counters counted the money and announced the amount that members had saved 17 90 % 0 0 % 2 10 % 
The record keeper stamped the correct number of shares and crossed unused blocks  15 79 % 2 11 % 2 11 % 
Members were able to check that their savings were entered correctly 9 47 % 8 42 % 2 11 % 
Loan repayment       
The record keeper publicly announced the amount due for each borrower and asked them to repay  15 79 % 4 21 % 0 0 % 
The money counters counted the payment, announced the amount  18 95 % 1 4 % 0 0 % 
If the remaining balance due was zero, the record keeper announced that the loan had been repaid 15 79 % 3 16 % 1 5 % 
Everybody that had a loan, repaid part or all of it and interest? 1 5 % 18 95 % 0 0 % 
Loanees who did not repay or pay interest paid a fine 11 58 % 8 42 % 0 0 % 
Loan taking        
Members requested loans by stating the amount they needed 12 71 % 3 18 % 3 12 % 
Group discussed the loan requests 4 25 % 11 69 % 1 6 % 
If total value of the loans requested more than the money available, group discussed any adjustment 5 31 % 9 56 % 2 13 % 
The record keeper entered the loan amount and interest due into member's passbook 12 75 % 3 19 % 1 6 % 
Borrower signed that she/he had received a loan 7 41 % 9 53 % 1 6 % 
Borrower announced out loud the total amount received 6 38 % 9 56 % 1 6 % 
Closing the meeting       
Record keeper announced total loan fund and chair instructed the members to memorise the balance 2 11 % 15 79 % 2 11 % 
Key holders locked the box 9 50 % 3 17 % 6 33 % 
*Not applicable or not available 
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There were several rules that the groups and group members were supposed to follow when 
they were contributing their savings, some of which were only followed by a minority, whilst 
others had been adopted by the majority.  The SG methodology suggested that before the 
members saved in the group meeting, the record keeper was supposed to ask those attending 
to recall the balance of the total loan fund from the previous meeting, but this was only 
observed only in on group (FBO4-R)    Only four groups kept money in the box between the 
meetings.    In these groups none of the leaders did ask the members to memorise how much 
was kept in it.   
 
Regarding the amount of savings,  group members had initially decided the value of the 
minimum saving that each member was supposed to save.  The methodology suggested that 
members should buy between one and five shares at each meeting.  However, the groups in the 
sample had decided they had to buy (save) between one and 10 shares.  There was only one 
group where all the members saved during the meeting and regarding the rest there were on 
average 3.4 members that did not save anything.  Regarding the maximum amount of savings, 
there were three groups where several members saved more than 10 shares during a meeting, 
which clearly broke their own pre-set rules.33   
 
 The methodology also suggested that members be called upon one by one to come in front of 
the group to save so that everybody saw and heard what was happening.    There was a strong 
degree of compliance with this recommendation, for all the observed groups except one did so. 
After receiving the savings from members, the money counters were supposed to count the 
money, announce publicly how much a person had saved  and place it in the money-counting 
bowl or on the table, which happened in all the groups where saving was taking place.    Then, in 
15 out of the 17 groups where it was applicable the record keeper stamped the appropriate 
number of times in relation to the amount saved or wrote the correct number of shares into the 
passbook and crossed out any unused blocks.  In the other two groups passbooks were filled in 
after the meeting and it was later found out that in these two groups the secretaries had 
falsified the records.  In only nine out of 19 groups were the members able to check that the 
savings amount had been entered correctly as the secretary handed the passbooks to them for 
inspection.  
 
                                                          
33
 The SG methodology also allowed the members to contribute more than five shares in the beginning of 
the new cycle if all the group members agreed and if all the group members contributed equal amount 
(VSL Programme Guide – Field Operations Manual 2007).  
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Regarding loan repayment, according to the CARE methodology, the record keeper was to 
announce publicly the amount due by referring to the borrower’s passbook. In 15 groups this 
procedure was followed, whereas in the other four groups the member paid and the secretary 
did not announce the amount of loan before the payment or tell the group after how much the 
member was still owing.   In only one group did all the members either repay their loans or 
interest on them. In eight groups members did not pay a fine even when they did not contribute 
anything towards a loan repayment. 
 
 According to the methodology, the chairperson was to invite loan requests and remind 
members of the maximum permitted duration and the loan amount, which was usually three 
times members savings. Then, the members were supposed to request loans by saying the 
amount, duration and purpose.  In 12 groups the members requested loans openly by telling the 
others out loud how much they had requested or by writing it down on a piece of paper.  We 
observed that in three groups that the  leaders obtained loans without any open discussion and 
found out later that they had agreed among themselves beforehand the amount of the loans 
that they would receive.  
 
Following this, each group was supposed to discuss the loan requests, but this only happened in 
four of them.  The record keeper was then expected to calculate the total value of the requests 
and announce it.  If the total value was more than the money available in the loan fund, the 
group was supposed to discuss adjustments to the individual loan amounts until all members 
were satisfied. However, this was done only in five groups, for in the other nine where this 
applied there was no discussion.  Subsequently, we found that in some of the groups where 
there was no discussion, the leaders and powerful members were able to receive larger loan 
amounts than other members. 
 
 According to the methodology, the record keeper should then have entered the loan number, 
loan amount and service charge due in the borrowing member’s passbooks.  In most of the 
groups the loans amounts were entered into the ledger or the passbook, but in three this was 
not done (FBO3-N, FBO5-N and FBO6-N).  The borrower was then supposed to count the money 
and sign for it.  It was observed that in less than half of the groups (seven) did the members sign 
anywhere that they had received a loan.  The CARE recommendation was that the record 
keeper should then to instruct the borrower to announce out loud the total amount due and 
the deadline for repayment, but none of the groups had introduced this part of the 
methodology. The record-keeper was then supposed to announce the total of the loan fund 
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once again and the chairperson was supposed to instruct all members to memorise the balance 
for the next meeting, which was observed in only two groups. The total loan fund was not noted 
anywhere in the ledger in any of the groups.  Then, the box was to be locked, with the keys 
being given to different people and of the 13 groups using boxes, nine locked them at the end of 
the meeting, but the process of distributing the keys was unobserved.  It was later found out 
that regarding two of the groups where the boxes were not locked, the secretaries took the 
books home to work on them and falsified group records before locking them in the boxes.   
 
Index for the degree of rule following 
 
In order to be able to compare whether there were differences in rule following between the 
districts and between the different delivery channels in later analysis, a rule following index was 
constructed based on table 5.2. 
 
Index for degree of rule following: 
1. Did the record-keeper take the attendance? 
2. Did the group have a box? 
3. Did members that did not come to the last meeting pay a fine? 
4. Did members  pay a fine for coming in late for the meeting? 
5. If a member did not  save, did they pay a fine? 
6. After the secretary had recorded the amount saved into the passbook, was the member 
able to the check that the entry was correct? 
7. Did the record-keeper publicly announce s the amount due by referring the borrowers’ 
passbooks? 
8. Did the group discuss the loan requests? 
9. If the total value of loans requested was more than the money available in the loan 
fund, did  the group discuss adjustments to the individual loan amounts until all 
members were satisfied? 
10. After the member had received a loan, did she/he sign the passbook? 
 
Table 5.5 indicates that overall more rules were followed in Rachuonyo when compared to 
Nyamira. Moreover, the groups under the FBO channel in Rachuonyo followed more rules than 
the other delivery channels.34  
                                                          
34
 Whether rules are followed is also related to whether members know and understand them.  If 
members had not been trained on the methodology, it was less likely that they were following the rules.  
We explored the extent of turnover of the membership. After two share-outs, on average, nine members 
had left and 14 new members had joined the sampled groups that were now in their third cycle.
  
 There 
were no major differences between the different channels.  This means that in a typical group of 30 
members after two cycles close to half of the group members (45%) had not been trained by the rules, 
unless the t did some refresher training. In most of the groups there were also members that had been in 
the group from the first cycle, but had not been trained because they had joined soon after training.  In 
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Table 5.5 Mean number of rules followed by different delivery channels  
 Nyamira Rachuonyo 
Overall Mean 3.7 4.7 
Overall median 3.5 5.5 
FBO Mean 3.5 5.6 
FBO Median 3.5 6.0 
CARE Mean   3.8 
CARE Median  3.0 
Franchisee  Mean35 4.0  
Franchisee  Median 4.5  
 
To conclude on rule following, this subsection has indicated that many groups had adopted 
several of the key rules aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability.   In almost all the 
groups, the members carried out the financial transactions, saving and borrowing in front of the 
group. Similarly, the money counters counted the members’ savings and the amount that they 
had repaid, both of which were then announced to the whole group.   Subsequently, in three 
quarters of the groups the secretary recorded the amounts into the ledger and/or members’ 
passbooks.   
 
It was expected that the groups would not follow all the details of the methodology, but it was 
surprising how many key procedures were not adopted.    Considering that the metal box was a 
salient part of the methodology, it is surprising that only one third of the sample used it as the 
suggested.  Fines that were supposed to enforce discipline were used only in half of the groups.  
Similarly in only half of the groups were members able to verify that the savings had been 
entered correctly into the passbook.  Further, in less than half of the groups did members sign 
anywhere that they had received a loan.  FBO groups followed more rules during the meetings 
than those in other channels.  Then there were rules that were not followed at all, such as the 
fact that in no case was a group members asked to recall the balance of the loan fund from the 
previous meeting. In addition to rule following, it is important to understand what was the 
quality of record keeping in the different groups and the next subsection presents the findings 
on this.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
sum, the fact that half of the members had never received training might also have had a negative impact 
on the rules being followed.  
35
 Three of the groups that had been trained by the franchisee were not meeting at the time of  research 
visit. One of them had stopped meeting, members did not save, loans were not repaid and no fines were 
paid. This group did not get any points.  The two other groups that had stopped operating were not 
included.  If these groups would have been included, the mean and median of the franchisee channel 
would have been even lower. 
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5.3.3. Quality of record keeping 
 
In addition to training the groups on how to conduct meetings, save and borrow, the groups 
were given instruction on recordkeeping.  At the beginning of the project, CARE advised the 
trainers to train the groups only on the centralised ledger where all the members savings and 
loans were to be recorded.  Later, it changed its approach and started training groups on 
passbooks only.  The groups that had been initially trained on ledgers were also introduced to 
the passbooks and most began using them.     Hence, there were groups that used only ledgers, 
some that used only passbooks and others that used both.  Table 5.6  reports that almost all the 
sampled groups (21 out of 24) used a ledger as observed during the initial contact.  Similarly, 21 
groups used passbooks but two did not and 19 used both methods. This review of 
recordkeeping involved the records from 20 groups as four were no longer operational and 
records were not available.36   However, both ledgers and passbooks were only received from 
16 groups on request and those that were available were analysed to assess the quality of the 
record keeping. 37  For the groups that used both the ledger and passbooks, we wanted to check 
whether savings and loans tallied.38  Out of the 16 groups from which we had both recording 
means, in 11 cases the savings amounts in the passbook tallied with the ledger, but the other 
five the figures did not, three of which were from Rachuonyo  and two from Nyamira.  
Regarding loans records, in four groups the passbooks and ledger did not tally.  
                                                          
36
 However, during our first visit to these four groups we had seen whether they use ledger and/or 
passbooks. 
37
 There were variations even in the passbooks, for during the project CARE had provided to the groups 
with two versions.  In the first, there was no space to write the interest and in the second, a column for 
the interest had been added.  Out of the 21 groups that used passbooks, 18 used the second version and 
one used the first, whilst two groups had created their own passbooks that were not similar to the CARE 
ones.  
38
 Five members from each group were randomly selected and then the passbook records were compared 
with the ledger records. 
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Table 5.6. Quality of book keeping 
 Yes Yes % No No % Missing* 
Group uses a ledger 21 87.5 % 3 12.5 % 0 
Group uses passbooks  21 87.5 % 3 12.5 % 0 
Group uses both ledger and passbooks  19 79.0 % 5 21.0 % 0 
Savings in the ledger and passbook tally 11 69.0 % 5 31.0 % 3 
Member signs in the ledger that a loan has been received 5 25.0 % 15 75.0 % 0 
Member signs in the passbook that a loan has been received 6 30.0 % 14 70.0 % 0 
There is a date for when the loan was given**  15 83.0 % 3 17.0 % 2 
Date of repayment is marked in the ledger 13 81.0 % 3 19.0 % 4 
Repayment marked in the passbook 10 62.5 % 6 37.5 % 4 
Marked clearly in the ledger whether interest on loan has been paid  12 75.0 % 4 25.0 % 4 
Marked clearly in the passbooks whether interest on loan  paid  11 69.0 % 5 31.0 % 4 
The ledger and passbook tally*** 12 75.0 % 4 25.0 % 4 
* Missing indicates that either passbooks or ledgers were not available or the groups did not meet and hence we could not identify where they 
were kept 
**Either in the ledger or passbook 
*** Several groups did not enter loans into the passbooks. 
   132 
 
 
The methodology suggested that after receiving a loan the borrowers were to sign to indicate 
that they had received it, either in the passbook or in the ledger or in both. In the great majority 
of cases, there was a failure to sign for loans by either method.  In 15 cases ledgers were not 
signed, while in 14 this was the case for the passbooks.    In the majority of groups it was 
possible to establish when the loan was given, and when repayment was made. Specifically, for 
15 groups out of 18 there was a date either in the passbook and/or in the ledger when the loan 
was given. In the ledger repayment was marked clearly in 13 out of 16 cases. In the passbooks 
repayment was marked clearly in 10 out of 16 cases.   In relation to Rachuonyo, there were 
more groups where repayment was marked clearly than in Nyamira and for all the groups under 
the FBO trainers in the former area the loan repayments were marked clearly. In order to 
understand whether everybody paid interest, it had been explained to the groups that it was 
important that these payments were clearly marked in the ledger and/or passbooks.    In 
respect of this, 12 groups interest was clearly marked in the ledger and for 11 it was so in the 
passbooks.  Regarding the two regions, the results were different in that for Rachuonyo interest 
payments where marked clearly in all groups’ ledger and in all but one case in the passbook, 
whereas in Nyamira there were four groups where the ledger was not correctly entered and this 
was so for  five groups’ passbooks.  Overall it can be concluded that introducing first the ledger 
books and then later the passbooks did certainly not make it easier for the groups to adopt the 
record keeping system. 
 
Index of quality of record keeping 
 
In order to have an overall measurement for the quality of record keeping an index was 
constructed, which consisted of the following questions constructed from the statements in 
table 5.6 and one point was given for each that was complied with. 
 
Index of quality of record-keeping 
• Did the savings in passbooks and the ledger tally? 
• Have all members signed in the ledger that they have a loan? 
• Have all members signed in the passbook that they have a loan? 
• Did all loans have a date when they were given? 
• Was loan repayment marked clearly in the passbooks and in the ledger? 
• Was interest payment marked clearly in the ledger? 
• Was interest payment marked clearly in the passbooks? 
• Did members’ loans in the passbook and ledger tally? 
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Table 5.7 indicates that the quality of record keeping in Rachuonyo was higher than in Nyamira.  
The highest quality records were found with groups that had been trained under the FBO 
channel in Nyamira and the worst were in groups that had been trained by the franchisee in 
Nyamira.   
 
Table 5.7.  Mean number of record keeping rules followed by delivery channel  
            Mean           Median  
 Nyamira Rachuonyo Nyamira Rachuonyo 
All groups 1.3 3.8 1.0 4.5 
FBO  1.5 4.2 1.0 5.0 
CARE   3.4  4.0 
Franchisee  1.0  1.0  
 
To conclude on record keeping, even though in two thirds of the groups most of the key 
principles were followed, it was nevertheless worrying that in one third there were cases where 
the members savings in the passbooks and the ledger did not tally and in one quarter of the 
groups this was the case for some of the members’ loans. In general, the highest level of rule 
following was found in groups that had been trained under the FBO channel in Rachuonyo and 
the second highest was for those that had been trained under the franchisee.  However, half to 
the groups under this channel could not be observed, because they had not restarted after a 
partial share-out (too many defaulters) or had stopped operating.  If they are included, the 
groups under the franchisee turn out to be the bottom performers as the non-operational 
groups were no longer following any rules.   In line with rule following during the observed 
meeting, the FBO groups in Rachuonyo also had the highest attendance levels as well as the 
best quality record keeping.  At the other end, the attendance in meetings was lowest with the 
franchisee groups, which also had the poorest quality of record keeping. 
 
5.4. Financial performance of the sampled groups 
 
This section discusses the financial performance of the groups and first, a review of this is 
provided through analysis of the levels of savings, loans and return on savings (ROA) at the end 
of each cycle.  Subsequently, in order to compare the financial performance across the groups 
an index regarding this is constructed for subsequent correlation analysis. 
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5.4.1. Savings and loans 
The expectation of the methodology was that groups would start with small savings and as 
members started to trust each other through their collaboration, they were able to 
intermediate more funds.  Savings levels between the cycles are analysed first.  As the bars for 
all groups in figure 5.1 shows, the saving in cycle two was substantially higher than in cycle one 
and that in cycle three was higher than in cycle two, but the increase was not as high as that 
between the first and second cycle.   
 
Figure 5.1. Mean monthly savings for all groups as well as in Nyamira and Rachuonyo
39
 
 
 
 
When analysing districts separately, in Nyamira savings started at a relatively lower level than in 
Rachuonyo during the first cycle, but then increased so much in the second cycle as to overtake 
the amount saved by the latter region during this cycle.  However, by the third cycle, savings in 
Nyamira had virtually levelled off whereas in Rachuonyo they once again surpassed the other 
region with a marked further increase.  
 
Figure 5.2. shows that there were also  differences between the different  channels.  The savings 
levels increased in each subsequent cycle for all the channels, except for a decrease between 
the second and third cycle for the franchisee groups.  In Nyamira, the franchisee groups saved 
almost twice as much as the FBO ones, whereas in Rachuonyo, the latter groups saved initially 
                                                          
39
 Monthly savings were analysed because several groups had not completed their third cycle.   
 
   135 
 
substantially more than the groups trained by CARE.  However, during subsequent cycles the 
CARE groups’ savings rate also increased.  The difference in savings levels in Nyamira can partly 
be explained by the fact that poverty likelihood scores of  the franchisee groups were lower, 
thus indicating that they were somewhat less poor than the members of FBO groups.  However, 
in Rachuonyo the FBO groups saved substantially more than the CARE groups even though FBO 
groups were more likely to be poor.   
 
Figure 5.2. Mean monthly savings by delivery channel 
 
 
There were also differences in the savings levels within the cycles.  The figure 5.3, shows how 
the monthly savings varied during the different cycles in that groups saved more at the 
beginning and less towards the end. This trend is most apparent during the second and third 
cycles and less so during the first.  This could be explained by the fact that in the beginning of 
the second and third cycles, members had money from the share-out and wanted to invest it 
back into the scheme, but towards the end of the cycle they were saving less so that they could 
use all the available funds for repaying their loans. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean monthly savings per member in all groups during each cycle 
  
 
Figure 5.4. indicates that the mean loan sizes increased from the first to second and from the 
second to third cycle, except for the franchisee channel groups, which was in line with the 
increased monthly savings.  However, in the franchisee channels groups the mean loan size fell 
between the second and third cycle, which corresponded with reduced savings levels for these 
groups. 
Figure 5.4. Mean loan sizes during each cycle by delivery channel 
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5.4.2. Share-out and Return on savings    
 
On a date chosen by the members, usually after about a year, all the financial assets were 
divided among  them in proportion to each one’s savings in the “share-out” meeting.   The 
share-out is complicated when a member has not repaid a loan at the time of the share-out.   In 
such cases, the value of this particular person’s shares, which is equal to the outstanding loan, is 
cancelled in the pass book.  This cancellation is a penalty because the profit of the group is 
distributed based on the number of shares that the members have.     
 
In order to divide the profit  (i.e. accumulated interest) proportionally among the group 
members at the time of share-out, trainers or group leaders are expected first to calculate the 
group profit, return on savings (ROS) for the whole group.. In order to elicit this figure, net profit 
first has to be calculated through the following formula that SG promoters use :   
 
Net profit = cash at hand – savings of the group.  
 
After that the return on savings is calculated through the following formula:   
 
return on savings40 = net profit / cumulative value of savings. 
 
When the profit for the whole group, Return on Savings, has been calculated, trainers or group 
leaders calculate what each member is due. 
 
According to the SG methodology, the ROS can only be calculated after all the loans have been 
repaid.  If some members have not repaid them by the time of the share-out, their savings are 
to be deducted before the share-out so as to offset their loans, which is key part of the 
proposed methodology.  However, the practice uncovered that for three quarters of the 
sampled groups the ROS was not calculated, but instead estimated by the trainer before most of 
the members had repaid their loans under the assumption that all the members would repay 
their loans.  Then, based on this assumption, the group profit was allocated according to the 
                                                          
40
 This is standard approach to measure Savings Group performance. The term ‘Return on savings’ (ROS) 
is commonly used within the promoters of Savings Groups. ROS is equivalent  to Return on Assets within 
Microfinance industry.    
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savings of each member.  In this way, the members that still had not repaid their loans used 
their savings and the calculated profit41 to offset them.  Even members who did not fully pay 
their loan on the share-out day and whose loans were bigger than their savings and estimated 
profit, agreed with the secretary that the savings and profit would be deducted from their loans. 
Then, in order to clear their loans fully, they then agreed the date after the share-out day to 
repay the balance.  This meant that other members that had repaid their loans before the 
share-out did not get the full amount that they merited when this was paid.  In 11 groups 
defaulters who did not repay their loans on the day of share-out, were still given their 
‘estimated’ profits which were then deducted from their loans.  This new way of calculating ROS 
is problematic, because the members that have repaid fully do not get all their savings and 
profit back.   The distributional consequences are unjust in the sense  that members that have 
repaid, do not get all their money back, but those who have not repaid their loans were able 
keep other members money.   In essence, this meant that members that followed the SG rules 
and repaid their loans suffered because they did not get their all of their savings and profits and 
also they could not be sure whether they would ever get their funds back.  By contrast, the 
members who did not follow the share-out rules, did not suffer in any way because they had 
group funds available for expenditure throughout the cycle.  This new way of doing the share-
out also removed the incentive to repay the loans before the share-out.  
 
The fact that in half of the groups defaulters (members that had not repaid by the time of share-
out) still did receive their profits, and that several trainers  did the share-out calculations this 
way, indicates that for them the norm of fairness was viewed from a somewhat different angle 
than what the methodology.  Several respondents told that it was not fair towards the 
defaulters not to give any profits to the defaulters, since the also the defaulters had save the 
whole cycle and borrowed from the group and paid interest. (FBO1-N, 2) 
 
In table 5.8 both the mean and median estimated ROS42 and the actual ROS at the time of share-
out are presented.  During the first cycle there was only a difference of two percent in ROS 
between the mean estimated (what theoretically should be the ROS) and actual (what return 
the members actually received during the share-out day). During the second cycle the 
difference between these two figures had increased to 10%, and during the third cycle, for 
                                                          
41
 i.e. not the real profit but expected profit 
42
 ROS under the assumption that all the loans have been fully repaid, even though they had not been 
repaid. 
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which there was less data, the difference rose to 26%.43   The data in the table also indicate a 
downward trend in the actual ROS between the first, second, and third cycles  both in terms of 
the mean and median scores, from 82% to 59% and from 80% to 64%, respectively. 
  
Table 5.8. Calculated and actual mean and median ROS during the share-out in each cycle 
 Mean   Median   
 Calculated ROS Actual ROS 
Calculated 
ROS Actual ROS N 
1st cycle 84% 82% 80% 80% 22 
2nd cycle 75% 65% 78% 72% 15 
3rd cycle 85% 59% 84% 64% 5 
 
However, in these ROS figures there is a selection bias in that they were only calculated from 
groups that were able to perform a share-out.  If the groups that failed to collect all the loans 
back and postponed the share-out indefinitely or stopped operating in the middle of a cycle are 
included, the mean figures are naturally lower.  For, in most of the cases where the share-out 
was postponed indefinitely, the ROS was negative.  If we assume that in those groups that did 
not manage to calculate the share-out the ROS is zero, the following ROS are obtained.   
Table 5.9. Calculated and actual mean and median ROS for all groups 
 Mean   Median   
 Calculated ROS Actual ROS Calculated ROS Actual ROS N 
1st cycle 77% 75% 80% 80% 22 
2nd cycle 70% 54% 75% 68% 15 
3rd cycle 61% 33% 81% 9% 9 
 
5.4.3. Financial performance index 
 
In order to further analyse financial performance of the groups in relationship to location, 
delivery channels and the degree of rule following, I created an index based on the ranking of 
both the ROS and level of savings (mean monthly savings). Since it was likely that groups with 
on average poorer members would be saving less, I attempted to normalise mean monthly 
savings by dividing them with the poverty likelihood index that I had calculated for each group 
(see table 5.2.). The latest actual ROS figures at the time of share-out were used. 
 
                                                          
43
 There were also cases where the trainer estimated ROS was lower than the actual.  In these cases our 
respondents had expressed suspicion that the trainer together with group leaders were taking the 
difference for themselves.   
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That is, the following formula was used when creating the index:  
Financial performance index (for groups) = ROS index + (mean monthly savings ranking  x  mean 
poverty likelihood for the group)  
 
Table 5.10 reports the mean financial performance index for groups, first in Nyamira and 
Rachuonyo, and then with respect to each delivery channel.  Again, a similar pattern as in the 
previous section can be seen in that the groups in Rachuonyo scored higher, the FBO groups in 
Rachuonyo  had the highest score of all the channels and the Franchisee groups had the lowest.  
 
Table 5.10. Comparative financial performance index by districts and delivery channels 
District N Sum Mean 
Rachuonyo 12 374 31.1 
Nyamira 12 303 25.2 
Delivery channels    
FBO Rachuonyo 6 215 35.8 
Direct CARE 6 159 26.5 
FBO Nyamira 6 157 26.1 
Franchisee 6 146 24.3 
 
 
To conclude on financial performance, an index was created based on the ROS and savings 
levels of the groups, with the latter being adjusted using the poverty likelihood score.   
5.5.   Loan repayment   
 
The methodology suggested that members should repay the loan after one month together 
with interest.  However, if borrowers were unable to repay within this time, they would be able 
to extend the loan up to three months. The groups were asked to set the monthly interest rate 
and all those in the sample charged 10% per month.  They were also supposed to discuss and 
set fines and other penalties for members who did not repay after three months. 
 
Financial data collected from the ledgers and passbooks indicated that in most of the groups 
there were overdue loans (over 3 months).44 However, these were not treated as defaulted 
loans, especially if interest was being paid.  In fact, none of the groups took any steps to enforce 
                                                          
44
 It was difficult to obtain exact figures because half of the passbooks did not indicate the date when the 
loans were given or the date when the loans were repaid. With some groups, secretaries were also 
unwilling to disclose who was late. 
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repayment as long as members paid interest.  When asked about the late loans, the secretaries 
only listed those on which no interest had been paid.  The respondents did not see any problem 
in the loan remaining outstanding so long as interest was paid, since that person was 
contributing to the group income.45  This, however, meant in practice that funds were not 
rotating within the groups as intended in the methodology. Further, most of the groups did not 
take any serious action to enforce repayment during a cycle even when group members had 
outstanding loans of more than three months and had not paid interest.  Sometimes a 
neighbour was sent to inquire what the problem was.  All the groups, except two, waited until 
end of a cycle before taking any serious action to enforce repayment.   The two groups that took 
action had tried to take assets when the members with late loans had not paid interest for five 
months.  However, taking action in the middle of a cycle was new even to these two groups. All 
the groups had members that were late with their loans at the time of share-out.  Hence, the 
local practice for late loans did not pertain to those that had not been repaid in three months as 
the methodology suggested but rather, those that had not been repaid at the time of share-out. 
In fact, loans were rolled over in practically all the groups as long as the interest was paid.  The 
fact that many members were slow to repay  can also partly be explained by use of local norm 
that loans are open ended.  This will be discussed further in chapter Six. 
 
To analyse more systematically how the groups handled late loans, they were divided into 
different categories based on their level of compliance with the five criteria below, which are 
also shown in table 5.11. Red indicates that the group did not follow the methodology, whilst 
green refers to those where it was followed.  The data for the table was taken from the most 
recent cycle. 
Delayed share-out 
As pointed out above, the methodology proposes that before the share-out can be calculated, 
all the loans must have been repaid.   In cases where all the loans had not been repaid on time, 
the share-out would have to be delayed.  The sampled groups usually delayed the share-out by 
two weeks or one month. In fact, 23 groups had postponed the most recent share-out because 
members with loans had not repaid them on time, i.e. only one had not delayed it. 
Clearing late loans before the share-out  
                                                          
45
 This was similar to the indigenous ASCAs in Nyamira, where it was a common practice to take a loan 
during the first month of the cycle and keep it throughout the cycle. 
 
   142 
 
In ten groups, all the loans were recovered before or on the new share-out date.  Members with 
loans had either repaid them or the group had taken assets in lieu of them.    In five cases the 
groups was not able enforce repayment even though the share-out had been delayed several 
times and three of these groups never managed to complete the process. The other two made a 
partial share-out where the funds that were in the group fund were divided among the 
members that had fully repaid.  In nine groups, the leaders and members were not able to 
enforce repayment even though the share-out had been delayed multiple times, but it was 
conducted eventually even though not all members had repaid.  In these cases, the moneys that 
were available in the group fund were divided between the members that had repaid in full. 
Clearing late loans after the share-out 
There were four groups where members cleared their loans within two months after the share-
out, whilst the rest took longer and five were not able to enforce repayment at all. 
Proportion of the portfolio not repaid at the time of the share-out 
In five groups the proportion of uncollected loans at the time of the latest share-out was less 
than 10 ten percent of the total group funds and in eight groups this figure was over 10 per 
cent. 
Restarting a new cycle after the share-out 
Nineteen groups restarted immediately after the share-out even though in 11 not all the 
members had repaid their loans from the previous cycle.  The members that had not repaid 
their loans were nevertheless allowed to participate in the new cycle.  Five groups did not 
proceed with a new cycle.  
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Table 5.11. Late loans 
District  
Delivery 
channel and  
Group code 
Share-out 
was 
postponed 
Late loans were cleared before the delayed share-out 
date, or were the late loans pushed into new cycle or 
were the cases NOT cleared 
Number of months after the 
share-out when the loans were 
cleared 
Proportion of 
portfolio not repaid 
at the time of 
share-out  
Group restarted 
after share-out 
Nyamira FBO1-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid Yes 
  FBO2-N Yes Default cases cleared before the share-out   Yes 
  FBO3-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid Yes 
  FBO4-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle < 2 months after share-out  < 10% not repaid Yes 
  FBO5-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle > 2 months after share-out  < 10% not repaid Yes 
  FBO6-N Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  FR1-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle < 2 months after share-out  < 10% not repaid Yes 
  FR2-N Yes Late loans moved into new cycle > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid Yes 
  FR3-N Yes Late loans not resolved, group not operating > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid No 
  FR4-N Yes Late loans not resolved, group not operating > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid No 
  FR5-N Yes Has delayed share-out > 6 months  No activity     ? 
  FR6-N Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
Rachuonyo CARE1-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  CARE2-R Yes Late loans moved into new cycle > 2 months after share-out  >10% not repaid Yes 
  CARE3-R Yes Delayed share-out > 6 months. Partial share-out later   > 2 months after share-out >10% not repaid No 
  CARE4-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  CARE5-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  CARE6-R Yes Has delayed share-out > 6 months  No activity     ? 
  FBO1-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  FBO2-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  FBO3-R Yes Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  FBO4-R Yes Late loans moved into new cycle < 2 months after share-out  < 10% not repaid Yes 
  FBO5-R No Default cases cleared before share-out      Yes 
  FBO6-R Yes Late loans moved into new cycle < 2 months after share-out  < 10% not repaid Yes 
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As the table indicates, there were differences between the districts and also between the 
delivery channels.   The amount of green in Rachuonyo clearly indicates that groups were 
performing there better than in  Nyamira.  In Rachuonyo, seven groups out of 12 had managed 
to recover all the late loans before the share-out, whereas in Nyamira only two had done so. 
Here, the FBO and franchisee channels performed equally poorly, with only one group from 
each being able to recover all the loans before the share-out.  However, the FBO channel in 
Rachuonyo had the highest number of groups (four) that managed to recover all the late loans 
before the share-out, whilst those trained by CARE came second with three.  Based on the table, 
a loan repayment index was developed consisting of the five factors illustrated, which is used in 
section 5.6 when correlations are calculated to test the association between a range of factors. 
The findings indicate that groups that took defaulters’ assets were more likely to recover all the 
late loans.  Specifically, out of the 10 groups that had recovered all the late loans before the 
share-out, seven had taken members assets.  Six of these were from Rachuonyo (three under 
the FBO and three under CARE) and only one from Nyamira (under FBO channel in Nyamira).  
 
To conclude, both the groups trained directly by CARE and under the FBO channel in Rachuonyo 
had less serious default cases compared to the FBO and franchisee groups in Nyamira.  One 
important reason why the groups in Rachuonyo performed better was that they were able to 
recover all the loans before sharing out.  Moreover, it seems that one key tool for ensuring 
timely repayment was that the groups trained under CARE and FBO in Rachuonyo took assets 
from defaulters before the share-out much more frequently  than those in Nyamira.  Asset 
taking will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
In reality the situation was even worse than what the table indicates.  For instance, there were 
unjust distributional consequences, because several groups postponed their share-out by over 
six months and other over one year.  For all the groups where the share-out was postponed, it 
was the leaders that benefited, because they had the biggest loans.  In one group (Engoa), the 
chair and secretary had loans that were ten times bigger than their savings.  In another group 
that had postponed the share-out by one year, in addition to the leaders’ big loans one wealthy 
businesswoman had a loan of Kshs 83,000, which like most of the other excessive loan examples 
broke the group’s own rules on no one borrowing more than three times what they had saved.   
However, there were unjust distributional consequences even in groups that had managed to 
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perform the share-out.  In eight groups46, there were several members that had not repaid their 
loans six months after the share-out and in several of these the group members had not 
received payments from the defaulters even after 12 months.  In the next section, the 
appropriation and fraud cases are discussed. 
5.6. Appropriation and fraud cases 
 
Cases were encountered where group funds were appropriated by the trainers and there were 
also several fraud incidents committed by group leaders. Most of the information regarding 
these was volunteered by group members.  When possible we tried to confirm the cases from 
other group members or in some cases from the financial records and a few examples were 
uncovered through observing the group meetings.  
 
Table 5.12 shows how the misappropriation and fraud cases were divided into cases that 
related either to savings &loans and then on other issues like charging extra fees from groups. 
In Box I (delivery channel representatives taking loans from groups) there was only one case in 
this sample, an assistant trainer in Rachuonyo in the groups that had been trained by CARE. She 
was a member and also an officeholder in several groups that she had recruited for CARE. She 
was also member of several groups that she had set-up herself.  The appropriation cases in 
which the assistant trainer was involved were fairly large and in total she owed to several 
groups more than Kshs 200,000. Her case is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Table 5.12. A matrix to structure the appropriation and fraud cases 
 Groups’ core activities: 
savings and loans  
Other issues (such as fees and 
the metal box) though which 
appropriation took place 
Appropriation by the delivery 
channel representative 
Box I Box II 
Appropriation by the group 
leaders 
 Box III Box IV 
 
There were seven cases belonging to Box II (representatives of the delivery channels 
appropriating funds from groups through fees etc.).  Five were from Nyamira, involving three of 
the groups that had been trained and managed by the franchisee channel and two by that of 
the FBO.   In terms of monetary value, the worst case uncovered was when a representative of 
                                                          
46
 FBO1-N, FBO3-N, FBO4-N, FBO5-N, FR1-N, FR2-N, CARE2-R and  CARE6-R. 
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the franchisee was charging ‘registration’ fees as well  extra-large share-out fees at the end of a 
cycle and at the beginning of a new one to two groups in the sample.   The appropriation cases 
in the two groups under the FBO were small in monetary terms.   
 
Box III (group leaders taking money from the group through its core activities: savings and loans) 
has the most appropriation/fraud cases (nine cases).  Eight of these nine involved falsification of 
records, either in the passbooks or in the ledger or both.   Four of the cases were from Nyamira 
and five from Rachuonyo. Of the four in Nyamira, three were in groups that had been trained 
and managed by the franchisee channel. Of the five in Rachuonyo, all occurred in groups that 
had been trained directly by CARE, but did not currently have a trainer.  In terms of monetary 
value, these cases were smaller than those where the delivery agent was involved (Box I and II), 
with the value of the fraud or attempted fraud ranging from Kshs 50 to Kshs 7000. 
 
Box IV (group leaders appropriating funds from the groups for themselves at the expense of 
group members) involves two cases. In the first, it was reported by a number of members in the 
same group that the male chairman had received sexual favours from several female members 
who had not repaid their loans after the share-out.  In the other example, the box keeper 
refused to use a locked metal box arguing that people would know there was money in it if it 
was moved around, which enabled him to give group funds to businessmen that were not 
members.  The monetary value in both of these cases was substantial (several women still owe 
to the group 6 months after the share-out between Kshs 4,000-6,000 and some businessmen 
had not returned Kshs 40,000 for the box keeper on the day of the share-out.  
 
In total, 21 appropriation and fraud cases were uncovered involving 16 groups and table 5.13 
lists these cases in red.  
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Table 5.13. Appropriation and fraud cases 
District  
Delivery 
channel/ 
Group 
code 
Appropriation/
fraud cases 
Appropriation 
by trainer 
Fraud by 
group 
leaders 
Scale of 
appropriation/ 
fraud 
Did members 
know about the 
case 
Action taken 
Case 
resolved 
Nyamira FBO1-N Yes   Small No No action No 
  FBO2-N Yes   Big Yes Assets taken from some Partly 
  FBO3-N Yes   Small Yes Leaders changed Partly 
  FBO4-N No       
  FBO5-N No       
  FBO6-N Yes   Small Yes No action No 
  FR1-N Yes   Small No No action No 
  FR2-N Yes   Small No No action No 
  
FR3-N Yes  
 
Medium Yes 
Trainer followed up, no 
results 
No 
  FR4-N Yes   Likely big Yes No action No 
  FR5-N Yes   Big No No action No 
  FR6-N Yes   Big No No action No 
Rachuonyo CARE1-R Yes   Big No No action No 
  CARE2-R Yes   Medium Yes Leaders changed Partly 
  CARE3-R Yes   Small Yes Leaders changed Partly 
  
CARE4-R Yes 
 
 Big Yes 
Leaders changed, 
money returned 
Yes 
  CARE5-R Yes   Small Yes No action No 
  CARE6-R Yes   Small Yes No action No 
  FBO1-R No       
  FBO2-R No       
  FBO3-R No       
  FBO4-R No       
  FBO5-R No       
  FBO6-R No       
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The table indicates that none of the groups that had been formed under the FBO channel in 
Rachuonyo had cases of fraud.    At the other extreme, all the groups developed under the 
Franchisee and directly by CARE had suffered some form of corruption.  The cases within the 
franchisee channel where the delivery representative had appropriated funds through charging 
groups additional fees were serious, especially because information came to light that 
appropriation had not only taken place for groups within the sample but also systematically 
pursued in numerous groups under the franchisee channel.  The example where the assistant 
trainer was at the same time the mobiliser, trainer, group member and group leader and 
through these positions was appropriating funds was also serious, because the she had ended 
up destroying multiple groups through her action.  Also, other similar cases were heard of from 
other groups that were not part of the sample involving other trainers. In 11 cases, the group 
leaders were responsible for the appropriation of the funds and in three of these groups the 
trainer and the leaders were in alliance in appropriating funds. 
 
In three of the cases where the funds were appropriated by the delivery channel 
representatives/trainers, the scale of was relatively large (around Kshs 9000 but in one case up 
to Kshs 29000 per group), one involved Kshs 5000 (medium) and four instances were quite  
small (< Kshs 3000).  Of the appropriation/fraud cases where the group leaders were 
responsible, five cases were small, one medium and three relatively big (from Kshs 7000 – Kshs 
40.000). In six of these examples the members did not know that appropriation was taking 
place.  In two of these five cases the trainer (or regional co-ordinator)  was responsible for the 
appropriation (and it was in their interest that the groups would not know it). In the three other 
cases the members did not know that the secretary had falsified the books in order to benefit 
herself/himself and some selected friends/leaders. Regarding the 10 times where members 
knew that group funds had been appropriated, six groups attempted to take corrective 
measures. Four changed the leaders that had been responsible. In one group the chair was 
convinced to start taking assets and in one case group followed the trainer that they thought 
was responsible for appropriation but did not get their funds back.  One of the groups where 
the leaders had taken assets did not exist anymore.   In one case, a trainer had taken money 
from the group in order to buy the box and passbooks but had never bought them and when it 
tried to phone her but she did not respond. The group then made no further follow up.    Finally, 
in one group the leaders and some wealthy members were so powerful that even though the 
group members wanted to correct the situation, they felt they could not do anything. 
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The last column of the table 5.14 shows whether the appropriation or fraud cases were 
resolved.  In only one case out of the 21 brought to light had the matter been resolved, with the 
funds having been paid back and the leadership changed.  In four cases, the appropriation case 
had been partially resolved in the sense that the leaders had been removed, but the money that 
the group had lost had not been returned.  None of the cases where trainer was implicated had 
been resolved.   In all the four cases where the appropriation had been partially resolved and in 
the one where it was fully resolved, the implicated were allowed to continue to be members of 
the group, however not as leaders.  
 
5.7. Correlation analysis  
 
This section investigates, first, whether the degree of rule adoption affects the level of financial 
performance and second, whether the socioeconomic characteristics of groups and their 
members affect the extent to which the rules are adopted.  Third, the relationship between 
socioeconomic indicators and financial performance is examined to ascertain whether or not 
there are elements of their interaction that are not captured by the direct measurement of the 
degree of rule following, but they are, nevertheless, affecting financial performance. Figure 5.5 
illustrates the different potential associations that are tested. 
Figure 5.5. Schematic representation of relationships between variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
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First, in order to examine whether rule following was directly associated with financial 
performance, a set of correlations was calculated. The tested measures of rule following were 
as follows: group meeting attendance as a percentage of total group membership; the index of 
the degree of rule following in the meetings; and the index of quality of recordkeeping 
developed above. The measures of financial performance are the financial performance index 
and the loan repayment index constructed above.  The correlation coefficients were calculated 
and tested for their significance.  
 
Table 5.14. Rule adoption and financial performance 
 
Financial performance Loan repayment index 
Meeting attendance .54** .54** 
Rule following  .69** .59** 
Quality of record keeping .43 .17 
**. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed).   
  
Table 5.14 shows significant and strongly positive relationships between meeting attendance 
and both measures of financial performance as well as for rule following and both measures of 
financial performance. However, although positive, the correlations between quality of 
recordkeeping and financial performance and loan repayment are not significant.  These results, 
therefore, confirm the importance of meeting attendance and overall rule following, but 
counterintuitively suggest that record keeping is not particularly important.  This is interesting 
for a number of reasons.  First, the SG methodology does put a lot of emphasis on the oral and 
enacted processes involved in the meeting rather than writing.   These aspects have been 
especially emphasised where the methodology originated in Mali and other parts of West Africa 
where adult literacy rates - particularly among women - are extremely low. Hence, these 
findings would appear to vindicate the need to prioritise effective oral communication within 
groups.   Second, in this context where records were, it has been demonstrated that the quality 
of many of the records was extremely poor. However this does not seem to have been a 
particular problem, thus suggesting that the oral and enacted aspects of the process are able to 
partially to compensate for this.  
 
The literature review elicited that the socioeconomic differences that may be particularly 
important determinants of group performance are those of: gender, poverty and wealth, and 
levels of education.   Second, examining whether socioeconomic dynamics according to the 
different characteristics within groups affect the extent to which rules are adopted, the 
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correlation between the index of rule following and record keeping developed above and 
measures of socioeconomic difference are tested using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  
Measures of socioeconomic difference within groups were therefore constructed as follows: 
first, to test the role of gender, the proportion of male group members was calculated.  Second, 
in order to measure whether the overall level of poverty of the group is important, the mean 
likelihood of being poor was calculated across all the group members.  Third, so as to assess 
wealth inequality, the standard deviation of the mean likelihood of group members being poor 
was estimated.  Finally, to assess the influence of educational levels, the proportion of members 
of the group who had completed secondary education was employed.  The groups were 
subsequently ranked on each of these measures as well as on the index scores and then the 
rank correlation coefficients were calculated and tested for significance.  The results are given in 
Table 5.15.     
Table 5.15. Socioeconomic characteristics by rule following and record keeping 
 Rule following  Record keeping  
Proportion of male group members .37 .33 
Likelihood of being poor -.07 -.01 
Wealth inequality (Std. Dev) .46 -.11 
Education (% with secondary completed) -.38 -.53* 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The findings indicate that the proportion of male group members is positively correlated with 
the degree of rule following and record keeping, but the relationship is not very strong and is 
not significant.   This  suggests that the proportion of men in groups may not be as much of a 
negative influence as is often claimed in the literature. The correlation between the overall level 
of poverty of the group and rule following and record keeping is very slightly negative, which 
indicates that poorer groups may find adopting rules a greater challenge, but again this result is 
not significant.   When the extent of inequality within groups is considered, this appears to be 
very positively related to rule following, but mildly negatively related to the degree of record 
keeping.  The fact that these pull in different directions is notable but may relate to similar 
dynamics identified in the case of education which is considered next.  The result for education 
is negative, but not significant for rule following, whereas for record keeping it is both negative 
and significant.  This indicates that when the proportion of members who have completed 
secondary education increases, the quality of record keeping falls.   This is surprising, as it would 
be assumed that the better educated people in groups would support greater rule following and 
record keeping. I will return to this result after presenting the other correlations.   
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In order to understand whether the socioeconomic dynamics of groups might be associated 
with financial performance through routes other than rule adoption and record keeping, direct 
correlations between these two aspects were also calculated, with the results being given in 
table 5.16.   Gender, poverty and wealth inequality are all positively associated, but not 
significantly so, with financial performance and loan repayment, again suggesting that these 
differences do not in fact result in deteriorating overall financial performance.  However, in 
groups where at least two of the three group leaders were women47, the Return on Savings was 
77%, whereas when two were men were leaders it was only 34%, which seems to indicate that 
having a majority of female leaders might improve financial performance.  
 
Table 5.16 also shows that there is a significant negative relationship between education and 
financial performance as well as the loan repayment index. That is, this indicates that the higher 
proportion of members completed secondary education is correlated with lower financial 
performance and loan repayment.  This is somewhat counterintuitive, because it would be 
expected that those groups with higher levels of education would exercise rules adoption more 
vigorously, because they would have a better understanding role as well as be able to interpret 
them appropriately so as to meet the needs of the group than those with lower educational 
attainment.  
 
Table  5.16 Socioeconomic conditions by financial performance 
 Financial performance Loan repayment index 
Proportion of male group members 0.40 0.24 
Likelihood of being poor  0.29 0.10 
Wealth inequality (Std. Dev) 0.14 0.06 
Education (% with secondary completed) -0.44* -0.45* 
*. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
 
So, combining the outcomes in tables 5.15 and 5.16 regarding education, a number of points 
can be made.  First, as was evident in table 5.1., at the beginning of the chapter, the proportion 
of all members who had completed secondary education was low at on average, only  14.3%,  
and ranging from 0% to 37%. Given that well educated members in all the groups represent the 
minority,  it could be the case that they are insufficient in number to ensure that the group 
carries out record keeping effectively. This implies that some sort of threshold should be aimed 
at so to bring about more effective record keeping and hence, better financial performance. 
                                                          
47
 The three group leaders were the chair, secretary or  box keeper (treasurer). 
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Second, the record keeping system was not easy to use and later introduction of the passbooks 
further complicated this process, even for those who were better educated. However, such an 
explanation seems counter-intuitive because  the SG methodology was originally designed and 
intended to be adopted by less literate and educated people.   Nevertheless, these findings 
show that there needs to be a balance in groups, such that the oral traditions recognised in the 
SG methodology are kept as part of the rules so as to facilitate effective participation of those 
less educated.   
 
However, a third explanation is possible and this is that the real issue underlying the education 
figures can be attributed to the difference in the districts involved.  That is, as was discussed in 
section 5.1, the share of members with secondary education completed was three times higher 
in Nyamira than in Rachuonyo.  Also, on average, the index for quality of record keeping was 
substantially lower in Nyamira (M=1.78, SE = 0.57) than in Rachuonyo (M= 3.40, SE= 0.56) and 
this difference was mildly significant (t(19) = 0.59 >0.10).  Thus, both a substantially higher level 
of completed secondary education and substantially lower record keeping were in found 
Nyamira.  Similarly, as discussed in sections 5.4 and section 5.5., financial performance and loan 
repayment performance were substantially lower in Nyamira than in Rachuonyo.  However, the 
above suggested reason for these outcomes that those with higher levels of education could be 
more capable of corrupting groups might therefore not be the problem, rather an alternative 
explanation is that the delivery channels in Nyamira were inferior to those in Rachuonyo. These 
are key outcomes that are explored further in the next chapter. 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented empirical analysis of the quantitative data with the aim of 
addressing the research question as to whether rules have been institutionalised in the longer 
term.  Specifically, based on detailed information from 24 groups, the focus has been on 
whether  rules were  institutionalised and/or whether strong financial performance was 
maintained. As explained in chapter 3, the sample of groups in this study was supposedly from 
the best trainers in the two areas.   As discussed in chapter 3, the data were gathered during 
four visits over a period of up to two years after CARE had left the area. 
The degree of rule following during monthly meetings was analysed and this was found to be 
highly variable, but in general the overall institutionalisation appeared surprisingly weak only a 
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year after CARE had left .  In particular, meeting attendance had fallen drastically after this time. 
It can be concluded that there was relatively high level of rule following during the meetings in 
some aspects such as doing all the transactions in the front of group and announcing each 
members’ transactions publicly.48   However, in several other aspects such as in the use of 
locked boxes and enforcing fines the rule compliance was much lower, with only about half of 
the groups following these rules.  Given the finding that fines were not enforced as first agreed, 
it is hardly surprising that members in these groups were poor at making loan repayments by 
the end of the cycle 
The key purpose of institutionalising rules was to retain a level of transparency and 
accountability  which ensured that the funds lent out were repaid and that members got  what 
was their due. The two most concerning areas emerging from the analysis were loan repayment 
and misappropriation of funds.  The fact that in over half of the groups the share-out was 
conducted before all the loans had been repaid indicates that some of the most important rules 
had not been institutionalised .  Sharing out before everybody had repaid also led to unjust 
distributional consequences: the members who had fully repaid their loans did not get back all 
the funds that belonged to them.  And the members who did not repay their loans before the 
share-out,  had other people’s money in their use all the time. Three of the four trainers failed 
to intervene when the share-out was being undertaken resulting in loss of savings and 
distributional injustice for the members who did follow the rules.   
The other key area that the methodology overlooked was the possibility of trainers 
misappropriating funds.  Specifically, the rules were intended to prevent the misappropriation 
of funds by leaders which was found to be the case in 11 groups, but it did not anticipate the 
extent of misappropriation by the trainers, which was found in nine groups .    
Financial performance was also analysed.  Regarding ROS, this was very volatile across the 
sample, ranging from zero to over 100%.  Moreover, there was also a downward trend in the 
average between the first, second and third cycles (from 82% to 59%). Further, several groups 
did not restart after the second or third cycle.  Also, it emerged that there was a fall in the 
savings levels in the franchisee groups that had the lowest level of rule following.  
The analysis showed that socio-economic factors did not appear to affect rule following, record 
keeping, financial performance or repayment performance. The one exception to this was the 
                                                          
48
 Because the research team was not present at the time when the groups were trained, it was not 
possible to assess the rule following compliance immediately after the training and compare that with the 
level after CARE had left the area. 
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level of education, whereby a significant negative relationship was found between those groups 
with a higher mean educational achievement and the quality of recordkeeping, financial 
performance and the repayment of loans. However, as discussed earlier, there are indications 
that the region and the training channels in Nyamira also created the problems in financial 
performance and loan repayment.  
The results of the correlation analysis suggest that meeting attendance and rule following were 
important for financial performance, but somewhat surprisingly recordkeeping seemed to 
matter less for this performance.  For, despite the recordkeeping being poor in several groups 
they performed well financially, thus suggesting there were other elements of the  adopted 
methodology that compensated for weak record keeping. Rather, the findings suggest that 
transparency (all the transactions taking place in front of the group, and savings and repayment 
of loans of each member being publicly announced) was a much stronger indicator of 
performance.  For this meant that members still knew who owed money to the group and how 
much, even though the quality of book keeping was not so good.     
As discussed previously, the best performance was by groups in the FBO channel in Rachuonyo, 
followed by the CARE channel in Rachuonyo, then the FBO channel in Nyamira and finally the 
and franchisee channel in Nyamira was the poorest. The lower performance of the FBO trained 
groups in Nyamira compared to Rachuonyo, raises the question of why this is when those in 
Nyamira actually have a higher level of education than those in Rachuonyo.  Alternatively, it 
could be the case that there are other factors specific to Nyamira that are responsible for the 
lower financial performance of groups there. These key findings are explored further in the next 
two chapters along with investigation aimed at uncovering other reasons for differential 
adoption of the rules and performance between the two delivery channels and the two regions.  
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CHAPTER 6.  INSTITUTIONALISING RULES: IMPLEMENTATION 
DYNAMICS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the process of institutionalising rules in groups by focusing on 
the way that the CARE and the different delivery channels implemented the methodology 
through training. The last chapter demonstrated that the most critical issues for group financial 
sustainability were managing funds effectively through ensuring loans are repaid and funds are 
not mismanaged. This chapter will therefore seek to understand  in greater depth how the 
trainers implemented the SG methodology and its rules  with a particular focus on their role in 
institutionalising rules on loan repayment.  It will also explore the – unexpected role – that 
trainers themselves played in misappropriation and fraud cases.     
In the previous chapter, it was also found that all the trainers had an ongoing involvement with 
the groups after the first cycle, with their being involved especially in assisting them in enforcing 
loan repayment and conducting share-outs.  This chapter analyses these issues from the point 
of view of the implementing organisations, delivery channels and the trainers, whilst the next 
will investigate how the internal group dynamics influenced repayment and in some cases 
resulted fraud.   
In chapter two, Ostrom’s design principles for creating successful groups were reviewed. Those 
needed for institutionalisation of rules are that the participants are able to contribute to the 
rules or modify them as well as the importance of effective monitoring arrangements, 
graduated sanctions, effective enforcement of these and local conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Regarding the role of trainers, section 6.2. will assess the quality of training and the process of 
developing the constitution.  First, the interest here lies in the degree to which they created 
participatory space for groups to design their rules during the constitution development  
process. As became clear in chapter five, the trainers were also to varying degrees monitoring 
the agreed rules and enforcing repayment after the first cycle, even though this was not a role 
that the methodology assigned to them.  Hence, this chapter will also consider the role of 
trainers in group monitoring and in enforcement. Section 6.3. analyses the role of delivery 
channels and trainers in misappropriation cases. 
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This chapter and the next draw mainly on detailed data from eight groups and four trainers.  
These groups are those for which data are available over the full two years during which the 
field work was carried out and hence, can offer the most in-depth perspective.   They were 
selected from the 15 groups49 that already existed when the research started and four groups 
were selected from each district, two groups from each trainer.  The best group under each 
trainer was always included as one of those analysed and those that were no longer operating 
were excluded. 
Table 6.1. Anonymized names of trainers and groups
50
 
District Delivery channel Name of trainer Group name 
Nyamira FBO Paul Amabebe 
 
FBO Paul Etanda 
 
Franchisee Jacob Boburia 
 
Franchisee Jacob Engoa 
Rachuonyo CARE *Grace Tumaini 
 
CARE *Grace Kabonyo 
 
FBO Timothy Ongoro 
 
FBO Timothy Awuor 
* = the original trainer had left CARE and the assistant trainer, Grace, 
supported groups when needed 
 
6.2. The implementation of group training,  monitoring and enforcement 
 
In order to assess where there were gaps between the methodology and practice, this section 
discusses the role of trainers in terms of the quality of their training, the development of the 
constitution as well as monitoring and enforcement.   At the same time, consideration is made 
regarding whether Ostrom’s design principles were present during the implementation of the 
methodology.  
                                                          
49
 For the number and details in selecting  ’old’ and ’new’ groups see table 3.1. 
50
 For the groups I have used names that other groups in the area use 
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6.2.1. The quality of training 
 
Training of the ‘old’  groups had taken place before this research commenced and hence it could 
not be observed. So, information on whether groups had been trained, for how many days and 
on what aspects of the methodology were studied by observing the group meetings and by 
interviewing the group members as well as trainers when they attended.  The methodology 
suggested that the groups were trained over a period of five days before they started operating.  
The findings indicate that the groups under the FBO channel received more training days than 
those under the franchisee and those directly managed by CARE.  Respondents from the 
sampled groups explained that the FBO groups received exactly five days training, whereas the 
directly trained CARE groups received three and a half days on average (with a range one day) 
and the franchisee groups had two days training on average (with a range of two days) before 
they started operating. (Engoa, 5, 6; Etanda, 4; Kabonyo, 9, 10,12)51 
 The trainers in  the other channels expressed their concern that the franchisee channel group 
training had not delivered effectively and that this was the reason why a lot of the groups had 
ceased functioning (KI-2).  In sum, these findings show that the FBO groups  were the only 
groups that had received the recommended five day training and the franchisee groups 
undergone the least.  
However, the length of training does not alone explain the financial performance. Two of the 
eight groups were retrained again after the first cycle, i.e. received more training days than the 
others. One of these two, Etanda, was performing so poorly that the CARE director ordered the 
trainer to retrain the whole group.  Regarding the other group, the first trainer left and so the 
new one trained the group again (Own observation).  However, the retraining did not improve 
the performance of either of these groups, which suggests that additional training does not 
necessary help.  This ineffectiveness of retraining could also imply that the formation of groups 
and the quality of the initial training was very important.   
                                                          
51
 Information on this also from CARE2-R,2;FBO6-R, 1; CARE6-R,1;FR4-N,2; FR4, 4)  
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Another variation (in addition to the number of days spent on training groups) was how many 
groups were trained at the same time.  The methodology suggested that each group should be 
trained separately, but several franchisee trainers delivered this in clusters.  That is, several 
groups were asked to attend a training site at the same time where they were then given the 
necessary instruction.52    “[The franchisee] discovered the advantages of forming the groups 
into clusters. This saved time and allowed for much greater efficiency. Her [Franchisee’s] largest 
cluster has 20 groups.”53.  However, the sampled franchisee groups had not been trained in 
clusters. 
However, trainers from the other delivery channels were sceptical about training several  
groups at the same time.  Timothy, the FBO trainer from Rachuonyo noted that he needed to 
talk to each person in a group and that was not possible when more than one group present.   
“If you train clusters, you have to skip some parts.  I only train one group at a 
time, so that I can look at everyone, and even talk to them one on one…  I  am 
also asking a lot.. Please talk about yourself, or your neighbour, cousin etc… do  
you know her, so why do  you want to join” (Timothy).   
Another trainer said  
“It cannot be an effective method to train several groups at once. This is because 
one needs to show the group what the passbooks are, how to record them. It is 
advisable to train fewer people at a time” (KI-2).  
In the next subsection, the development of a group constitution, especially with the aim of 
ensuring loan repayment through the enforcement sanctions, is discussed. 
6.2.2.   Developing rules:  the constitution   
 
According to the SG methodology, the development of the constitution was the responsibility of 
the group and all of the members were supposed to participate in its development in line with 
Ostrom’s first design principle.   The trainer provided each group with a skeleton constitution 
that consisted of several questions.  By discussing and answering the questions the groups 
agreed the rules each was willing to follow.    However, members participation was bounded in 
                                                          
52
 The monitoring of groups also took place in clusters.   
53
 The reference material is not being disclosed, because although it is in the public domain, it would 
directly connect  my actors whom I have anonymised . 
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the sense that several of the key rules were already set as a mandatory part of the methodology 
and hence, in these areas there were no questions, just instructions on what the group must do.   
Most of the questions that they were encouraged to provide answers for were not the most 
critical for group survival, such as for example,  how much members should pay as a fine, if they 
arrived late to the meeting or if they did not attend at all.    
Regarding the most critical aspect of the survival of the groups, i.e. whether the group was able 
to ensure that loans are repaid, the methodology provided clear technical guidance to the group 
leaders on how to deduct late loans from members savings. Regarding which the methodology 
handbooks noted: 
“If any member owes the Association money (from loan arrears), the shares 
equal in value to his/her debt are cancelled in his/her passbook. In this way the 
defaulting member is penalised, because the cancellation of the shares means 
that he/she will not receive the profit on those shares, but only on the number of 
shares remaining. By this time it is too late to make up the arrears, because 
money paid in the last meeting cannot be borrowed and will only unfairly serve 
to increase the particular member’s share of the profits if it is paid in at the last 
minute”  (Allen and Staehle 2006, 78). 
 
However, the more difficult part, on how to ensure that members actually repaid on time was 
left in the constitution for the groups to decide.  Groups were asked to discuss among 
themselves what action to take when someone did not repay on time and the skeleton 
constitution asked the groups to answer the following questions on this matter: 
• “What will happen if a member does not repay a loan? 
• After how long should the Association consider that a loan is unlikely to be repaid and 
begin recovery action against the defaulter?” (Allen and Staehle 2006, 47). 
 
However, several groups had not discussed what they would do if someone was late with their 
repayment.  This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.   This subsection probes why 
CARE and the trainers did not ensure that rules on sanctions and enforcement were properly 
discussed and agreed upon.  
CARE project director explained that since the SG methodology did not prescribe what to do 
with late repayers, the organisation also did not want the trainers to put forward any practical 
methods regarding this.   Another reason for not prescribing what to do was the fact that 
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according to the project director, CARE had not previously encountered cases were members 
were late with their repayment.  
“During our stay there we did not have cases where people stayed with loans for 
more than 3 months.  It is first after we had pulled out, when there were these 
cases where members defaulted (i.e. kept loans for more than 3 months). We did 
not confront that reality because default was not there” (CARE project director).54   
The training of trainers (TOT) was rather negligent in discussing how the trainers should guide 
the groups on how to handle late repayers.    Hence the trainers were ill equipped regarding the 
strategies that groups could engage in if  members did not repay all their loans before the 
share-out.  When one of my key informants, another FBO trainer from Nyamira, was asked 
whether during the training of trainers the issue of how to deal with late repayers was 
discussed, her response was:  
KI-2: “Yes, we were taught about defaulters. We were told to inform the members 
to get to know each other well, love each other.  
Interviewer:  Did you mention the possibility of requisitioning the assets of 
defaulters?  
KI-2:  We were not told about that” (KI-2). 
 
Trainer’s response that group members needed to ”love each other” clearly indicates that the 
way that trainers approached the subject did not at all address the potentially difficult issues 
that might be involved in ensuring the members’ paid.  Indeed it suggests that the reality of 
these dynamics was subsumed in a discourse of unproblematic support and co-operation. . 
However, Paul , one of trainers that CARE had selected for us, who was also under the FBO 
channel in Nyamira, claimed that during the training of trainers the issue of late repayment had 
been discussed. According to him, the issue of how to enforce repayment had covered the 
possibility of taking assets.  But then again, the franchisee owner also claimed that when 
trainers were trained, neither enforcement nor the possibility of taking assets had been 
discussed (Paul, Franchisee owner).  
This indicates that the issue on how to deal with members that did not repay their loans on time 
was not a central part of the constitution at least in Nyamira or alternatively, as suggested 
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 Even CARE’s own MIS showed  that not all loans were repaid even during the first cycle.  
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above, some trainers during their training were not sufficiently informed about the real 
challenges that the groups might face.   
As a consequence, several of the trainers in Nyamira were not well prepared to provide 
guidance to groups that had problems with repayment.   
“When we trained them, we advised them to take loans that they will be able to 
repay since most the members requested huge loans to pay school fees which 
they could not afford to pay back. We did not specify what they should do if one 
defaults” (KI-2). 
As in Rachuonyo one of the trainers had already left the area before the research started, it was 
not possible to confirm how she had trained the groups on enforcement of late loans or 
whether she had raised the possibility of taking assets. By contrast, Timothy, the FBO trainer in 
Rachuonyo, followed the SG methodology and insisted that groups answer the question on 
what they would do if a member did not repay on time.  Initially, he also claimed that the 
groups were willing to confiscate members property if they did not repay on time.  
 “It was the group [that came up with the idea of taking assets]. In the skeleton 
constitution of the group, it was like if a member does not pay the loan within this 
period of time… it was left for the group to fill in.  So, I believe that all the groups 
that were under CARE filled in the gap.  In my groups, they said if one does not 
pay the loan within the three months, then, your property which is equal to the 
loan will be taken and auctioned to pay for the loan.  If that part [of the 
constitution] was not filled in and it was not clearly stated that you will have your 
property auctioned, the group would not have gone far” (Timothy).  
However, subsequently it became clear that Timothy had not just ensured that group members 
discussed what they were willing to do when someone did not repay, for he had also insisted 
that they should take assets from them if they did not so.  In addition, he promised that he 
would lead the group when they if they needed to  confiscate  property.    
Interviewer: “Did they come up with the idea of auctioning or are you the one 
who told them?  
Timothy: I was just preparing them that they should not default. What I 
discovered with this product is that we were using scaring theory; if you default, 
this or that may happen to you. Practically, some of the things would never be 
done. I was just instilling in them to work hard to pay the loans. This is because at 
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the back of their minds, they remember that the trainer said that if I default, he 
[the trainer] will be the one to lead delegation on when things are to be 
auctioned. 
Interviewer: Even though you would not do that, would you [because trainers are 
not supposed to help the groups for a long time]? 
Timothy: Yes, even though I won’t do it, I do tell them that I will be the first to 
lead the delegation.  If anything will be auctioned, I will be the one responsible in 
that case. This tactic worked well for my groups” (Timothy).   
 
By promising that he would assist the group in enforcing the repayment, he had effectively 
taken the responsibility away from the group leaders, although he expected that they later 
would lead the group.  
However, as the following quote from a group member indicates, members rather waited than 
took quick action:  
“Since we knew the defaulters’ situation, rather than trying to take assets  we 
decided to continue talking to the defaulters.   We knew that the main problem 
was that they did not even have food and children were in the school, so they had 
to pay school fees. Hence we did not want to be too harsh”  (Amabebe;3). 
 Trainers and also CARE knew about this local norm that emphasized “sympathy” towards the 
members that were late in their repayment.   Since the trainers were also from the same 
communities, most of them were also in agreement with this norm (CARE director and Jacob).  
Hence it was understandable that they had not pushed the members very hard to discuss the 
possibility as a last resort to take members assets in order to recover the defaulters loan. 
Shipton  (2007) claims that there is also another norm that explains poor repayment. According 
to him loans among Luos and their neighbours (like Kisiis) are open ended, people are not going 
to repay until the group knocks on defaulters door.   As noted above, leaders did not push too 
much to make members pay.  Neither did trainers push members hard to repay in the middle of 
cycle.  
 “CARE teaches[that] after 3 months  assets should be taken[from members that 
have not repaid] , but people have sympathy they wait until end of cycle. 
[Members have sympathy because] these defaulters did not run away and that 
they are willing to repay” (Paul). 
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When members did not run away and were willing to repay (but often unable) the groups 
viewed the non-repayment as delay rather than default. 
The findings so far have indicated that only the FBO channel trainers had made sure that groups 
discussed the enforcement methods.  It is interesting that when group members who had 
properly talked about these methods were asked would should happen if loans were not repaid 
on time, several were of the view that assets should be taken.  According to one trainer, some 
groups might have adopted this position from microfinance organisations that were also 
operating in these communities. “We were not taught by the CARE Group about that. However, 
members borrowed the idea of holding assets from the Bank Groups” (KI-2). 
The methodology aimed to increase members’ ownership of group rules by encouraging them 
to participate in their design.  Nevertheless, as pointed out above, this participation was 
bounded  in the sense that several of the key procedures were non-negotiable.  Whilst the 
methodology did encourage the groups to decide on the most important matter for group 
survival, how to ensure the repayment of loans,  the fact that the majority of the groups did not 
include any rules in the constitution on how and when to enforce repayment indicates that it 
was very problematic because it meant having to accept the possible eventuality that the group 
would have to take members assets in order to recover the loan.   Most trainers failed to take 
up the responsibility of following up whether the groups had discussed this issue and arrived at 
a consensus on what they would in these circumstances do.  
In groups where the trainers had not actively followed-up that the enforcement issue had been 
discussed, groups had not agreed on any rules to be included in the constitution.   Ensuring that 
the trainers follow-up on groups would have been the responsibility of CARE.    However the 
fact that CARE claimed that they had not experienced any default in the groups  is somewhat 
surprising and suggests a lack of understanding of the weakest link in microfinance and in these 
kinds of groups in particular of the difficulties and dynamics of loan repayment and makes it 
more understandable that CARE was not active in this regard. 
Only in the groups that Timothy had trained, had the groups written in their constitutions that 
the assets of members would be confiscated if loans had not been repaid after three months 
(Copies of the constitutions).    However, it was certainly easier for his groups to include such a 
statement in the constitution, because he had promised that he would be “responsible”  if 
assets had to be taken and auctioned.  Of course, this also meant that the effectiveness of these 
groups operation was dependent on him.  As will be discussed later, Timothy’s promise to ”be 
the first” to enforce repayment worked when he was still assisting the groups, but problems 
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arose when he no longer visited them.  This meant continuing problems on how to ensure 
repayment, because the groups had not come up with their own ideas on how to enforce 
repayment and they did not hold to the ”foreign” (Boettke)  idea of taking assets.  
This section has shown that it was in the main the trainers that introduced a blue print of rules 
and members did not really participate in the crafting of rules.  The only area were groups 
decided rules where the amount of fines.  However, most of groups did not discuss and agree 
on what sanctions should be applied to members that did not repay on time. 
The skeleton constitution did not suggest any ways that local and permanent conflict resolution 
mechanisms might be deployed, which, as pointed out earlier, is one of the Ostrom’s design 
principles.  Nor had this been done by any of the trainers or groups.  Most of conflicts that the 
groups had were related to repayment of loans and to misappropriation cases.   However, the 
fact that this design principle was missing from the SG methodology highlights that its 
assumption that the groups themselves would able to resolve their conflict was probably 
misplaced and this will be further discussed in a subsequent section as well as the next chapter. 
Next monitoring and enforcement by the trainers is discussed. 
6.2.3. Monitoring by the trainers  
 
This subsection focuses on the degree to which trainers  involved themselves with groups in 
relation the monitoring.  The methodology advised that after the five days of initial training the 
trainer should visit each group for which he/she was responsible 10 times before the end of the 
first cycle. During the last visit the trainer was expected to conduct the share-out calculations 
and assist the group in distributing all its savings and profits (i.e. interest) (Allen 2011).  
However, the franchisee acknowledged that trainers under their channel had reduced the 
monitoring/follow-up visits from 10 down to four.  “She [the franchisee owner] has reduced the 
training time during the first cycle to a total of [four], three observation and support visits, and 
one visit to help with the share-out.” 55  We did not collect systematic data from other channels 
on how often the trainers visited the groups during the first cycle. 
The SG methodology further suggested that after the first share-out the groups would be able 
to handle all their affairs on their own and thus, the trainer would move on to train new groups, 
and hence would not visit the groups anymore.  However, all the three trainers that stayed in 
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 The reference material is not being disclosed, because it would directly connect my actors whom I have 
anonymised. 
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their respective areas (out of the four trainers that were in the sample) visited the sampled 
groups also during the second round at least twice.  The assistant trainer that had replaced the 
CARE trainer in Rachuonyo also visited several of the sampled groups during the second cycle 
(Own observation, Jacob, Paul, Timothy, Awuor,1,8; Engoa, 2).     For Paul and Grace, it was easy 
to visit groups because many of them were within walking distance from their homes.  Jacob 
and Timothy visited sampled groups that were further away, with the latter only going when 
invited and they had to pay his transport (Kshs 200) as well as provide lunch. Jacob reported 
that he visited second cycle groups while training new groups in the same area (Jacob). The 
primary interest for trainers attending groups during the second and third cycle was to be able 
to conduct the share-out at the end, because groups were willing to pay them for conducting 
the share-out.  In the next chapter, there will be detailed discussion regarding why most of the 
groups expressed the view that even during the second cycle they needed someone to assist in 
the share-out calculations.  
During the third cycle, both the FBO and franchisee trainers in Nyamira visited one of two 
groups that they had trained in the smaller sample of eight groups. However, the FBO trainer in 
Rachuonyo did not visit the groups during this cycle.   This suggests that there does not seem to 
be a direct relationship between the number of visits and the performance of the groups, for his 
groups were still performing well in the third cycle, whereas the two former groups under Jacob 
and Paul in Nyamira did not perform well in latest cycle (Own observation, Timothy, Jacob).   
There are indications that more important than the number of visits was what the trainer did 
whilst there and whether they insisted that certain key rules were followed. Regarding the first 
matter, the FBO trainer in Rachuonyo inspected the groups’ records during visits, whilst the FBO 
and franchisee trainers in Nyamira did not do so (Own observation).  It is clear that the trainer 
(Timothy) who was really following up and checking that the records were in order was having 
more effect than other trainers who turned up but did not check the books.  
The trainers did not usually involve themselves in changes in group leadership, with only the 
FBO trainer in Rachuonyo suggested to the groups that this should happen if they had not 
followed rules. Even during the second cycle he ensured that those responsible for this 
occurring were changed:  
Timothy: “We never thought that she will be a chronic defaulter. In the first cycle, 
she acted very well but in the second cycle, she started to default. This did send a 
very bad signal to the members. We talked with the group. 
Interviewer: Without her knowing! 
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Timothy: Yes, without her knowing. We discussed that for the group to sustain, 
we needed to have another chair. I told them that in a group of 30 members 
everybody can be trained to be a chair or a record-keeper except those who 
cannot read and write, since they cannot be record-keepers.  
Interviewer: How could you have a meeting without the chair? 
Timothy: It was not in the meeting; it was just outside [of the meeting]” 
(Timothy). 
 
This quote shows that Timothy invested a lot of energy into politicking to ensure that the leader 
was changed and it also illustrates how an initially responsible leader can quickly become 
irresponsible.  In this group, the members needed a lot of encouragement to usurp this 
chairwoman from the trainer, because she had been proactive in forming the groups and was 
also influential in the community.    
To conclude on monitoring, even though Paul, Jacob and Grace turned up in groups during the 
second and sometimes during the third cycle at the time of share-out, this does not mean that 
they were actively monitoring the rule following.  The primary reason to be there was to 
conduct the share-out regardless of whether everyone had repaid and earn some money from 
that.  That might have been also one of Timothy’s motives, but through inspecting the ledger 
books and observing he group meetings and noting inconsistencies with the methodology he 
was actually monitoring the rule following. Next subsection discusses enforcement of 
repayment by trainers. 
6.2.4. Enforcement of repayment by trainers 
 
As noted earlier, the research team was not able to observe the trainers actions during the first 
cycle, but first during the second and third cycle and there were variations in the methods that 
the trainers took in enforcing repayment.  The assistant CARE trainer encouraged members to 
repay their loans before the share-out, but if they did not, she just encouraged the other 
members to wait.   She also conducted the share-out even though some members had not 
repaid (Own observation). 
Similarly, the franchisee trainer encouraged members to repay before share-out, but  did not 
want to be involved in enforcing repayment, but rather, left it to the groups. Nor was he 
involved in negotiations where the groups were trying to make defaulters repay. He did not 
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want the latter to think that he had encouraged the groups to recovering their assets.  “I am is 
not an advocate of taking assets… I am also at risk as trainer, so I don’t propagate, they might 
do something against me” (Jacob, own observation). That is, this trainer felt that it was better 
for him not to be active in the field of enforcement so he could move around freely without fear 
of reprisals.  
Only the FBO trainers, Paul and Timothy, had during second and third cycle advised and assisted 
groups in negotiations with members that had not repaid their loans. However, in most of the 
cases Paul had also left the enforcement of loan repayment to the groups. Nevertheless, there 
is evidence from one case where he had advised the group about what action should be taken 
when members that were not willing to repay their loans and had also joined them when they 
went to negotiate the collection of assets from one group member.  While the group was 
negotiating with the defaulter what he would be prepared to give to the group, Paul insisted 
that the leaders to do the talking while he stayed on the side.   However, Paul did not help 
another group in the sample even though they had much more severe repayment problems, 
which was  because the leaders had not asked him to intervene.   
Timothy was the only trainer who had a progressive process of enforcement that consisted of 
several options.  He encouraged the group leaders to start contacting the defaulters early on to 
remind them that they had signed that they would repay and he also called them himself.  As 
explained above, he had told to the groups that he would not carry out the share-out 
calculations before all the members had repaid their loans. In the cases where the groups were 
not able to enforce repayment before the share-out, he was very proactive in galvanizing the 
group, by taking action as advising the leaders on how they should proceed to ensure the loan 
was repaid in some way. He usually reserved a whole day for ensuring that all the loans were 
repaid and for the share-out calculations, stayed with the group members and advising the 
leaders on the next steps to take. However, he did not participate in the actual negotiations 
regarding the assets that the defaulter might want to give to the groups.  I observed  two 
occasions when Timothy advised the group leaders, and how then the whole group  together 
with the village elders went to negotiate with the defaulter what the group could get in 
recompense for the loan (own observation).   The fact that he was sitting with the whole group 
advising them on how to handle the default cases, appeared to give them the impression that 
he was there to support them and that it  was right that the money had to be returned or goods 
in lieu of repayment.   When preparing the groups to go and talk the defaulters, he emphasised 
that the purpose was not simply to take assets, but rather, to ask the person who was not able 
to repay what they would be prepared to give to the group.   
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 “I prepare them that there is always a fine everywhere. If members will be going 
out to talk  to the person [defaulter] , they will request them [defaulters] that 
since you were unable to repay the loan in the required time, please give us 
something so that we can resell and repay the loan. This has worked as many 
people will tell you that this is the thing that I have that can get sold. It is the 
defaulter who gives the group the property that you have that can be sold. You 
[the people demanding money] do not go there as an arrogant person and start 
taking the assets. No! You go talk and ask the person what he has to give you. In 
most cases, they will give something, but in some cases they will not. If he/she 
refuses to give you something, that is when some little force will be used to take 
this thing and repay our money. Remember, they cannot take something if the 
member is not present” (Timothy). 
Chiefs are part of the local administration in Kenya and are sometimes asked to assist 
microfinance organisations, in particular, obtaining assets from loan defaulters and using them 
was also on option for Timothy, as a last resort, if the debtor was not willing to hand anything 
over.  However, this option had not been noted in the group’s constitution.   
“If there is resistance, then we involve the chief… In the passbooks and record 
books they have signed that they owe [to the group] so there is evidence. But 
involving the chief is expensive, so we don’t [usually] involve them”(Timothy). 
However, chiefs were usually considered expensive, because they normally expect to receive 
half of the recovered loan amount (KI-4). 
Timothy claimed that the groups have to be very strict with members that do not repay on time.   
“In some regions, most of them [groups] are non-existent.  You will find out that 
the major problem is that some of the money was not returned in good time and 
hence, the faith of members went down. The members will ask why they should 
continue when we are very aware that our money will get lost. They will say that 
they want to continue and yet we are looking for nearly Kshs 200,000 which is out 
of the group that has not been returned.  They fear for the safety of their money; 
they see people who are conmen in these groups. They see that when they save 
and loans are given, during the time to return the loan, it becomes a nightmare; 
for the group members, teachers and for everybody” (Timothy).  
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In this quote, Timothy claims that there are whole areas were Savings Groups do not exist 
anymore because neither the trainers nor the group leaders had been strict enough with 
enforcing loan repayment. 
Timothy also insisted that CARE should have permanently stayed in the area assisting the 
trainers and groups in enforcement. 
 “In share-out they always need us there, at least to oversee.. so that we can 
intervene  if there is a problem. There is big money, only 1-2 members have an 
idea of the formula, all the others are in darkness, so don’t you see that we have 
to be there, because members can get scared and conned. We have record 
keepers that can do it, but since members don’t understand they suspect leaders 
will take some money and that is the reason why we have to be there”( Timothy). 
Here again, Timothy is expressing a very clear understanding of the consequences of not 
following the methodology and the difficulty of getting it to work without external enforcement, 
because of internal group dynamics.   
“The groups that are still attached to the trainers who formed them are ongoing 
well, but the groups that were formed and their trainers have left the village for 
different reasons, are not doing well. This then calls for an office or a permanent 
person who will manage the groups, then we will go to another level” (Timothy). 
These quotes also hint at the fact that trainers knew that their authority was diminished after 
CARE had left the area and that the local CARE office was not any more available to support 
them.  
To conclude, the trainers in two delivery channels, the direct CARE and franchisee channels, 
played a very limited role in following up defaulters and certainly never went as far as Timothy 
did in encouraging the groups to visit the homes of defaulters to negotiate with the defaulters 
what they were willing to give to the groups in return for the loan that the defaulter had 
received.  In three out of the four groups under the FBO channels the trainers had assisted in 
asset negotiations and defaulters had actually given some of their assets to group to sell the 
asset to recover the loan.   Regarding the fourth group, the leaders had mismanaged the group 
fund and so did not want the trainer to be involved, and Paul who had trained the group only 
intervened after the group’s new leaders invited him to do so.  
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The findings indicate that the trainers’ role in negotiating asset recovery was central. Regarding 
which, at the time of second or third share-out when asset recovery had been negotiated from 
members that had not repaid, the trainer had always been present.  Asset recovery negotiations 
had been institutionalised only in one group out of eight in the sense that its members were 
willing to negotiate with the late repayer even if the trainer was not present, but this only took 
place for the first time at the end of the third cycle.  
There were also major differences with regards to how the trainers performed the share-out. As 
pointed out above, the FBO trainer, Timothy was also the only one insisted that all the loans had 
to be repaid before he was willing to perform this task.  Moreover, if there were some members 
that had not repaid, he enforced rule following by asking the group to negotiate with the 
defaulters what assets they could give and sell them.   Even after he stopped attended the 
group they continued to carry out the share-outs  according to the methodology (Own 
observation). The fact that this trainer provided ongoing support during the first two cycles on 
the enforcement of rules and more specifically, insisted that all the loans were repaid before 
the share-out, had clearly helped to institutionalise this practice and both groups shared out 
first after everybody had repaid. 
As mentioned above, when Timothy did not have time to visit a group in person he still tried to 
make phone calls to defaulters so as to convince them to repay before the share-out.  “I always 
engage into a phone call with the defaulters. I believe that if I talk to him or her, they may see 
the light”(Timothy).  Grace, the other (assistant) trainer from Rachuonyo, was towards the end 
of field research already so mistrusted that her groups did not allow her to conduct the share-
out.  
The FBO and franchisee trainers in Nyamira performed the group share-outs even if not 
everybody had repaid their loans (own observation).  The former knew the SG methodology for 
carrying out the share-out, but after CARE had left he listened to what the group wished.  
 ”I suggested that I would calculate the normal way when they have all paid but 
they thought that it would take time and the group members wanted to have 
their money” (Paul).  
Jacob, the franchisee trainer, also knew how to perform the share-out according to the 
methodology, but he claimed that he did not have enough authority to enforce the members to 
repay.  
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“It is like taking a cow that is not thirsty to the river.  You can’t force it to drink.  If 
the defaulters say that in one month or in two months I will repay and if the 
members agree, then the trainer can’t force them” (Jacob).   
When asked why members were not willing to take assets, this trainer responded  
“Most people are related and from the same village. So how can you go to uncle’s 
house and take an asset from there and that is where you are going to sleep one 
day” (Jacob).  
Jacob claimed that he had tried to monitor that the SG rules on loan repayment were being 
followed. However, according to him members got tired of waiting especially when they felt 
that they could not take assets from their relatives.  He encouraged  them  
“to go and get at least more money so that I can do the share-out, but the group 
said, no, no, just do the share-out with what little money is here and so I did it. 
People did not want to wait anymore so that everybody would bring the money 
back, they wanted to get at least something” (Jacob).  
Here, Jacob’s enforcement consisted of encouraging the group to ensure that as many members 
as possible had paid, but he did not want to  use any more forceful methods.  
 It is obvious from these quotes that  Jacob and Paul did not enforce rules after the first cycle, 
whereas Timothy continued to do so.  As Jacob noted, he felt he did not have ”authority” to 
enforce rules after CARE’s departure.  One reason why Jacob and Paul had less authority than 
Timothy was that they were younger and only form four school leavers, whereas he was a 
church elder in one of the major churches in the area. Timothy had also previously worked as a 
voter registrar and at the time when CARE was leaving the area, he was nominated as the 
assistant chief for his area.  All of these factors increased his authority when compared to Jacob 
and Paul. 
To conclude on monitoring and enforcement,  in chapter five it emerged that all the groups had 
experienced difficulties in loan repayment except those under the FBO channel in Rachuonyo.  
This section has investigated these difficulties with the help of Ostrom’s design principles in 
terms of assessing how far the methodology, especially that pertaining to loan repayment had 
been institutionalised and if not, why not.  
It emerged that constitution development was weak in most of the groups, which left them 
feeling that they did not know how to get overdue loans back nor how to carry out the share-
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out. The fact that the franchisee groups were monitored less frequently during the first cycle 
might have led to their weaker performance and more group deaths in that channel.  The 
findings also revealed that the institutionalisation was dependent on the external party, the 
trainers, which is not something that the methodology catered for, because the expectation was 
that groups would have taken charge of enforcement after the first cycle.   The three original 
trainers that remained in the study area continued visiting the groups also during the second 
cycle and two trainers also attended during the third.  However, the visits mostly took place at 
the time of share-out because the trainers wanted to get paid for their visits and most groups 
were willing to pay something for the trainers when they did the share-out at the end of the 
second and third cycle.  Jacob, Grace and also to some extent Paul, did not want to get involved 
fully in enforcing loan repayment.  In Jacob and Grace’s groups the institutionalisation of the 
expected rules was weak, this was slightly stronger in Paul’s groups  Timothy was the only 
trainer who was strongly enforcing repayment  and perhaps unsurprisingly, his groups were 
ones that were the strongest.    
The findings indicate that rather than the number of visits or the duration of contact between 
the trainer and the group being salient, what was more important was what happened during 
these visits.  Timothy’s impact was much bigger than other trainers, because he inspected group 
records, enforced repayment of all loans before he was willing to conduct the share-out and 
even ensured that badly performing leaders were removed. The franchisee trainer had 
indicated that they believed they did not have enough authority to enforce rules  and the 
assistant trainer in Rachuonyo did not even try to enforce any rules.   By contrast, Timothy and 
also to some extent Paul were able to institutionalise these rules themselves.  Especially 
Timothy’s  ability to do so appears to  be dependent on their own status and  level of authority 
in the community.   
It seems clear that the methodology did not anticipate the ongoing relationship  between the 
trainers and groups.  Even though the institutionalisation that Timothy provided was not part of 
the (ideal) methodology, (because after the first cycle there were not supposed to be external 
parties involved), nevertheless CARE was very proud of Timothy’s performance.  But as the 
discussion has revealed, all the trainers had a continuing relationship and as will be seen in the 
next section, not all of these relationships were to the advantage of the groups.  
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6.3. Misappropriation of group funds by the trainers 
 
This section investigates the role and impact of the delivery channels and trainers regarding the  
misappropriation cases that involved them.56 In table 5.12 a matrix was presented that 
identified to categories regarding the misappropriation and fraud cases by the delivery channel 
representatives and trainers. First, there was a case where the delivery channel representative 
took loans from groups but did not repay them. Second, there were incidents where the 
trainers appropriated funds from groups through charging fees that were not part of the 
methodology or through collecting money for the metal box but not delivering it.  The next 
subsections discuss these in turn.  
6.3.1.  Misappropriation of funds through loan taking  
 
In Rachuonyo, the CARE trainer had trained six groups out of the full sample of 24 but had left 
after the first share-out.  In order to ensure that someone was available to support the groups 
and observe performance,  the regional CARE office had nominated an ”assistant trainer” and  
asked her to provide support to the groups in the area if they so wished.  Initially, this assistant 
trainer, Grace, was a group member, but then began to mobilise new groups for the CARE 
trainer and through this process was seen by CARE as an able person who could also train 
others.  
However, while recruiting and assisting groups, she also became a member in numerous groups, 
took large  loans and did not repay them, which led to groups collapsing.  She was also secretary 
in many groups and through falsifying the records was able to profit from her participation in 
them.  Respondents also reported cases where she had been money keeper before the share-
out, but when it was time for this she was not able to return the money (KI-3).57 
                                                          
56
 This means that this section will discuss all the misappropriation cases not just the misappropriation 
cases in the sample of eight groups.   
57
 In addition to this one case, the research team found two other cases where the representatives of the 
FBO channel in Nyamira  had  abused their power  by borrowing from the groups and not repaying.  The 
two other involved groups were not part of sample.  Hence we do not discuss them further evidence 
here.  However, these other cases suggest that such incidents were not isolated.   
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Another trainer working in the area reported that Grace started mismanaging the groups once 
the supervision from CARE was no longer present.   
“...it is not only in Tumaini groups where some group officials are messing the 
groups, when they have realised that there is no supervision, when the 
supervisory body is gone [i.e. CARE], they do it in their own way. They leave the 
standards of GSL and “mess up” the groups. Grace [assistant trainer] knew that 
groups can’t go to anybody and that is the key challenge. There is no supervisory 
body now.  Even if Grace takes three loans in one meeting, they can’t question 
that” (KI-1). 58 
This trainer had also been asked by CARE to inspect the records of one group where Grace was 
the secretary and noted that members could recall that she had topped up her loan of Kshs 
13,000 with another Kshs 8,000, but there was no record of it (KI-5). Grace was the money 
keeper in several groups  before the share-out was conducted and one was supposed to 
perform this task, she did not bring back Kshs 40,000 that had been entrusted to her.  Members 
kept their loans because they realised that there was no one to enforce the rules. As one said: 
”We cannot take assets from her [assistant trainer] because she does not have anything in the 
house” (CARE 3 R, 5).  Other instances were reported by local chief ( KI-1, KI-3). 
Members were very unhappy and disillusioned when they realised what their trainer was doing: 
 “If Grace [assistant trainer] does not pay, we will not pay.  She is our Mwalimu 
[teacher] and then she is the bad one, that is really bad.  We do not know what 
she does with the money and we are asking for  help from the [CARE] office.  We 
were happy with the group at first but now we really need help as groups” 
(Tumaini, 5). 
The key informant reported that everyone ”hates” the assistant trainer. However, he also noted 
that  
“The level of transparency is not so high, even herself she [Grace]  feels that she is 
not alone because others have also taken money, she thinks even if I have eaten, 
others have also taken” (KI-1). 
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 According to CARE rules a member cannot have more than one loan at a time. 
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The trainer working in the area explained that the members that were unhappy with the groups 
were the ”lowest class”   and those that try to protect themselves because they had taken 
money from the group  were the most powerful in the community (KI-1). 
According to the trainer from the area, the reason why Grace and a few other influential 
members had set up so many new groups instead of saving more in the existing ones, was that 
when they were unable to get  money in group A, they could go to  group B, and when there 
were no longer funds there, then they could go to groups E,F etc. “Even though most of the 
members are the same, there are some new faces that will save and increase the group fund so 
that the old members can take new loans” the trainer explained (KI-1).  
By 2013, none of the eight Tumaini groups that Grace had ‘supported’ were operational and 
one of these was in the eight sampled.  The area chief reported that Grace had been in addition 
to the eight Tumaini groups also a member in at least 12 others, in many of which she was the 
secretary or treasurer and she had also taken out big loans that she had not repaid (KI-3). Grace 
acknowledged that she had loans from several groups that she could not service.  However, she 
did not acknowledge that she had appropriated group funds through falsifying records or 
keeping money before the share-out and not being able to return it (Grace).  
Unlike the SG methodology suggests, she asked all the members to leave the room before she 
made the share-out calculation with the other leaders, as one of the group members explained:. 
“Grace forced the members to leave and she remained with the group leaders. 
Afterwards, a deficit of Kshs 2,000 was realised and nothing was explained. 
Therefore, during the second share-out, we requested Amos [CARE director] to be 
present. He observed everything that took place and he queried and quarrelled 
with  Grace and her team.  
Interviewer: When the group members were forced to leave, why didn’t anyone 
object? 
 
Respondent: We had nothing to do since she had supremacy over us.  We even 
tried to withdraw out shares, but they hindered us. When  Allan [regional project 
director] arrived and found us locked out of the meeting hall, they started 
questioning us. We told them that Grace told us that she was trained that no 
members should be present when doing calculations on profit share-out. We all 
got confused. After the officials locked themselves inside, they only told that they 
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have tried to know where the cash was but it was never found. We just went 
although we gossiped about them; we had nothing to do” (Tumaini; 6). 
 
The comment that “we all got confused” illustrates how easy it is for people to be persuaded 
that their understanding of the methodology was incorrect when someone appears to have 
legitimacy, in this case from CARE.   
 
On several occasions, the group members tried to take away Grace’s assets, but they had not 
been successful as she had managed to  conceal them.  The chief had also tried to get assets 
back from Grace. He had written several letters to her and also tried to visit her at home, but 
she was never in. In addition, the chief could not find anything that could have been sold 
(Tumaini, 6; KI-3).  
Analysis 
 
Grace, the assistant trainer, managed to misappropriate hundreds of thousands Kenyan shillings 
from the groups.  She derived her legitimacy and power over groups from her association with 
CARE.  Specifically, she had trained many groups together with the original CARE trainer and had 
been seen moving around with CARE project leaders (KI-1). Moreover, she gained trust through 
mobilising and being a member in most of the groups in the area where she lived. Further, there 
was a local norm that leaders were respected.  As one of the key informants noted “in our 
culture if you are a leader, you are given respect” (KI-1).  Hence members believed in her 
integrity when for example she insisted to it was the rule that before the share-out that all the 
members had to leave the room whilst she made the calculations.  However, Grace lost her 
legitimacy very fast when she was not able to repay her loans and members suspected that she 
had falsified records. Her reputation worsened further when they saw that she did not return 
the funds that she had kept as money keeper before the share-out.  
As indicated, the CARE project director had visited the area and had tried to discipline Grace, 
but had clearly not been able to sort things out.  This was partly because she was not an 
employee of CARE and so the organisation could not sanction her. Another reason was, that at 
the time of disciplining Grace CARE had already closed down this project and did not have much 
time to deal with this one since it had new projects. If CARE had bothered to take her to court, 
they would probably have been as unsuccessful as a local chief who tried to do so, but every 
time he attempted to present a court order she was either not at home or pretending to be out.   
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6.3.2. Misappropriation by charging fees  
 
Regarding the second category of misappropriation, charging fees from groups that were not 
part of the methodology,  there were seven cases in the sample: five in Nyamira and two in 
Rachuonyo.  In Nyamira, three of the groups had been trained and managed by the franchisee 
and two by the FBO channel.  The two cases in Rachuonyo where the misappropriation had 
taken place were in groups that had been trained directly under CARE.  In terms of the 
monetary value, the biggest cases were the two groups where the representative of the 
franchisee was charging ”registration” fees.  The other appropriation cases were relatively small 
in terms of monetary value. In what follows, to begin with the smaller misappropriation cases 
are considered and after that the focus is on the bigger cases where ”registration fees” were 
charged.  In the bigger cases the share-out fees are first discussed followed by ”registration” 
fees that the franchisee channel regional coordinator collected from groups in the beginning of 
every cycle. Then the views of the franchisee and CARE on registration fees are presented and 
this section concludes by analysing how and why the franchisee channel coordinator was able to 
charge from groups so much.  
6.3.2.1. ‘Smaller’ misappropriation cases by charging fees 
 
Before moving to the biggest misappropriation case, few smaller cases are briefly discussed. The 
following cases are significant in the sense that they indicate at least part of the rationale for 
trainers continuing involvement with the groups: additional opportunities to misappropriate.  
There were four cases where the delivery channel representative had collected money from 
groups to buy a metal box, but had not delivered it.  In three of these cases the franchisee 
channel was involved and in one the direct CARE channel. (Kabonyo,6; FR4-N,2; FR5-N,1). There 
was also a case where a trainer charged existing groups training fees for new members but did 
not deliver the training (FBO1-N,1).  In another group (CARE5-R), an assistant trainer insisted 
that he undertakes the share-out calculations and did it and the group paid him something, 
even though the group did not want him to do calculations.    Further, there was one case, 
where it was unclear whether the trainer was involved in the appropriation of funds, for 
according to the group concerned, he was, but he denied this. This group (FR3-N) made a partial 
share-out in August 2011 at which point in time twelve members had not returned a total of 
Kshs 112,000.  Hence, the group chairman asked the franchisee to assist in getting the loans 
back from the biggest defaulters.  The franchisee had asked assistance from a private auctioneer 
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with the recollection of loans. Auctioneers take on the role of debt collectors and are 
sometimes employed by microfinance organisations to pursue debtors.  The auctioneer along 
with the trainer, approached one defaulter, who gave them Kshs 5,000 as a partial payment of 
the loan that should have been returned to the group, but that money never arrived to the 
group.  According to the chairman, the trainer had acknowledged that he received that money 
and when the matter was discussed with him, he denied taking it, saying that the auctioneer 
was the culprit. The case has not been resolved.    
As indicated above, some of these misappropriation cases could have been misunderstandings, 
such as in the auctioneer case, but several others seem to be more systemic. All the sampled 
trainers obviously saw an opportunity to remain involved with the groups after the first cycle, 
which as mentioned previously was not an intention the methodology. They realised that this 
would be a way to continue receiving financial benefits from the groups. Whilst the biggest 
misappropriation case, which is described below, as well as the Grace’s case were highly 
significant, the petty misbehaviour of the trainers was widespread and this meant that many of 
the groups were subject to their unaccountable wrong doing. For instance, the four metal box 
cases and also the training one indicate that members did not receive some of the key services 
that they were entitled to and yet they still had to pay for them.   
6.3.2.2. Share-out fees 
 
According to the SG methodology, trainers were not supposed to receive any money from the 
groups.  The methodology also assumed that after ”graduation”, i.e. after the first share-out, 
the groups would continue operating without the assistance of the trainers.   However, as 
discussed, all the sampled trainers continued assisting the groups during the second cycle. All of 
them received a payment for attending the share-out meeting and calculating how much each 
member would receive, on average, they got about Kshs 500 for making these calculations (Own 
observation).  Paying for trainers Kshs 500 was considered fair.  However, the group members in 
groups that the franchisee ”regional co-ordinator” Bosire’s had mobilised  reported that his fees 
were higher, but he gave no explanation for these high fees.  In fact, the respondents reported 
that he demanded Kshs 3,000 for the share-out,  Kshs 1,000 being his fee, Kshs 1,000 was for 
the trainer who actually made the calculations and Kshs 1,000 was for the group leaders.  In 
some groups, Mr. Bosire had taken Kshs 2,000, but in these cases he did not give anything to the 
group leaders.  Regarding the other delivery channels, the groups paid only one person, namely, 
the trainer who actually carried out the calculations.  During 2013, Mr Bosire had increased all 
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the share-out fees from Kshs 3,000 to Kshs 5,000 (FR4-N,1; FR4-N,2; FR5-N,1). Next, the biggest 
misappropriation cases, the registration fees  are discussed. 
6.3.3. ‘Registration’ fees  
 
During the research, it emerged that in two of the sampled groups59 the franchisee delivery 
channel representative had been involved in charging additional ‘registration fees’ that the 
methodology did not mention.  The franchisee business that CARE had subcontracted to train 
the groups was owned by a young woman who had three small kiosks where she sold airtime 
for mobile phones and Mr. Bosire,  a former local politician and the person responsible for the 
largest appropriation of group funds, was her father. 60 Bosire would attend the share-out 
meeting with one of the franchisee trainers, who, as explained above, carried out the necessary 
calculations.   During the share-out meeting, Mr. Bosire also asked  in both groups whether the 
members wanted to register with CARE for the next cycle.  According to him, the registration 
fee was Kshs 200 per member and everybody who wanted to continue had to pay it.   “He told 
us if you do not register you will leave the group, so the members registered” (FR5-N, 2; also 
FR4-N, 1)61  Members registered by writing their name on a piece of paper that Mr. Bosire then 
took together with the money, informing them that he would take the registration fees to the 
”office”, which they understood as being the CARE office in Nyamira.  Mr. Bosire had not asked 
                                                          
59
 Of out of the total 24 groups   
60
 The respondents referred to him as the ‘regional coordinator’ and some group members referred to 
him as the father of the franchisee owner. However, when I referred to him as Lucy’s father [father of the 
franchisee owner], he reacted strongly and seemed to be somewhat surprised or frightened and asked 
me somewhat aggressively how did I know this.  This indicates that at least not everybody knew that they 
were related.  Also, it is not clear at what stage CARE realised that they were related, although it is 
plausible that some CARE people knew right from the beginning that Mr. Bosire was Lucy’s father.  This is 
because CARE had been asked to form a large number savings groups and politicians are good at getting 
people together. 
61
 Another respondent from another group reported on the registration fee that Bosire takes an exercise 
book and says that since the money is on the table, members should now register.  He takes the names of 
the individuals and takes the money from the pile before the share-out.  They wrote their names on the 
list, and then he said that he would communicate when he was back in the office and even left the money 
there. So, after 1-2 days he phoned saying  that ”I am on my way to Nyamira can get the list and the 
registration money” and so the secretary or treasurer needed to struggle to get to the road side and find 
Bosire to give these to  him” (FR5-N, 2). 
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the group to pay registration fees during the first cycle62 and the respondents reported that he 
first collected the fees from the groups at the start of the second cycle when CARE was leaving 
the area (FR5-N, 2; FR4-N, 1).  
During 2013, Mr Bosire had apparently increased all the registration fees along with increases in 
the share-out fees.  Specifically, one respondent from a sampled group  reported that he had 
doubled the registration fee from Kshs 200 to Kshs 400 per members.  As one of the 
respondents reported: 
“We didn’t pay the first cycle, and then second, the third and the fourth we have 
been paying two hundred but now that we have reached the fifth cycle, now he 
wants four hundred shillings for registration” (FR4-N, 1). 
On the day of the share-out, Mr. Bosire was able to take substantial amount of groups’ money, 
because all their funds were on the table.  Regarding one group, he had taken Kshs 29,000 from 
the group before it shared-out, which he explained as Kshs 5,000 for managing the share-out, 
Kshs 16,000 for the registration for the next cycle (40 members x Kshs 400) and Kshs 8,000 to be 
paid to the police so that they could ”harass” defaulters to repay (FR4-N,1). However, the group 
members had seen no evidence of the police visiting defaulters, nor had any of the outstanding 
money been repaid to the group. According to respondents, Mr. Bosire collected registration 
fees in all the groups that respondent knew of.  
Interviewer: How many groups are you in? 
Respondent: I am in five  groups and in every group I am either a treasurer or a 
money counter.  
Interviewer: Does Bosire come to all your groups to collect the registration? 
Respondent: There is only one group [into] which he doesn’t come, and that is 
because that group is for cousins (FR4-N, 2).   
Respondents also reported that Bosire had asked group members with sick children63 to register 
with CARE.  So, the details of such children along with a photograph had to be given to Mr. 
Bosire, who explained that he would deliver the forms to CARE, with the registration fee being 
Kshs 200.  In one group some members registered and paid the stated fee per child, whilst 
                                                          
62
 This might be because CARE had informed the groups that they did not have to pay anything for the 
training.  Also, during the first cycle CARE was still around and could have monitored what the franchisee 
coordinator was doing.  
63
 One respondent also reported that elderly people should have also been registered. 
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others did not believe Bosire and refused to do so (FR4-N, 2 ; FR5-N, 4). The upshot is that  CARE 
did not have any programmes in the area for assisting children at the time.  
However, not all the groups were willing to pay registration fees to Mr. Bosire every year. After 
hearing from the research team that CARE did not collect registration fees in other groups, two 
respondents asked whether they could get another trainer instead of Mr. Bosire to support 
them or whether they could become ”completely independent” (FR4-N, 1). However, distancing 
themselves from his sphere of influence was not easy, because he had local informants in every 
group, which helped him strengthen his position.   
“He has a deep network of friends and people who are very close to him and some 
of them are in these groups.  But, he doesn’t have much interest in this group” 
(FR4-N, 1). 
Mr. Bosire had recruited community members as ”coordinators” to recruit groups for him, 
falsely claiming that CARE had selected these people as chairpersons for a certain area.  The 
coordinators were then in charge of reporting to Bosire when the groups were sharing-out so he 
could attend to collect the share-out and registration fees.   
Respondent:  “He told us that one member by the name Moses, whom they 
[CARE] have appointed to be the chairperson of all the Rianyariki groups.  
Interviewer: So is he [Moses] now the chair of the Rianyariki area groups? 
Respondent:  In our group, he is just a member but he is the chair in the other 
three. So since he is the one who came up with the groups we just call him the 
chairperson. 
Interviewer: Does it have any practical implications? 
Respondent:  He has never told us about anything that happens but anything that 
happens in the group he tells Bosire” (FR4-N; 1). 
 
Bosire explained to the groups that it was CARE that had set up the system of coordinators that 
reported him, but he  had actually invented this system  himself, because through them he was 
able to get useful  information from groups. A respondent reported that their group coordinator  
reported  to Bosire when the members criticised him: 
“When we realised that Bosire was conning us, Moses [coordinator] told Bosire 
what was happening.  We also decided that during the share out we can do the 
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calculations [ourselves] and share the money without either Bosire or the trainer 
but he [Moses] tells him when we are almost doing the share out” (FR4-N, 1). 
Another respondent actually claimed that Mr. Bosire ”owned” their group because he had 
mobilised people and then set it up, which gave the impression to those who joined that it was 
wrong to criticize him and expect to remain in the group.     
Respondent:  “Bosire is the one who formed the group so it is like he owns the 
group and they [group members] respect him like a person from CARE. 
Interviewer: So he kind of owns the group.  
Respondent:  He owns them 
Respondent:  Moses tells us that Bosire has done no mistake and has done 
nothing so if we don’t want [to stay and pay] we can leave the group” (FR4-N,1). 
 
However, not all the groups were happy  with their relationship with Mr. Bosire’s.  One of the 
groups that I studied was set up during my initial visits to the area and when I was present.  and 
the members  used my presence at its formation to challenge his authority over the group in an 
attempt to break free from his control.   
 “We told him that we are in the Mzungu ]European person’s] group and he 
became bad tempered and told us that if he goes the Mzungu cannot come and 
look at our money.   Mr Bosire became so upset that he threw the books and  we 
were afraid, so we gave him the four hundred shillings” (FR4-N,1). 
What these instances show is that respondents understood themselves as part of a wider 
context and network in which Bosire had considerable power  although they were unhappy with 
it.  In this latter case they even used my presence as a means of contesting who their patron in 
fact was and hence his role in relation to them. They were concerned about the consequences 
of leaving his network although it is not entirely clear what these would be.  It is certainly likely 
that they would recognize that they would not be favoured in future cases where NGOs might 
bring programmes to the area, but it is possible that falling out of favour with him might well 
affect other aspects of their relationships with powerful people locally that were not 
immediately apparent from the research.  
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Bosire’s and CARE’s views on registration fees 
 
When Bosire was asked why he collected registration fees, he responded that these were for 
covering his “fuel costs”  (Franchisee owner and Mr.  Bosire).  However, the groups in the 
sample were close to Mr. Bosire’s home so he did not need the transport to get to their 
meetings and to reach most of those located further away , he would not have needed more 
than Kshs 250. When the issue of registration fees was brought up with CARE, it claimed that 
the research team had confused the registration fee with fee-for-service.  Specifically, at the 
time when CARE was closing down the project, it had proposed to trainers that after CARE had 
left, the trainers could continue recruiting and training groups in return for a fee that the 
members would pay to the trainers. However, all the groups in the sample had been started 
before CARE left.  Some trainers had recruited new groups after CARE had left and trained the 
groups for a fee.  However, one year after CARE’s withdrawal, all the trainers had stopped 
charging for training , mainly because groups were not willing to pay them.64 CARE had not 
asked the delivery channels nor the trainers to collect registration fees and neither did the 
research team hear similar stories on ‘registration fees’ from the other delivery channels.   Also, 
the respondents understood that the registration fee was for registration, not for training and 
did not expect to receive any services in return for this fee: “He just told us that the money goes 
to the office so that we can be recognised as being under CARE“ (FR4-N 1). 
Towards the end of the field research, the franchisee channel owner, i.e. the daughter of Bosire, 
called one of the CARE directors in Nairobi, saying that the research team was asking the groups 
“negative questions”. Thus, it would appear that she and her father were worried that the 
research team had discovered some of the fraudulent practices, including the registration fee 
collection. CARE then called the donor, who then complained to us that we were only asking 
critical (“negative”) questions.  Subsequently, the research team met both the CARE project 
director and the franchisee owner (Bosire’s daughter)  to discuss the concerns of the franchisee 
channel and CARE.    What seemed to irritate the franchisee most was that when we visited the 
groups for a third time, we did not first contact them.  During the first and second visits we had 
gone together with the franchisee trainers and they had naturally informed the groups 
beforehand that we were coming.  They were unhappy that the team had subsequently visited 
‘their’ groups without their prior knowledge. CARE was clearly worried that we would spoil the 
good reputation of the franchisee channel, because as the project director put it, “there are 
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 Interestingly, Bosire was the only person that continued to establish new groups. 
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people from other organisations abroad right now on their way to come and study the 
franchisee channel in order to replicate it in their own countries” (CARE project director).  
Analysis 
 
The franchisee channel in Nyamira had mobilised and trained more groups than all the other 
channels put together.  The donor and the others who were intending to implement similar 
schemes elsewhere were interested in the franchisee mobilisation and training methods, 
because at first glance they appeared to be more cost and time effective.  Consequently, at the 
time, CARE’s reputation as the SG programme implementer rested a lot on the franchisee’s 
fortunes and so they were unwilling to criticise their methods.  One indication that CARE really 
appreciated the work of the franchisee was that it was nominated by CARE Kenya in a global 
competition held by the organisation for the most outstanding performance of the year by a 
provider.   In sum,  at least at the time, it would appear that CARE leaders considered the 
franchisee channel with Bosire’s involvement  was the horse they were wanted to back, through 
which they could also attract future funding for the project and consequently, they were not 
prepared to listen to any concerns raised by the research team.     
Mr. Bosire had managed to build up a system where he was able to misappropriate roughly Kshs 
20,000 from each group under him at the end of each cycle and there are suggestions that he 
had hundreds of groups under him.  This subsection explains how Bosire was able to 
misappropriate registration fees, fees for registering sick children with CARE, fees for the police 
and to obtain extra-large share-out fees.  Three different explanations are provided. First, his 
successful misappropriation of fees from the groups can be attributed to his position in the local 
community.  Second, it was down to the power he had through falsely claiming his association 
with CARE and third,  since he had mobilised the groups, the group members recognized his 
‘ownership’ of groups.   
One of the main reasons for his being able to charge registration fees from the groups was the 
fact the Mr Bosire was a local influential politician, a former councillor, with a wide network of 
contacts in the area.65 According to the franchisee owner, her father had assisted her in 
mobilising groups and this had been key to her success.  The father informed the other 
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 It is interesting that the father of the franchisee was able to charge registration fees.  He did not own 
the company with which CARE had signed the contract, he had not been trained by CARE on the SG 
methodology and he had not trained any groups.   
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councillors and the chiefs in Nyamira about CARE and the Savings Group project.66  If a powerful 
politician is involved in an activity, people tend follow his or her guidance since they also bring 
resources to the area. Moreover, given his access to other authorities, especially the police and 
judiciary, he was able to give the impression that he could be dangerous to those trying to 
challenge him.    
Another strategy that Bosire used to boost his legitimacy in front of the groups was his claim to 
be a CARE representative or at least associated with the organisation. He took the following 
actions to support  this impression.  First, respondents reported that he wore  an ID with the 
CARE logo as well as a CARE T-shirt when visiting the groups. 
Interviewer:  “How do you know that Bosire is from Care? 
Respondent:  He has some logo that looks like an Id, his photo.  
Interviewer: Does he carry it? 
Respondent:  He usually comes with the logo and also the T-shirt” (FR4-N,1). 
 
The research team also observed that he wore a CARE ID badge.  None of the other trainers 
wore any CARE IDs or T-shirts.  Second, he used blank CARE forms to collect the yearly 
registration fees from the groups (Own observation, FR4-N,1).  
Interviewer: What kind of form do you fill when you are registering? 
Respondent:  He comes with a form from CARE. 
Interviewer: Does it look like CARE form? 
Respondent:  It’s a form, on top there is some writing and there  numbers one to 
thirty eight for the members to register there ( FR4-N,1). 
 
He also falsely claimed that he would take the registration fee and the registration forms to the 
CARE office, even though it had already left the area.  Third, a group mobiliser, who was a 
member of several groups, alleged that Bosire made “fake” calls during meetings to CARE as a 
further way to present this façade of legitimacy.  
                                                          
66
 The reference material is not being disclosed, because although it is in the public domain, it would 
directly connect my actors whom I have anonymised. 
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“After the first cycle we asked him to come, so he came with his Mwalimus 
[teachers in Swahili i.e. trainers] and he had phones, so he makes fake calls that 
he is contacting Wazungus [white people or Europeans] in CARE Kenya” (FR5-N, 
2).   
Fourth, Bosire told the research team that even after a project had been closed down, he would 
invite the CARE representatives to the share-out celebrations and sometimes they would come. 
This further reinforced group members’ perception that he was associated with CARE (Bosire). 
Third explanation for wielding his influence over the groups was  that members recognized his 
‘ownership’  of the groups since he had mobilised them. The point is that there was an 
underlying set of social norms here about who mobilises groups and how this leads to him being 
seen as its patron.  This in turn meant he was seen as having the authority to charge members 
fees. However, the aim of the SG methodology was to create autonomous groups, where the 
members ‘own’ the group and clearly mobilisation by Bosire meant that the ‘ownership’ was 
shifted to him.  That is, as someone who had mobilised groups he was seen like others who had 
mobilised ROSCA and ASCA  as having more rights than the members to dictate how the 
relationship between him and group would continue.  However, Bosire was able to go further 
than this by claiming his association with CARE, which his group members considered to be 
advantageous also for them as they expected benefits from this. The members would not have 
patronised him with considerable amounts of money in the form of registration fees, if they 
thought they would not have reaped any benefits, such as the proposed support for sick 
children. However, the reported contestation about ownership of the ”Mzungu group” above, 
indicated that this group was not satisfied with the traditional power structure, whereby a local 
big man was able extort fees from the local community. Nevertheless, their attempt to take 
power back for the group was not successful in this case, thus demonstrating the enduring 
nature of the existing power structure.   
There was one key similarity between Mr. Bosire and Grace, the two biggest misappropriation 
cases.  Members viewed both of them as mobilisers and associated with CARE, which made 
them legitimate in the groups’ eyes.  However, there were also key differences between the 
two, with first being that Grace took loans to obtain funds, whilst Bosire extracted fees.  Taking 
loans made the former much more vulnerable than the latter and soon after she was not able to 
repay, the groups became suspicious of her. By contrast,  Mr. Bosire collected fees that he was 
never supposed to pay back and any case, the ”fees” were according to him not for himself, but 
for CARE.  He had protected his legitimacy much more carefully  in the sense that is was difficult 
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for groups to differentiate him from CARE, because of his CARE ID-badge, CARE T-shirt, copied 
CARE registration forms and the pretend phone calls to the CARE office. Even in cases where the 
groups were not satisfied with him and wanted to become more independent so they could 
stop paying fees to him, they were cautious with him and eventually decided to stay under him.  
Compared to Bosire, Grace did not have any formal position in the community that would have 
brought her power or authority.  Nevertheless, she was initially able get multiple loans without 
paying them back, in some cases from the same groups. Hence, this underlines the power of 
being associated with CARE over group members, because they saw organisation as very 
influential outside NGO.  In sum, both these people exploited their supposed link with CARE 
cleverly, but  Bosire, with his leadership position in the community was able to so much greater 
extent than Grace.   
The registration fees were not the only changes that Bosire and the franchisee channel had 
introduced to the SG methodology.  Groups were encouraged to save only during the first 
months of the cycle rather than throughout the cycle. At the time when CARE was leaving the 
area, the franchisee channel trained the groups that they should save only once, in the 
beginning of the cycle.  Further, group members were encouraged to stay with their loan as long 
as they wished  (Bosire and Jacob). Both of these deviations from the SG methodology were 
essentially adopted from the indigenous ASCAs in the area, and made the training and 
monitoring much easier since the groups could  continue using the existing indigenous ASCA 
rules and norms.  
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Discussion:  explaining differences between the delivery channels 
 
The differences in rule following and performance for the different delivery channels can at 
least partly be explained by different local institutions, local power relations and local social 
norms. The key actor in the franchisee channel, Mr. Bosire had established a strong position as a 
patron of the groups that he had mobilised.  His patronage of the groups enabled him to utilise 
a new linkage, CARE, to external resources to be able to demand fees.  Ultimately  from the 
groups point of view it was not clear that he was needed to run the methodology but his link to 
CARE had power because members believed it may have future potential.  
Likewise, also the Faith based (FBO) channel (especially in Rachuonyo)  was part of a local 
institution and underlying set of moral norms.   Hence, the differences in performance between 
the delivery channels can at least partly be explained by the different institutional structures 
and the norms underlying these institutions.   The institutional structure of the church was 
further strengthened by the fact that it had formed a committee to select and oversee the 
trainers (Own observation).  This committee had  selected as trainers professional people with 
former experience from working with the communities, often church elders, who had greater 
moral authority than ordinary members of the community.   This further limited opportunities 
for rent-seeking and ensured that the FBO channel (in Rachuonyo) delivered services that were 
in line with the norms of the institution.  At the other extreme, in the case of Bosire, the norms 
underlying the institution of patronage did not limit rent-seeking nor had CARE created any 
monitoring arrangements that might limit this potential opportunism by a private sector 
franchisee who might approach the task with different values.  In fact, the only person who 
might have provided oversight of the other trainers, the regional coordinator, was responsible 
for much of the appropriation.   
This discussion on the two major misappropriation cases has also clearly shown that had the 
group members been trained on one of the Ostrom’s design principles, the conflict resolution 
mechanism, they might have reacted earlier.   On the other hand at least Bosire so well 
connected in his locality that only CARE could have been in a position to discipline him. 
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6.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented qualitative empirical evidence on the delivery channels and trainers 
with the aim being to address the research question as to whether rules have been 
institutionalised in the longer term.  Specifically, the purpose was to find out how the 
methodology was actually implemented by the different delivery channels and the trainers 
within these. First, there was analysis of the ways in which the trainers attempted to introduce, 
monitor and enforce the SG methodologies so that groups would be able to manage repayment 
and it emerged that the constitution development process did not adequately conform to 
Ostrom’s design principles.  The method was only participatory to a limited extent.  The 
constitution development process did not come out clearly in terms of who should monitor  the 
rule following on repayment, or were the sanctions for default were ,and how, as well as when,  
should the group enforce repayment.   The groups were supposed to decide upon these issues 
among themselves, but most groups did not voluntarily discuss when or how to initiate the 
recovery process on defaulter loans, because these people were usually their relatives or 
friends.  In the great majority of cases, the trainers did not follow-up whether these issues had 
been discussed and because most of the groups had not agreed any strategies on how to ensure 
repayment, it is not surprising that the trainers adopted different strategies on how to approach 
this issue. 
Regarding the monitoring and enforcement of sanctions, continuing involvement of the trainers 
in the affairs of the groups was observed.  From the trainers’ perspective, the groups did not 
seem to want to enforce repayment and appreciated when trainers offered to perform the 
calculations for the share-out, hence being happy to pay them to do so.  All the trainers that had 
continued to reside in the area were willing to be involved, because of this payment and often 
travel and lunch allowances. 
However, only Timothy had developed a systematic strategy of enforcement that ensured that 
everybody repaid before the share-out was conducted, whilst Jacob did not want at all to get 
involved with enforcement after the first share-out.  However, he conducted share-outs for 
groups when invited even if not everybody had repaid.  Paul was in the middle in the sense that 
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if the group leaders invited him to assist in enforcement, he participated, but if they did not, he 
would not become involved.  In general, the analysis revealed that repayment was essentially 
dependent, not on groups, but on whether the trainers were willing or able to enforce it.  
However, not even Timothy with his extremely extensive enforcement strategy had been able 
to institutionalise this in all his groups, for as members from one reported, once he stopped 
visiting them they were not willing to continue using his methods. 
The section on misappropriation presented two major cases in depth, where it emerged that 
both Grace and Mr. Bosire had established ways through which they were both 
misappropriating funds.  There were similarities between these two major misappropriation 
cases:  Both Grace and Mr. Bosire claimed association with CARE and both attempted to gain 
influence and respect in groups through mobilising them and Grace also through joining the 
groups either as a leader or as a member.  The supposed connection to CARE was an added 
incentive for groups to remain connected  to these delivery channel representatives.  That is, in 
both cases, the delivery channel representatives were able to use the association with CARE  
and groups’ expectation of future assistance from the organisation to exploit the groups.   
However, Grace was much more vulnerable because she was basically a group member, 
whereas Mr. Bosire was a former politician and hence, had much greater power and influence.  
These two misappropriation cases clearly showed another gap in the SG methodology: there 
had been no discussion during the training on local conflict resolution mechanisms, because it 
was assumed that groups can resolve their conflicts on their own.  
The different delivery channel representatives reacted in different ways to the pressures (not 
being able to repay on time/not having money to save etc.) coming from the groups.  Timothy 
stuck with the SG rules and tried to deliver them such that the groups would understand the 
sense of having them and hence, would accept them.  Timothy’s ability to resist being 
influenced by the groups can at least partly be explained by his character including age, 
education, work history with civil society, and social status as a church elder.    On the other 
hand, Bosire’s response was, even though he also had a high social status because of his 
background as a politician, to adapt the SG methodology closer to the existing indigenous ASCA 
methodology, which meant that training and monitoring became much easier because groups 
already knew the methodology and whilst supporting these changes, Bosire systematically 
collected extra fees to line his own pockets and those of his supporters. 
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The differences in institutionalisation of the different delivery channels can also at least partly 
be explained  by the different local institutions in which the different trainers/delivery channel 
representatives were embedded.  The franchisee channel regional coordinator skilfully 
transformed the SG methodology into a form that it could be institutionalised and merged into 
(his) existing patron client relationships.  On the other hand, the institutional structure of the 
FBO channel in Rachuonyo with a committee overseeing the trainers enabled a better oversight 
and ensured that the SG methodology was closely followed.  This further limited opportunities 
for rent-seeking and ensured that the FBO delivered services that were in line with the moral 
norms of the church in which Timothy was one of the elders.  
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CHAPTER 7.  INSTITUTIONALISING RULES: GROUP DYNAMICS  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
The previous chapter studied the impact of the delivery channels and trainers on 
institutionalising the SG methodology. This chapter turns to an investigation of how the internal 
group dynamics affected the ways rules were institutionalised.   The focus is on loan repayment, 
default and misappropriation cases in which the group leaders were responsible.  It seeks to 
understand how the group dynamics shed light on the extent to which the SG rules were 
institutionalised. 
As discussed in chapter two, Dore (1988) claims that,  in the context of co-operatives, these 
relations are based on mutual trust and too little on mutual suspicion and this trust reflects 
traditional authority, for while these societies exhibit cohesion they rarely involve equality.  The 
author suggests that methodologies that increase transparency and accountability  “[allow] a 
strict apportionment of benefits to contributions and … devices of institutionalised suspicion 
which prevent the abuse of leadership powers”  (Dore 1988, 58).  Hence, as discussed in the 
introductory chapter,  the aim of the SG methodology was to increase transparency and 
accountability or as Dore (1988) calls it, to “institutionalise suspicion”.    However, given the 
existence of a wide variety of kinship relations amongst group members and norms concerning 
seniority and social status that relate to age, gender, education, and so on the SG rules that 
attempt to increase transparency and accountability potentially create tension among group 
members.  As Johnson and Sharma  (2007) note, it is not the case that groups can easily 
institutionalise the principles of accountability and transparency that are delivered as an 
integral part of group training.   
The previous chapter reviewed to what extent Ostrom’s design principles for creating successful 
groups were used by the trainers when implementing the methodology. In this chapter, 
whether and how the design principles were observed during the implementation by the group 
leaders and members constitutes the main focus.  In chapter two, Ostrom’s boundary rule, who 
has the right to join the group, was also discussed and so, this chapter will also assess whether 
the training involved setting the boundary rule recommended in much of the literature that the 
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number of family members in a group restricted and if this the case, whether this was complied 
with. 
Acknowledging the difficulty to institutionalise suspicion in the context of a range of social 
relationships, the first section considers in greater depth how groups came together and what 
kinds of relationship members had.  The section 7.2. will proceed as follows.   First, the views of 
the SG methodology and the implementer CARE on how the relationships should be taken into 
account when groups are mobilised, are discussed.  Second, how the groups were mobilised, 
why did it happen that way and the role of relatives in the groups is discussed.  Third section 
analyses the relationships in groups and  the extent to which leaders were held accountable by 
the methodology.   The tensions and conflicts between leaders and members in the groups are 
probed to understand what factors provide the ability for the groups to remove them in order 
to improve performance.  As is shown, the ability to do this cannot be taken for granted and the 
ways in which groups are mobilised and the social relations between members affect this 
capacity.   
Section 7.3. presents short case studies on the groups.  For the case studies, first, the default 
and/or misappropriation cases where leaders were involved are presented, which is followed by 
analysis to ascertain what led to identification of the wrongdoing, especially whether the SG 
methodology contributed to the discovery as well as whether it contributed to the solution of 
the problem.   Then, the leadership dynamics (the extent to which the leaders were 
collaborating and what their relationships with the members were) is probed so as to 
understand in whether and how the leaders contributed to the creation of problems and in 
what circumstances were they able to provide solutions. Moreover, what were the conditions 
that enabled groups to change their leaders is also probed.  Further, because several default 
and misappropriation cases were not resolved by the leaders, the role of trainers in regarding 
these matters is also discussed. Lastly, the case studies also geared towards determining 
whether gender dynamics had an impact on group performance as indicated in some of the 
relevant literature.  
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7.2. Group mobilisation and kinship ties 
7.2.1. The SG methodology and perspectives on relatives in groups 
 
As discussed in the chapter 4, the literature shows awareness of the challenges of having 
relatives in the groups.  However, the VS&L Programme Guide (2006) does not discuss the issue, 
only noting that “members must know and trust each other”  (Allen and Staehle 2006).  The 
designer of the methodology, Hugh Allen, reported that during training he told groups that 
there should be no more than one relative member as a member( Personal communication), 
but he did not specify the closeness of this person.  However, the director of the project 
acknowledged the challenges related to having relatives in the groups and reported that the 
issue was discussed with the trainers at the training of trainers workshops and that they were 
supposed to deal with the issue. 
“It was discussed during the training of trainers course for trainers and trainers 
did deal with the issue at group training level on need basis.  The issue of 
relatives was dealt with at the group constitution level where the criteria for 
membership was clarified. Membership of relatives were usually kept at a 
minimum and loans to them were usually mitigated by certain measures” (E-mail 
communication  24.09.13).  
However, the project director acknowledged that:  
“Dynamics around membership of relatives is a tricky affair especially when it 
comes to rural-based groups because most of them are comprised mostly of 
relatives. These kinds of groups usually have activities that are ongoing so 
trainers have to adjust their training orientation to suit what they find especially 
at the pre-training stages. When problems arise such groups already have 
mechanisms to resolve them” (E-mail communication  24.09.13). 
Hence, CARE saw its role as highlighting the challenge if there were many relatives in the same 
group, but did not give any specific guidelines on how to deal with the issue.   Timothy, one of 
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the trainers, claimed that CARE had highlighted the risks of having too many relatives in the 
same group.  He reported that trainers had been instructed not to have the chair and secretary 
from the same family, while other trainers in the sample claimed that this issue had not been 
discussed at all (Timothy, KI-4).   
 
An SG trainer who was not in the sample clearly demonstrated that he understood the 
challenges of having many relatives in a group.     According to him, it was often the case that 
both the husband and the wife had a loan and both would wait until they received payment for 
work done, pay the loan,  but this was often insufficient to cover both loans. 
 
“Loan of Kshs 10,000 [for husband] and wife Kshs5,000 and tea bonus [is] 
Kshs7,000, there is a problem.  Also with cousins and aunts, children and parents 
it is difficult to push your relatives to pay the loan, if I am the secretary, it is 
impossible for me to push my aunt to repay the loan.   First, I will fear that at 
home we will quarrel about the loan, so the group is bringing enemity into the 
home, and people don’t want that” (KI-4).   
7.2.2  Group mobilisation  
 
After CARE and the trainers had informed the communities about their intention to form and 
train SG groups, those interested were asked to form groups of 20-30 members.  Groups were 
mobilised, in the main, by few members and in some cases no real mobilisation was needed 
because the group already existed at the time when CARE arrived to the area.  For example, the 
Engoa group had functioned before CARE’s arrival as a ROSCA, while in Boburia, the current 
leaders had been jointly members in another group (Engoa, 2; Boburia,8) .   
The leaders were formally elected during the training of the group.  Regarding which, the 
mobiliser often acquired this role and this is similar to ROSCAs, where that person usually also 
becomes the leader.    Timothy, one the trainers, knew about this dynamic and always carefully 
selected one person with the right leadership qualities, who he asked to start mobilising a group 
for him.  That is, he did this because he knew that the mobiliser would eventually become the 
chair of the group (Timothy).  In the groups that already existed, the current leaders also 
became the new leaders.  This was the case in the Engoa group, where the pastor from the local 
indigenous church was the chair of the original ROSCA and then also became the chair of the SG 
group as was the case in Boburia (Engoa, 2; Boburia,8). 
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Relationship-maps drawn up for each group reveal that mostly relatives were mobilised.  Even 
though CARE and at least some of the trainers were aware of the challenges of having many 
relatives in the same group, given the local norms that family members should support the 
welfare of each other, it was to be expected that relatives would be selected for the groups.    
As one of the trainers noted: 
 “If I pick e.g. only my grandfather, my grandfather will come to me and say that 
why can’t you also select other members of my family, because otherwise my 
family will be against me.  And if you only select some few[family] members and 
not everyone, then the people that were left out think that you have a [wealthy] 
donor and you only want some few people to benefit” (KI-4).   
 
The quote indicates that when people expect that resources will flow through groups, it is 
important to include as many of your relatives as possible.  As pointed out in chapter 6, since 
CARE was an international NGO, many  of the potential group members assumed that it would 
not only train the groups, but also bring some more tangible benefits (KI-2).  
Most members knew that CARE assists people when there is flooding etc.. This 
time around we told that we just train them, but most people still believed that 
after we have trained them we will bring in some support, that we will give 
[them] some money (KI-1).  
7.2.3. Relatives in the groups 
 
In order to ascertain how many relatives there were in each group, relationship maps were 
drawn up.   Table 7.1 summarizes, from these maps, the percentage of members that had 
nuclear family member(s) or grandparents, cousins, aunts and uncles or in-laws in the groups.  
The in-laws were mostly women since the majority of the members were women.   The last 
column, financial performance, is based on the financial performance index developed in 
chapter 5, comprising Return on Savings as well as level of savings adjusted using the client 
poverty index (PPI) from the last cycle for which there were data.  In the table, the groups with 
highest percentage of members with nuclear family members are ranked in descending order 
for the two regions.   
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Table 7.1. Nuclear family members, other relatives and in-laws in the sampled savings groups 
District 
Group 
name 
% of members with 
nuclear family 
members in the 
group 
% of cousins, 
aunts, 
uncles 
% of in-
laws 
Financial 
performance 
Nyamira Engoa 58 18 12 Weak 
Rachuonyo Kabonyo 58 33 44 Strong 
Nyamira Boburia 57 29 49 Weak 
Nyamira Etanda 40 55 0 Weak 
Nyamira Amabele 28 69 26 Strong 
Rachuonyo Awuor 26 0 66 Strong 
Rachuonyo Tumaini 6 0 52 Weak 
Rachuonyo Ongoro 6 18 88 Strong 
Mean Nyamira 46 43 22  
Mean Rachuonyo 24 13 63  
Mean all groups 35 28 42  
 
The same eight groups are included in the analysis for this chapter as for the previous one, the 
reasons having been explained in chapter 6. 
As the table indicates, the mean share of close relatives (both nuclear family and cousins, aunts 
etc.) was substantially higher in Nyamira compared to Rachuonyo.  In Nyamira, almost half of 
the members (46%) had a nuclear family member in the group, whereas in Rachuonyo only one 
quarter (24%) of the group members had a nuclear family member in the group. However, the 
range in Rachuonyo was very wide from 6%  to 58%.  Likewise in Nyamira 43% of the members 
had at least one cousin, grandparent, aunt or uncle in the group, whereas in Rachuonyo only 
13% of the members had these relatives in the group.  Regarding in-laws, the situation was 
different in the sense that there were three times more in-laws in Rachuonyo compared to 
Nyamira.  63% of the group members had an in-law in the group in Rachuonyo, whereas 22% 
had an in-law in the groups in Nyamira.  Because most of the group members were women that  
lived at husbands homestead (patrilocal marriage system), most of the in-laws were husbands 
siblings.  Respondents did not consider in-laws as (close) relatives because many of the women 
were new in the village, having married in.67  Unlike with nuclear family members or cousins and 
aunts,  the in-laws did not necessarily have much influence over the in-laws in the group.  There 
could be  several reasons for this discrepancy between the two regions.  It  could be the trainers 
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 In a group where every member had an in-law as one of the leaders and the respondents were asked 
whether they had relatives in the groups, one said: “No, people are coming from different places” 
(Ongoro, 4)  Another respondent noted:  “First, I disagree with you as most of the members are not close 
relatives” (Ongoro, 7). 
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way of forming groups, it could the nature of the societies themselves, or it could be just by 
chance. Further investigation would be needed to understand which is the case.   
 
The findings indicate that groups with the high percentage of nuclear family members in the 
group tended to be financially weakly performing or not functioning at all  and conversely, in the 
groups where the percentage of nuclear family members was low, the financial performance 
tended to be stronger.    The relatively low share of nuclear family members does not alone 
explain the group strength, but could have provided the setting where it was easier to build 
strong groups that followed rules unhindered by family ties that distorted group relationships.  
Moreover, having a high proportion of in-laws could result in strong group formation where it 
was easier to build strong groups that followed rules unhindered by close kinship ties.   
 
However, there were exceptions.   During the last cycle, Kabonyo was a strong group even 
though the percentage nuclear family members was high.  For the first two cycles, the group 
was weak, with a low level of rules following and weak financial performance, during which time 
the chairperson was a woman who did not enforce repayment. However, when the first female 
chairlady was replaced by the head of the clan at the beginning of the third  cycle, the group 
started following the SG rules and the leader enforced timely repayment at the time of share-
out.  Under the clan head leadership the financial performance also improved.  The new chair 
was aware that over half of the group had nuclear family members, obviously not all the same 
family, but because of his position in the area he was able to handle the situation. “I have some 
unique things, first I am the head of the clan and the adviser to the chief thus this position gives 
me an upper hand” (Kabonyo, 6).  This demonstrates that he was a leader who had status in 
both the clan and community as evidenced by his stated role in advising the chief and so could 
use the authority derived from these positions to discipline members.   
 
In addition, in Kabonyo there were only two other groups that referred to the issue of kinship 
ties when trying to explain why the group was not performing well.  As the case-study below on 
Boburia shows, the respondents felt that they could not take any action against the 15 
members that had not repaid after the share-out because most of the members were related to 
each other.  In Etanda several members had left the group, because the leaders were not willing 
to take assets from some members that were related to them. 
 
“This is because some of the committees could be related with the members or 
within the group there could be relatives, so they could be scared to go and get 
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away the property so they favour them in a way that they ask them to bring the 
loan with time instead of going for their property as the rules should be” (Etanda, 
2) 
7.2.4. Analysis 
The SG methodology is interested in institutionalisation of its rules, thereby increasing the 
transparency and accountability of the group operations, but as Dore  (1988) notes, existing 
social relations, mutual trust and traditional authority make it often difficult to do so.  This 
section has discussed what type of social relations there were between the people who joined 
groups.  Regarding who should join the group, both CARE and the trainers were aware of the 
challenges of having many relatives in the groups. However, knowing that most of the people in 
villages were related to each other, it would have been difficult for them to implement this 
programme at all if they were too strict regarding the kinship issue   and the CARE project 
director even noted that they had to compromise on this matter.  As a consequence, this matter 
was not directly addressed with the groups, for there was very little evidence of trainers or 
members discussing it during training.68 Moreover, the findings from the previous chapter 
indicated that groups had not talked about how to get outstanding loans back more generally. 
Given that most of the trainers, as explained in chapter 6, had failed to discuss recuperating 
loans from defaulters, it is hardly surprising that there was no evidence that they had covered 
the thornier issue of getting money back from close relatives.  Referring back to Ostrom’s 
boundary rule, from the findings it seems reasonable conclude that the challenge of having 
many relatives was not underlined enough by those responsible for rolling out the 
methodology. However, perhaps more tellingly the methodology itself put insufficient emphasis 
on ensuring that kinship ties did not damage group dynamics by making members aware of the 
possible pitfalls involved. 
7.3. Default, misappropriation and leadership change 
 
The research uncovered a lot of misappropriation, fraud and also default by leaders; while a few 
groups were able to change their leaders, some were not. Some of the groups that managed to 
change their leaders, improved their performance, both in terms of rule following and financial 
performance, whereas all the groups that had not changed their leaders were very weak 
financially two of the three no longer existed at the time of our last visit.   The extent to which 
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 Only Timothy noted that chair and secretary are not allowed to be from the same family. 
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the SG methodology enables leaders to be held accountable appears, therefore, to be a critical 
aspect of the institutionalisation of the rules.  One issue that seems to impact on whether 
leaders can or cannot be changed is the extent of their kinship ties within the groups.  When 
talking about leaders, in this chapter, only the chairperson and secretary are being referred to, 
who were by far the most influential people in the SGs.  The other, less influencal leaders were 
the box keeper and two money counters. 
This section presents short case studies on each of the eight groups where there were default 
and/or misappropriation cases by leaders, with the key interest being in how the groups 
handled the situation.   To begin with, there is consideration of three of these groups where the 
financial performance during the third cycle was very weak, partly because the leaders were 
causing the groups to die owing to their not repaying their loans or they were defrauding the 
money from the group.  None of these groups had changed their chair or secretary, the two 
most important leaders, during the first three cycles. Subsequently, four other groups are 
discussed that also had default and/or misappropriation cases by leaders, but that were able to 
change the leaders and lastly, the circumstances of one group that did not have default nor 
misappropriation are analysed.  
For the case studies, first, the default and/or misappropriation cases where leaders were 
involved are presented, which is followed by analysis to ascertain what led to identification of 
the wrongdoing, especially whether the SG methodology contributed to the discovery as well as 
whether it contributed to the solution of the problem.   Then, the leadership dynamics (whether 
the leaders were united and what their relationships with the members were) is probed so as to 
understand in what situations the leaders contributed to the creation of problems and in what 
circumstances were leaders able to provide solutions and in what situations where the groups 
able to change their leaders.  Because several default and misappropriation cases were not 
resolved by the leaders, the role of trainers in solving or not solving the problems is also 
discussed. Table 7.2. presents the default and misappropriation cases by the leaders in the eight 
groups as well as the financial performance for each. Lastly, case studies also attempt to review  
whether gender dynamics had an impact on group performance.  These issues had risen from 
the chapters six and seven and the literature as issues that have impact on internal group 
dynamics and performance.  I am using the case studies to flash out how these factors impacted 
the functioning of these groups. 
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Table 7.2. Default and misappropriation cases by leaders and group financial performance 
 
Group 
name 
Leaders in default 
at the time of 
share-out  
Misappropriation 
cases 
Financial 
performance 
Engoa Yes Yes Poor 
Boburia Yes Yes Poor 
Tumaini Yes Yes Poor 
Ecererubo  Not known Yes Poor 
Amabele B Yes Yes Good 
Awuor Yes Attempt Good 
Kabonyo Yes Yes Good 
Ongoro No No Good 
 
As the table shows, both default and misappropriation cases by the leader were very common. 
Leaders were involved in default in six out of the eight groups.  In Etanda, the leader who had 
taken both the chair and secretarial position did not allow us to inspect the books to confirm 
whether he was defaulting.  In six other groups the leaders were involved in misappropriation 
and in one case the chairwomen had attempted to misappropriate funds, but after about six 
months this was exposed by one trainer and the matter was settled beneficially for the group.  
In only one group was no default or misappropriation found, thus indicating that cases of 
wrongdoing were the norm rather than exceptions to  it.  
7.3.1. Poor performance not leading to leadership change 
 
In this subsection, there is analysis of three groups,  Engoa, Boburia and Tumaini, which had all 
had default and misappropriation cases, but none of the chairs or secretaries responsible had 
been removed. 
Engoa 
 
The Engoa group had previously existed as a ROSCA.  It had been mobilised by a local male 
pastor who ran an small indigenous church in the village, who with the secretary was 
responsible for mobilising about a third of the members.  The chair and secretary who brought 
the group to CARE remained in charge up to the end of our field work in the third cycle. 
Leaders took large loans and were collaborating to mis-record them.  We observed during the 
meeting that the leaders falsified their own passbooks during a group meeting, but members 
were not aware of this.   We also identified a loan in the chairman’s passbook that was worth 
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Kshs 8,000, but according to the ledger he had received one of Kshs 5,000; the dates in the 
passbook and the ledger were the same.  According to a key informant, the figures in the ledger 
were used for “announcing” and for repayment of loans, hence his lower loan would be 
reported to the group (KI-4).   
By the end of the third cycle the majority of members had not repaid, thus resulting in the share 
out being postponed again.  When we visited again some seven months after the initial share-
out date  we reviewed the books and found out that the chair and secretary had by far the 
largest outstanding loans - some ten times their savings level -  whereas the rule was that loans 
should not exceed twice savings.  Our inspection of the books led to the members being 
informed of this issue, because we did it with several members of the group present.   Since 
some of the members had repaid their loans in full and had saved up to Kshs 40,000 they had 
effectively lost their savings (Financial analysis of the records, KI-4, Engoa, 7 and 8, and own 
observation). Members that had repaid their loans fully  and also some leaders wanted action to 
be  taken but that this was seen by them as the responsibility of CARE and not the responsibility 
of the group leaders.  Some of the respondents told us that they had suggested that assets 
should be taken from members so that the group could undertake the share-out.  But most of 
them hoped that the responsibility of enforcing repayment rested with CARE and the trainers.  
One the leaders, a money counter asked us to inform ”the office” (i.e.  CARE) to come and 
explain to the group that it was quite alright under the methodology for them to discuss the 
seizing of assets as they reasoned that if CARE stated sequestration was acceptable then it 
would be easier for them to apply it.    “CARE Kenya should help because they have seen groups 
of KWFT that have taken assets but no group from CARE has taken assets and that’s the reason 
people are not returning loans” (Engoa, 4). Another member still hoped that trainers would 
attend every group meeting. “We have problems with the teachers [i.e. trainers]; we need a 
teacher to attend every month who can really help us in terms of money collection” (Engoa, 7).   
The trainer, Jacob, had not visited the group during the last 12 months before our last visit and 
he was not keen on getting involved in default and misappropriation cases (see ch 6)( Engoa, 7 
and 8).  
This case demonstrates clearly that there was little understanding of how to undertake 
enforcement and an expectation that external actors are responsible for this.  In its absence, the 
leaders were able to take advantage of their position to benefit themselves at the expense of 
other people’s savings by mis-recording loans, taking bigger loans than the group rules allowed 
and not repaying the loans.  It was only the involvement of the research team that brought the 
way in which the leaders had taken advantage of the situation to the notice of the members.  
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The chairman was also able to prevent further action because of the respect afforded to his 
status as a pastor and his assertion that CARE should be present if action was to be taken.    
Boburia   
Boburia had performed very well during the first two cycles with a high ROS (around 100%).   
However, during the third cycle members had noticed that female leaders did not announce the 
amounts that members were saving or the how much they were repaying.  So, some members 
had  challenged leaders:   
“We asked them why they are not announcing that so and so has brought such 
amount of shares and they said that they are tired and that they had other things 
to do so they were hurrying” (Boburia ,7).   
Even though the great majority of the members were women, it was some of the male 
members that were most critical towards the female leadership.  Another member, a male, 
explained:   
“I raised that issue with the leaders that why can’t they announce [the savings 
and loans] but then the leaders said that I am starting up a quarrel with them 
bringing a lot of politics so we didn’t do anything. The members were there when I 
was raising this issue but they also did nothing” (Boburia, 6). 
These two quotes clearly indicate that group members had been trained on the SG 
methodology that emphasizes transparency and that they were aware that the leaders now 
wanted less of it.    
Around that time, the research team had collected financial data from the group’s records and 
returned the books to this same male group member, who promised to deliver the books back 
to the secretary.  Because this member had never seen the books and since some members 
suspected that the group leaders were not honest, he, together with the newly appointed male 
assistant secretary inspected the books. They discovered that the leaders had given themselves 
loans that they were not repaying and that these had been recorded in names of members who 
had already left the group.  They also found that the secretary had increased her own passbook 
savings at the expense of those of some illiterate members  (Boburia, 1,  6 and 7). The assistant 
secretary confirmed that, indeed, there were substantial problems at the time of the last share-
out and that Kshs 250,000 had not been repaid.  Several members did not even receive their full 
amount of savings back at the time of the share-out and although they were fully reimbursed 
   205 
 
subsequent to this, they received no interest.   As a result, fifteen members left the group 
(Boburia, 1 and 2). 
The poor repayment can, at least partly, be explained by the fact that there was no 
enforcement mechanism and the assistant secretary also confirmed that they had not discussed 
this matter, only considering delaying the share-out.  When I asked why not, he told me that 
“we thought everyone is good and is going to repay”(Boburia, 1).  We found that the 
chairwoman and secretary were related to most of the group members and also provided 
favours in the form of big loans or extended repayment periods to some of their relatives or 
friends ( Relationship map, Boburia, 7). 
Group members that had raised critical questions felt that taking any action against defaulters 
(leaders and members) was almost impossible, because most of the members were related to 
each other.  The assistant secretary noted that defaulters: 
“are relatives so there is nothing you can do to them. We told them to bring 
money but until now there is nothing. Because they are like our own family so we 
can only listen to their promises…. When someone comes and tells you that she 
doesn’t have money what will you do and maybe that person is your 
grandmother69  …Since we are related and they expect me [the secretary] to be 
soft on them. What I can suggest is the teacher [i.e. trainer] to come because no 
one is from his family here. So what he says, people will follow and he won’t have 
sympathy towards the members” (Boburia, 1).  
However, the group had not invited the trainer to visit the group after the last share-out eleven 
months ago.  
Indeed the leaders had many relatives in the groups; the chairwoman had 23 members who 
were related to her out of the total membership of 39, including: two nuclear family members, 
three cousins and three in-laws, who in turn had 15 relatives related to them, many of whom 
were their own nuclear family members.  The secretary had also brought 13 relatives and 
neighbours to the group. In fact, the two leaders had mobilised 94% of the total group 
membership (Boburia relationship-map).   
Regardless of these challenges, the original chair and secretary (as well as the box keeper and 
money counters) continued as leaders for the fourth cycle.  However, during that cycle there 
                                                          
69
 The chairwoman was, indeed, the grandmother of the assistant secretary! 
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was some movement and the assistant secretary took over the role of secretary, whilst the 
previous incumbent stopped attending even though she had an outstanding debt of Kshs 
20,000. By the time of our final visit, the misappropriation by the chair and secretary had not 
been resolved and 15 members had not returned to the group  (finding from the review of the 
ledger and passbooks, Boburia, 1 and 2;   own  observation).   To conclude, because the chair 
and secretary had mobilised and were related to the majority of the group members, they had 
enough authority to continue as leaders even though they were implicated in misappropriation 
cases by their male relatives. 
Tumaini 
Grace, the assistant trainer (see chapter 6) had been instrumental in mobilising the group, 
because she lived in the village. In the Tumaini group, the chairwoman and the secretary had 
mobilised two thirds of the members, who were relatives and relatives’ relatives. The chair and 
the secretary had also brought their neighbours and friends to the group.  All the Tumaini 
leaders and members were female.   
At the end of third cycle, the majority of members in Tumaini group had not repaid their loans, 
with the leaders and members closely related to them being the biggest defaulters which 
included a businesswoman, who was an in-law to the chairwoman who had borrowed over Kshs 
80,000 .  She had borrowed this money through several other members70 and was a member of 
several Tumaini groups from which she had also borrowed funds through other members.   
Also, the assistant trainer, Grace, had a loan of Kshs 30,000, which she claimed she was not able 
to repay.  As a consequence of the outstanding money, group leaders had postponed the share-
out for nine months. During this time the group did not meet nor did anyone pay any interest, 
which meant that the leaders with biggest loans benefited most and were able to keep other 
members’ savings interest free, whereas those that had not taken out loans could not get their 
money out from the group, thus in reality subsidising with loans  (Tumaini, 3 and 6, Tumaini 
relationship map, Grace). 
According to one member, 
 
“there was no one to remind the group that there was a defaulter until the last 
day when there were no profits at the time of share-out. That is when we were 
                                                          
70
 “She convinces them, for example, she tells someone ‘I have problems and I need a loan, can I use your 
name but at the time of repaying I will pay’. That is how she is convincing people and members give it to 
her. She used to return the money on time so members do not fear her” (Eunice third interview Tumaini). 
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forced to go and look for the defaulters... The leaders would tell us that since we 
are just  relatives, we should be lenient to each other and give members more 
time to repay a loan” (Tumaini 6).  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the members were aware that Grace, the assistant trainer, 
did not follow the SG methodology, as she ordered them to leave the room when she calculated 
the share-out.  The members explanation was that they did not have enough power to question 
the trainer: “We could do nothing, since she had supremacy over us” (Tumaini 6). A key 
informant noted that since the members were of ”lower class” they did not have the authority 
to remove the leaders. Poverty data confirmed that the leaders were less poor than the 
members (KI-1).    
 
Most of the members were in several groups as this made it easier for them to get loans.  
“Members are in many groups so that they can borrow from one group to return a loan in 
another group and if the loans are stopped in one group they can still borrow in another group” 
(Grace).  Being in several groups contributed to the downfall of this and other Tumaini groups.   
The chairwomen of the group had six in-laws in it and she had brought in another five friends in 
addition to these people.   She was also herself a defaulter like all the other leaders and some of 
the biggest defaulters were her in-laws, including the businesswoman who had a Kshs 80,000 
loan from the group (Relationship map).  Moreover, the money keepers, those members who 
held the repaid funds before the share-out, were mostly her relatives, but she kept most of 
these funds, a total of, Kshs 50,000, which were at her disposal for almost a year before they 
were eventually distributed (Relationship map). 
 
The leaders and big defaulters used various methods to deter members from trying to 
confiscate their assets.  One of the members that had allowed the businesswomen with the 
huge overdue loan to borrow from the group on her behalf reported  that she had warned the 
members that her husband would kill her if the group came her house.  Members also reported 
that leaders warned that ”evil deeds” or a ”bad omen” would happen in the homestead of the 
defaulter if the groups were too harsh towards them and  Grace’s son, who had committed 
suicide was cited, as evidence.  That is, the leaders’ view was that Grace’s son had committed 
suicide because everybody talked negatively about her.  Also, the fact that some defaulters’ 
husbands divorced them because they had not told them they had taken out a loan, was used as 
evidence of that  of a ”bad omen” , if the group were to inflict too great a penalty on debtors 
(Tumaini, 6). 
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Some members reported that the group was not willing to use Grace’s assistance to ensure that 
the leaders and members repaid their loans. At this stage, she was already very unpopular 
among the groups as the leaders as well as the members knew that she had defaulted in several 
other groups and misappropriated funds from them.  After nine months some members took 
the issue to the local chief and he divided up what little money there was with the treasurer.  
Some of the members who had the biggest loans had then  repaid small amounts to the group, 
but most did not repay anything.  However, some of the members on whose behalf the 
businesswoman had borrowed did repay through the chief, even though they had never in fact 
received the money. This group was not operational when it was last visited in May 2013 
(Tumaini, 3 and 6,  relationship map, Grace). 
 
In this case, Grace’s version of the SG methodology had already watered it down and set 
confusion in the members’ minds as to what the rules were.  However the groups awareness of 
this also meant that they could not turn to her to help address the problem. The leaders were 
also able to blame her and refuse to pay before she did. Moreover, the invocation of evil deeds 
and bad omen’s befalling defaulters who were punished speaks to the widespread belief in 
witchcraft in this area.  Nevertheless, some members did resort to involving the chief although 
he did little more than divide the funds that were available.  
7.3.2. Leadership change without improvement  
In this and the next subsection four groups are discussed where the leaders were involved in 
default and misappropriation and those implicated were successfully removed  but the 
outcomes of these changes varied. To begin with, there was the Etanda group where the 
changes in the leadership did not improve the rule following or the financial performance.  
Then, three other groups, Amabele, Awuor and Kabonyo are discussed where the leadership 
changes did lead to better rule following and improved financial performance. 
Etanda  
The financial performance of this group was weak. At the end of the second cycle the estimated 
ROS was 34%, four big loans were still outstanding, thus indicating that the real figure was 
substantially lower.  CARE staff who happened to be at the share-out were also very dissatisfied 
with the level of ROS and ordered that the whole leadership had to be changed. The local tea 
buying centre chair was elected as the new chair.  One member reported that at the end of 
third cycle she received Kshs 1,000, when she had saved Kshs 9,000, indicating that she had lost 
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most of her savings.  During the fifth cycle the defaulters from previous cycles were no longer 
followed up.  Members also reported that the aforementioned head of tea buying was the 
chairman of the group during the third to fifth cycles and he allowed several female group 
members not to repay their loans even after several months after the share-out in exchange for 
sexual favours (Own observation, Etanda, 1). 
Interviewer:  When we were here last time, there were young women who 
complained that there was a certain leader who demanded sexual favours so that 
they may join the group. Does that still happen? 
Respondent: According to the reports I got, he is still continuing with the 
misconduct. In fact the members are the ones who requested him to be moved to 
the secretary position from being the chairperson as that will make them benefit 
more from him. 
Interviewer: How do they benefit from him? 
Respondent: He does give them loans readily” (Etanda 1). 
The fact that the bookkeeping was non-existent especially during the fifth cycle and that the 
research team was not allowed to look at the books in any detail indicates that during these 
three cycles the chair most likely took out loans that he did not repay or that he did not pay 
interest on.  The weak performance of Etanda  was not an exception, for there were seven 
groups in the sub-location and most of them were no longer in existence at the time of our last 
visit (Etanda, 1 and 2). 
There were power struggles between the chair (the head to tea buying centre) and secretary 
during the third cycle. The latter had challenged the former for favouring some members over 
others and the two had quarrelled.  For the fourth cycle, the secretary was elected as the chair 
and chair became the secretary.   The newly elected chair and the money counter attempted to 
follow the SG rules, insisting on timely repayment as well as paying fines.  However, during a 
funeral where the chair and money counter were not present, the head of tea buying centre 
who, as pointed out above, was the secretary at that time, suggested that the members should 
remove the two of them from their leadership positions.  The former chair reported that   
“[Geoffrey, the then secretary and the head of tea buying] said that we [the then 
chair and money counter] were spying about the group with the guests [the 
research team] who had come to visit us. Geoffrey [the then secretary] did not 
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want me to be in any leadership role; be it a money counter or chairlady since I 
would be so watchful of him.  
“He [Geoffrey, the then secretary] comes from ‘the other side of the road’ so 
when he proposes something he has the upper hand as more members are from 
that place.  And most of the ladies from the Geoffrey’s place are widows and they 
have love affairs with him. He allows the members from his locality to default.    
They may also be allowed to continue repaying interest for 4 months without 
repaying the principle. When I [as a chair] try to chip in and have the loans repaid 
I do not have enough support. …In the event that the keys are with the members 
from the secretary’s side, he asks for them and alters the records. After locking 
the box the secretary is the one that issues the keys so he knows the key carriers 
and could therefore get them back and open it” (Etanda, 1). 
Eventually the tea buying centre head who was secretary for the fourth cycle was re-elected as 
the chairman for the fifth.  This time he doubled up as the secretary, even though the members 
view was that he was illiterate. The research team was able to have a quick look at the group’s 
records during his tenure as chair and secretary.   In the passbooks only savings were recorded, 
but not the loans and in the ledger the pages  where the chair-cum-secretary was supposed to 
record the loans were mostly empty (Etanda 1 and 2). 
The popularity of this illiterate head of the tea buying centre and chairman-cum-secretary can 
be attributed to the fact that he had more relatives as group members than others.  Moreover, 
as chairman of the tea buying centre:  “He is influential in the tea buying centre so people would 
want him to continue holding this position so that he could continue favouring them even in the 
tea buying business“ (Etanda, 1). This was an important position, since the chairperson’s 
“friends” were allowed to be the first ones in the morning to bring in tea (when it weighed 
more). He also gave members ample time to repay loans and did not always charge interest. 
Further, he was also against taking members assets.  The fact that the bookkeeping was virtually 
non-existent and that he had not allowed the research team to look at the books does raise 
suspicion that he had unpaid loans and/or did not pay interest (Etanda 1 and 2). The fact that 
members had changed their leaders several times is evidence that they were aware of the SG 
methodology and that was also practised.  However, as was noted earlier, initially CARE ordered 
the group to change its leaders indicating that the initial push for changing leaders came from 
CAR.  Also. the fact that newly elected leaders tried during the fourth cycle to introduce more 
discipline was an attempt to reduce the problems with default.  The trainer, Paul, had not 
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visited the group after the second share-out that he had conducted, indicating that all these 
changes happened later without any external intervention. Even though the leaders were 
changed several times, the local tea buying centre head kept his power and  stayed as chair, 
then as secretary and then as both chair and secretary and also managed to remove other 
leaders from their positions to ensure that he, rather than the SG rules guided the group.  Next, 
the three groups where the leadership changes led to improved rule following are discussed. 
7.3.3.  Leadership change resulting in improved performance 
Amabele 
CARE had initially contacted the chairwoman and she had, together with other members of the 
group, mobilised the members.  However, she had only three relatives amongst them, whereas 
the young male secretary had seven.  Together these two people had mobilised one third of the 
members (their relatives and relatives’ relatives).  Moreover, the box keeper had more relatives 
and relatives’ relatives than the chair or the secretary (Amabele, 3; relationship map), which 
meant the power among the different leaders in the group was more evenly distributed than in 
many other groups.   
During the third cycle one of the members had a loan but was not able to come to the group 
meeting to repay the loan, so instead gave the money to the secretary to bring to the group, 
which he did not do. When the member attended the next meeting, she realized the secretary 
had not given the money to the group and from that incident the group became aware that the 
secretary was falsifying the records.  At the end of third cycle, the secretary claimed that he had 
repaid his Kshs 12,000 loan and his  passbook, which he filled in himself,  indicated that this was 
the case. Some members and the chairwoman suspected that he had falsified his own passbook 
and since he had refused to fill in the ledger, the only available evidence was secretary’s 
passbook.  The chairwoman, however, kept her own private ledger and based on these records 
she claimed that the secretary had not brought the aforementioned member’s money to repay 
her loan nor had he repaid his own Kshs 12,000 loan (Amabele, 3 and 4). It took the chairwomen 
together with several group members many months to agree with the secretary’s parents that 
they would repay his  outstanding loan.  One reason for the long negotiations might have been 
that the fact that the secretary had seven cousins in the group.  However, the chairwoman was 
popular among the members, because CARE had contacted her first and she had mobilised most 
of the group members (Relationship map, Amabele, 3). 
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The relatively strict implementation of the SG methodology reduced the likelihood of default 
and assisted in resolving the misappropriation case.  The group had a clear enforcement 
strategy to ensure timely repayment, which was activated if the members had not repaid a loan 
within three months, whereby the interest for the subsequent months was tripled.  The 
chairwoman also ensured that neighbours visited the late repayers to remind them and she also 
participated in the negotiations with defaulters.   She preferred negotiation  but the group had 
also previously confiscated members’ assets.   An intermediate strategy that was not considered 
too harsh was leasing of the defaulter’s shamba (small holding) by a member, who would then 
repaid the loan back to the group in exchange for growing crops for an agreed period of time 
(Amabele, 2 3 and 4).   Regarding the solution to the misappropriation case, when the secretary 
in the Amabele group refused to use the ledger from the second cycle onwards, the 
chairwoman started her own private ledger, which helped in resolving the said case.  Even 
though her private ledger was not part of the official methodology, she found the idea of 
replicating transactions entry useful for getting clear overall picture of the operation of the 
group and for reducing the likelihood of misappropriation.  
The trainer, Paul was also  involved in solving both the default and misappropriation cases.  At 
the end of the third cycle, there were members who had not repaid, so the chairwomen asked 
the trainer to accompany the group members to the defaulters’ homesteads.  The trainer joined 
the group even though he did not participate into the actual negotiations.  Moreover, during 
the negotiations with the secretary and his parents the chairwoman was occasionally assisted 
by the trainer. (Amabele, 3 and 4). 
To conclude, the Amabele group’s chairwoman insisted on rule following and the group had a 
clear enforcement strategy for loan repayment. Her popularity and strictness in the group also 
ensured that most supported her attempts to remove the chair from the group because he had 
falsified his own records.  The chairwoman discussed the default and misappropriation cases 
with the trainer who also occasionally visited the group during the third cycle and supported her 
efforts to deal with defaulters and the misappropriating secretary. 
Awuor 
Before Awuor  savings group was formed, several women were members of a ROSCA called 
Awuor Women’s Group.  When they heard of CARE’s savings groups they decided to transform 
their ROSCA into one and invited the trainer to train them.  Awuor members came from the 
Kokelo clan and according to members this increased the mutual trust (Awuor, 11 and 12).  
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Towards the end of the second cycle, the chairwoman had four loans that she was unable to 
repay and the practice was that during the group meetings she would always announce who 
was late, but even though she was guilty of defaulting she did not say so.   “The secretary writes 
who is late and then the chair reads who is late but she did not read out her name, others she 
read out very loudly”(Awuor, 1).   The other leaders did not disclose to other group members 
that the chair was late “because that would demoralize the members” (Awuor, 1).  The chair 
and secretary were in-laws and so too were the secretary and box keeper (Relationship map). 
It is not clear whether the members knew about the efforts of the leaders to hide the 
misappropriation case.  Whatever the situation was, the role of the trainer in resolving the 
default and misappropriation case was central.  Close to the time of share-out, group members 
called on Timothy, the trainer, to visit the group since half of the members had not yet repaid 
their loans.  Timothy attended the meeting and set a date by when everybody must have 
repaid. He then came again after one month to ensure that everybody had repaid and to 
perform the share-out calculations for the group. At that time,  three members, including the 
chair, had not repaid, so Timothy asked the group to visit the defaulters houses and take assets.  
According to the treasurer of the group: 
 “Chairlady had gone to look for money but she took long and when she came 
back, they had already taken her assets but she was not angry, she apologized for 
taking for so long.[However) the cow was not sold. It was kept at the church for 
two hours and the teacher had also come.  Then the chair came and paid 
everything and she even got her share—because she had paid everything” 
(Awuor, 1).  
 
Even though the whole group had gone to the chairwoman’s house to seize a cow, members 
were hesitant to remove her from her position.  As discussed in chapter 6 (section 6.1.3.) .  
Timothy, the trainer, needed to engage with a lot of hard  convincing and politicking with the 
group before they dared to replace her. 
The fact that group did not follow the SG methodology strictly also increased the default 
problems.  Specifically, it had not developed incentives to enforce repayment and there were no 
penalties for repaying late. Members just paid the interest for all the months that they had the 
loan and hence, there was really no incentive to repay. Timothy had suggested that the group 
should have a penalty of Kshs 100 if the members did not do so on time, but according to the 
ledger, no penalty on late loans was paid, only the interest.  The treasurer’s view was that 
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penalties would bring a lot of burden because the interest was already high: “This would lead to 
a situation where people would not take loans” (Awuor, 1).   Further, the secretary  noted that if 
a member had not repaid the interest within three months, then the case would be reported to 
the trainer.   This indicates that the group had outsourced not only handling of misappropriation 
cases and removal of leaders, but also the enforcement of repayment to Timothy, the trainer.  
(Awuor, 2)  
To conclude, in Awuor the chairwoman who had played a central role in mobilising the group 
was so powerful that a strong external intervention from the trainer was needed before she was 
removed from her post. Despite the methodology promoting transparency within groups, the 
actions of a small minority were able to keep important facts secret, such as inability to repay 
loans, whilst claiming to be following the rules.  
Kabonyo 
In Kabonyo group, during the second cycle, the chairwoman took out loans, for which she did 
not pay interest or repay them on time, but she was not penalised for this.  Further, a member 
reported that  
“the chairlady and the secretary are always absent from the meetings. The 
treasurer is then forced to do the duties of the absent officials in addition to hers”  
(Kabonyo,3).  
 Because the chairwoman was not present, she could not pressurize others to come to the 
meeting on time.  During this second cycle the members did not save regularly (Kabonyo, 3) and 
there were also reports that the chairwoman had not repaid her loans by the time of the share-
out.  A respondent noted   
“I realized that when somebody wanted a loan they didn’t care even about the 
shares, if somebody is late, there was no fine, then; I knew that the group would 
collapse” Kabonyo, 6). 
Grace, the assistant trainer assisted the leaders in performing the share-out at the end of first 
and second cycle.    As mentioned earlier in chapter six, members reported that they were not 
allowed to be present when she and the leaders divided  the group funds and allegedly took 
some money for themselves.  When training the Kabonyo group, the CARE trainer had 
suggested that a women should lead the group (Kabonyo 6).  Almost 90% of the members were 
women.  However, at the end of the second cycle the current chair reported that the group 
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realized that the trainer was not in the vicinity any longer and so it was decided to select a male 
leader, thus at the beginning of third cycle, a new chairman was elected for the group. The SG 
methodology was important, in the sense that the proposed chairman reportedly told the group 
that he would only take the position on the condition that the group started following the 
original rules that the CARE trainer had provided.    Most of the members in the group belonged 
to one clan and the new chairman of the group was also the head of this clan as well as being an 
adviser to the chief.  “I have some unique things, first I am the head of the clan and the adviser 
to the chief thus this position gives me an upper hand” (Kabonyo, 6) and with this ”upper hand” 
he had authority to enforce timely repayment of loans.    
Under the new chair, the Return on Savings increased from 50% to 100% and members liked the 
higher returns as well as the new officials, especially the chairman,   “He comes to all the 
meetings and makes sure everyone pays the fine” (G14/3). The new chairman noted that it was 
the original CARE trainer that had trained the group to be strict. 
“Lavender [the CARE trainer] even stressed it that if someone fails to repay the 
loan, we call her and she comes with someone to bring down the roof. You know 
she said the roof but people started taking even cows just recently but the law 
[rule] states the iron sheet (laughing)” (Kabonyo,6).  
The new chairman also used these methods in practice when enforcing repayment. He 
explained how he threatened one of the group members before the share-out: 
“So I personally talked to her over the phone [the person that owed group money 
was in Nairobi] that the roof will be brought down. Then I started hitting 
somewhere pretending that the roof is being brought down and she asked us to 
wait a bit.   Then the money was sent” (Kabonyo, 6).    
The fact that the new chair was the head of the clan can also be seen in the composition of the 
group.   The relationship map shows that he had one nuclear family member, five in-laws, three 
cousins and another ten members that were in turn related to his relatives.  Out of 31 
members, there were only three men in the group and hence, in addition to having power 
through being the clan leader he also had gender power because his relationship with other 
(female) group members was mainly as an in-law.  Kabonyo can be seen an example of a group 
that was using kinship power positively.    
The role of the trainer was not central in clearing the default cases, since the new chair had 
enough power to do so himself. Moreover, Kabonyo did not want to get any kind of assistance 
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from Grace.  However, even the new chair felt that the group needed an outside person to 
conduct the share-out and asked the research team to recommend a trainer who could assist 
them.  We recommended someone we knew and during the field research he performed the 
share-out calculations twice for the group. Members were clearly aware that the first 
chairwoman had not followed the rules, but it was only the clan head that was able to challenge 
her. The willingness of the clan head to become the new chair of the group and his ability to 
enforce the SG rules enabled the group to improve its performance substantially.  
 
7.4. Analysing leadership change  
 
Table 7.3. summarizes the key features from the case studies on default, misappropriation and 
leadership changes for the sampled groups. 
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Table 7.3. Change of leaders and the role of SG methodology in informing and resolving the default and misappropriation (D & M) cases 
 
Group 
name 
Leaders in default at 
the time of share-
out  
Misappropriation 
cases 
Financial 
performance 
Were 
leaders 
changed 
How many 
members 
mobilised by the 
chair and 
secretary 
Role of 
methodology 
informing the 
members of D or 
M 
Did  methodology 
assist in resolving 
the D or M? 
Role of  
trainers in 
resolving D 
&M 
Engoa Yes Yes Poor No 32 % No No No 
Boburia Yes Yes Poor No 94 % Yes No No 
Tumaini Yes Yes Poor No 63 % Yes No No 
Etanda  Not known Yes Poor Yes,  36 % Yes No No 
Amabele  Yes Yes Good Yes 32 % Yes Yes Yes 
Awuor Yes Attempt Good Yes 44 % Not known No Yes 
Kabonyo Yes Yes Good Yes 66 % Yes No No 
D= default; M= Misappropriation 
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In this analysis, the four key themes which appear to  determine the functionality of groups that 
emerged from the data presented in chapters 6 and 7 as well as the literature are considered in 
turn. These being, first, the level of comprehension of the SG methodology and the group’s role 
in ensuring that breaches were addressed ; second, the social dynamics  that made it possible to 
actually change leaders; third, the role played by the trainers; and finally, the dynamics of 
gender relations.   
The role of the methodology in understanding breaches in rules 
In most of the groups, having been trained on a set of rules  assisted the members to 
understand when they were not being followed, and in several cases also to react against the 
leaders when they did not follow them. Only in Engoa did we find no evidence that members 
had understood the rules such that they could identify when they were not being followed.  
However, even though members understood that leaders did not follow the rules, this did not 
necessarily lead to better rule following or ensuring the default and misappropriation cases 
were resolved.  As the short case-studies and table 7.3. show, there were different patterns in 
how members tackled their leaders over this and whether or not changes resulted.  There were 
three groups where no chairs or secretaries had been changed throughout the cycles (Engoa, 
Boburia and Tumaini) and they were all poorly performing.  Two of these were actually not 
operational anymore, with one having lost a third of its members and not being able to recover 
a third of its loan fund from late repayers a year after the share-out.  Regarding the other four 
groups (Etanda, Amabele, Awuor and Kabonyo) they had managed to change one or both of the 
key leaders (chair and/or secretary). In Etanda, the performance remained very weak even after 
the change, whilst in the other three, performance had either improved or had remained 
strong.   
In the four better performing groups, the SG methodology had contributed to the identification 
of default  through the fact that members were aware who were late because the repayment of 
some members were not announced and also because bookkeeping especially in Amabele and 
Awuor and Ongoro clearly indicated who was late. and helped result in a change of leadership.  
In three of these, the leaders had been changed specifically because of default or 
misappropriation. However, it is clear from the Awuor case-study that the role of the trainer 
was more important than that of the methodology itself.   In Kabonyo, the new chair insisted 
that he was willing to take up the post only on the condition that the original SG rules would be 
re-adopted. In Amabele, the chairwoman’s experience from learning bookkeeping in indirectly 
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contributed to her setting up her own private ledger.   The SG methodology had therefore 
assisted the group members to become suspicious in these groups.  
The social dynamics of changing leaders 
A key factor in whether or not the groups were able to change their leaders once problems 
came to light was the role of kinship ties and the norms this invoked about how to behave in the 
group.  The case-studies have indicated that the chairs and secretaries in Boburia, Tumaini and 
Kabonyo appeared to have more relatives and connections in the group than leaders in the 
other groups.  Table 7.3 shows the percentage of members in each group who were brought 
into the group by the chair and secretary and for these groups this proportion is over a half.  
This suggests that it was harder to change leaders under these circumstances. However, in the 
case of Tumaini the inability to change leaders was not only an issue of relatedness, but also 
one of status, in that the leaders and members related to them were better off than the other 
members.   
Engoa was an exception in the sense that the chair and secretary were related to only one third 
of the members or had brought the members into the group and in this case no leaders had 
been changed.  One of the reasons why this did not happen was the fact that many of the 
members did not understand that any misappropriation had been taken place.  The chair also 
commanded a lot of authority as the pastor of the local church as well as having been chair of 
the ROSCA that had later been converted into a Savings Group.   
On the other hand, in the four other groups where leaders had been changed,  up to five 
mobilisers had brought their relatives and friends to join  suggesting that these constituencies 
were more diverse and that loyalty was not so easily commanded.   
However, whilst changing leaders improved the rule following in Kabonyo,  Amabele, Awuor, it 
did not do so in Etanda. Kabonyo was different in that it was basically a clan group involving 
many relatives, but it was nevertheless able to change leadership and improve rule following 
and financial performance.  The female leader had been elected mainly because the group 
thought that CARE required a woman leader and when the clan leader came to the fore to take 
over, he was able to use his authority to do so and institute the rules effectively.  This case 
contrasts with that of Etanda in which the head of the local tea buying centre took over but 
performance became worse rather than better. 
Another characteristic that is evident from the  groups in which leaders were changed was that 
the leaders were less united among themselves, and hence also easier to remove   In Amabele, 
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the chair was convinced that the secretary had attempted to misappropriate funds and so tried 
to remove him, eventually succeeding in doing so.  In Kabonyo, the original chair was often 
away and was criticized also by the secretary (who happened to be the wife of the clan head).  
Of the well-performing groups, Awuor was an exception in the sense that the leadership was 
united and hence, outside intervention was needed to remove the chair. 
The role of trainers in resolving default and misappropriation  
 It is evident that the trainers were largely absent from resolving the difficulties that the groups 
faced. Among the defunct or  poorly performing, in Boburia, the trainer went ahead with the 
share-out even though one third of the loan fund was still outstanding  and did not want to get 
involved in resolving the internal problems of the group.  In Engoa, when members suggested 
that assets of defaulter should be seized, the leaders cleverly argued that  CARE had to be 
present if that rule was adopted , and since CARE was not available this enabled them to remain 
in control. In the case of Tumaini, it took the group almost a year to bring the case to the chief 
and seek some resolution because CARE had not set up a clear approach to conflict resolution in 
the absence of trainers.   However, since Grace had left with the books he could do little other 
than divide the available money equally among those were present at that meeting. 
  In the better performing groups trainers presence was more evident.  The trainer was critical in 
removing the chair in Awuor.  In Amabele, while it was the chairwoman who took the lead, the 
trainer  assisted her when she was negotiating with the secretary’s parents . Overall then it is 
only in two groups, Kabonyo and Amabele, where it was the internal dynamics within them that 
created the demand for leadership change, and which subsequently led to improved 
performance.   
Members certainly expected the trainers to assist them in resolving conflict related to default 
and misappropriation, and this underlines the failure to set up conflict resolution mechanisms 
to be used once the training and supervision period was over. Moreover, even when trainers 
were available, of course some group leaders did not want to involve them because they 
themselves were implicated in the default and misappropriation cases.   One group in this 
sample of eight and several in the sample of 24 had approached chiefs to assist them but this 
was in itself problematic.   The chiefs and police usually expected to receive about a half of the 
outstanding loan amount as their remuneration for getting involved and the groups were  - 
understandably - not usually willing to pay.    Hence, institutionalising the transparency of the 
SG methodology  was problematic because it challenged social norms at many levels, in 
particular, the extant kinship ties and hierarchical power structures. 
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Gender dynamics 
The gender dynamics within the groups merit specific comment as patterns can be identified.   
First, there was one group where male leaders exploited women members in the form of sexual 
favours, and in return provided them with loans and did not force them to repay.  Second, 
however, in  four out of eight groups  women leaders were using their positions in the groups to 
gain financial advantages through misappropriation  and default (Boburia, Tumaini, Kabonyo 
and Awuor).  This is in contrast to the findings of Johnson and Sharma (2007) who suggested 
that it was male rather than female leaders who tended to take greater advantage of their 
positions. 
Third, moreover,  the gender dynamics of leadership challenges do not suggest a clear cut 
dynamic around the role of gender such that men are necessarily able to exert more power than 
women.  Rather they suggest a complicated set of dynamics of age, kinship and social status 
outside the group as important in determining whether or not problematic leaders were 
dislodged   So, in Boburia where male members challenged their female leaders on 
misappropriation of funds, they were not able to dislodge them. However, in two cases the 
male challengers became the chairs in place of a female rival (Kabonyo, Etanda).  Additionally a 
female chair was able to remove a male secretary.   In the case where the male challengers 
were not successful in ousting female incumbent leaders, they did not have social status outside 
of the group, were younger than the female leaders and were related to them, thus indicating 
that age and kinship tended to dominate over gender relations.  In the cases where the male 
challengers were able to dislodge female leaders, the former occupied an important position 
outside of the group that assisted in their taking over the leadership.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
As was discussed in the beginning of this chapter, Dore recognizes that it is the mutual trust of 
deep local ties that enables people to co-operate well but and that also “rational accounting 
methods … and other devices to institutionalise suspicion” are needed  (Dore 1988, 58).  This 
chapter has investigated in detail the internal dynamics inside the groups, in particular 
examining whether and how they were able to address the breaches of rules and 
misappropriation and default by their leaders which presented a significant problem to their 
sustainability.  The relationship between leaders themselves and their mobilisation of the group 
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members along with kinship ties was found to be particularly important in how the internal 
dynamics of the groups ultimately played out.  The evidence shows how the rational accounting 
methods of the SG methodology were helpful in exposing some of the problems but ultimately 
it was these internal social and power dynamics that affected whether or not the methodology 
could be implemented effectively.   
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CHAPTER 8.  INSTITUTIONALISING RULES:  INSIGHTS FROM 
THEORY 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the different theoretical frameworks introduced in 
Chapter two are able to shed light on the empirical findings.  In the sections that follow, I 
therefore review the findings in relation to Ostrom’s framework and design principles; Mahoney 
and Thelen’s approach to examining gradual change; and Boettke et al.’s theorem of 
institutional stickiness.  Using these frameworks enables different dynamics of the operation of 
groups to be analysed and brought to the fore.  Using Ostrom’s analysis enables us to examine 
whether her design principles of participation, monitoring, enforcement and conflict resolution 
were applied while training groups.   Then the framework of Mahoney and Thelen  focuses 
analysis on the dynamics of gradual institutional change and how power relations impact 
change.  Using Boettke et. al.’s  theorem facilitates the analysis of impact of external 
intervention.   This analysis is therefore able to show the way in which these  different theories 
assist in focusing on different  aspects of the process, but none of frameworks was able to cover 
all the of  three key areas that were evidently of importance  i.e. embeddedness, power 
relations and  the role of external intervention.Further,  the findings of Chapter six have 
demonstrated a significant level of variation in results depending on the way the trainers 
themselves operated.  The theories of institutional change do not offer tools to adequately 
capture and discuss these dynamics.  In considering how to better theorize these dynamics I 
have turned to the anthropology of development literature and in particular the broking and 
translating literature of David Mosse after reviewing the findings with respect to the three main 
frameworks presented above, I will then introduce this literature and consider the empirical 
findings through this lens.   
 
8.2. Institutionalisation of SG rules: the Ostrom framework 
 
As noted in the literature review, Ostrom developed categories for different types of rules. Her 
aim in listing all the rules that exist in an action situation was to establish whether there are 
   224 
 
some key rules that need to be present in any situation for a group to function well.  To this 
end, the key rules of the SG methodology are considered by applying them Ostrom’s rule 
categorization.  As discussed in the literature review, she contends that groups require rules in 
the following categories in order to function well:  
• boundary rules or exit and entry rules 
• position rules 
• choice rules  
• aggregation rules  
• information rules  
• payoff rules 
 
According to Ostrom, for common property resource groups to function well the group needs 
rules covering all the above categories, they have to be clear and be in use. In Table 8.1, the key 
SG rules have been entered where they appear to correspond to Ostrom’s categories, as set out 
above.  The first column of the table shows the rules that were introduced/supposed to be 
introduced to the groups.   However, Ostrom exclusively focuses on rules-in-use. I have used 
both scenarios, because the aim is to determine whether the SG methodology was watered 
down. The second and third columns report whether the rules were in use or not.   If all three 
columns are green, then the rule was introduced and great majority of the observed groups 
used it. Whilst red in the first column indicates that the rule that groups follow is not part of the 
SG methodology. Red in the second or third column indicates that some or many groups did not 
follow a particular SG rule even though it was introduced by the trainers.  The numbers of 
groups in the table refer to all 24 groups what were discussed in chapter 5.  
Table 8.1. Whether SG rules were introduced and in use under different Ostrom’s rule 
categories     
SG rule introduced by 
CARE/trainer/monitored and 
enforced by trainer  
Respondents reported that 
rule was in use 
Observation that rule was in 
use 
Boundary rules   
Group members should do a 
self-screening71 
In 13 out of the 16 groups 
not in use 
Several groups were clan 
groups and according to 
respondents, it would 
unacceptable to exclude clan 
members from joining 
Position rules   
                                                          
71
 Officially called self-screening, so members screen themselves, whether can follow rules. 
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SG rule introduced by 
CARE/trainer/monitored and 
enforced by trainer  
Respondents reported that 
rule was in use 
Observation that rule was in 
use 
Group leaders elected through 
secret ballot 
Group leaders selected in 
elections (mostly not secret) 
 
Elections in all groups 
Even though elections, non-
performing leaders in several 
groups not removed through 
elections, but rather,  re-
elected  
The group: a chair person, 
secretary, possibly a vice-
secretary, a box-keeper and 
two money-counters as well as 
key holders who are changed at 
each meeting and are 
anonymous to nearly all other 
group members  
Yes Yes, However, in most of the 
groups that used a box, the 
chair kept the keys.  
The designer of the 
methodology was of the view 
that members should only have 
one relative per group, but this 
was not a formalized rule 
In most of the groups each 
member had several 
relatives  
In most of the groups each 
member had several relatives 
Trainer only one cycle with the 
group 
Trainer more than one cycle Trainer more than one cycle 
Choice rules (on how to 
allocate resources), i.e. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
  
A member can borrow up to 
three times her savings  
IN most groups the rule: 
member can borrow up to 
three times, adhered to in 
two groups only 2 times  
In several groups some 
members borrowed  up to 5-
6 times their savings. 
Monitoring/enforcement: Loans 
have to be repaid after three 
months at the latest 
 In the great majority of 
groups members could stay 
with loans until the end of 
the cycle as long as paid 
interest  
Calculation of share-out: profit 
divided based on savings  
Yes Yes 
Calculation of share-out: if 
member has not repaid the 
loan by the time of share-out, 
her savings are deducted to 
offset her loans, which means 
that she receives less profit 
because she has less savings  
 In six groups this was the 
case, in the rest their savings 
were not deducted.  
Regardless of whether 
members were late, they first 
received their (estimated) 
profit, from which the 
outstanding loan was 
deducted, hence no sanctions 
were imposed 
The methodology does not take 
into account that trainers might 
appropriate group resources  
 No rules/guidance to 
members to ensure that 
trainers did not appropriate 
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SG rule introduced by 
CARE/trainer/monitored and 
enforced by trainer  
Respondents reported that 
rule was in use 
Observation that rule was in 
use 
group resources 
Information rules   
The amount members can save, 
borrow, owe as well as the 
cumulative savings and loans 
should be announced.  Also, 
members should memorize the 
total amount outstanding  
 
 What members owe is 
announced in most of the 
groups,  Total amount of 
loans and cumulative savings 
not announced in any of the 
groups 
The role of ledger is so that 
secretary and also, all the 
members can crosscheck that 
the figures tally with those in 
individual passbooks 
In several groups, 
respondents reported that 
they were told that  they 
were not allowed to look at 
the ledger book (e.g. ”mind 
about your own business, 
this is my book”, one 
secretary told members 
interested in looking at it) 
 
Aggregation rules   
All the transactions must 
happen during the meetings so 
that everybody can see and 
agree what is happening 
 In most groups all the 
transactions occurred during 
the meeting. 
In only two groups did some 
members save and/or repay 
loans outside of the meeting 
Before loans are given, 
members should discuss who 
gets what 
 In practice this happened 
only in a minority of groups 
In the majority of groups, 
trainers had suggested that as a 
last resort members should 
take assets from members that 
were not willing to repay 
 Assets were taken in quarter 
of the groups with the 
assistance of trainers. Assets 
were taken in only one of 
eight groups without the 
direct assistance of the 
trainer 
Payoff rules (costs and 
benefits) 
  
Every member has to save in 
each meeting at least one share 
Yes Most of the members saved 
in each meeting; incentive to 
save because the profit was 
based on the amount saved 
Group decides whether there 
are fines for breaking the rules 
and the amount of these fines 
Groups had fines for non-
attendance, coming late, for 
phone ringing in the 
meeting, etc. 
Half of the groups enforced 
fines Many groups with fines 
for breaking rules do not 
enforce them 
All loans have to be paid back 
within three months. However, 
no rules/agreements how to 
Loan should be repaid after 
three months. If not, the 
group talks to the person, 
Even though after 3 months 
loan in default, usually no 
action before end of cycle 
   227 
 
SG rule introduced by 
CARE/trainer/monitored and 
enforced by trainer  
Respondents reported that 
rule was in use 
Observation that rule was in 
use 
get the loan back but the group usually waits 
until end of cycle 
If a defaulter has not repaid the 
loan in full at the time of share-
out, their savings are deducted 
to offset their loans.   
 In six groups this was the 
case, in the rest their savings 
were not deducted, meaning 
that there were no sanctions 
for being late. 
Group leaders supposed to 
monitor and enforce that a 
defaulter repays after three 
months  
 During the first cycle the 
presence of the trainers 
ensured that the loan was 
repaid, which  meant that 
that group leaders got little 
experience of enforcing 
repayment 
Group members supposed to 
discuss sanctions and 
enforcement methods and 
agree on them.  
In half of the groups,  
members claimed they 
would take assets if 
members were not 
willing/able to repay loans  
Lack of adequate discussion 
on sanctions and when and 
by whom sanctions were to 
be enforced  
Only the FBO groups in 
Rachuonyo had a systematic 
enforcement strategy that 
included also holding 
members assets until they 
repaid or even selling assets.  
In half of the groups assets 
were never taken 
The methodology did not 
propose any rules 
 In only two groups did 
members enforced severe 
sanctions like confiscating 
assets. 
In six groups the trainers 
enforced the sanction of 
taking assets  
The methodology did not 
propose any rules  
In several groups, if assets 
were taken, all the group 
members had to go to 
defaulters house and any 
person not attending would 
have to pay a fine of Kshs 
200  
In several groups, if assets 
were taken, all the group 
members had to go to 
defaulters house and any 
person not attending would 
have to pay a fine of Kshs 200 
the GSL methodology assumes 
that after the first cycle SG has 
‘graduated’, i.e. is independent 
and, hence no further contact 
with the trainer is required   
This means that no rules 
regarding whether and for what 
purposes the group should pay 
 Since the methodology is not 
clear on whether the groups 
should pay for the services of 
a trainer, delivery channel 
representatives appropriated 
funds in several groups 
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SG rule introduced by 
CARE/trainer/monitored and 
enforced by trainer  
Respondents reported that 
rule was in use 
Observation that rule was in 
use 
for the services of a trainer  
 Data from chapters five, six and seven 
As table 8.1., which was adapted from Ostrom’s rule categorization, indicates, the SG 
methodology has rules in all the required categories.    The green items in the left column refer 
to  SG trainers having introduced the great majority of these rules to the groups, whilst in the 
second and third columns this shows the cases where the groups actually followed the rules.  
For example, the idea of election of leaders had been introduced in all the groups and all 
claimed that they held elections.  The idea behind having elections was naturally to get rid of 
poorly performing leaders and replace them with better ones.  However, as has been shown in 
chapter 7, even though elections were held, not all the groups were able to remove leaders that 
did not follow the rules nor was the ballot secret in most cases.  In most of the groups the 
leaders from the previous cycle continued in that role for the next and if these people were 
changed, this happened openly through a show of hands. However, as the large amounts of red 
text in the middle and right hand column indicate, there were several rules that had been 
introduced but were not practised in the majority of groups.  For example, even though the 
trainers had suggested that members should repay their loans after one month and at the latest 
after three months, there were several groups where this did not happen and some members 
kept their loans throughout the whole one year cycle.  Similarly, despite the trainers having 
introduced a share-out procedure where late repayers did not receive their bonus, in three 
quarters of the groups these people did receive one.  
Table 8.1 also illustrates that there were gaps in the SG methodology.  For example, according 
to it groups were supposed to come up with rules regarding sanctions, if the members were not 
repaying their loans on time and most had agreed to charge small fines, if they did not repay 
after three months.  However, the rule of charging fines was not followed by the majority of 
groups.  Nevertheless the most serious gap becomes clear not so much from the simple 
enumeration of gaps but the results of them as we have shown above. In the context of savings 
and loans, getting funds back is an absolutely central task and yet the SG methodology only 
suggests that the groups themselves should come up with sanctions and enforcement strategies 
to ensure loan repayment.  However, it is clear from the discussion in the previous chapters that 
this was poorly implemented, to the extent that “we were told to love one another”, which is 
far from a practical approach to enforcement.  Neither did the implementer, namely, CARE. or 
most of the trainers ensure that the groups had discussed and agreed upon the sanctions.    In 
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fact, as chapter six has shown, only groups under the trainer Timothy had a strong follow up 
procedure regarding defaulters and only one group was able to enforce any sanctions after the 
trainers became less involved.  Moreover, it appears that Timothy’s implementation of an 
enforcement strategy to repossess assets in the event of non-payment was very much of his 
own making.   
Ostrom’s rule categories presented in table 8.1 are helpful in the sense that they clearly show 
the numerous ones that were not in use as well as the gaps in the SG methodology.  However, 
one of the weakness of her static perspective on rule categories is that it does assist in providing 
understanding as to why rules are not in use.   In the next section, to what extent Ostrom’s 
design principles were in use and the degree to which they can assist in explaining whether or 
not the rules were institutionalised is discussed.   
8.2.1. Explanatory power of design principles 
 
As discussed in the literature review, Ostrom (2005) has also sought to identify principles that 
describe the process through which the institutionalisation is achieved.   She suggests that these 
design principles or the common features of successful group-based institutional arrangements 
required are participation by members in crafting or modifying the rules, monitoring them, 
agreeing on graduated sanctions, their enforcement and conflict resolution as well as whether 
these rules are being applied.   
In this subsection, each of these is considered in turn with aim of determining the extent to 
which each can shed light on group trajectories in terms of performance. 
 
1. Participation: The SG methodology states that training is participatory and that group 
members should come up with several key rules.  However, the training was externally 
prescribed and the findings indicate that few groups discussed and agreed these rules, 
despite this being the intention of CARE.   According to the methodology, the trainers 
have a key role in ensuring that group members discuss and agree, e.g. what sanctions 
the group will use against the group members that do not repay on time or that do not 
do so by the time of share-out.  This participatory discussion and agreement did not 
take place in most of the groups, because the trainers did not invest heavily in ensuring 
that they participate in the rule design and consequently, they were less likely to ”own” 
the group rules.  
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Also, the incentive system of the project encouraged the trainers to form as many 
groups as possible, but there were no such incentives to ensure the quality of 
participatory processes.  Indeed, the methodology clearly puts little emphasis on 
developing the trainers’ skills in this process or on how to manage the potentially 
uncomfortable dynamics of managing such discussions among people who are friends 
or relatives. During the early stage of the group formation, trainers were under pressure 
to form groups and in doing this, the potential future difficulties were clearly glossed 
over.  It is understandable why most of the trainers would find this difficult, given that 
they belonged to the same community. 
 
The findings indicate that the trainers were not explicitly requested when introducing 
the methodology to explain that discussion and agreement on a set of rules by the 
group through participation was essential. In addition, little evidence came to light that 
groups had made such agreements during the constitution process.  Hence, this does 
not accord with Ostrom’s assertion that ”rules take time and effort to develop [by the 
group], try out, modify, and then experiment again” (Ostrom 2005, 264), which 
indicates that nearly all the groups failed to deliver active participation through the 
methodology.  In fact, the approach was only nominally participatory in that the groups 
were asked to come up with less important rules, like when to meet and the level of 
fines that should be collected for certain offences.  Consequently, the methodology in 
its current form fails to be participatory in the transformatory/empowering sense that 
Ostrom (2005) promotes (see the discussion on different types of participation in 
literature review  (White 1995, Cornwall 2003). Ensuring that the whole group 
participates in designing, testing, modifying and testing again their own rules, the way 
Ostrom proposes, would have been likely to produce a greater transformation of 
understanding.  However, it has to borne in mind that in the case of Ostrom, the 
participation took place in an endogenous institution without any outside intervention, 
whereas regarding the SGs there was such intervention.  Ensuring from outside that 
there is participation is certainly more complicated than in an endogenous institution 
where people are already members.72 
                                                          
72
  However, Ostrom does not problematize the nature of participation.  Even in indigenous  institutions 
the poorest might participate less than the wealthy. Neither does she discuss the fact that social relations 
matter regarding participation in that some community members are included and others are excluded or 
marginalized.  
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The findings indicate that the designers of the incentive system and CARE were in 
critical ways responsible for so little participation taking place.  Indeed, it is clear that 
the SG methodology has little participatory ethos underpinning its implementation at 
all. This dynamic aspect of participation, as suggested by Ostrom, in which groups learn 
from their mistakes and modify rules in order to improve them was clearly lacking.  
Indeed, there were no groups that were clearly in control of the methodology in such a 
way that they modified it in order to improve it or adjust what they were doing to make 
it work better.   All of the important rule modifications resulted from an inability to 
manage poor performance and adjusting to this reality rather than seeking to find ways 
to adhere to an original vision of what was to be achieved. In sum, the failure to meet 
Ostrom’s first  design principle of participation meant that there was no sense of 
ownership of the overall vision of what might be achieved by the group.  
 
2. Monitoring: The findings indicate that Ostrom’s second design principle, monitoring, 
was not properly implemented.  According to the methodology, after the first cycle 
when the trainers left the group, the leaders were supposed to monitor the members, 
who were to be provided tools through which they could also monitor the leaders.  In a 
few groups leaders monitored meeting attendance and latecomers. Loan repayment 
was only monitored in the sense that members with late loans had to pay additional 
monthly interest and in only one quarter of the groups was an additional fine for late 
repayment. This lack of monitoring seems to stem from the lack of participation in the 
design of rules.   I addition, there were no incentives for members to monitor leaders or 
vice versa. The fact that neither leaders nor members had built in incentives to monitor 
helps to explain why some of the rules in some groups were not followed. 
 
As in CPR institutions, in the SG methodology there was also an idea of the need to 
monitor the whole resource.  Accordingly, the leaders were supposed to announce the 
total size of the fund during every meeting  and,  interestingly, this rule was dropped by 
all the groups, with the total fund never being announced.  However, the leaders did 
proclaim what individuals had saved and borrowed, which group members seemed to 
be satisfied with as long as they got a loan and at the share-out their savings back plus 
some interest.   Hence, even though the leaders in most of the groups were able to 
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cream off some of the funds through default and misappropriation, they still were able 
to reach an equilibrium by ensuring the members still were able to get loans and some 
profit. In general, there was a lack of concern about the overall distribution at the group 
level, as long as the members saw that they individually got something.  This raises the 
issue of their being group hierarchies, such that different members might have had 
different access to the resources available depending on the intensity of their 
relationship with the group leaders.  As discussed in chapter 4, the members in 
indigenous ASCAs that operated in Nyanza were not able to know the total fund 
amount, for only the leaders were party to this information. 
 
Since the groups were not doing the monitoring for themselves, as emerged in chapters 
six and seven, external monitoring was happening in varying ways which was not part of 
the plan and were implemented with different degrees of care and support.   Indeed, it 
appears that monitoring by trainers was undertaken to an extent beyond the original 
intention of this being only for the first cycle.  The incentive for this was the payment 
that they received for doing so, especially at share-out time.73  This incentive fits with 
Ostrom’s design principle on monitoring in the sense that monitors need incentives to 
perform the role effectively, but this is not the intention in the methodology.   However, 
in this cultural context paying for services received is an understood aspect and groups 
therefore also had to pay ”lunch” for the trainers.  Hence, the incentive for trainers to 
continue monitoring was not part of the methodology, but arose out of the local norms 
and because the groups were not confident enough to perform the share-out on their 
own at the end of the first cycle.   Another reason why groups were interested in staying 
in contact with the trainers was to have access to the international NGO that might be 
able to offer other services to the groups.  Mosse’s  (2005) theoretical framework is able 
to capture these other reasons better than Ostrom’s, which is discussed in section 8.4 
below. 
 
3. Graduated sanctions and enforcement.  Ostrom’s third design principle, graduated 
sanctions and enforcement, was not properly institutionalised in the great majority of 
the observed groups.  The trainers were supposed to ensure that they discussed 
sanctions and agreed among themselves how these would be enforced.  As the findings 
from the two qualitative chapters indicate, there had clearly been a lack of adequate 
                                                          
73
 However, during the third and fourth cycles, share-out meetings were attended by fewer and fewer 
trainers. 
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discussion on these issues. Out of the sample of eight groups, at most four had some 
kind of enforcement strategy, and in at least two of these cases it was the trainer who 
was taking the initiative.   In practice, most groups had only talked about the amount of 
fines.   According to the methodology, after one or three months, if loans were 
outstanding, then sanctions were supposed to be imposed, but only in two groups out 
of the eight did members pay a fine when this was the case.  However, this fine was 
usually not applied for more than a couple of months even though the member had still 
not cleared her loan. In the stricter groups members were also reminded during the 
cycle that they were late but they were able to stay with their loan as long as they paid 
interest.  It was first at the end of the cycle, after the share-out had been delayed, when 
the group took hold of defaulters assets in order to ensure repayment. This means that 
even in the groups that tried to enforce these rules, during the cycle the increasing 
incremental penal element was not evident and even at the time of share-out, when 
this had to be delayed because defaulters had not repaid, there were no additional 
sanctions for the defaulters.  In the majority of the groups that were more relaxed, 
there were no sanctions and hence, no increasingly punitive fines for default on loans. 
In addition to not discussing sanctions and enforcement during the group training, there 
were other reasons why these matters were ignored.    In particular, the social and 
kinship relations made enforcing sanctions challenging.  There was also a general 
expectation among the groups that the trainers were or should be in charge of this.  
 
 
4. Conflict resolution: In the SGs, this usually meant ensuring repayment at the time of 
share-out.  According to the SG methodology, after the group had been trained, the 
group and especially its leaders should have been able to ensure timely repayment of 
loans.   However, in practice the groups that still had a relationship with the trainer 
expected him/her to resolve any disagreements. This is supported by the quantitative 
results that indicate that in the groups where the trainers were still involved, enforcing 
repayment was more successful and faster than where they had withdrawn.   Moreover, 
financial performance was weaker in the groups where trainers were no longer actively 
involved.   
 
Since the methodology assumes that groups are able to resolve their internal conflicts 
themselves,  no alternative conflict resolution mechanisms were discussed.  The local 
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mechanisms for this outside of the group  conflict resolution that members were aware 
of were either the police or the chief, but they were hesitant to take the default cases 
to these people.  As discussed in chapter six, the chief and police were perceived of as 
being expensive: they usually demanded a fee amounting to half of the outstanding 
loan.  They were also perceived as corrupt, sometimes non-partial and unreliable  In 
one SG group the police had actually supported the members that stole money from the 
group because they were able to pay more to them (KI-4).  Regarding the local conflict 
resolution mechanisms, it would appear that Ostrom assumes that if they exist, then 
they will function effectively. However, there was no discussion of what mechanisms to 
use in the situation of conflict in the observed groups and moreover, the locally 
available mechanisms of the police and the chief were so costly that in most of the 
cases they were not willing to use them. In cases when they had been used, they were 
often not reliable, in the sense that even though they were paid, they did not deliver.74  
It seems that what needs to be asked, is not whether there are local conflict resolution 
mechanisms in place, but rather, whether they actually work such that the community 
is willing to use them when required.    As part of the methodology of institutionalising 
new rules is to discuss conflict resolution at the outset. CARE should have been 
adjusting the approach according to whether or not these mechanisms were available 
and working effectively as well as introducing this discussion as part of the 
methodology.   Whether the conflict resolution mechanism works or not is again related 
to power and as discussed in chapter seven, the power relations were complicated, but 
Ostrom’s framework does not deal with this. 
 
8.2.2. Ostrom’s rules and design principles: discussion 
To conclude on Ostrom, the extent to which the adoption and use of SG rules can be explained 
through her framework needs to be assessed and regarding the different rule categories, she 
notes that all need to have rules-in-use. Drawing on the findings in chapter 5, Table 8.1 
illustrates an adaptation of Ostrom’s rule categories in accordance with the rules that were 
introduced to the SGs. It clearly shows that in groups where the SG methodology prescribed 
rules were also the rules-in-use under the different rule categories, the groups performed well.  
But as the findings have indicated, having rules in all of these rule categories was not enough. 
                                                          
74
 For example  Bosire collected money for the police so that they would then harass the defaulters, they 
never did anything. On the other hand, regarding the group where Grace had taken money, the chief did 
what he was asked to do. 
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That is, there are gaps in the rules or at least reinterpretation of them different levels, with the 
most critical concerns relating to sanctions and enforcement. It has also emerged that external 
intervention was critical (even after the first cycle) in ensuring good performance, which implies 
that the process of institutionalising the rules internally within the groups was poor.   
Institutionalising the SG methodology represented an attempt by an outside agency to establish 
an action arena with the idea being that once the group had been trained, the outside agent 
would leave.  The fact that the SG rules were not followed can at least partly be explained by 
the fact that Ostrom’s design principles were not followed.  Discussion on these has clearly 
shown that the process through which the groups were established was clearly not adequate as 
the implementer did not sufficiently identify the range of potential weaknesses in the 
methodology in addressing critical areas. Further, Ostrom’s emphasis  on the role of 
participation is absolutely central in achieving adequate ownership of the rules as well as 
adapting them to actual performance.  This first design principle would have required a very 
strong participation in which all group members were engaged in developing and adjusting 
rules, which was fundamentally absent across groups.   In particular, there was no active 
experimentation during the training process, that would have enabled the trainers to work with 
the groups in slightly different ways so as to establish the means by which groups could be 
encouraged to truly develop their own sanctions.  Had this occurred, then the 
institutionalisation process would have been one in which the rules were actively tailored to the 
ability of groups to operate involving a range of approaches aimed at improving performance.  
Moreover, the trainers themselves were not coached so as to acquire the necessary skills to be 
able to make such a participatory process a reality.   That is, the methodology only provided the 
groups with a highly generalized blue print and consequently, perhaps understandably the  
groups and trainers neglected the more challenging areas in that blueprint. Since critical 
weaknesses were not identified and genuine participation not ensured, the role of the outsiders 
(trainers) became critical in ensuring  and rules were monitored and sanctions enforced, which 
led to most of them remaining in charge of this after the first cycle, even though they were not 
supposed to do so.  
Regarding the other design principles, as this section has discussed, monitoring was not strict 
and sanctions and enforcement were not properly discussed. Consequently, there was no 
agreement on how to implement them and/or resolve conflict helps to explain why the rule 
institutionalisation was not good.  In the groups where the rule following was better, 
enforcement was in most of the cases through external intervention.  Perhaps most 
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importantly, CARE did not properly ensure that monitoring, enforcement and conflict resolution 
were in place.  
Regarding the implementation of design principles more generally, when Ostrom’s design 
principles were not followed in an action situation, for example when the members did not 
participate in crafting of the rules,  it is not clear in Ostrom’s framework who will then introduce 
and implement the design principles and how they will be introduced.  The likely reason why 
Ostrom does not problematize the implementation of design principles is that she has largely 
studied successful indigenous CPR systems and in the case studies that she investigated all the 
key design principles were already in place.   Hence, the question of what to do when these 
principles are missing did not arise.  However, in the case of SGs the implementation process 
was at least partly exogenous, in that the rules were provided from outside.   As discussed in the 
literature review,  Ostrom  notes that if external rules are imposed on a group, it does not 
develop its own internal rules and also, will be unwilling to enforce the former  (Ostrom 2000).  
This implies that if members are not willing to implement design principles, an external agent is 
hardly likely to introduce them successfully either. 
Mosse (1998) notes that Ostrom’s framework does not explain how change happens, that is, 
she does not provide any discussion on how rules or design principles might evolve or change 
and what social, cultural or political forces might cause that change (Mosse 1998, 8). Much of 
the variation in rule following can be explained on what the trainers did or did not do when the 
group leaders and delivery channel representatives defaulted and/or appropriated resources.   
Part of the variation was also explained by internal group dynamics, general relationships and 
kinship relations where power was also involved, all of which made it difficult to institutionalise 
suspicion within the groups.  Hence, it can be concluded that while Ostrom’s framework 
assisted in analysing the lack of genuine participation, however, external intervention and the 
interaction of power dynamics with this within groups owing to kinship and other power 
relations are not adequately addressed within Ostrom’s framework. In fact, her framework does 
not explicitly deal with power.  Next, whether Mahoney and Thelen’s view provides additional 
useful angles for understanding the dynamics of SG institutionalisation is assessed. These 
authors examine institutional change from a perspective  of power, power balances and agent 
politics.  
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8.3. Institutionalising SG rules: insights from Mahoney and Thelen  
 
 
In the literature review Mahoney and Thelen asked two questions:  
• “Does the political context afford defenders of the status quo strong or weak veto 
possibilities? 
• Does the targeted institution afford actors opportunities for exercising discretion in 
interpretation or enforcement?” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 18) 
Based on these two questions the typology in table 8.2 was created.   This section discusses 
whether and how this can assist in explaining what has been taking place in relation to the 
implementation of the SG methodology. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) deal with political 
settlements that are in the context of wider political economy.  However, I consider that this 
theory can be applied at the micro-level to provide useful insights, as demonstrated below. 
Specifically, I am going to use the theorization by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) as a heuristic 
device.  
 
Table 8.2.Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of institutional change 
 Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
Low level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
High level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
Characteristics of 
the Political Context 
Strong veto 
possibilities 
Introduction of new rules on 
top of the old ones 
Layering 
Neglect of existing/old rules 
 
Drift 
Weak veto 
possibilities 
Removal of old rules and 
introduction of new ones 
Displacement 
Active change in functions of 
existing rules 
Conversion 
Adapted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 19) 
In order to apply Mahoney and Thelen’s typology to the SGs, certain adaptations need to be 
made.   The typology is a predictive tool, which takes the pre-existing situation and suggests 
where it will end up. I take it that the pre-existing situation, i.e. the situation before the 
introduction of the savings groups methodology, is an indigenous ASCA group and in terms of 
rule enforcement, this group belongs in the high level of discretion category in Mahoney and 
Thelen’s typology.   This is because as discussed in the context chapter, there is a wide variation 
in rule enforcement in indigenous ASCAs.   What the theory is suggesting is that an institution 
with an initially high level of discretion will end up either drifting, if there is a strong veto or 
converting if this is weak.   However, conversion is not an adequate description of what is taking 
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place in SGs.  That is, the SG methodology introduces new rules, not ”active change in functions 
of existing rules” as the typology above suggests (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 19).  Specifically, 
the aim is not to have the old, existing, rules functioning differently, but rather, to have new 
ones adopted and enforced.  This also implies moving from a high level of discretion in rule 
following to a low one.   This adaptation thus turns Mahoney and Thelen’s typology into a 
dynamic framework, which is about changing the level of discretion of the rules, whereby 
groups  move from high to low discretion or vice versa.  This involves inserting an additional 
layer into these authors’ typology.75   
 
One way of considering the aim of the SG methodology is that it seeks to move ASCAs from a 
situation where there is a high level of discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
rules to one where there is a low level.  However, Mahoney and Thelen’s framework is not 
explicit about who is creating the change.  Given their macro perspective, it seems that the 
assumption is that the government is creating the change, i.e. trying to introduce something 
new and according them either strong or weak veto forces to this change exist. Weak veto 
means that no one is likely going to stop the government change initiative, whereas if there are 
strong veto forces, they are more likely to prevent the change process. In the case of the savings 
groups the set-up was  different in that the possible veto forces were the same actors who were 
supposed to ensure the enforcement of the new rules, i.e. the trainers and the group leaders.   
According to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), when the aim is to introduce new rules and ensure 
that they are also adopted, a weak veto and a low level of discretion is required.  In the context 
of the savings group dynamics, the trainers needed to have a positive influence in implementing 
change, so the issue was not about a weak veto.  As the discussion in chapters six and seven has 
shown, for this to happen both the trainers and leaders had to have a positive influence in 
enforce the rules..   Moreover, the equivalent of a strong veto in the context of the savings 
groups is  when some trainers and leaders wanted to prevent the shift from a high to low level 
of discretion.  Hence, in order to make the Mahoney and Thelen typology fit  the SG situation 
better it needs slight modification, such that the change agents that facilitated change and 
enforced the new rules are now called agents with positive influence, which replaces the ”weak 
veto possibilities” in the typology.   The strong veto of the typology remains and refers to those 
actors who opposed the introduction of the new SG rules or who proactively worked to ensure 
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 Mahoney and Thelen (2010) are simply saying that if you start with high discretion and you can 
introduce new rules without a veto then conversion takes place in which the existing rules change function, 
whereas if you start with low discretion and have a weak veto then you end up displacing the old rules 
rather than converting them.   
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that the new rules were not followed.  In my modified typology under both the veto and 
positive influence there are vetoes by trainers and by leaders as well as the positive influence by 
these people. check   Table 8.3 presents the modified typology.     
Table 8.3 also shows assumptions regarding the expected progress under the SG methodology, 
whereby the untrained groups were to be first, through training, shifted from a high level of 
discretion in interpretation/enforcement to low one during the first cycle (from Box 2  to Box 5). 
During the second cycle when the trainer is no longer present  the group remains at a low level 
of discretion as under the SG methodology it is assumed that there are no veto powers that 
would move the group back to high level of discretion in interpretation and enforcement.  
According to the methodology, during the second and consequent cycles positive veto or 
enforcement of the key rules is carried out by the group leaders/members.  This means that 
trained groups from the second cycle onwards are in box 7. Having veto and positive influence 
in separate boxes does not indicate that in some groups there would only be the former and in 
others just the latter.  
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Table 8.3. Adapted Mahoney and Thelen typology of institutional change during last observed 
cycle 
  
Low level of discretion in 
interpretation/enforceme
nt  
High level of discretion in 
interpretation/enforceme
nt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
of the Political 
Context 
Strong veto by 
trainer  
Box1 
Layering 
Box2 
Drift 
 
Strong veto by 
group leaders
76
 
Box 3 
Layering 
Box 4 
Drift 
 
 
Positive 
influence/ 
enforcement by 
trainer  
Box 5 
Displacement 
Box 6 
Conversion 
Positive 
influence/ 
enforcement by 
group leaders 
Box 7 
Displacement 
 
Box 8 
Conversion 
Adapted from  Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 1977) 
In table 8.4 the adapted typology is applied to SGs.  The implementation of the SG methodology 
had managed to convert half of the groups from a high level of discretion to low one, which 
were the well performing groups where the rule following and financial performance were 
better.  Three groups (Ongoro, Awuor and Kabonyo) out of the sample of eight groups were 
found to be in box 7 at the end of programme and one group (Amabele) in box 5.  
 
 
                                                          
76
 In the case where the new rules were against the local norms, then it would not only be the leaders but 
the whole group that would veto the new rule. 
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Table 8.4. Adapted typology of institutional change showing groups 
 
during the last observed 
cycle 
  
Low level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
High level of discretion in 
interpretation/ 
enforcement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
of the Political 
Context 
Strong veto by 
trainer  
Box1 
Layering 
Box2 
Drift 
Tumaini 
Strong veto by group 
leaders  
Box 3 
Layering 
Box 4 
Drift 
 
Boburia 
Engoa 
Etanda 
Positive influence/ 
enforcement by 
trainer  
Box 5 
Displacement 
Amabele 
Box 6 
Conversion 
Positive 
influence/enforcem
ent by group leaders 
Box 7 
Displacement 
Ongoro 
Kabonyo 
Awuor 
Box 8 
Conversion 
Adapted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 19) 
According to the SG methodology, all the groups should have been in box 7 after the first cycle, 
because from then on it was the responsibility of group leaders to enforce rules.  However, only 
three groups were in this by the time of the last observation, because, as discussed in chapter 
seven,  they had been able to enforce repayment of all loans before the share-out without the 
assistance of the trainer.  Two of the groups also performed the share-out without the 
assistance of the trainer. These actions indicated that the group leaders were able to exercise 
enough positive influence to keep the groups in the low level of discretion category.  As 
discussed in chapter six, even though the group leaders had a primary role in enforcing rules, 
trainers also intervened in these three groups to ensure a low level of discretion.   However, the 
role of the trainer had been even more central in one of the low level of discretion groups  
(Amabele) and hence it has been placed in box 5. It was not clear that all the groups coming 
under a low level of discretion would permanently stay there.  As discussed in chapter seven, in 
one of these groups (Awuor) the leaders had not been happy with the way trainer had ensured 
   242 
 
enforcement of repayment and did not want to continue using his methods.  Hence, there was a 
possibility that this group would slide back to a high level of discretion. 
Half of the groups, generally the poorly performing ones, were in the state of high level of 
discretion in interpretation/enforcement in spite of having been trained in the SG methodology.    
Three belonged to box 4, which is where all the groups were assumed to be before the SG 
intervention and one has been allocated to box 2.  This group (Tumaini) has been placed here, 
because the trainer, Grace, had a key role in ensuring that the group soon after the training 
moved back to a high level of discretion, even though  leaders were also responsible for default 
and mismanagement.  Regarding the three groups in box 4, the driving force for vetoing the 
new SG rules was that the leaders benefited from the new rules not being followed.   A common 
feature in all the high level of discretion groups was that the leaders were free to exercise a 
veto, because the trainers no longer visited or if they did, they had stopped trying to enforce 
the new SG rules.   As discussed in chapter seven, members in some groups attempted to 
uphold the positive influence or remind the leaders that new rules should be enforced, but they 
were invariably to powerful and hence, the groups returned to a high level of discretion.  
 
Regarding the change strategies, as table 8.4 shows, the groups that had institutionalised more 
crucial rules are in the two displacement boxes (5 and 7) and the groups that had failed to adopt 
these or even no rules at all, are  in the drift boxes (2 and 4).  Displacement refers to the change 
strategy of the removal of old rules and the introduction of new ones, with the outcome making 
sense as well as being effective.  These groups had certainly adopted more SG rules than those 
in the drift boxes.  The fact that some of the groups after the training were sliding back to high 
level of discretion is easier to explain within Mahoney and Thelen’s framework, if the groups slid 
back from layering to drift than from displacement to drift.  Sliding from layering to drift implies 
that the group just ignored the most recently adopted rules and returned to the old, pre-
existing ones. The high level of discretion in interpretation groups (not so successful groups) are 
in boxes 2 and 4, which according to M&T, would use drift as a change strategy, whereby the 
rules would be implemented in groups in very much varying ways.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) call the agents in the 
displacement box insurrectionists, because they actively try to replace the pre-existing rules 
with new ones and Timothy fits this description well based how his approach was described in 
chapter six. This would appear to imply that in order to create new groups that follow rules 
without any outside intervention the methodology requires insurrectionists as trainers.  
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However, the discussion in chapter six has shown that Timothy was indeed an exception and 
most of the trainers did not have the qualities of an insurrectionist.   The agents responsible for 
drift Mahoney and Thelen call parasitic symbionts.  This is also a strong term and describes well 
the strategies of both Bosire and Grace along with the group leaders in Boburia, Engoa, Etanda 
and Tumaini, who were diluting the methodology for their own benefit. 
 
To conclude on Mahoney and Thelen’s typology, in order to make it of relevance the SG 
methodology I modified it.   Specifically, weak veto possibilities were replaced with positive 
influence, because some of the change agents facilitated change.  Further, I specified the actors 
as being trainers and leaders who could exercise positive influence or a veto. The framework 
was also modified in the sense that the context in a particular situation was not seen as being 
static in the sense that there was either a high or low level of interpretation of rules, but rather, 
it took account of change agents being able to shift groups between these two categories. 
Considering the SG methodology through the M&T framework, it would appear that there was 
the assumption that prior to the external intervention a high level of discretion existed78 and the 
aim was to train people in better ways to govern and manage their groups.  Through this 
process of training and monitoring the trainer would take the group from a high to low level of 
discretion.  The SG methodology also seemed to assume that when the trainer is taken away 
from the group after one year, there will not be any strong veto powers that would move the 
groups back to high level discretion.  If there are negative veto powers, group leaders and 
members will have internalized the new rules, thus ensuring that the groups remain in the low 
discretion category.  As the modified table and the have discussion indicated, these 
assumptions of the methodology do not hold, for there were several kinds of veto powers 
exercised that pulled the groups back to a high level of discretion. 
 
The modified framework and the discussion around it have also shown the need for an alliance 
between the trainers and groups in order to create change.  The results indicate that there has 
to be adequate internal demand for change from members through having elected leaders that 
wanted to implement the new rules or via changing their leaders if they had not initially chosen 
ones that wanted to enforce the rules.  However, having internal demands for change was 
usually not enough, for in addition it required good external enforcement by the trainer to 
ensure that the group retained a low level of rule interpretation.   This is an important finding 
since the formal methodology assumes that trainers have already gone during the second cycle.   
                                                          
78
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As the evidence has shown, in all the groups that remained in the low level interpretation boxes 
the external enforcement by the trainers was stronger than those that returned to a high level 
of interpretation in rule following.  However, as the experience with high level discretion groups 
indicates, despite the trainer being tasked to provide external enforcement aimed at lowering, if 
leaders were not willing to follow then that person could not change the direction of the group.  
 
What  Mahoney’s and Thelen’s modified framework does is that it introduces the power of 
different actors  in the context of a potential change, and highlights their strength as well as 
their impact on whether the new rules are institutionalised or not.   Consequently, this 
framework enables the observation of different sources of power, power from outside in the 
form of trainers and delivery channels and power from within the groups.   However, neither 
Ostrom nor Mahoney and Thelen have included explicit external intervention in their 
framework.  Next, Boettke et. al’s (2008) theorem is discussed and then, Mosse’s (2006) who 
both deal explicitly with external intervention. 
 
8.4. Institutionalising SG rules: insights from Boettke et al.  
 
An outside agent attempting to change the collective action situation (CARE and its delivery 
channels)  is central in the introduction of the SG methodology.  As reviewed in chapter two,  
Boettke et al. (2008) focuses explicitly on foreign introduced and indigenously introduced 
institutions.   The author also emphasizes that the new institutions need to have a link with 
metis, the local culture, or be traceable to it or local norms. Boettke et al. claims that 
institutions belong to one of the following three categories:  
• indigenously introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions 
• foreign-introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions  
• indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions 
 
In table 8.5 I have arranged  Boettke et al.’s (2008)  categories  into a matrix.  
 
Table 8.5. Boettke et al.’s typology: how institutional change is introduced 
 Endogenous institution Exogenous institution 
Indigenously introduced IEN IEX 
Foreign introduced  FEX 
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As the table shows, one of the boxes in the matrix is empty.  Boettke et al. (2008) does not see a 
possibility that endogenous institutions could be foreign introduced, it would be a 
contradiction.  According to them, the most likely institutions to endure are indigenously 
introduced endogenous (IEN) ones. However, the problem is that the endogenous and 
indigenously introduced institutions, like the indigenous ASCAs, are problematic, because they 
have not “institutionalised suspicion” or in other words,  are not very transparent or 
accountable.   The SG methodology can therefore be interpreted as having the aim of 
introducing some external ideas, whilst at the same time ensuring that the methodology has 
enough endogenous elements or is indigenously introduced so that it “sticks”.   Hence,  the 
essence of Boettke et al.’s  (2008) theorem is to identify the required balance between 
endogenous and exogenous institutions along with indigenous and foreign processes for 
introducing them.   
 
It is not immediately obvious into which boxes in the matrix the savings groups fit. The SGs have 
been built on the principles of indigenous ASCAs and ROSCAs that are close to local norms, i.e. 
very close to endogenous institutions.  However, SG methodology added rules to these ASCAs in 
an to attempt to upgrade them and make them more transparent and accountable.  These 
additional rules were introduced “from above” by an international NGO, with there being 
elements of exogenous rules and some degree of “foreign” introduction. The SG methodology 
has the aim of taking an endogenous institution, an indigenous ASCA, and improving it by 
revising the rules in ways that are not familiar to members.  Hence, amongst Boettke et al’s 
(2008) alternatives an IEX  would appear to be what this institution is.  This is because rules are 
introduced through a process of outside intervention which involves insiders.  At the highest 
level it is foreign introduced, but it is delivered through a process whereby local Kenyans from 
the communities are actually mobilising the groups and carrying out the training .  
 
The SG methodology being used by CARE was in part developed in an earlier phase of the 
project in which there had been experimentation with the model on the ground as a result of 
disaffection with the results (Johnson and Boulton 2014).  However, over time it was codified 
into an approach through discussions between international experts and the senior 
management of the NGO.  The methodology was then delivered through a hierarchical system 
of project management in which training was cascaded down from the regional office to the 
local project offices, whose staff were trained prior to their inducting local staff, FBO staff and 
franchisees in methodology and these people then trained community members. The 
qualitative evidence presented in the last two chapters demonstrates how this cascading of 
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training can affect the ways that the “outside” or “foreign” element of the rules are understood 
and implemented.  While the rationale underpinning elements of the methodology, that of 
producing improved transparency and accountability of the ASCA, was understood at the 
highest level, this was subject to some attrition as it cascaded down through the training 
system.    Indeed, there appears to have been a strong implicit assumption that as the training 
was cascaded down, there would be a clear understanding the rules and their purposes at every 
level.  Consequently,  there was no barrier to trainers or leader wishing adjust or reinterpret the 
rules, who could then easily  implement or explain their versions of them to group members.  
 
However, as the findings demonstrate, most of the trainers had clearly not been introduced to 
the deeper rationale regarding the SGs in relation to transparency and accountability nor did 
they have an understanding of why the rules should be introduced exactly the way the way the 
methodology suggested.  Many trainers claimed that they had not been taught during the 
training about the importance of the rules or how to enforce them and hence, a number of 
them allowed groups to proceed with the share out even when loans were still outstanding.  
This, therefore, presents a spectrum of implementation between Boettke et al.’s (2008) two 
levels of foreign and local introduction, whereby the communication of the rules and their 
underlying rationale, or what is needed to enable them to be implemented, as a result, get lost.  
 
This institutionalisation of rules in an attempt to enshrine transparency and accountability in 
the groups through a process that involves a chain of actors spanning local trainers to foreign 
donors seems therefore to cut across Boettke et al.’s categories.     That is,  the SG model, whilst 
recognizing the importance of working with endogenous institutions (indigenous ASCA) and 
acting indigenously to the extent that local trainers were involved in order that changes in the 
rules would stick, introduced ideas and intentions in relation to transparency and accountability 
that were essentially foreign.  The SG methodology, being  considered an IEX institution, 
suggests that there is a critical balance between being close enough to the culture that the new 
rules will stick to, while managing also to change those rules and that the process of seeking 
change has to be one that can allow for this balance to be struck.  As Dore has noted, this is 
clearly a difficult balance, one that requires a clear process of institutionalisation, which as a 
whole was not consistently achieved in this case.  As discussed above, the institutionalisation 
was not achieved, in part, because the SG rules were not crafted through intense participation 
and learning that would have enabled the exogenous aspects of the institution to be 
communicated, understood and brought into relationship with the local culture or metis.    
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There clearly was variation in practice across the delivery channels as well as the trainers, who 
achieved different degrees of institutionalisation.  As was seen in chapter six, overall, the FBO 
delivery channel had institutionalised the methodology better than the other channels, 
especially one of the trainers within this channel, who was able to introduce the rules in a way 
that retained much of their integrity in practice.   Two  trainers (Paul and Jacob) were more 
inconsistent in their practice when compared to Timothy, having the ability to uphold the 
implementation of critical rules on repayment in some groups and not others. By contrast, the 
franchisee regional coordinator , namely, Bosire  and the CARE assistant trainer, Grace, oversaw 
a much bigger scale process of rule downgrading. This raises the issue of the role of the 
individual within the process of institutionalisation. The findings indicate that the trainers 
became central to this as it was not adequately developed in the project as a whole.  Instead, it 
appears that a number of factors affected their ability to persuade or influence group leaders 
and their members to adopt new rules.  These would appear to include their own understanding 
of the main reason for the rules being implemented, namely, to ensure fair outcomes for all 
members, as well as their having sufficient authority, power or influence to achieve this.   This 
means they were put in a position where they had to draw on their own personal resources of 
integrity, power, social position, cognitive resources and so on.  Indeed, Timothy’s success was 
not as a result of a process of participatory discussion and internalization of the rules amongst 
the group as Ostrom’s principle would suggest are needed, but rather, that he had greater 
personal authority and status, as well as understanding, than the other trainers.   
 
Boettke et al.’s theorem is therefore useful for analysing SGs because it helps in the 
identification of the potential role of external intervention in the process and facilitates 
understanding regarding how this might mediate between different approaches to institutional 
operation.  While allowing for external intervention, the theorem at the same time emphasizes 
the importance of institutional stickiness, i.e. the importance of understanding the local norms 
and aligning the institutional change with them. Boettke et al.’s theorem also shows how the SG 
methodology is trying to have a critical balance between the endogenous and exogenous.  
Endogenous in the sense that it has to stick and exogenous referring to the fact that it is trying 
to introduce foreign rules like transparency and accountability on the top of the endogenous 
institutions, in this case, informal financial groups.  However, despite Boettke et al.’s (2008) 
theorem drawing attention to the problematic issue of the way in which endogenous 
institutions interact with an externally initiated processes of change, it does not address the 
other key issues that the empirical analysis on power relations and participation uncovered.  
Neither does Boettke et al’s theorem address the detail of the process through which that 
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change might be implemented, especially the role of the delivery channels and trainers in this 
process.  
 
8.5. Brokering and translating 
 
So far I have introduced and applied three institutional frameworks presented in chapter 2. and 
it is clear from the findings that that these frameworks do not adequately explain the variation 
in outcomes in terms of their dependence on the role of the trainers themselves.    Seeking to 
understand this dynamic demands recourse to a further area of literature.  The role of 
intermediaries in the implementation of programmes  and policies has been examined through 
the lens of the role of “street-level bureaucrats”, as termed by Lipsky  (1980) and processes of 
“brokering and translating”, as coined by Mosse  (2005).  I outline their contributions before 
discussing how these relate to the evidence above on the SGs . 
 
The role of those implementing policies in developed countries was examined by Lipsky (1980). 
His term ”street-level bureaucrats”, describes low level government employees who interact 
with the targets of policy on a daily basis will not have designed the project policies (i.e. rules), 
but are tasked with implementing them.   What his work demonstrates is the way in which such 
”street-level bureaucrats” have a degree of autonomy and discretion in how they interpret the 
policy that has been put in place and how this makes them central to the nature of the policy 
outcomes that arise.  Moreover, the operation of this discretion tends to result in their 
interpreting policies and implementing them in ways that are in line with their own personal 
preferences and priorities in terms of their values, interests, working patterns and so on  (Lipsky 
1980; Kaler and Watkins 2001). Indeed, studies have found that the deviations from the official 
policy are not so much because the street level bureaucrats have not been properly trained or 
have not understood what they were supposed to do. The deeper reason for deviations can 
rather be explained by the fact that the ”street-level bureaucrats” have different values, norms 
and intentions than the organization whose policies they are supposed to promote (Kaler and 
Watkins 2001).   
When studying a family planning programme in Nyanza in Kenya, Kaler and Watkins (2001) 
found  that the community based trainers (CBTs) (who are in this case the street-level 
bureaucrats of that programme) did not pursue the intended policy of making family planning 
widely available to all those who wished to receive it.  In particular, they discovered that the 
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community health workers did not provide contraceptives for women who had not yet given 
birth.   This was because there was a widespread belief in the community that the use of 
contraception might damage a woman’s chances of conceiving, and the health workers 
therefore regarded it as problematic to provide contraceptives to young women who had not 
yet given birth as it might damage their future prospects of doing so.  Instead they found that 
health workers understood the policies but  ”were concerned with building up their own stocks 
of prestige and respect from their community members, and … avoiding blame for any possible 
negative outcomes of family planning” (Kaler and Watkins 2001, 254). This was particularly the 
case because they were from those communities and had to live with their neighbours and kin 
long beyond the timeframe of the programme.     
The literature on “broking and translation” takes the analysis of the role that local actors play in 
implementing development programmes further.  Bierschenk et al.  (2002), Mosse (2005) and 
Mosse and Lewis (2006) claim that local development  ”brokers”  have an important role in 
development with regards to mediating between the different actors.  Boissevain (1974) defines 
the broker as an active mediator between two social units who benefit from this mediation.   
Bierschenk et al.  (2002) argue that the reason for brokers prominence especially in Africa is the 
weak state capacity, especially at the local level.  For, when the state is weak, there is a lot of 
space for intermediaries between different associations and especially between the donors and 
the local community. A broker provides an ”interface” between different worlds and groups of 
people, in the SG case, between donors, implementers of the project (the NGO) and the local 
community (Mosse and Lewis 2006). For Bierschenk et al.  (2002), a broker is an ”entrepreneur”, 
who for profit manipulates people and information in order to increase understanding between 
the different parties, with his key resource being his networks.  Olivier de Sardan (2005) 
distinguishes between agents who work directly for donors and rent-seeking development 
brokers, “between grassroots do-gooders and corrupt actor” (Olivier de Sardan 2005, chapter 
11; here Lindquist 2015). 
 
Bierschenk  et al.  (2002) identified several characteristics typical for successful local 
development brokers. First, brokers have to master both the local language and culture as well 
as the language of the development experts or ”the development  language”.  Mastering the 
local language is usually not a problem, if the broker was born in the area, whereas mastering 
”the development language” requires substantial effort.  Second, brokers need competencies to 
organize, including the roles of the: promoter, federator and capturer. A promoter can, for 
example, set up local groups for development purposes, whilst a federator is able to bring 
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groups or communities together into a federation, if the donor so wishes and a capturer will, for 
instance, bring existing groups into a new project.  Third, a good broker also needs 
”scenographic competence” so as to be able to create a ”show window” for the project.  Donors 
and evaluators will then be brought to see this window.  Alternatively, brokers will organize a 
carefully designed show to impress the spectators. Fourth, brokers need to be able to maintain 
good relations with both the local community and the donor and/or the development experts. 
Lastly, brokers that have all the above characteristics have often been active in local politics or 
in civil society organisations where these competencies are also needed (Bierschenk et al., 
(1992).79   
Mosse and Lewis (2006) want to add the metaphor of ”translation” to that of brokering to 
analyse development projects.  They are not only interested in how brokers operate and 
mediate solutions between the development organisations and the local communities, for they 
aim to understand:  
”how development projects—always unforeseeable— become real through the 
work of generating and translating interests, creating context by tying in 
supporters and so sustaining interpretations The concept of ”translation” here 
refers to mutual enrolment and the interlocking of interests that produces 
project realities”  (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 13).  
 
Actors with different and even contradictory interests can still be brought together in a project 
as long as the project design or the development policy has a high degree of ambiguity.  
However, bringing the different actors together necessitates a lot of translation:   
 
“of policy goals into practical interests; practical interests back into policy goals, 
which is the task of skilled brokers (managers, consultants, fieldworkers, 
community leader, the subjects of this book) who read the meaning of a project 
into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder supporters, constantly 
creating interest and making real” (Mosse 2005, 9). 
 
                                                          
79
 There is also a South Asian brokering literature that emphasizes more the clientilist and negative sides 
of brokering.   (see e.g. Neale, Walter C (1983): The role of the Broker in Rural India. In P. Robb (Ed) Rural 
South Asia – Change and Development. London: Curzon press and  Simon, Gregory L. (2009): Geographies 
of mediation: Market development and the rural broker in Maharashtra, India. Political Geography 28(3): 
197–207.) 
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Next section attempts to use the concepts of brokering and translation to explain the significant 
variations in the institutionalisation of SG rules. 
 
8.6. Institutionalising SG rules: brokering and translating  
 
The delivery channels and trainers were given incentives to create SG groups and train them.  
They had to effectively broker relationships with the groups to achieve these tasks, for which 
they were paid by CARE.  This process involved relying on their ability to translate this 
intervention so that local communities would understand what was going on and to ensure that 
the interests of the groups and group members were sufficiently in line with savings group 
approach as set out in the methodology.   As became evident from chapter six,  there was one 
very effective trainer, Timothy, bringing the rules into the local context and the franchisee 
coordinator, Bosire,  who delivered quite the opposite.  I am going to first consider them 
through the lens of brokering and translating, so as to explain the significant contrasts in these 
two people’s group outcomes.  The aim is to show how differently they translated and brokered 
the SG methodology. In fact, Bosire’s translation was not really a translation in the Mosse’s 
sense of the expression, but rather a mistranslation.   
I begin by analysing how Bosire translated and brokered.  His interactions with the groups and 
CARE show how he actually created ”success” on the top of a situation that was a failure from 
the group’s point of view, even though apparently most of the groups did not understand how 
he was misappropriating group funds.  I continue by showing how the ‘success’ that Bosire 
produced really convinced CARE that this was the reality. When our research team subsequently 
revealed something fundamentally different, this resulted in a reaction from CARE and the 
Franchisee channel. Next, Timothy’s translation and brokering are analysed, being followed 
finally by analysis of the translation undertaken by Paul and Jacob.   In terms of brokering and 
translation, Timothy and Bosire were outliers, whereas those of Paul and Jacob were closer to 
the profiles of a more typical trainer.    
8.6.1. Brokering and ‘mis-translation’ 
 
As discussed in chapter six, the franchisee channel trainers, especially Bosire, essentially diluted 
the SG methodology into a local indigenous ASCA methodology: members saved only at the 
   252 
 
beginning of the cycle and were able to retain loan as long as they wished.   Mosse  (2005) talks 
about translation.    In the case of franchisee channel we should perhaps rather, as pointed out 
above, talk about mistranslation,  because the most critical SG rules were left out of the ”new 
CARE” methodology80, with only the pre-existing indigenous ASCA ones remaining in place.  
When Bosire told the groups that the fees that he was collecting were for the implementing 
NGO, when in fact he was pocketing everything, he was directly lying to them.  When some 
groups realized that the franchisee representative was collecting the fees for himself, they 
wanted to stop co-operating with him. Hence, Mosse’s idea of translating meaning keeping the 
different actors together was turned on its head and thus, to all intent and purposes was 
mistranslation.   
In the previous subsection, recall that Bierschenk (2002) noted that good brokers need to be 
good at organizing people, need to master both the language and norms of the local people as 
well as the development language and also need to be scenograpically competent.  Bosire was 
highly competent at organizing people into groups.  As noted in chapter six, the franchisee 
delivery channel had formed more SG groups than any other and Bosire himself had formed 
more groups than any of the trainers.81  The fact that he used to be a local politician, a 
councillor, meant that he had good contacts with local chiefs and politicians, who assisted him 
in group formation.    This is in line with Bierschenk et al.’s  assertion that good brokers have 
often been active in local politics or in civil society organisations.  Moreover, Bosire also 
mastered both ”development” languages, which was evident from the fact that he wore the 
NGO staff badge and NGO T-shirt, adopted the use of NGO forms and falsely promised the 
groups that if they registered through him with the NGO, they might be entitled to other 
benefits.   
Bosire’s scenographic competence became evident in the ”shows” that he organized during the 
group meetings and during the share-outs.  As was discussed in chapter six, he made ”fake” 
phone calls to the NGO even though it  had already left the area as a further way to ensure that 
group members believed that he remained as being the mediator and the formal 
representative, i.e. broker between the groups and the NGO.    He also announced that he 
would take the registration fee and forms to the CARE office, even though it had already left the 
area. A further way to show his scenographic competence was the way in which he organized 
the share-out meetings as events where 10 to 20 groups from the area were sharing out at the 
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 Bosire’s term for his adaptation of the SG methodology (Bosire) 
81
 Bosire had formed over 500 groups (Bosire interview) whereas the best trainers had formed not more 
than 150 groups. 
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same time, food was eaten and a local politician as well as NGO representatives were invited to 
give speeches.   This was to impress the local communities so that they would join new SG 
groups.   He also ensured that even though not everybody had repaid the loans, the share-out 
”show” was performed as if everything was in order.  Bosire told the research team that even 
after the project had been closed down, he invited CARE representatives to the share-out 
celebrations and sometimes they did attend. All these actions, served to reinforce group 
members’ perspective that he was associated with the NGO (Bosire and Franchisee owner). 
Bosire used his scenographic competence mostly to attract new members but also to impress 
CARE, who although having left this project, wanted to promote it seeming success to other 
interested parties, as discussed further in the next subsection. 
8.6.2. Contrasting success with mistranslation 
 
The directors of CARE who were in charge of the SG project were not happy when they found 
out that the findings of the research team were not in line with the message that had been 
delivered to the donor and to the public.  Towards the end of field research, the SG specialist 
from CARE Headquarters in Nairobi called the donor of the project who was also funding the 
current research. As explained in chapter six, he complained that the research team was only 
asking ”negative questions” from the sampled groups.  Further, after the CARE SG specialist had 
complained about the research team, the director of the SG project called me to arrange a 
meeting and when we met, he was accompanied the owner of the franchise, namely, Bosire’s 
daughter.  This suggested that it was the franchisee channel representative who had 
complained about us to CARE. The CARE project director informed us that groups that we had 
met had complained that we were asking ”negative questions” and that we had stayed in the 
groups for too long without giving them lunch.  When we asked the franchisee to specify what 
she meant by  ”negative questions”, she responded that we had asked group members 
questions about other groups of which those being questioned were not members.  She said we 
had also asked whether these other groups had actually been trained by the Mwalimu (trainer). 
The franchisee channel trainer (Jacob) who had trained these groups and visited them 
occasionally was surprised after our meeting, because none of the groups had contacted him to 
complain about our questioning. At the end of the meeting the CARE project director noted that 
the franchisee channel had been the most successful, ”our shining star” and that other trainers 
had visited the franchisee channel and that the franchisee owner “ is very good, and people 
come to see her.  It is important not to say negative things about her” (CARE project director). 
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When the draft report was presented to the CARE team, they suggested that the research team 
did not understand the SG methodology well enough and that our findings on misappropriation 
were misunderstandings when in fact the payments for Bosire were fee-for-service ones. When 
the CARE team left they told trainers that wanted to continue training there no was money left 
to pay them, so they, suggested that the trainers start charging the groups.  Several trainers 
tried to train groups for a fee, but during our last visit none were doing so, because the groups 
were not willing to pay.  It also has to be noted that Bosire was not a trainer, had not been 
trained by CARE and never trained any groups himself. This is not the first time that influential 
players have objected to key research findings and tried to discredit them  (see Bretell 1993 for 
a review of similar cases; here Mosse 2006).  In sum, even though from our point of view the 
groups that the franchisee channel trained in many respects involved  mistranslation, from 
CARE’s perspective the work that the franchisee had done was a success, because so many 
groups were produced.  This confirms Mosse and Lewis’  (2006) point that though skilful 
translation interests of different parties can be interlocked, in this case,  between CARE and 
Bosire.  
8.6.3. ‘Enhanced’ brokering and translation 
 
When Timothy’s translation is compared to that of Bosire, it is near to the other end of the 
spectrum in the sense that the key principles of the SG methodology were delivered to the 
groups, largely, as the methodology suggested. Regarding brokering, like Bosire, Timothy was 
also good at organizing people into groups and this was not least because he had previously 
worked for civic society organisations.   Being from the area, he had the mastered local 
language and was embedded in local norms. He had also mastered the ”development language” 
owing to his work with civic education and voter registration. Moreover,  his role as a church 
elder and member of the church development committee exposed him further to this language.  
Timothy’s mastering of the development language was evident from the fact that CARE often 
took  foreign visitors to his groups. Timothy’s ”show window” was the share-out days, but they 
were rather different to Bosire’s, since his intent was the enforcement of repayment.   If some 
of the group members had not repaid by the time of the share-out, he would spend the whole 
day with the group and tried to convince them all to go to all the defaulters houses and come 
back with either money or assets.  The aim of this show was to ensure that other members 
would not be tempted to fail to repay on time.   Hence, Timothy’s ”scenographic competence” 
was directed more at a particular group so as to ensure that members who had not repaid 
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would learn to do so in future, in contrast to grandstanding behaviour.   CARE, in turn, used 
Timothy’s groups as a show window for donors. 
Timothy was able to broker and resist the watering down of rules by the group leaders, because 
he was respected in the community through being an elder in the church and through 
previously working with voter registration and interacting with the local community.  Also, by 
the end of the research when he had been appointed as a chief, this made it easier for 
defaulters to receive harsh treatment, if it was needed.  This FBO trainer in Rachuonyo was the 
only one whose social identity, experiences, network, social position and power was sufficient 
to enable him to broker the original SG methodology despite its gaps into practice. He also had 
enough power not to allow the translation of the original SG methodology into something that 
the groups might have been more familiar with that accorded with local norms.   However, to 
ensure that groups continued to follow the original SG methodology, Timothy had to broker the 
rules continuously, not only during the first, but also during second and third cycles.   
To conclude on the FBO and franchisee channels, findings in chapter five indicated that the 
former performed better than the latter.  Even though the sample was small, this might be 
underpinned by the value structure and the oversight that the church provided.  By contrast, 
the franchisee channel had many fewer constraint, which left it open to opportunistic money 
behaviour through the SG approach.  
8.6.4. Brokering and translating:  Avoiding risks 
 
Whilst Bosire and Timothy were almost at opposite ends of the spectrum  in terms of translating 
and brokering, the two remaining trainers, Paul and Jacob, were in between these two 
extremes.  They represented the great majority of the trainers, many of whom were Form 4 
school leavers, had undergone less formal training than Timothy and were younger than both 
him and Bosire.  They were not as experienced and good at organizing as Bosire and Timothy, 
nor did they have the wide existing networks through which both Timothy and Bosire were able 
to organize groups. Moreover, neither Paul nor Jacob had any formal position through which 
they exert influence, such as  Timothy, the church elder and assistant chief or Bosire, the 
politician.  Finally, they did not turn the share-out into a show. 
Because enforcing repayment was a sensitive issue, both trainers translated these issues only 
vaguely and when the groups did not follow the rules at a later stage,  in most of the cases they 
did not enforce rule following.    This led to a situation where enforcing repayment and share-
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out was transformed into something that was closer to local norms:  Paul and Jacob approved 
the group policies where members were given time to repay; in many of their groups members 
could repay their loans even after the share-out.  Also, both these trainers were willing to 
”translate” the share-out calculations into a system where even the defaulters received their 
profit, even though the official SG methodology is against that.  This style of operating and 
desire to comply with local norms and to avoid upsetting people locally, which in line with the 
notion of “street level bureaucrats”,  was underlined when Jacob noted, “I am not an advocate 
of taking assets… I am also at risk as trainer, so I don’t propagate, they might do something to 
me”(Jacob, CBT 2; 2nd round).  This demonstrates his lack of power to confront the local norms 
and lack of desire to suffer potential cost of his doing so of compromising his long term 
significant role in the community in which he lived.   That is, if he had been too strict, he might 
have lost any ”prestige and respect” he had in the community from engaging with the external 
actors who brought in the project in the first place and so, by adapting the SG rules closer to 
local norms he ”avoided blame for any possible negative outcomes” (Kaler and Watking 2001, 
254). To conclude on Mosse, his framework has allowed for a further facet of the 
institutionalisation to be uncovered, that highlights the specific roles of the different trainers 
and delivery channels. 
 
8.7. Institutional change theories and SGs: assessing their usefulness 
 
Evidence from the institutional change processes in the SGs indicates the usefulness of the 
different institutional theories in explaining the institutionalisation of the SG rules and its 
variation across the groups.  When attempting to explain institutionalisation, Ostrom’s 
framework concentrates on whether the rules are adopted and the process through which the 
rules are adopted (i.e. the design principles).   Adapting Ostrom’s framework in table 8.1, by 
adding into the table the rules that the trainers introduced or were supposed to introduce, the 
gaps in the methodology were highlighted, including the most critical one regarding 
enforcement. That is, there was a failure to address what is the core to any institutionalisation 
in any financial institution, that of members repaying their loans.  Ostrom’s design principles 
helped to explain the generally low level of institutionalisation of the rules. Regarding 
participation, whereas Ostrom’s  concept regarding this is transformational, the  SG’s practice 
was, at best, nominal. Moreover, the incentive driving the implementation of the SG 
methodology by delivery channels and trainers was the number of groups formed.  This meant 
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that there was rarely sufficient time for thorough implementation of the design principles or for 
genuine participation by group members so that they would have understood the rules and find  
them meaningful. 
Regarding monitoring, individual group members had a natural incentive to monitor that they 
themselves received their savings back at the end of the cycle plus some profit.   However, there 
was no monitoring or at most very limited monitoring of the whole loan fund.  The fact that 
there was not a clear understanding about the size of the total fund and accumulated interest, 
enabled the leaders in most of the groups to achieve an equilibrium in which members were 
satisfied because they were able to get loans from the group fund, get their savings back at the 
end of the cycle plus some profit, and some leaders were able to manage group funds in ways 
that brought additional benefits to themselves through misappropriation and default.  In the 
literature review Ensminger and Knight  (1997) , wrote about bargaining as a process of 
institutionalisation.  This equilibrium could be interpreted as being an implicit bargain about the 
distribution of the benefits between the group leaders and members. Ostrom’s design principles 
note that monitors are supposed to be provided with incentives for monitoring effectively. 
According to the SG methodology, group leaders and members are supposed to do the 
monitoring, but it does not stipulate any incentives for doing so.   The trainers were supposed to 
monitor the groups only during the first cycle, but most visited them in subsequent ones and 
the incentive to do so during these later stages was the payment that they received, especially 
for conducting the share-out.  This incentive fits with Ostrom’s monitoring design principle in 
the sense that incentives are required for effective monitoring, even though the intention of the 
methodology was not that the trainers would continue providing services to groups after the 
first cycle.  
Regarding Ostrom’s design principle on sanctions and enforcement, it became apparent that 
most groups had not discussed this matter.  In the few SG groups were sanctions were applied, 
a graduation of sanctions, was not evident.  Further, in most cases where sanctions were 
enforced, it was the trainers that had an important role in enforcing them.  According to 
Ostrom’s design principles, groups also require local conflict resolution mechanisms.  However, 
the SG methodology assumes that groups are able to resolve their conflicts internally, which as 
the findings indicate, was not the case.  The implementer, CARE, did not ensure that as part of 
the training there would be discussion on what were the local reliable and effective conflict 
resolution mechanisms that the groups resort to using if necessary. Even though the design 
principles and especially, the lack of genuine participation, are able to explain the rather low 
level of overall institutionalisation, this cannot elucidate why there large variation in the 
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institutionalisation of the rules between the groups.  The reasons that would appear to have 
resulted in such variation are the external intervention, the differing behaviour of the trainers as 
well as their status, and the level of authority they commanded.  However, Ostrom’s framework 
does not deal with external intervention or focus on the power dynamics between trainers and 
groups as well as within groups themselves. Another limitation regarding Ostrom’s framework is 
that since it is interested in the outcomes, it does not attempt the explain the reasons why the 
design principles, in particular genuine participation were not implemented.  The findings 
indicate that it was not easy to discuss sanctions or enforcement mechanisms with relatives and 
friends.  According to local norms, relatives and friends are supposed to help each other. 
Because the trainers were also from the local communities they were not eager to enforce 
discussion so as to get agreement on these issues.  However, kinship and local norms that can 
help to explain the low institutionalisation do not feature in Ostrom’s framework.  
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) emphasize the importance of political dynamics in the introduction 
of new rules.  In order to accommodate the two different sets of actors with power in this 
situation, I have modified their framework to identify how the influence of trainers and group 
leaders had an impact on the way in which the rules became institutionalised or not.    
Moreover, this adaptation of their framework includes an additional dynamic by considering the 
level of discretion involved as one of features that the methodology is trying to change.  That is, 
their framework does not consider the extent to which institutional change might be about 
seeking to change the governance process itself. This modified Mahoney and Thelen framework 
helps to identify the sources of variation in the institutionalisation of rules: the trainers with 
positive influence were able to move groups from a high level of discretion to a low one, whilst 
those trainers and leaders with veto power could resist this or even ensure that the groups slid 
back from to a high to low level of discretion.   It also helps highlight that the removal of their 
positive veto power after the period of training led to attrition regarding rule following.    In 
order to remain at a low level of discretion both the trainers and group leaders’ efforts were 
needed.   That is, if it was the trainers alone that attempted to enforce the new rules, but the 
leaders opposed them, then it was the latter who were able to prevail once the trainers had 
stepped back.    
Mahoney and Thelen also note that incremental change is likely to happen when there are 
”gaps” in compliance, i.e. where the participants have different interpretations of the rules.  In 
my modified framework the key finding regarding these gaps is that this is where most of the 
variation was and that often led the group back to a high level of discretion. In fact, it was the 
very committed trainers and leaders who were able to institutionalise the rules.  Mahoney and 
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Thelen call actors who have a powerful enough veto to displace the rules ”insurrectionists”.   
Insurrectionist is a very strong word and suggests just how strong the intention has to be 
actually to implement a set of alternative rules.   However, only one of the trainers seems to fit 
this description  (Timothy), while at the other extreme groups were used by some of the 
trainers to achieve their own ends, which fits rather better with the term  ”parasites” in 
situations where there is high discretion and the rules drift.  
As discussed earlier, the role of external intervention is not theorized by Ostrom or Mahoney 
and Thelen. Whilst Boettke et al. (2008) do so,  they are pessimistic about the potential for 
exogenous institutions to stick as a result and take the view that indigenously introduced 
endogenous institutions will fit best with the underlying culture. They are also of the view that 
the indigenous introduction of exogenous institutions  (IEX) as a middle road in which 
institutions are exogenous to local communities might be successfully introduced if carried out 
through an indigenous process.  Indeed, although Ostrom’s analysis of successful CPR 
institutions puts them into the IEN category, the design principle of participation is strongly 
consistent with an IEX approach in the sense that participation attempts the bridge the gap 
between exogenous and endogenous through indigenously introducing foreign elements. 
 I have discussed above how the SG methodology cuts across the categories they propose in 
that it has an element of foreign design, but is indigenously introduced by local trainers.  It 
highlights the need to balance between being close to local culture, whilst at the same time 
managing to change pre-existing rules so as to achieve higher levels of transparency and 
accountability.   It problematizes the “foreign” elements of  the institutions because they are far 
away from the culture, but does not analyse in any greater depth the role of culture.  What this 
case shows is that the SGs are very close in design to the indigenous ASCAs, which have an 
underlying set of norms about how they are implemented and the exogenous component 
involves attempting to make the rules more transparent and accountable. Nevertheless, 
Boettke et al.’s categories enabled us to see how the SG methodology in some senses 
attempted to achieve a balance between the exogenous, endogenous and well as foreign and 
indigenous introduction by recognizing the importance of endogenous institutions (ASCAs) and 
attempting to introduce the methodology indigenously through local trainers by giving them 
some space for local interpretation. However, beyond this broad assessment Boettke et al. gives 
little insight into how the dynamics of culture in the local context might operate. 
The key elements underpinning the “culture” and influencing group dynamics were the social 
relations of kinship, gender and age as well as social status.  Kinship involves a range of norms 
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on how to treat relatives and the importance of involving them in activities which are likely to 
benefit them.  What is evident from the findings is that the leaders, in particular, used the 
power they derived through a range of different social relational statuses whether kin, age, 
gender or socially based and that these sources of power influenced the way in which the rules 
were institutionalised.  Similarly, the social status of trainers, alongside their gender and age 
were important to the way that the rules were communicated and enforced.  
In order to understand the process of rules introduction in more depth, I turned to 
Mosse’s  (2005) actor-oriented approach to examine the way the trainers brokered and 
translated the approach into practice.  His emphasis is on how such actors construct 
development success and indeed from CARE’s point of view the project had been a significant 
success, which attracted international visitors.  This analysis has shown that this ‘success’ was 
very variable in reality, which in turn provoked a reaction from the organisation being 
researched. Beyond this, the analysis has shown how central the process of brokering and 
translating the SG methodology into practice was, for it helps to explain the differential 
institutionalisation amongst the groups. It has emerged that there were two extreme styles in 
operation, with ”scenographic competence” and ”shows” being used in completely different 
ways by Timothy and Bosire, the chief protagonists in this regard.   Moreover, their previous 
roles as civil society activist and politician are relevant to the skills they used in implementing 
the methodology and the outcomes these produced.  The remaining two trainers occupied 
within this range exhibiting the characteristics of ”street-level bureaucrats”, whereby their 
intervention was geared towards accommodating local norms in their brokering and translation 
and hence,  not wanting to be too ”strict” with the rules so as to ”avoid the blame for any 
possible  negative outcome” (Kaler and Watkins 2001, 254) from the community in which they 
had to continue to live long after the intervention ended. 
The detail of different styles of brokering and translation is not central to Mosse’s analysis, but 
rather he focuses on the systematic ways through success in projects is achieved.  However, the 
evidence from the current research suggests that these styles are strongly influenced by the 
individual characteristics of the trainers, such as age, education and social status derived from 
positions, which were extraneous to the CARE SG programme.  However, these individual 
characteristics were not all that was involved, for as discussed in chapter six, the values and 
norms underpinning the different delivery channels also came into play in explaining group 
success or failure. Regarding which, the analysis showed that it was the delivery channel based 
in the churches that was the more successful in terms of outcomes, and this also provided a 
degree of oversight and potential fall back in case disputes occur, none of which was delivered 
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through the private sector based approach that Bosire was part of.   This suggests that 
underlying frameworks of norms and values influence the styles of brokering and translation in 
operation.  Apart from Timothy’s personal status and characteristics, his role operated with an 
underlying set of norms of the church and with oversight by the church development 
committee.  In the case of Bosire, his role as a politician with the norms of patron-clientelism 
that underpin this in Kenya helps to explain why he undertook his role in the way he  did.  
Indeed,  Bosire’s style fits rather better into the older tradition of analysing broking that sees it 
as a model of exploitation, which in the language of de Sardan  (2013) would lead to him being 
labelled a “crook”.  
To summarise, this review has demonstrated the ways in which the theories illuminate different 
dimensions of how institutionalisation takes place.  What this analysis has shown is that 
different theories assisted in analysing different  aspects of the process.  The analysis with 
respect to , Ostrom’s design principle shows that the intervention did not conform to her design 
principles and that there was especially the need for genuine participation.  Mahoney and 
Thelen’s framework highlighted the fact that institutional change is often gradual as well as the 
importance of power relations in institutional change. This allowed me to analyze the 
implementation as a process where some trainers attempted to move the group from high level 
of discretion to low level of discretion as well as the subsequent attrition to high level of 
discretion in half of the groups.  Further, the analysis with respect to Boettke et. al. allowed me 
to analyse the central role of external intervention in the SG methodology in order to increase 
transparency and accountability and also allowed the analysis of the interaction between 
endogenous institutions and external intervention.  The analysis also provided an explanation 
on why external intervention does not easily bring permanent institutional change.  Lastly, using 
Mosse’s framework helped me to explain how the variation in institutionalisation of rule 
following was dependent on the very different ways the different trainers brokered and 
translated the SG methodology.   Mosse’s analysis also showed how the gaps between Boettke 
el. al.’ exogenous and endogenous rules can be bridged through the concepts of translation and 
brokering.   However, none of frameworks was able to cover all the of three key areas that were 
evident from the empirical material - that is, embeddedness, power relations and  role of 
external intervention. In the next and final chapter, I further assess the explanatory power of 
the theories covered in this chapter for the analysis of development interventions more 
broadly. 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
9.1. Introduction 
 
In the context of the promotion of SGs by NGOs, this research set out to examine the extent to 
which the SG rules had been adopted by groups to produce a sustainable model of financial 
intermediation.  Conceptualizing the SG approach as an attempt to create institutional change 
through the adoption of these rules, led it to seek to examine how theories of institutional 
change could enable the adoption and use of the SG approach to be explained.   
This chapter provides a concluding discussion of this thesis.  Section 9.2 summarizes the main 
findings presented in Chapters five, six and seven.  Section 9.3 then assesses the usefulness of 
the existing institutional change theories for analysing the SG methodology as discussed in 
Chapter 8.  Section 9.4 then draws on the research findings to further reflect on the perspective 
that institutional theory provides for analysing development interventions.   Section 9.5 offers 
some reflections on the methodology while section 9.6 provides some implications for the 
policy and practice of SGs.  
 
9.2. Summary of the empirical findings 
 
The intention of institutionalising the SG rules is to provide a level of transparency and 
accountability that ensures that savings are made, loans are given and repaid on time and that, 
at the time of share-out, members receive back what is their due as the basic requirements for 
an ongoing system of financial intermediation.  The methodology does this by introducing a set 
of rules and the technology of a lockable box, passbooks for recording savings and loans, a 
meeting format and so on.  The empirical enquiry focused on 24 groups, with greater depth of 
investigation of eight.  It started by examining the extent to which the rules and procedures of 
the methodology were in fact being followed.   
From the analysis of chapter five, two key features emerged that were highly significant to the 
ongoing operation of the groups: extensive difficulties in getting loans repaid and instances of 
misappropriation of funds. In over half of the sampled groups, there were serious problems 
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with loan repayment. Either the groups shared-out their funds before everybody had repaid or 
the repayment problems were so severe that they had not managed to do so even twelve 
months after the original share-out date. Repayment problems, in turn led, to unjust 
distributional consequences such that the members that had repaid their loans did not receive 
any or some of their savings back and/or the profit they were entitled to. Moreover, the 
members who had defaulted were able to use other member’s money to benefit themselves. In 
addition, in groups that performed the share-out, even though some members had not repaid, 
the defaulters also received their interest (profit), although they were not entitled to it 
according to the methodology.   
Moreover, the findings showed that nearly all the trainers continued to visit the groups after 
the first cycle was completed - something that was not anticipated by the SG methodology.  But 
despite this, only one diligently tried to intervene to ensure that the accumulated group funds 
were distributed according to the group rules.  In two thirds of the groups misappropriation 
cases were identified where either the trainers or the group leaders took group funds to which 
they were not entitled and most of these cases have not been resolved. 
Unsurprisingly these problems had an impact on financial performance which showed a 
downward trend in the Return on Savings (ROS) from the first to third cycles.  Given the 
indications of the literature that aspects of socio-economic difference might contribute to 
power dynamics that would affect performance, the analysis explored whether the financial 
performance and rule following was correlated with socioeconomic factors (gender, poverty 
and inequality) but found that these did not seem to be linked. However, it was found that 
meeting attendance and rule following did significantly contribute to financial performance. 
Both in terms of rule following and financial performance Rachuonyo scored higher than 
Nyamira and the driver of this appeared to be the FBO delivery channel, which scored highest 
both in terms of rule following and financial performance.  In terms of rule following, the groups 
trained directly by CARE scored lowest and regarding financial performance the groups trained 
by the franchisee fared the worst. 
Therefore, Chapter six offered an examination of how the methodology was actually 
implemented by the different delivery channels and the trainers.  There was analysis of the 
ways in which the trainers attempted to introduce, monitor and enforce the SG rules so that 
groups would be able to manage repayment.  It emerged from this analysis that the constitution 
development process did not adequately conform to Ostrom’s design principles for the 
participatory development of the constitution and a learning process regarding what rules work.  
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The critical failure during this process was that most of the groups did not agree what sanctions 
they would use if members did not repay on time.  Indeed, in most of the groups the trainers 
did not actually discuss what sanctions were to be or how to enforce them. Although the 
trainers continued to visit the groups, only the FBO trainer in Rachuonyo had a systematic 
strategy of supporting enforcement.  However, when he finally stopped visiting the groups and 
doing this, the leaders reported that they did not intend to continue to follow his enforcement 
strategy.  Other trainers attended because they earned money from assisting with the share out 
calculations, but they were unwilling to get involved in actually enforcing repayment.   
The research also revealed major misappropriation cases involving the franchisee and CARE 
delivery channels themselves.  In one, the assistant trainer was able to form and join numerous 
groups, falsify records and take big loans which she did not repay, resulting in the 
misappropriation of some hundreds of thousands of shillings.  In the other case, a former 
politician used his power, influence and association with CARE as a pretext to collect yearly 
registration fees from each group that he had formed.   Although the groups did not like this 
arrangement they believed they had to pay him because as the mobiliser and initiator of the 
groups he was entitled to his fees.   
This revealed that, despite being direct towards the groups of the ‘best’ trainers, differences in 
institutionalisation were explained partly by the characteristics of the trainers and delivery 
channels.  The age, education and social status of the trainers appeared to be important in the 
way they undertook their tasks and, the different values and oversight mechanisms of the 
delivery channels.  The franchisee channel which involved the local politician had deployed – 
indeed institutionalised - the methodology into an existing set of patron-client relationships.  By 
contrast, the structure of the FBO channel with a committee overseeing the trainers appeared 
to offer better oversight and ensure that the SG methodology was more closely followed.   
Additionally several norms were identified  that made the institutionalisation of SG rules 
difficult.   There was, first  a norm of fairness that all members – (including those who had not 
paid in time) should receive their profit, and second that kin cannot be excluded from joining 
groups   Third, the norm of “sympathy” and fourth, the norm of open ended loans were linked 
to each other.  The norm of sympathy meant that loan repayment was not enforced as long as 
people “were willing to repay”. And as long as people did not run away from groups, other 
members considered that they were willing to pay.   The norm of open ended loans in turn 
meant that people were not  repaying  until the group knocked on their door.   Fifth, in the 
Kenyan cultural context paying for services is a norm, be it for the police or the chief or for an 
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indigenous ASCA manager that charges “registration fees” in the beginning of each cycle.  In this 
context therefore, it was straightforward for a delivery channel manager  to impose such fees. 
These norms appeared to be similar between the two ethnicities 
Beyond examining the role of the training and delivery channels, the research examined the 
internal dynamics of groups to investigate to what extent and how the rules had been adopted 
internally.  Chapter seven gave a quite bleak picture of the ability of the groups, especially their 
leaders, to institutionalise the rules.  In fact, it was the leaders who were responsible for default 
and misappropriation cases in practically all cases in the more successful groups in the smaller 
sample of eight groups that were studied in depth. The research found that group members had 
on the whole understood the rules to an extent that they could see when they were not being 
followed.   And in several of them, this realization led some members to react against their 
leaders.  However, the suspicion led to a change of leaders in several groups, but in most of the 
cases the default and misappropriation cases were not resolved.  In fact, in only one of the 
groups did the SG methodology directly contribute to effectively sorting out the issues.  The 
analysis revealed that these difficulties of changing leaders were strongest where leaders had 
recruited their relatives into the groups, indicating the importance of kinship loyalties in 
preventing such changes.  On the other hand, where group recruitment was more diversified it 
appeared easier to remove leaders.  
In the cases where there were challenges to, and changes of leadership, it was evident that the 
dynamics of social relations were diverse.  Apart from the role of kinship, social status outside of 
the group and age seniority appeared to play a role in power dynamics which trumped gender.  
Hence, where younger male group members challenged their older female kin who were 
leaders, they were not successful.  On the other hand where male leaders took over from 
women, they usually had important positions outside of the group that facilitated this.    
The analysis on internal group dynamics therefore demonstrates that, although the 
methodology provided the members with some tools that showed them that there were 
reasons to be suspicious, in the context of social relationships of kin, gender, age and social 
status, it alone was insufficient to ensure that breaches of rules could lead to leaders being 
removed and default and misappropriation cases resolved.  Indeed, this in depth evidence 
revealed that none of these dimensions was clear cut in terms of how they played out and also 
helps explain why the quantitative results in Chapter five did not reveal clear patterns of 
performance that were correlated with aspects of social relations.  
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Indeed, in the brief review of the Kenyan political economy provided in Chapter four, it was 
shown that patronage politics has led to the situation where the more powerful negotiate or 
manipulate access to resources as part of their leadership roles.  Clients take part in this system, 
because they hope to receive some small reward.   In this investigation this behaviour was most 
evident in the case of Bosire and to a lesser degree by group leaders who could take advantage 
of their positions to exploit the resources available to them.   Some of the groups nevertheless 
continued, and leaders were differently adept at concealing their benefits while members were 
able to continue to get loans and receive some profit.   Indeed it was found that the announcing 
of the group fund was dropped although individual savings, loans and repayment continued to 
be announced in many groups.  Hence the distributional consequences of this behaviour were 
not necessarily evident to members.  This suggests a kind of “equilibrium” within this “parasitic” 
behaviour such that there was a lack of concern about the overall distribution of resources, as 
long as the members saw that they individually received some benefit.  A situation that seems 
to reflect aspects of the political economy of Kenya more broadly, such that it is only when 
these are extreme that attempts to disrupt them come about.   So that even in cases where 
groups continue their operation, this did not mean that they had effectively institutionalised a 
transparent and accountable set of rules and procedures. 
 
9.3. Institutional change theories and the SG methodology 
 
The analysis employed three institutional theories in order to assess the way in which the SG 
methodology was operating in practice.  Given the high level of abstraction of most institutional 
theory, Ostrom’s framework for analysing collective action situations was employed in order to 
give a more detailed structure of rules through which the analysis could proceed.   The gradual 
institutional change theory of Mahoney and Thelen was applied, and the insights that Boettke 
et al’s theorem were examined.  However, the empirical findings of Chapter 6 highlighted the 
very particular roles of the trainers in implementing the methodology which neither of these 
theories was able to accommodate.  I therefore turned to the actor-oriented sociology of Mosse 
on brokering and translation as a means of examining these aspects in greater depth.  
First, Ostrom’s adapted rules categories highlighted the gaps in the SG methodology, the most 
critical being the failure to address how to ensure that loans are repaid on time.  Further, her 
design principles of participation, monitoring, enforcement of sanctions and conflict resolution 
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were laxly introduced and implemented, which hence explains the overall low level of 
institutionalisation.  However, the design principles were unable to elucidate whether there was 
large variation in the institutionalisation of the rules. The findings indicate that the trainers’ role 
was critical in the way the rules were institutionalised.  Consequently, since Ostrom’s 
framework does not focus on external intervention or on the power relations between the 
trainers and groups or those regarding leaders and members it is not able to explain the 
different levels of institutionalisation achieved. Finally, Ostrom’s framework does not 
accommodate kinship and local norms that according to the findings also help to provide 
understanding in relation to the variation in institutionalisation of the rules.  
Second, drawing on Mahoney and Thelen’s work, I developed a modified framework to identify 
power relations that had an impact on rule institutionalisation:  specifically the veto power of 
the trainers and the leaders, while also suggesting that institutionalisation in this case was in 
fact about moving from a high level of discretion to a lower level.  Through this it was able to 
show how there were trainers who through training and monitoring moved the groups from a 
high level of discretion (low level of rule following) to a low one. However, there were also the 
counter dynamics of veto power exercised by other trainers and some group leaders to move 
things in the opposite direction. Moreover, according to Mahoney and Thelen, 
institutionalisation can take place where there are gaps in compliance. However, these gaps in 
the SG methodology included, for example, when and how to enforce repayment or how to 
perform the share-out calculations and rather than this resulting in new rules 
institutionalisation it led to the maintaining of the status quo in most cases.  Moreover, these 
gaps were the areas where most of variation was found.  However, this variation in most of the 
cases meant that the groups returned to the rules that had pre-existed the SG, i.e. to the 
indigenous ASCA situation, which fundamentally meant they were not changed. 
In line with Ostrom, Mahoney and Thelen do not theorize about external intervention. 
However, Boettke et al. do so, pointing out how attempts are made from outside to introduce 
new rules in order to achieve higher levels of transparency and accountability.   The proponents 
of this theory also emphasize the need for a balance between the external and local.  The 
categories of the theorem help to explain how the SG methodology allowed for a balance to be 
struck between endogenous rules (similar rules as in indigenous ASCAs)  and exogenous one 
that were indigenously introduced by community trainers. However, Boettke et al.’s theorem 
does not cater for the cultural aspect in any depth and hence, cannot account for the finding 
that the key drivers of group dynamics were the social relations of kinship and social status.  
Kinship, in turn, involved a range of norms in relation to how to treat the relatives and to ensure 
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that they were included in the groups.  Moreover, the power of the leaders was derived from 
social status, gender and age, which also influenced whether and if so, how rules were 
institutionalised.  
Finally, I turned to Mosse’s actor-oriented approach on brokering and translating to examine 
the role of the trainers in greater depth.  This helped to explain that the variation in 
institutionalisation of rules was due to the very different ways in which the trainers brokered 
relationships and translated the rules to apply the methodology in practice.  The analysis 
highlighted two extremes – a style of “mis-translation” that was more akin to the pathological 
brokering of previous brokering analysis, in contrast to the rather more successful or 
“enhanced” brokering which produced much better financial performance outcomes.  Never the 
less, even this enhanced brokering style appeared to be unsustainable in the longer term and 
did not fully operationalize the more transformatory participatory approach discussed above.  
Further, the remaining two trainers appeared to operate more in line with the analysis of the 
literature of “street level bureaucrats” in which they are at pains not to move outside of 
accepted norms and values as they have to continue to work and live in their communities.   
 
9.4. Development interventions as institutional change 
 
The SG methodology is an example of a development intervention in which NGOs or change 
agents seek to improve the way indigenous systems of management or governance operate.  At 
the national level, policy reform around the management and governance of public services for 
example has been extensively reviewed (for example Grindle 2007; Grindle and Thomas 1991) 
and it is at this national or sectoral level that institutional change theories have tended to be 
applied (see Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).   This study has applied the analysis of institutional 
change at the level of a micro-level intervention rather than at the wider more national level of 
institutional change that it has been more generally deployed, however, as a case study it 
suggests a number of gaps and ways in which research in this area might proceed.  First, in its 
discussion of institutional change theories in relation to SGs, the thesis has made a number of 
points in Chapters two and eight about the way that these theories relate to analysing a 
development intervention.  I have pointed out that each of the theories addresses some aspects 
of the puzzle while neglecting others.  This section discusses both the contributions these 
theories offer and the analytical gaps that this research has identified which require further 
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development of the theory.   Ostrom’s focus on rules and design principles offered an important 
starting point for the analysis, and the key contributions of institutional change theories were 
the recognition of political power dynamics in the theory of Mahoney and Thelen; and of culture 
and the dynamics of external intervention in the theory of Boettke et al..  But the analysis has 
demonstrated gaps: first, the need for a more systematic approach to incorporating the role of 
social norms and embeddedness; and second, the need for a much more nuanced theorizing of 
the role of external intervention.  
The findings indicate that social embeddedness in the form of social and power relations,  local 
norms and culture were critical for the institutionalisation of the rules. Social relations of 
different forms: kin, gender, age, social status had a critical impact on the institutionalisation of 
rules by affecting relationships between trainers and members and among members 
themselves.  
However, the different institutional theories do not incorporate these deep aspects of 
institutions that Williamson (2000) calls the embeddedness level. Whilst Ostrom’s framework 
does identify “attributes of community” these attributes remain little investigated and remain 
something of a black box for her.  While Boettke et al. identify culture as important; they go no 
further in identifying its dimensions, which this evidence suggests would indeed need to be 
widened to include dynamics of social relations.  In this regard Boettke et al.’s theorem provides 
concepts only at a very high level of abstraction which cannot be operationalised and hence, 
empirically investigated.   
Indeed, while Boettke’s theorem notes that institutions that are very close to ”metis” or culture 
are most likely to “stick” and institutions that are ”foreign” are least likely to (FEX),  as Goodwin-
Groen  (2012) notes, the predictive power of the theorem is very weak in the middle ground 
between these two extremes.  In many cases of institutional change – and especially in the 
context of development interventions - there are indeed both endogenous and exogenous 
aspects as well as foreign and indigenous introduction.  However, Boettke’s (2008) theorem is 
not able to provide any guidance how to judge the conditions under which changes might be 
more inclined to stick.  
Further, this leads to the second issue of the role of external intervention.  It is not simply the 
SG rules that are in some sense ”exogenous” but that they were introduced through an  
exogenous  or foreign process – i.e. by an external intervener, the NGO.  The NGO sought to use 
a chain of actors to implement the SG methodology with local groups, which meant that success 
was dependent not only whether rules were “exogenous” or “endogenous” but very much  on 
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the dynamics of intervention between the CARE’s national level office, regional office, field 
offices, delivery channels, trainers and finally groups.  In this context Boettke et al.’s theorem 
looks rather simplistic compared to Mosse’s perspective on how processes of brokering and 
translating an intervention into practice might in fact take place.  According to Boettke et al., if 
the rules are foreign, they necessarily are not likely to stick while Mosse’s analysis attempts to 
understand how actors in development projects do in fact enable such boundaries to be crossed 
by bridging the gaps between the intervention and local social dynamics and meanings.  In this 
analysis, I have considered how processes of brokering and translation may in fact be highly 
individualized with some being rather more successful than others.  While this detailed 
examination of the way different field workers operated was not the focus of Mosse’s approach 
to examining the construction of success by a development project, this analysis does suggest 
that it is also necessary to recognize the potential for there to be highly divergent styles of 
brokering and translation and suggests a further arena to consider in the operation of 
development interventions.  While it could be viewed that this was the result of the way the 
incentive structures of the project interacted with the design of delivery channel (NGO; FBO and 
private sector), the evidence of significant variation does indicate that the values and 
organizational structures involved matter and need to be studied. 
As has been discussed, Mahoney and Thelen’s framework offers an approach to directly 
addressing the relative power of agents affected by processes of change.  This analysis has 
developed this framework to identify the role of the change agents or external intervention in 
this process, by suggesting that they can play a positive veto role and not only a negative one.  
This approach is therefore a further way in which this theory could be extended in order to 
address the role of external intervention.   
In summary, these theories offer useful tools for the analysis of the dynamics of development 
interventions but their dimensions need to be extended and brought together to provide a 
more thorough approach to analysis.   
 
9.5. Reflections on the research methodology 
 
The study adopted a mixed methods approach within a critical realist methodology 
incorporating a realist ontology and interpretivist epistemology.  This has allowed the study to 
investigate both the dynamics of financial performance and its potential determinants while 
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also recognizing the role of underlying social structures and the importance of meanings and 
values, and how actors understandings influence outcomes.   
A longitudinal research methodology was essential for this type of study, for in addition to it 
allowing for the capturing of change over time it also served other functions, such as building 
trust with the groups and gradually uncovering the reality of default and misappropriation.   
There are few, if any, independent studies of SGs to date that have engaged with groups over 
such a period in order to understand their dynamics and sustainability.  The repeated visits also 
enabled us to gradually distance ourselves from the intervening organization through which we 
had initially had to negotiate access.  It was in these later visits that the cases of default and 
misappropriation cases came to light as the group members became more willing to talk openly 
about what had happened.   Further, this familiarity meant that we were able to observe 
meetings that we attended without this being pre-arranged and gave valuable insights on their 
operations in practice. However, as reported it was this direct access that was not appreciated 
by the franchisee owner and led to us being reported to the NGO as asking only, as she put it, 
“negative” questions about the groups. 
The importance of collecting financial information directly from the groups became more 
evident as the enquiry proceeded.  As discussed in Chapter one, studies on savings groups or 
ROSCAs and ASCAs usually involve undertaking either quantitative or qualitative analysis, but 
rarely both.  Research that uses quantitative data also often draws this from secondary sources, 
such as the records of the NGOs and now from online repositories of NGO data such as SAVIX82 
and assumes that these data are reliable.  However the findings from the current study have 
shown that there was a substantial difference between the data from the organization’s own 
management information system and those which we collected.  This underlines the 
importance of deep engagement to uncover the reality of how money is managed in practice.  
As for the weaknesses of the research, arguably a long term ethnographic study would have 
enabled observation of the initial mobilisation and training of some of the newly formed groups,  
as well as revealed more about the internal dynamics among group members and how these 
played out over time between members.  However, such ethnographic fieldwork would have 
required substantially more time and resources than were available for the study and it would 
also likely have meant that it focused on one area rather than two.  The advantage of the 
approach adopted was that it allowed for investigation of 24 groups, a significantly larger 
sample over a bigger area than an ethnographic study might have covered.  Moreover, although 
                                                          
82
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a larger quantitative study would have allowed for generalization, it would not have provided 
rich robust qualitative data that showed how the SGs have been operating, as has been 
achieved in this research. In sum, the mixed method approach has allowed a more 
comprehensive perspective by providing data for cross-validation which a choice of 
ethnographic or quantitative study alone would not have offered.   
 
9.6.  Implications for SG policy and practice  
 
The SG methodology has been developed to be a low cost approach to providing a basic form of 
financial intermediation that is anticipated to be sustainable over the long term.  It involves an 
intervention of relatively short duration - a year – which is intended to institutionalise a set of 
rules that upgrades the existing ASCA model.  However, the findings have shown that 
institutionalising these rules which involves “institutionalising suspicion” is no easy matter. 
Institutionalising suspicion is difficult, because when an external intervener attempts to bring in 
new rules it is confronted by underlying norms and social relations of kinship, gender, age and 
status that are the cause of inequitable dynamics in the first place.  The research has shown that 
the new rules were subject to attrition over time with the groups tending to return to using 
rules and norms with which they are more familiar.  From the point of view of the policy makers 
the failure rate was actually quite high even for groups trained by those trainers thought to be 
providing the highest quality by the NGO.   Some 20% of the groups were no longer operational 
by the end of the field research indicating complete failure, and in over 80% of the groups the 
members  did not get as much profit as they should have or did not get back all their savings  
due to default and misappropriation.  This evidence therefore throws considerable doubt on the 
success of the intervention as a whole and suggests that the sustainability of groups in adopting 
the rules over time is likely to be subject to similar processes of attrition.   
In this thesis, I have considered this methodology not primarily in terms of the extent to which it 
provides savings and credit services, - though the assessment of this has also been made - but 
considered its primary purpose as seeking to develop a system of financial intermediation which 
would reduce the likelihood of problems associated with indigenous ROSCA and ASCA 
technologies and upgrade these groups to provide safer and securer services through the 
institutionalisation of a set of rules.  With this understanding of the objective, the analysis has 
shown that implementers need to pay considerably more attention to how this can actually be 
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achieved.  This approach needs to include an understanding of  both the social dynamics within 
groups and between delivery channels and groups. The findings attest to the somewhat 
technocratic orientation and “cookie cutter” style of approach to the intervention through  the 
introduction of a box with keys, defined roles for leaders, the introduction of passbooks and 
ledgers, and training on a set of rules.     
Ostrom’s assessment of rules underlines the gaps in the methodology as it stands.  In particular 
it has shown that there is a gap around the way that trainers discuss sanctions and enforcement 
and support groups to implement these.   Also around responsibility for monitoring and the 
need for greater discussion about the options for resolving conflict within the groups, once they 
have to resolve matters on their own.  Beyond these gaps, Ostrom’s first design principle of 
participation is critical.  It is clear that the way the methodology is introduced does little to 
enable the members to genuinely participate in the crafting of rules, which she points out needs 
to be a process of learning about what works.   Indeed, this fits with the findings of an extensive 
range of development literature on the need for participation in development interventions to 
be transformatory in the way they engage rather than nominal or instrumental  (White 1996). It 
is clear that the current approach is mainly nominal and that a transformatory approach would 
involve group members being involved in crafting the rules, testing them, reviewing them and 
modifying them, then embarking on a further cycle of testing. Through this process a 
transformatory style of participation would lead to learning about when certain rules work and 
others do not and to a greater ownership of the process.    
However, it is important to recognize that implementation is never going to be perfect!  While 
discussing how to transform governance structures, Grindle  (2007) points out how challenging 
this is and hence that  “good enough governance” should be the aim rather than ”best 
practice”.  Similarly, in this context it is important to ask what “good enough governance” might 
look like in the context of SGs.  It might be unrealistic to expect all groups to function with 
complete fairness in contexts where kinship and local power relations prevail. The question is 
therefore what a minimum floor of operation might be which needs to be achieved to ensure a 
sufficiently fair distribution of the benefits.  This thesis has identified a situation in some groups 
where a kind of equilibrium has been achieved in which leaders benefit more than members but 
in which members do not lose out.  Further examination of this dynamic needs to be 
undertaken, and consideration given to what it might mean for assessing a minimum standard 
of financial intermediation. 
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A further finding was regarding the relationship between the trainers and delivery channel 
intermediaries and the groups.  First, it became evident that trainers who lived in the 
communities continued to have a relationship with the groups and in most cases continued to 
benefit from this by providing a service and being paid at share-out for doing this.  It was shown 
that they also had opportunities to take advantage of the way the intervention works either to 
charge fees, become members of groups giving them access to multiple loan sources or 
misappropriate funds as group leaders.  It showed the influence of the trainers and the desire of 
members to continue to stay linked to them, often because they are seen as the link to 
potential future sources of NGO and other support as these trainers and intermediaries clearly 
have these social connections.  As also shown, in one case, a group wanted to be autonomous, 
but a trainer was deliberately not enabling the group to undertake its own share-out .  This 
therefore reveals the problematic nature of these relationships and again the way power is held 
and used to benefit.   In Kenya, SG interventions are now considering how to enable trainers to 
form networks and continue to provide support services after the NGO has ended the project.  
The research shows that in taking this route careful attention needs to be paid to the dynamics 
of these relationships if institutionalisation of autonomous working is indeed the objective. 
Indeed, the research has shown how the delivery channels and trainers were influenced by the 
values underpinning the delivery channels themselves. When selecting the different delivery 
channels, CARE was in essence choosing a set of values that either supported this process or 
undermined it.  What is clear is that the incentives provided within the private sector 
operations, namely the franchisee channel, were counterproductive especially because they 
operated in a system where there was no impartial oversight or regulation.  On the other hand, 
although the regulation that the FBO channel provided was mostly informal, the underpinning 
values, namely those of the church, led to the new rules making at least some impact.    Hence 
the different delivery channels should be assessed not only on the potential number of groups 
they can form, but also on the permanence and values of the institution as well as the oversight 
structures. 
The evidence has also shown the variation in results arising from the differences between 
trainers themselves and their styles of brokering and translating.  This highlights the need to 
take into consideration how the age, educational background and status of trainers impacts on 
how they are able to broker and translate the methodology into practice.  Indeed, the analysis 
suggests that the greatest success was where the trainer had a strong understanding and values 
oriented to ensuring the methodology would work, even where he was clear that people would 
not like this although in the longer term even this was insufficient to bring about loan 
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repayment enforcement.   This demonstrates just how challenging the role of the trainers is in 
working against underlying social relations and norms.  The importance of a transformatory 
approach to participation is to ensure that this is not the role of the trainer alone but is in fact 
institutionalised into the way the intervention itself is implemented.  
However, there is another possibility here.  The experience of MFOs has been of the need to 
find strategies to enforce repayment and group members are often looking for this assistance 
from an external agent.  Indeed, as the evidence has shown they do not wish to upset their 
relatives by having to force them to repay.  This fits with the experience of another ASCA 
programme in Central Kenya in which this was a key role of the ASCA manager  (Johnson et al. 
2002b).   Consequently, an alternative is to deliberately organize this ongoing role and to set up 
delivery channels that stay in the area so that the groups can invite them whenever they need 
assistance.  However, the terms on which the trainers help the groups should be communicated 
by the implementing organization, not by the delivery channel or the by the trainers 
themselves, and with due regard to supervision in order to limit opportunities for 
misappropriation. 
In sum, this evidence has shown that the SG methodology does not provide a simple or 
straightforward approach to providing basic and sustainable financial intermediation that can 
be treated as a “cookie cutter” for the purposes of achieving scale at low cost.   The 
institutionalisation of rules is a slow and difficult process that can be improved through the 
different strategies suggested above, but the idea of the intervention that a year of training is 
sufficient without either a transformatory participative approach or ongoing support is clearly 
overly ambitious.  Moreover, the dynamics of the intervention revealed here are not dissimilar 
to those of development interventions in other contexts such as Bangladesh, whether 
microfinance or empowerment more broadly (e.g. Devine 2003; McGregor 1994). This section 
has suggested ways in which the intervention could be revised to take into account the findings 
of this study and to tackle the real difficulties and dynamics involved in “institutionalising 
suspicion” that will inevitably arise across a range of socio-cultural and political contexts.   
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